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Abstract 
 
 
 
Being Toward Birth: Natality and Nature in Merleau-Ponty 
 
By Kascha Snavely 
 
 
This dissertation articulates Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature in relation to the existential 
condition of “natality,” as defined by Arendt.  Where Heidegger emphasizes mortality in his 
post-metaphysical ontology, these investigations follow Merleau-Ponty and Arendt who 
emphasize that humans are not only mortals but “natals,” beings who begin.  The project has a 
twofold aim: 1. to present an exegesis of Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre with a special emphasis on the 
Nature Courses and 2. to sketch out a natal ontology in its own right.  This ontology depends on 
Merleau-Ponty’s methodological advancement beyond genetic phenomenology to generative and 
“poetic” phenomenology, a practice that incorporates historicity and expressivity.  He offers a 
critique of science, particularly of evolutionary biology, that is shown to be relevant in a 
contemporary context.  His natal ontology co-emerges with an ethical standpoint; he shows that a 
natural prereflective relation to a plurality of others, rather than only a single other, 
fundamentally conditions human existence.  In a natal ontology, knowledge depends on being 
born with others, through a co-naissance of one’s worldly situation.   
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Introduction: Of Being Numerous 
 
“Shipwrecked by the singular 
  We have chosen the meaning  
  Of being numerous” 
 – George Oppen 
 
Natals and Plurals: Toward a Natal Ontology through Merleau-Ponty 
 We are not born alone, nor do we live alone.  That will be basic assertion of this 
project.  This is not a novel suggestion. But it is one that I would like to situate in a 
particular philosophical history.  According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this history is for 
the most part a Cartesian history.  In his courses on nature, Merleau-Ponty describes how 
the Cartesian project marks a certain origin of modern and contemporary thought on 
being and nature and, perhaps more importantly, the beginning of a method for 
approaching the origin of one’s self and other selves.  Following Merleau-Ponty, let us 
return to that beginning.   
 In his famed Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes reflects on his origin, 
reinitiating philosophy as a sort of naval-gazing: philosophy as reflection, as a turn 
toward interiority.  Descartes considers his origins, but he considers these origins without 
regard to his exterior.  Descartes ask himself: “From what source, then, do I derive my 
existence? Why, from myself or from my parents, or from whatever other things there are 
there are that are less perfect that God” (32).  Initially, it seems to Descartes that his 
parents caused him: he recognizes that his parents brought him into the world.  Yet this 
moment of appearing in the world does not satisfy Descartes’s quest for his origins.  
Parents, human lineage, and generation do not define sense of origin that Descartes 
intends; behind particular parents must lie an infinite series of other parents, and other 
causes that began these other people (Descartes 34).  In order to escape this evident 
infinite regress, Descartes returns to the classical Scholastic postulation of a metaphysical 
God as the absolute site and source.  This God not only sets in motion the chain of events 
leading to Descartes’s birth, but also preserves Descartes’s and others existences 
(Descartes 34).  In the third of his Meditations, Descartes proves God and thereby shows 
himself that he is “not alone in the world” (Descartes 29).  Locked in his interiority, 
withdrawn from his senses, without flesh, Descartes required a metaphysical God to 
secure him access to the world and to company in that world. 
 But if, following Merleau-Ponty and his phenomenological contemporaries, we 
abandon the Cartesian appeal to metaphysics as the absolute origin, then we find 
ourselves in a post-metaphysical era searching for our origins.  No longer does an appeal 
to classical formulations of God, the soul or freedom suffice to describe either our 
beginnings or our aims in life.  With the end of metaphysics, philosophy no longer poses 
the question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”  Instead, we look at where 
we stand in relation to that question, to its appearance in our tradition.  We might then, as 
Heidegger suggests, ask instead, “How does it stand with being?” (Introduction to 
Metaphysics 27)  Or, how is being disclosed?  That is, how is being for the one who 
poses the questions? Heidegger offers these alternatives to traditional metaphysical 
questions which cannot address the phenomena of life’s appearance for us.  For 
Heidegger in Being and Time, being discloses itself to the mortal being, to Da-sein.  It is 
the human condition of mortality that first and foremost discloses being.  This 
Heideggerian turn follows a long philosophical tradition, perhaps first instantiated with 
Plato’s record of Socrates’s death in the Phaedo, persisting through Kierkegaard’s double 
2 
 
emphasis on selfhood and fear of death, and continuing into Heidegger’s own work 
which emphasizes mortality over natality.  Provocative and formative as this revelation of 
existence in relation to mortality has been, such phenomenology risks preemptively 
foreclosing and overlooking the very phenomenal appearance of life in birth.  
 In this project, I repose Heidegger’s question and consider another post-
metaphysical response, one oriented toward beginnings.  This response is suggested by 
the work of Heidegger’s contemporaries, Hannah Arendt and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  
Perhaps death is not the phenomenological event par excellence as Heidegger implies 
(Dastur 183).  Perhaps birth, perhaps natality not mortality, discloses being.  As 
Heidegger would no doubt affirm, death eludes experience: “One could say that death is 
the event par excellence, except that it is never present, it never presently happens. It does 
not open up a world, but rather closes it forever” (Dastur 183).  After death, I cannot 
reflect on death in this world; after birth, I can reflect on the ramifications of that event, if 
not the event itself.  Given this non-appearance of death, perhaps phenomenology might 
pursue birth rather than death as the paradigmatic event, bearing witness in 
phenomenological reflection to the opening and initiating of worlds.  
 If we begin a philosophical meditation on Heidegger’s question but without 
Descartes’s rejection of exteriority and flesh, we see new possibilities.  We ask similar 
and related questions: When did we, and do we begin?  Do I begin or do we begin?  Do I 
begin with my own birth?  If I give birth, when does the other person begin and when 
does the child cease to be a part of me?  Yet the answers to these questions differ 
profoundly when we admit our exteriority – our corporeality, our visibility – into 
consideration.  We notice a certain fragility and passivity inherent to corporeality; we 
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note that while we begin, we cannot do so with absolute agency and freedom as the 
Cartesian subject might.  I might ask, when I begin an action, how much of it actually 
originates in me?  I notice that in my natality, I am motivated and caught in a momentum 
of existence.  When we attend to our exteriority and corporeality, we also find that this 
momentum and flesh indicates that we are not alone as we act.  When we gaze at our 
navel, we see our navel: We see the mark in our flesh of our connection to other bodies.  
We see a literal reminder of what Merleau-Ponty calls our “umbilical bond” to being (VI 
107).  
 Hannah Arendt found birth to be the paradigmatic phenomenological event for the 
political philosophy described in the Human Condition (HC 9).  As she puts it in the Life 
of the Mind, Arendt suggests that we think of ourselves as “natals” as well as mortals (2 
109).  In the Human Condition Arendt argues that humans distinguish themselves as 
beings who begin: “With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the 
world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom 
was created when man was created but now before” (HC 17).  Our human actions, far 
from passive effects, initiate new and unpredictable trajectories of movements, events, 
and thoughts.  
 Arendt’s description of human being in terms of natality contrasts sharply with 
that of her eminent teacher Heidegger who shaped post-metaphysical phenomenology 
and ontology.  Their agreement in rejecting anthropology and “human nature” as a 
philosophical category notwithstanding, there are important differences between these 
two thinkers – indeed between the natal and mortal approaches to phenomenology and 
ontology – in their assessment of the etymological origins of “nature.”  Heidegger prefers 
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the Greek, physis, to the Latin natura, which means “‘to be born,’ ‘birth’”(Introduction to 
Metaphysics 11).  For Heidegger “physis,” roughly translated as “growing,” appears 
everywhere, from the rising of the sun to the growth of plants or humans, and all “Roman 
translations” mar the authentic Greek philosophical perspective (Introduction to 
Metaphysics 12).  Arendt, by contrast, values the Latin etymology: the Romans were the 
most respectable of people, the people who knew that to be alive as a person was “to live 
among men” and to die was “to cease to be among men” (HC 7-8).  Like many of her 
contemporaries – including Sartre, Beauvoir, and Heidegger himself – Arendt rejects a 
metaphysical account of “human nature” as the ground of philosophy, but she 
nonetheless emphasizes the Latin etymology of natality in natus.  This significance of 
this choice is twofold: first, natus directs us toward natality, and second, Arendt thereby 
allies her ontology with a political people and emphasizes life as properly lived, like the 
Romans, among other people.  Human life which is fullest in its most political expression 
cannot be understood as mere “physis,” mere being in contrast to non-being.  The birth of 
a human differs profoundly from the natural processes surrounding it because it initiates 
new, unpredictable actions.  As capable of initiation in its rich Augustian sense, we might 
define persons “not, like the Greeks, as mortals, but as ‘natals’” (LM 2 109).   
 Merleau-Ponty has a similar preference for the Latin etymology of nature, yet for 
reasons all his own.  For Merleau-Ponty, to be a human life is to be natus, born (NC 3).  
Human life originates from birth; this origin links it to other animal life, without reducing 
human to animal life.  In the words of Michel Henry, “Coming into being, is a fact for all 
being, of stone, of air, of water … neither being born nor dying except metaphorically.  
Birth is a quality of life and life alone” (“Phénoménologie de la naissance” 124, my 
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translation1).  In this turn toward a view of human life as born, Merleau-Ponty unlike 
Sartre or De Beauvoir2 commits himself to the attempt – unexpected in a post-
metaphysical and post-humanist discourse –to admitting human nature in 
phenomenological discourse.  Where Heidegger’s ontology considers being itself with 
attention to its mortal end, Arendt and Merleau-Ponty suggest an alternative ontology: a 
natal ontology that emphasizes human being as born and as beginning. Merleau-Ponty 
alone suggests that this ontology might make recourse to a study of nature.  
 We find this intention at the core of Merleau-Ponty’s well-known work on 
perception.  Summarizing it in a talk given at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty 
writes:  “The perceiving subject is not this absolute thinker; rather, it functions according 
to a natal pact between our body and the world, between ourselves and our body” (PrimP 
6). In this passage, Merleau-Ponty defines the perceiving subject through a natal pact.  
Let us take this passage on its own terms: Merleau-Ponty argues that subjectivity 
“functions according to” this pact which itself occurs between “our body, ourselves.”  It 
seems that, in short, natal being is best understood in this mode of the first person plural.   
The natal pact therefore occurs not between an isolated subjectivity and another 
subjectivity, nor even between one subject and one world, but between bodies and world.  
In that sense, for Merleau-Ponty, perceiving happens according to a latent pact inherent 
to natality, a natality always situated in a plurality of selves and bodies.  For Merleau-
Ponty as for Arendt, the state of natality is an ongoing condition, not a moment or event 
                                                 
1 The original reads as follows: “Venir à l’être, c’est le fait de tout étant, de la pierre, de l’air, de l’eau, et 
pourtant aucune de ces choses ne procède d’une naissance, ne naît ni ne meurt sinon métaphoriquement.” 
Note that in French “coming into the world” – literally “venir au monde” – is a synonym for birth.  It is 
worth nothing that although Henry discusses naissance and connaissance, he addresses neither the work of 
Merleau-Ponty nor that of Claudel from whom Merleau-Ponty takes his playful emphasis on co-naissance. 
2 Bonnie Mann has suggested that de Beauvoir may likewise be read as incorporating nature and 
naturalness into phenomenological discourse.  (See “Beauvoir and the Question of a Woman’s Point of 
View.”) 
6 
 
equivalent to birth: the incarnate, natal subject renews its natality with each action.  
Unpredictable and yet promising in its liveliness, the natal is “like a new language; we do 
not know what works it will accomplish, but only that, once it has appeared, it cannot fail 
to say little or much, to have a history and a meaning” (PrimP 6).  Natal life is not 
predictable and yet it promises meaning.  It does not promise just any meaning, but a 
meaning dependent on the contingencies of its situation.  Natals are born with a world 
and with others and cannot be understood outside of this situation.  Yet this situatedness – 
between bodies, selves, and world – constitutes the natal’s very freedom.  Merleau-Ponty 
writes: “The very productivity or freedom of human life, far from denying our situation, 
utilizes it and turns it into a means of expression” (PrimP 6).  
 The natal is free, productive, and situated in relation to a plurality of bodies and 
selves in the contingencies of the world. For both Arendt and Merleau-Ponty, an ontology 
that turns toward natality equally turns toward plurality.  In thinking of ourselves as 
natals, we might then equally think of ourselves as “plurals.”  For Arendt, plurality is the 
condition of human action (HC 8).  Merleau-Ponty agrees and in his work we see a 
similar simultaneous reorientation toward both of these conditions.  In particular, he 
shows this in regard to knowledge: to know is originally to be born into a knowing with 
others, into co-naissance of one’s worldly situation.  This is apparent as early as the 
Structure of Behavior, where knowing is best understood as connaissance: a knowing 
through familiarity, like the knowledge we have of people and as people, of their 
comportement.  For Merleau-Ponty, as for Paul Claudel, “Toute naissance est une 
connaissance” (L’Art Poétique 149): all knowing is co-knowing, a co-existing, emerging 
from birth.  We are born into a world already full of beings like ourselves; we give birth 
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to others like and yet unlike ourselves. Acting in concert, we initiate projects, and we 
speak, across differences, to those who can understand our speech.  
 Arendt explicitly identifies natality and being natal as definitive of the human 
condition.  In Merleau-Ponty’s work, by contrast, natality, birth, pregnancy, and related 
themes are frequent tropes, but not explicitly declared to be constitutive of his ontology.  
Merleau-Ponty offers no evidence that he had read Arendt’s work, although she had read 
his by the end of their lives; I remark on a similarity in their responses to their 
philosophical and historically situation but do not recount an active exchange between 
these two thinkers.  Nonetheless, I argue in this project that when clarified by the 
terminology defined by Arendt, Merleau-Ponty’s work expresses a natal ontology rooted 
in a phenomenology of nature and human naturalness.  As Arendt herself stresses, she is 
primarily a political thinker; if a philosopher, she would be a political philosopher, rather 
than an ontologist or a phenomenologist per se, however much she may contribute the 
latter fields.   In the context of her political project, however, Arendt did identify natality 
as a domain of study for phenomenology, a phenomenology that Merleau-Ponty himself 
began to perform.  I argue that phenomenology is still in need of investigations that 
complement our appreciation of mortality with a study of plurality and natality and that 
the resources to develop such a phenomenology and ontology are found in Merleau-
Ponty’s oeuvre.   
 
 The aim of this investigation is thus twofold: to present an exegesis of Merleau-
Ponty’s oeuvre in terms of natality with a special emphasis on the Nature Courses and to 
sketch out a natal ontology in its own right, taking a cue from Arendt’s work and 
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developing it through Merleau-Ponty.  I require both their work to establish this ontology: 
Arendt for her emphasis on difference and the political and Merleau-Ponty for his 
discussion of nature and the atmosphere of humanity that conditions existence.  I use 
Arendt’s work to highlights the theme of plurality in Merleau-Ponty’s work, yet I also 
depart from Arendt, in shifting the emphasis and concerns of a natal ontology toward the 
issue of nature.  In particular, I am interested in how natality directs existential 
phenomenology to our natural prereflective orientation to a plurality.  I will try to 
elucidate just one mysterious claim that he makes in the précis of his work, given at the 
Collège de France (See PrimP).  He claims that, if we adopt his ontology, “there is a type 
of doubt concerning man, and a type of spite, which become impossible” (PrimP 27).  
Has Merleau-Ponty thereby suggested that his ontology entails an ethical turn or even a 
new sort of humanism?  If so, does he make this ethical stance explicit?  How can a 
phenomenology of perception lead to an ethical ontology? 
 This inquiry is, therefore, as much about “Nature” and “plurality” as about 
“natality.”  We will find that these terms are conceptually and practically inseparable, 
though not identical.  This, moreover, is true not only in the work of Merleau-Ponty and 
Arendt but of human experience itself.  Human experience is conditioned by an 
orientation toward others: not an Other, but others in general and in the plural.  In the 
following pages, I approach our situation in such a plurality by way of the condition of 
natality.  When I speak of natality throughout this project, I refer to this complex of 
conditions, not merely to the “fact” of birth per se.  Natality here serves as a code word 
for a certain dialectical and chiasmatically complex relation to Nature and each other.  
We are both born from Nature and give birth to Nature, as we are born from others and 
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give birth to others.  We are naturally born and our sense of ourselves is born from a 
concept of Nature; at the same time, we give birth to both the concept of Nature and to 
other natural beings.  In that sense, “natality” merely serves as a concise reference for this 
complex chain/series of events.  But more importantly, speaking of “natality” ties these 
reflections on Nature to the existential phenomenological tradition.  This tradition 
understands that “mortality” refers not only to the fact of death, but a consciousness of 
that fact and the meaningful structuring of a life in relation to that fact.  Likewise, when I 
speak of human natality, I indicate these facts of birth, as well as the meaning of a life 
structured in relation to them.  
 I show how natality points “backwards” toward others and “forwards” toward 
others.  Our natality points us backwards toward our birth and to the birth of action in 
perception, and natality points forward toward projects to which we may give birth, 
forward to the expression that arises with perception.  Barbaras has described Merleau-
Ponty’s work as a rethinking of consciousness and nature by “starting from below” 
(Barbaras 3). Barbaras traces this descent in Merleau-Ponty’s thought and then postulates 
a later ascent toward the ontological in the Visible and the Invisible.  Perhaps this 
terminology of descent and ascent inserts an unnecessary and here unwanted hierarchy 
into Merleau-Ponty’s thought.  I prefer the terminology of “backwards” and “forwards,” 
hoping to avoid the impression of sequence of privilege.  This formulation echoes 
Husserl’s own “Ruckfrage” – questioning back – as the method of phenomenology.  
Rather than ascending from prereflective thought to the peak of reflective ontology, 
phenomenology must turn and return, spiraling toward its origins and toward the very 
question of what constitutes “origin” itself (the question that Descartes, in his 
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metaphysical appeal, foreclosed).  This spiraling unfolds temporally, and thus avoids the 
vicious, repetitive, and endless circling around a question. 
 When we turn back and phenomenologically reflect on the beginnings of our 
actions as natals, we find that passivity conditions the actions of natal beings.  Natality 
shows that “one begins, but coming from elsewhere,” as Bernard Waldenfels has put it 
(Experience of the Other 34).  Natals are both motivated by the world and caught in a 
momentum that that exceeds and precedes each individual existence, yet does not 
prescribe the trajectory of that existence.  Natality shows us to be beings defined not only 
by interiority but exteriority: as appearing in a world of appearances for others.  I will 
argue that through a natal ontology, when we properly understand ourselves as natals, we 
find that we “begin elsewhere.” 
  
Nature, Naturalism, and Natural Science  
 
 This project arose from a sense of the dominance of biological science in 
contemporary imagination, from the sneaking suspicion that phenomenology was being 
edged out by cognitive science, that philosophy in general was being encroached on by 
cognitive studies from one direction and critical theory3 from another.  What could a 
truly phenomenological perspective, a philosophy of existence and ontology, offer?  
What is there left for phenomenology to say about human nature in the face of 
contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science? What could we 
phenomenologists offer besides defensive exhortations that one must preserve the first 
                                                 
3 Under the broad rubric of “critical theory” I include studies conducted in, for example, literature, 
sociology, cultural theory, and art history departments that excavates discursive or power structures in 
cultural artifacts.  What critical theory does not offer, that I think phenomenology does, is an account of 
what experience is like for those who live among such artifacts and theories.  
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person perspective? How could we formulate a positive project rather than a merely 
negative, critical view of life science from the outside?  I felt sure that phenomenology 
offered more than an intuition that “science isn’t enough”; we need to provide not only 
the criticism and the critical apparatus, but a positive program of research content and 
method.  Merleau-Ponty’s work, with its consistent engagement with the natural sciences 
of his day, appeared as the most appropriate place to address this troubling écart between 
phenomenology and philosophy of mind. 
A note of clarification before I proceed: In what follows, I will refer frequently to 
the category “life science.”  I include both phenomenology and biology under that 
heading.  Both of these disciplines study life.  Their differences lie in their approach to 
that topic: the former studies the meaning of belonging to life (with certain qualities) and 
the later studies the definitions and qualities of life.  We might describe this difference – 
as many have – as that between the first and third person. Biology can say “A life is like 
this” and phenomenology can say “For me, life is like this” or “my life is like this.”  But I 
will suggest that between and within these two perspectives hides another perspective: 
the first person plural.  We can say “our life is like this.”  In this mode, we subjectively 
implicate ourselves in the sort of life studied but also assume that a view on that life is 
objectively available to many others.  That is, to use Arendt’s terminology, we situate 
ourselves in a plurality. In one sense, to speak of phenomenology as a “life science” is, as 
Arendt points out, “as redundant as … ‘botany’ is for the study of plants,” yet, as she 
continues “[i]t is, however, not coincidence that the word ‘existence’ has taken the place 
of the word ‘Being,’ and in this terminological change on of the fundamental problems of 
modern philosophy is contained” (Essays in Understanding 164).  What Arendt describes 
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as a shift toward “existence” and thus existential philosophy, I here describe as the shift 
from ontology in metaphysics to post-metaphysical ontology.   In the latter context, 
phenomenology conducts its research in life science. 
 Working on the cusp of the rise of psychology and yet before the explosion of 
philosophy of mind with cognitive science, Merleau-Ponty offers a unique perspective on 
the intersection of these domains with phenomenology, particularly in regard to nature 
and naturalism.  In Barbaras’s words, he struggles throughout his work with 
“understanding the relation between consciousness and nature” (3).  Merleau-Ponty 
offers a positive project, not merely a critique of life science for its failings.  He both 
points to problems with certain views of “nature” and “naturalism” and also suggests an 
alternative view of nature and naturalism.  Let me briefly point out some basic claims 
about naturalism that reappear throughout his work. 
1. First, “naturalism,” when used in its most reductive, dualistic sense, does not 
work as human life science which necessarily depends a pre-extant understanding of what 
life is like.4  I will look briefly – though not entirely recapitulate – the manner in which 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrates this in the Structure of Behavior.5  There it is argued that a 
non-dualistic method that attends to the total situation in which life emerges will succeed 
better as a life science.  In the Phenomenology of Perception, this conclusion is pursued 
particularly in regard to human affective life.  As Merleau-Ponty approaches the issue of 
nature in relation to human life, he faces a new problem: the relationship between the 
                                                 
4 In the words of Thomas Nagel, “Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be 
reduced” (167).  In this case “what is to be reduced” is human experience itself. 
5 Rather than dwelling on this problem, I will expect a certain complicity in the reader as to the value of the 
phenomenological project in lieu of a reductive naturalism.  While this complicity certainly cannot be 
expected, I cannot also here embark on a full justification of the phenomenological method per se.  That 
said, I shall try to show, indirectly in practice, the particular effectiveness of phenomenology in describing 
aspects of the human experience, particularly our situation in a plurality or in the “atmosphere of 
humanity,” as Merleau-Ponty puts it in the Phenomenology of Perception. 
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method of naturalism and ethics.6  The problem is this: as traditionally formulated, 
naturalism does not come with an ethical orientation. As he puts it in the Adventures of 
the Dialectic:  “Naturalism is a philosophy vague enough to support the most varied 
moral superstructures” (AD 75).  Naturalism in this sense would view humanity as only 
an effect of nature, allowing humans to abdicate responsibility for action.7   
 Clearly, if he hoped to be considered an ethically-minded philosopher, Merleau-
Ponty could not thereby consider himself to be a naturalist.  Or, if he would accept 
classification under this term, he would find that classification as uselessly tautological as 
being named “a philosopher.”  Yes, he might agree, I am a philosopher, I am a naturalist, 
but what you should ask is, “What is your philosophy?” and “What is nature?”  Merleau-
Ponty reminds us of the limits of a naturalistic stance per se.  Calling on nature for 
explanation means nothing if we do not consider the means by which we call.    
2. Second, traditional definitions of nature have divided its study from the study 
of ethics.  I hope to show that Merleau-Ponty has described an alternative definition of 
nature that appears with an ethical orientation.  In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s project 
contrasts with and offers a corrective to an implicit ontological position assumed by 
certain working life scientists along with the explicit ontological position of Heidegger.  
Although I put aside the project of a detailed mediation between these thinkers, I think a 
useful contrast can be made concerning their ontological differences on the status of 
nature and the relation between ethics and ontology.  Heidegger values the Greek vision 
                                                 
6 Certainly, one could encounter the issue of ethics in relation to animal as well as human life.  
Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty does not dwell on the ethical treatment of animals per se.  c.f. Bryan Smith, 
2009.  
7 Merleau-Ponty points to Trotsky as one who – problematically – saw historical progress as like natural 
selection.  With his Darwinian view of history, Trotsky found a “basis for humanism in the naturalist myth” 
(AD 75).  Such a humanism, however, risks not only a reductive but ethically misguided view of the 
person. As I address in chapter 5, the relationship with naturalims presents methodological and not only 
ethical problems for phenomenology 
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of nature as physis, that appears in contrast with ethos, differing from the Latin and 
standard contemporary opposition of nature/natus with non-living things.  For Heidegger, 
physis referred to an original ordering, growing, and coming to be, whereas ethos/mores 
denoted an agreed upon, conventional ordering (Introduction to Metaphysics 13).8  Ethos 
is determined by reflective, human putting into order. Heidegger thus situates the 
problem of life as the difference between human life and all other beings.  By contrast, 
nature, for Merleau-Ponty, should also be understood in its Latin origin as natus (NC 3).  
Understanding nature in terms of birth unites natural beings as beings who are born; in 
other words, Merleau-Ponty allies human life with animal life in a manner absent in 
Heidegger’s thought.9  Where Heidegger imagines that emphasizing the Latin natus 
could only entail the opposition between life and non-life, Merleau-Ponty shows it as a 
positive alliance of human life with life in general.  But his emphasis on nature in this 
sense of birth has further consequences if we consider the possibility of opposing ethos 
and physis.  If human life is natural life, then perhaps human ways of living together, of 
establishing an ethos, might find their roots in human nature, despite the on-going 
critique of human nature by many early twentieth century thinkers. In what follows, I will 
try to show how it is our nature in the sense of natus that initiates us into a world of 
others, tying us to Being through the “umbilical bond” (VI 107).   Whatever ethos we 
form will draw upon rather than oppose this natural, natal connection.   
 I should make clear that Merleau-Ponty himself does not explicitly address this 
connection between nature and ethics, nor even offer an ethics per se.  This lack of an 
                                                 
8 This is clear already by the 1929 course on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.  
9 Merleau-Ponty gradually moves in this direction. As I show in chapter 1, in the Structure of Behavior, he 
resists fully associating human and animal life. By the Nature Courses, however, he does ally these two 
modes of being.  For an explicit statement of this position, see my chapter 7-8 and NC 271. 
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ethics may seem strange in an author who was both politically active (in World War II) 
and politically reflective (in his many essays in Les Temps Moderne, Signs, as well as his 
books, Humanism and Terror and Adventures of the Dialectic).  Merleau-Ponty’s final 
work is notably incomplete due to his early death, but this abrupt end does not necessarily 
excuse or alter twenty five years of publications that do not present an ethical treatise.  
And indeed this ethics manqué is all the more striking given the attention Merleau-Ponty 
pays to the issue of the other.  Renaud Barbaras has even claimed – supported by 
Merleau-Ponty’s own commentaries recorded in a radio broadcast – that the issue of the 
other can be said to define Merleau-Ponty’s project (19).  How could a philosopher so 
concerned with the other not offer an ethics?   
 I think Merleau-Ponty does not offer an ethics separately from his 
phenomenology and ontology because an ethical standpoint inheres in these positions.  In 
fact, far from an ethics manqué, I argue that we find a nascent ethical ontology running 
through Merleau-Ponty’s entire oeuvre.  This ethical ontology is nascent in two senses: it 
is an ontology of naissance, of birth and natality, but also an ontology in the processing 
of being born, but cut short, in Merleau-Ponty’s own life.  I hope to aid in its birthing, 
hermeneutically enlivening this unthought in Merleau-Ponty.  Where Heidegger saw the 
possibility of ontology prior to ethics, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology describes a relation to 
being that is umbilical and ethical.  In rejecting of a prioritization of ontology over the 
ontic and the ethical, Merleau-Ponty shares the concerns of his contemporary Emmanuel 
Levinas who explicitly critiqued Heidegger’s ontological turn from the ontic and 
ethical.10  Merleau-Ponty would no doubt agree with Levinas that the ontological must 
                                                 
10 I leave aside close work on comparison between Merleau-Ponty and Levinas.  Such comparison is 
certainly possible.  I only point out that to my knowledge Merleau-Ponty never explicitly engages with 
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not forget the ontic, that as Levinas puts it, “fundamental ontology presupposes the 
factual situation of the mind that knows” (“Is Ontology Fundamental?” 2).  Ontology 
instead must describe a relation to being that appears in that very factical situation for 
Merleau-Ponty; he would also agree, though no doubt in his own way that, “ontology is 
not accomplished in the triumph of human beings over their condition but in the very 
tension where this condition is assumed” (“Is Ontology Fundamental?” 3).  Yet while 
these two French thinkers share a rejection of the Heideggerian division between ethics 
and ontology, they differ in the manner in which they avoid this division; Levinas turns 
from ontology and towards ethics while Merleau-Ponty attends immediately to ontology 
through his posthumously published final texts.   
 Let me sum up these issues.  For Heidegger, ontology can and must be first 
philosophy prior to ethics;11 for Levinas, by contrast, ontology should be rejected in favor 
of ethics.  But for Merleau-Ponty, ontology – our being toward being, our comportment 
and connaissance – already comes with an ethical orientation.12   To offer an ethical 
treatise independent of a natal ontology would make redundant the claims of both.   We 
can no more separate ontology from ethics than we can separate perception from action 
                                                                                                                                                 
Levinas’s thought despite the shared situation and philosophical concern shape their work.  Levinas does 
address Merleau-Ponty’s work in “Meaning and Sense,” yet this article was published after Merleau-
Ponty’s death and primarily discusses Merleau-Ponty’s work in relation to structuralism, not in terms of 
ontology or ethics. 
11 Certainly we must acknowledge the complexity of the relationship of ethics and ontology in Heidegger 
and the wealth of study on the topic.  Authors such as – to name just two – Lawrence Vogel and Joanna 
Hodge have attempted to show the importance of mit-Sein and even das Mann as reflective of a 
fundamental relation to the other even in Being and Time.  I think, however, that even if a relation to the 
other is described by Heidegger’s ontology, he himself would put the philosophical pursuit of ontology 
prior to the pursuit of relations to others per se.   
12 The same might be said for Levinas who writes “this existence is interpreted as comprehension.  From 
now on the transitive character of the verb to know (connaitre) is attached to the verb to exist” (“Is 
Ontology Fundamental?” 4). 
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for Merleau-Ponty.  That said, a primary concern of this dissertation will be to show just 
how an ethical orientation toward others appears in his natal ontology.    
Note on Content: Order and Scope 
 At the conclusion of this introductory material, I will present in more detail 
Arendt’s uses of the terms “natality” and “plurality,” then transfer these terms to 
Merleau-Ponty whose work will form the focus of the majority of this dissertation.  In the 
investigations in the chapters that follow, I locate the theme of natality in Merleau-
Ponty’s work, starting with his earliest published text the Structure of Behavior, select 
several key themes in his major work the Phenomenology of Perception, and bear out the 
investigation his latest work the “Eye and Mind” and the Visible and the Invisible.  
Chapter 1 reflects on Merleau-Ponty’s own philosophical beginnings in the Structure of 
Behavior; I point out the fundamental importance of the terminology of connaissance and 
comportment in Merleau-Ponty’s turn from dualism.  Chapters 2 through 3 focus on the 
representation of natal being in the Phenomenology of Perception; I consider how and 
whether Merleau-Ponty argues that natals are natural and yet free and then how a 
connaissance appears in being with other selves.  These preliminary studies in chapters 1-
3 aim to situate in particular the work in his courses on Nature given at the Collège de 
France.   In chapters 4 through 5, I trace Merleau-Ponty’s work in these Nature Courses. 
 Between 1956 and 1959, Merleau-Ponty gave three courses on the concept of 
nature.  The first course examined the concept historically, devoting special emphasis to 
the Cartesian definition of nature; the second course continued this investigation, again 
revisiting the Cartesian definition; the final course, given over a year later, gestured 
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toward a new notion of nature.13 This course material notably overlaps with the well-
known essay “Eye and Mind” as well as with the unfinished manuscript of the Visible 
and the Invisible in which Merleau-Ponty cryptically claims that he will perform a 
“psychoanalysis of Nature” (VI  256).  The material in the Nature Courses thus co-
emerges with Merleau-Ponty’s nascent ontology in the Visible and the Invisible and with 
the critique of science and aesthetics in the important contemporary essay “Eye and 
Mind.”  
 Everything thus suggests that we consider the Nature Courses to pave the way for 
the full-fledged ontology that would have appeared in the Visible and the Invisible.  Yet 
the courses, derived from notes by Merleau-Ponty himself and by his students, follow 
rough transcriptions; likewise, while the manuscript of the Visible and Invisible is more 
complete than the courses, it was never vetted by its author in final form.  Thankfully, 
Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts on nature began well before these unfinished works.  As early 
as the Structure of Behavior, he tacitly expresses concern over the status of nature.  In the 
Phenomenology of Perception, his longest and most widely received work, he begins to 
unpack the concept of nature in relation to freedom and to culture, and in the context of 
an ongoing reception of the human body and the natural world.   
 Through close consideration of his claims and allusions in these texts, I hope to 
illuminate the connection between his description of nature and natality.  Though I begin 
from Arendt’s early work, I do not focus on her vision of natality per se; however, in the 
penultimate chapter, I do return to connections between her later work and Merleau-
Ponty’s own later work.  In their un-finished later work, they each turn toward a 
discussion of visibility and plurality rooted in our natal entrance into the world, 
                                                 
13 See Translator’s Introduction to NC for more on the timing and format of the courses.  
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emphasizing exteriority in relation to human and animal nature.   More specifically, both 
Merleau-Ponty in his Nature Courses and Arendt in Life of the Mind refer to the work of 
German biologist Adolf Portmann’s work on the sexual display of animals for one 
another, and it is in these final discussions that connect natality with plurality and 
appearance for others that the implications of a natal ontology become most clear.  
Merleau-Ponty claims that we might restore an “ontological value” to the term species.  
That is, we can give ontological value to our prereflective orientation to others that 
grounds and elicits our connaissance of this world and action in that world.   
 
Note on Method:  Archeology, Dialectic, Dialogue, Interrogation, and Analysis 
 In order to sharpen a sense for what might be Merleau-Ponty’s own commitments 
in the Nature Courses as distinct from the readings of his students, I will show the origins 
of his later natal ontology and view of Nature in his early work.  This method matches 
both the form and content of a natal ontology as a return to beginning. Although a natal 
ontology might initially seem to entail a turning toward the future, to new beginnings, in 
fact natality also turns us to the past.   But turning toward beginning by no means 
suggests a turn toward novelty or newness. According to Arendt’s account of natality, 
natality turns us toward origins, archai, beginnings (HC 177): Mortality, by contrast, 
orients us toward future, endings, telos. Associating phenomenology and indeed Merleau-
Ponty’s work in general with beginning is not a novel decision.  As Michel Henry puts it, 
reflective philosophy’s beginning, however radical, “is not the new.  Rather it is the 
ancient, the most ancient” (“Videre Videor” 11).   John Sallis has called Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy as a whole “return to beginnings”; Lawrence Hass sees Merleau-Ponty’s work 
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as oriented toward expression as a project of “endless beginnings” (Hass 10).  As 
Barbaras shows, following the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty engages in an 
increasingly regressive method.14    Perhaps more importantly, Merleau-Ponty himself 
describes his method as archeological.  Phenomenology’s proper work, he argues, “is to 
unveil the pre-theoretical layer,” work that involves a “descent into the realm of our 
‘archeology’” (SI 165). 
 As we retrace Merleau-Ponty’s beginnings, we shall have to consider Merleau-
Ponty’s engagement with Kant, Schelling, Bergson, and Husserl.  In particular, I will 
emphasize Merleau-Ponty’s affinity for Schelling, and the aspects of Kant’s Third 
Critique that attract Merleau-Ponty as they did Schelling.  An explication of Merleau-
Ponty’s relation to Kant or Schelling per se is not necessary here,15  but I will make 
repeated allusions to these influences and connections as they appear throughout this 
project.  This is important because it demonstrates Merleau-Ponty’s deep commitment to 
hermeneutic engagement with the history of Western thought, as well as his tendency to 
disrupt and revise the dominant hierarchies and dualism inherent to that history.  
 I find this interrogative, dialogical method of explication to be appropriate to both 
the form and content of Merleau-Ponty’s work. That said, this is not without certain risks 
– including for Merleau-Ponty’s interpreter. The risk in writing on or through another 
(discipline or author) is always that one might conflate this other’s thought with one’s 
own.  Merleau-Ponty often reflects on the work of others and uses these works as a 
                                                 
14 Barbaras argues that having rethought the body and the dualistic relation of consciousness and object, 
Merleau-Ponty then rethinks language (Signs, Prose of the World) and then rethinks all cultural endeavors 
(“Eye and Mind”), gradually regressing to the very ground of culture in nature (Nature Courses) and 
finally, in ontology (Visible and the Invisible)  (Barbaras 60).  NB: I have filled out the texts to which 
Barbaras implicitly refers.  
15 This has already been accomplished vis à vis Schelling by Patrick Burke in “Creativity and the 
Unconscious in Merleau-Ponty and Schelling” and viz a viz Kant’s Third Critique by Galen Johnson in  
“Merleau-Ponty and Kant’s Third Critique” and The Retrieval of the Beautiful.  
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mouthpiece to express his own position.  Those familiar with Merleau-Ponty are familiar 
with his ventriloquism: One can at times lose track of Merleau-Ponty’s thought in 
contrast to that of the author he interprets.  His readings of Husserl, perhaps most 
famously, so generously give voice to his predecessor that the student of Merleau-Ponty 
must take great pains to untwine the threads of this French thinker from that of the 
German.  Merleau-Ponty himself is conscious of this problem and yet at the same time 
finds the struggle to speak with other thinkers to be the very task of philosophy:  
Between an “objective” history of philosophy (which would rob the great 
philosophers of what they have given others to think about) and a 
meditation disguised as a dialogue (in which we would ask the questions 
and give the answers) there must be a middle-ground on which the 
philosopher who is speaking [is] …present together, although it is not 
possible even in principle to decide at any given moment just what 
belongs to each. (SI159, cited in Barbaras 69)    
 
Within philosophy, we must find a way to address our philosophical predecessors without 
uselessly repeating their words yet also without distorting them to fit our own meaning.  
How can we know when we, or Merleau-Ponty, have managed a true dialogue – for 
example, with Schelling or, perhaps even more challengingly, with Darwin – rather than 
a meditation disguised as such?  How can the phenomenologist be certain Merleau-Ponty 
has presented the work of the biologist, the German idealist, or the poet, rather than 
merely bent this work for his own purposes? Rene Magritte, in fact, claims something 
quite like this with regard to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of painting in “Eye and Mind.” 
According to Magritte, “Merleau-Ponty’s very brilliant thesis is very pleasant to read, but 
it hardly makes one think of painting – which he nevertheless appears to be dealing with” 
(Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader 336).   Does Merleau-Ponty go beyond ventriloquism 
to something much more troubling?  If he has failed to speak of painting per se, or at least 
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to speak of painting from the painter’s perspective, then one may ask if he actually 
engages with that “other” of philosophy at all. 
 Without necessarily ruling out the purchase of Magritte’s charges, Barbaras points 
out that Merleau-Ponty does take quite seriously the complexity of actual dialogue.16 
When I speak with another actual person,  
I do not communicate to another a thought possessed elsewhere.  I think 
with him and make myself in his image; moreover, his thought comes to 
itself only by formulating itself and offering itself to me, so that there is no 
clear-cut distinction between what would belong strictly to an author and 
what the interpretation projects onto the author. (Barbaras 69) 
 
This ambiguity does not mark a law of authentic meaning but rather the ground of new 
meaning.  Merleau-Ponty imagines himself in conversation with Husserl as he writes his 
own phenomenology.  This conversation solicits meaning from Husserl, but also infuses 
Husserl’s statements with meanings that Husserl himself may not have expected or fully 
deployed.  Merleau-Ponty takes this attitude not only toward Husserl but toward all the 
authors he approaches.  Thus, as I recount in the following pages, Merleau-Ponty’s 
relation to such authors – whether Husserl, Schelling or Bergson – we must keep this rich 
                                                 
16 Barbaras claims that interpreters prior to 1970 failed to understand Merleau-Ponty, having lacked access 
to a careful reading of the Visible and the Invisible, the text in which Merleau-Ponty’s dialogical method 
becomes most explicit.  Barbaras cites Paul Ricoeur’s 1969 Conflict of Interpretations as exemplifying this 
pre-Visible and the Invisible position: “As Paul Ricoeur notes, ‘our relation to the greatest of French 
phenomenologists has perhaps already become what his was to Husserl: not a repetition but an 
appropriation of the very movement of his reflection.’ This explains the state of the commentaries [up to 
1969]” (Barbara xxxi).  Barbaras attempts to remedy this misunderstanding by providing a reading of 
Merleau-Ponty “as a classic,” performing a close-reading rather than offering merely an “intuition” of 
Merleau-Ponty with Ricoeur-like hermeneutic distortion.  While I agree with this need for a close reading, I 
do not agree with Barbaras’s claim that hermeneutic interpretation problematically distorts the classic 
author for some extra-textual goal.  In fact, I would argue that Ricoeur’s position holds, no matter how 
many unpublished texts become available to ‘correct’ the close reading.  Philosophy must proceed while 
conscientious of its own productivity, a point that Barbaras himself and Merleau-Ponty each make.  That is, 
as readers of Merleau-Ponty – or indeed any classic author – we must take responsibility for our reading as 
a productive appropriate of the this author.  To seek a “final” position for that author to “merely” 
recapitulate the position of this author at any point in his career would be less an impossibility than an 
unnecessary and unphilosophical exercise.  While this may sound like a harsh critique of Barbaras, I think 
his work is successful precisely because he himself accomplishes such an insightful and productive 
appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought.    
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ambiguity in mind.  Rather than repeatedly asking whether Merleau-Ponty has “got 
Schelling right” as Schelling would have himself, we should imagine Merleau-Ponty and 
Schelling in a room, conversing.  Merleau-Ponty, a skillful interviewer, engages his 
interlocutor in a lively conversation, drawing on various comments Schelling has made 
over his career and tempts Schelling to ‘say’ things that Schelling did say but perhaps 
could have or should have.  Such is always the result of a successful, journalistic 
interview, or indeed any conversation.   
  If we are to follow Merleau-Ponty, then, we cannot merely mimic his words. 
Rather, we must, in some way, adopt his method, treating him as a subject with whom to 
interact and thereby letting him teach us to respond to our own times. To do so, we must 
appreciate Merleau-Ponty’s responsiveness to his own historical cultural environment. 
We must address Merleau-Ponty as he addresses Descartes.  Merleau-Ponty writes:  
The reason why Descartes is present is that – surrounded by circumstances 
which today are abolished, and haunted by the concerns and some of the 
illusions of his times – he responded to these hazards in a way which 
teaches us to respond to our own, even though they are different and our 
response is different too.  (SI 128)  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s circumstances are similar to and different from our own, as his were 
from Descartes.  Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual and cultural world centered on – to name a 
few – Proust, Claudel, Gide, Cézanne, Marx, Kojève, and the Gestalt theorists.  Only 
some of these still matter greatly to us, and perhaps none matters quite in the way they 
did to Merleau-Ponty.  Merleau-Ponty’s diverse commentaries can serve merely as an 
intellectual and cultural barometer, as a tool to clarify any of these individuals, issues or 
schools.  But we can better read Merleau-Ponty as he suggests that one read Descartes: as 
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a model of how to respond to the hazards of any author in her or his cultural, historical 
situation.  
 That said, I have wherever possible taken steps to verify Merleau-Ponty’s citation 
and basic interpretation of each author.  In the discussion in the Structure of Behavior and 
in particular in the studies in the Nature Courses, I have researched the scientific issues 
and texts mentioned by Merleau-Ponty to ascertain the minimal correctness of his 
readings; I offer resources for further verification where necessary. I assume little 
familiarity by my readers with these scientific issues and texts.  I do assume, however, 
that my audience shares a familiarity with the European philosophical tradition.  In the 
cases of Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Descartes, Schelling, Bergson and others, I 
have attempted to present Merleau-Ponty’s view alongside some supporting citations 
from the text of the original authors to reassure the readers of the appropriateness of 
Merleau-Ponty’s comments.  I do this not only for the sake of scholarly thoroughness but 
in order distinguish more clearly the activity of Merleau-Ponty’s own thought in contrast 
to these predecessors.  I have generally set aside the problem of deliberating between 
Merleau-Ponty and his eminent contemporaries Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, although 
references and contrasts nonetheless appear as clarifications.  When these authors’ works 
intersect with Merleau-Ponty’s, I have elucidated the latter’s position, but it would be 
another project entirely to work out the relationship among these three thinkers.  When I 
do address these authors, I do so by way of contrast or to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s own 
claims about their respective positions.  
 Beyond the question of whether Merleau-Ponty has engaged in a dialogue with 
others, we might ask why Merleau-Ponty works in this dialogical manner. I suggest that 
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Merleau-Ponty speaks through other thinkers and through other disciplines because he 
has abandoned a classical model of interiority and exteriority.  Not only must we see our 
own flesh as permeable by the world, we must see philosophy itself as permeable and 
permeating its exteriority.  Likewise, philosophy must refuse to preemptively delimit and 
objectify other disciplines, such as visual art, and rather interrogate them from within. To 
learn what it is to paint, we attempt to see according to the style of Cézanne – insofar as 
this is possible – in order to think through the production of his work as he lived it, rather 
than study his painting as an object in the museum.  The proper, truly respectful approach 
to Husserl’s thought is not to witness it from the outside as a historical artifact – as an 
object – but to live within it, to think with Husserl as a subject. By so doing, we make 
that which seems to be ‘elsewhere’ into something effective here and now. 
 The result is an expressive, creative discipline.  Rather than prophesying an end to 
philosophy, à la Hegel, Merleau-Ponty envisions philosophy’s endless beginning.  
Philosophy can begin endlessly because it is a creative act, an act of expression.  So 
described, philosophy is allied with other expressive activities: artistic, poetic, spiritual, 
and scientific creativity.  Merleau-Ponty not only sees a permeability between 
philosophical practice and other expressive practices, but he borrows methodologically 
from other sciences and the arts.  Truly abandoning a representational account of 
cognition and adopting an embodied model of perception also entails rethinking the 
methods at work in philosophy. Instead of describing cognition, phenomenology becomes 
conscientious of its own productive and expressive activity.  As Barbaras has shown, this 
shift toward rethinking the philosophical practice as expressive upsets even the vestiges 
of duality in Merleau-Ponty’s own thought (49).  Insofar as he retained a model of the 
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phenomenology which viewed the phenomenologist as capable of pure reflection and 
absolutely active, Merleau-Ponty remained with a dualistic phenomenology and 
phenomenological method.  Moving beyond dualism entailed a new – poetic – 
methodology, as I discuss in Chapter 5. 
 This expressive project presents itself as “an endless task, but not a futile one” 
(Hass 10).  Representational Cartesian thought has attempted to resolve the problems of 
cognition and expression rather than admit that such representative reflective thought 
itself is a sort of expression.  Leaving behind the traditional representational model means 
that philosophy must also leave behind the expectation that it can unambiguously resolve 
its problems.  Merleau-Ponty puts it clearly:  “Questions can indeed be total; but answers, 
in their positive significance, cannot” (SI 3).  Philosophy cannot provide complete, 
systematic answers.  Rather than retreating from this intimidating range of possibility, 
philosophy should profit from this open-ended realm of significance.  
 The expressive practice of philosophy co-emerges with the perception of the 
incarnate subject.  If we preemptively separate our philosophical vision from our 
everyday vision – if we have one eye on being and another on nothing–we can never 
successfully coordinate philosophy with our everyday practices.  Nonetheless, this does 
not reduce philosophy to everyday, prereflective expression.  As John Sallis has shown, 
Merleau-Ponty’s exhortation to return to beginnings does not entail a turn from logos or 
reflection, but a return to the very ground of logos and physis themselves 
(Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings 10-11).  But how should philosophy 
proceed if its reflective thought truly arises from perception?  Merleau-Ponty has gained 
a reputation as one of, if not the most highly regarded twentieth century Western thinkers 
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of perception and embodiment.  But what is it to think according to the body?  What is 
the natural vision to which we would return? 
 Merleau-Ponty suggests that we ought to see a philosophical vision akin to our 
natural, binocular vision.  Rather than looking at the world through a dualistic 
“strabismus” 17  – to use Merleau-Ponty’s archaic term – we aim for a binocular 
philosophy appropriate to the incarnate subject (NC 127).18  Actual visual strabismus, a 
pathological condition, occurs when the left and the right eye do not properly coordinate 
so the person’s left eye seems to turn in one direction and the right eye in the other; Jean 
Paul Sartre famously suffered this condition.  By contrast, in normal binocular vision, the 
left and right eye work together prereflectively to focus two retinal images into one, 
apparently seamless, experiential image: When I look across the garden, I do not see the 
eastern side and the western side in two distinct images, but see the them together as part 
of one world which I inhabit.   
  In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Descartes instituted a strabismus into philosophy – into 
the theoria, the vision of philosophy – when he split mind from body, essence from 
existence (NC 134).  Having identified this pathological situation instituted by Descartes, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that phenomenology should find a more coordinated, natural 
vision: phenomenology should attempt a “binocular philosophy” (SI 134).   Human 
                                                 
17 The word comes from the term for squinting, but particular refers to the coordination of the eyes and can 
be used metaphorically as well.  From The Oxford English Dictionary: “a. An affection of the eyes in 
which the axes of vision cannot be coincidently directed to the same object; squinting, a squint.  
Convergent or internal strabismus, a turning inward of the eyes, cross-eye; divergent or external strabismus, 
a turning outwards of one or both eyes… b. fig. Perversity of intellectual perception….1881 E. CAIRD Ess. 
Lit. & Philos. (1892) I. 193 A review which supposes man to be afflicted with a kind of intellectual 
strabismus, so that he can never see with one of his mental eyes without shutting the other.” 
18 Merleau-Ponty revisits the charge of strabismus in the Visible and the Invisible, in a note that says his 
project will include “Reflection on Descartes’s ontologies – the ‘strabism’ of Western ontology” (VI 166). 
Le Forte comments in a footnote, in a 1957 course, Merleau-Ponty also called this “ontological diplopia,” 
the formulation that Barbaras takes up (83).  
28 
 
beings exercise binocular vision in concert with certain actions: upright posture, grasping 
hands, general motility.  Vision and action co-develop.  Binocular vision does not 
eliminate the problem of two eyes but assumes a prereflective coordination: Likewise, a 
properly practiced philosophy would not eliminate the problems of mechanism and 
finality, being and nonbeing, but face them in a unified and coordinated way.   
 Philosophy can take its cue from artists who practice binocular vision, allowing 
the circuit of eye and mind, hand and vision, to remain open.  As I will show in Chapter 
5, this methodological shift toward the arts naturally accompanies Merleau-Ponty’s turn 
from static to genetic, then to generative, and finally to what I call poetic 
phenomenology.  As Anthony Steinbock has pointed out, when we understand existence 
only in terms of a monodic self-constitution, we find a symmetry of past and future: 
history, personal or collective, does not matter.   That is, if we restrict phenomenological 
study to a static or even genetic study of the emergence of the subject, we find a 
symmetry of the past and the future. However, when we include birth in the range of 
topics under phenomenological study, we find that an asymmetry appears.  How does this 
happen?  How does turning toward natality so fundamentally alter the aims and methods 
of phenomenology? If we take birth and death as “constitutive occurrences,” then “the 
scope of phenomenological analysis must extend even beyond genesis” of a single 
subject (Steinbock “From Phenomenological Immortality to Natality” 34, hereafter cited 
as “Natality”).   Birth points us beyond even a synchronic intersubjectivity and towards a 
diachronic intersubjective community.  As Steinbock puts it, generative phenomenology 
points toward “geo-historical, social, normatively significant lifeworlds” (“Natality” 34).  
The smallest unit of this intergenerational homeworld, for Husserl as Steinbock teaches 
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us to read him, is the home “of mother or parent and child” (“Natality” 35).  Natality 
points us beyond an Other that faces us now, and beyond a community of multiple others 
among whom we grow and live.  Natality points us beyond a synchronic community of 
others toward a diachronic community of others.   
 This practice of what I call “poetic phenomenology” does not merely negotiate 
across an already established division in the subject.  Far from it: “the subject” or 
“consciousness” or “the individual” per se does not suffice to describe the phenomena 
under study.   Rather than finding a compromised “middle way,” Merleau-Ponty avoids 
the traps of intellectualism and empiricism by going to the limits of these two domains.19   
To borrow a frequent metaphor, Merleau-Ponty avoids that particular Scylla and 
Charybdis, not by threading between them, but by choosing another passage altogether.  
Traditional efforts to navigate this passage have failed the moment they start from within 
a dualism, assuming that one must choose either empiricism or intellectualism or some 
combination of the pre-established, inherited limits of these schools of thought.  By 
contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s third way lies not in the “middle” of philosophy but rather at 
its limits or margins.  These limits are not outside philosophy but within it; we can never 
step outside philosophy, nor find its “circumference.”  In the words of Barbaras, Merleau-
Ponty shows that “the truth of phenomenology resides at the very place of its limit, in 
                                                 
19 Readers of Merleau-Ponty have often described him as navigating between intellectualism and 
empiricism (See for example, Richard Kearney’s Movements in Modern Philosophy).  We might be 
tempted to think of Merleau-Ponty’s work as a “middle” way in the sense of a compromising third path 
between these two extremes.  But binocular vision is not an a posteriori bringing together of or 
compromise between two separate visions.  Rather, binocular vision assumes a radically different 
prereflective coordinating perception in which depth and movement co-emerge with vision.  Viewing 
Merleau-Ponty’s work as a “middle” way in this sense fails to give enough credence to the revolutionary 
shifts that Merleau-Ponty suggests that phenomenology, and indeed philosophy in general, ought to make.  
A compromise between existing philosophical terminologies does not always suffice to help us escape 
systemic problems, such as Cartesian mind-body dualism or Kantian sensation-understanding dualism.  
Attempting to mediate within a dualist structure does not help us out of inherent antinomies.    
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what motivates and stops simultaneously its enterprise of understanding” (77).  Merleau-
Ponty redirects philosophical thought toward its prereflective ground in lived experience.  
It is thus Merleau-Ponty finds that “philosophy’s center is everywhere and its 
circumference nowhere” (SI 128).  Yet he can only make this declaration after having 
truly stepped beyond traditional delimitations of philosophy; only after having thought 
according to Cézanne or Claudel or Marx as well as Descartes can Merleau-Ponty claim 
that philosophy can also be oriented from a center in these disciplines.  
 Poetry and art are not the only practices to have drawn Merleau-Ponty’s attention.  
I have remarked upon his engagement with proto-cognitive scientific studies and 
philosophy of mind, yet he also engages with psychoanalysis.  This move may seem 
unsurprising when we consider the importance that the psychoanalytic practice attributes 
to personal origins and connection to generations.  Merleau-Ponty makes explicit this 
connection to the psychoanalytic practice as he understood it. In a working note from 
1960 in the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty counsels himself: “Do a 
psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh, the mother” (VI 267). Though that text and 
project remain incomplete, he in fact began the preparatory work for that “analysis” in 
the first of the Nature Courses, where he traces this history and analyzes its meaning for 
our current condition.  He suggests that if we undertake an analysis – in the therapeutic 
sense – of our use of the term Nature, we uncover a peculiar trauma inflicted by 
Descartes.20  It is on that history rather than the sketches in the Visible and the Invisible 
                                                 
20 In chapters 4-5 I retell the history that Merleau-Ponty tells about Nature and natality, but I should caution  
that this is not the only history that can be told about Nature.  For example, Michel Henry draws very 
different conclusions from Descartes’s stance on nature. What Merleau-Ponty identifies as significant in 
Schelling, for example, is not a mere rehearsal of Schelling but a statement of Merleau-Ponty’s own 
method and content. I will consider the implications of the lacks and gaps in Merleau-Ponty’s history as 
indicative of his conclusions. Likewise, what I adopt and accumulate from Merleau-Ponty indicates my 
own commitments.   
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that I focus.  Beginning with a historical overview of accounts of nature, starting from the 
Greeks and covering figures all the way to Whitehead, Merleau-Ponty traces a certain 
trajectory our sense of Nature has taken.   
 In one sense, Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion that his work functions as a 
“psychoanalysis” is undoubtedly a heuristic metaphor; he does not explicitly adopt 
methodology from any of the schools of psychoanalysis of his time, though he was 
familiar with them.  On the other hand, we should note that Merleau-Ponty devoted time 
and textual attention to psychoanalysis.21  Alphons de Waelhens, noted scholar of 
psychoanalysis, wrote the introduction to the Structure of Behavior, setting Merleau-
Ponty’s earliest work in proximity to psychology.  In addition, we must acknowledge a 
positive shift in Merleau-Ponty’s attitude toward Freud in the Nature Courses; in the 
Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty dismisses Freudian psychoanalysis as a form of 
determinism, but in the later texts he declares that Freud “truly saw” his vision of “the 
flesh with its double sense” (NC 226).  In the Visible and the Invisible, in a note titled 
“The problem of analysis,” he tells himself: “Solution: recapture the child, the alter ego, 
the unreflected within myself by a lateral, pre-analytic participation.”  In the child hides 
“the common tissue of which we are made” (VI 203).22  In the psychological terms “alter 
ego” and “pre-analytic” Merleau-Ponty hints that his regressive pursuit of the child 
within perception echoes that of psychoanalysis. All this suggests that we should take this 
                                                 
21 Lacan and Merleau-Ponty were quite close, though Merleau-Ponty never became the ‘philosopher of the 
movement’ that some have suggested Lacan may have hoped for; apparently, one of the only times Lacan 
was seen to cry publically was at Merleau-Ponty’s funeral. Merleau-Ponty would have attended Lacan’s 
talks and Lacan certainly attended Merleau-Ponty’s  (c.f. Roudinesco 227, 351, 335).   
22 In the Visible and the Invisible, this interrogative method stands out in the chapter titles of each working 
section: “Reflection and Interrogation,” “Interrogation and Dialectic,” “Interrogation and Intuition.” In each 
case, “Interrogation” describes Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenological method as contrasted to Descartes, 
Sartre, and Husserl, respectively (See Barbaras 88).  
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metaphor of “psychoanalysis” quite seriously, while at the same time acknowledging its 
status as metaphor.   
 The overarching metaphor of psychoanalysis reaffirms Merleau-Ponty’s hints that 
the study of Nature is something accomplished through dialogical study. Generative 
and post-generative poetic phenomenologies presuppose a certain hermeneutic awareness 
at work in the phenomenological practice.  Merleau-Ponty’s hermeneutic style of study – 
and my own similar style – arises from deep ontological commitments, not because of 
critical literary conventions.  As I trace this unthought natal ontology through Merleau-
Ponty, I also perform a poetic phenomenology, risking ventriloquism, yet I do so in the 
services of making us familiar with his thought, offering a connaissance of Merleau-
Ponty’s thought on being and Nature, following the method of the artist and the poet who 
both admit their own productive relation to Nature.  That we should so “know” a text, an 
author, or Nature is appropriate to the ontology expressed herein.  Nature, as we shall see, 
is ambiguously interior and exterior, subject and object, in short, much like we ourselves 
who give birth to Nature.  
 
Natality and Plurality from Arendt to Merleau-Ponty 
 Before embarking on the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre that forms the 
main body of this project, let me clarify these two important terms – natality and plurality 
– as described by Arendt.  
 Plurality:  Plurality refers to the condition “of being numerous,” to use the 
words of the poet George Oppen.  As humans, we are not alone: We find ourselves to 
belong to a certain type of being, each of whose members is also unique.  As beings 
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conditioned by plurality, we are both like many others and different from others.  As 
Arendt puts it concisely in the Human Condition, “we are all the same … in that nobody 
is ever the same” (8).23  We have to speak and engage in actions to communicate with 
others because we are not identical; we cannot know exactly what other think or 
experience.  On the other hand, we can communicate: we share enough with others that 
we can initiate actions and speech that are comprehended and taken up.   Arendt goes on:  
Human distinctness is not the same as otherness… Otherness in its most 
abstract form is found only in the sheer multiplicity of inorganic objects, 
whereas all organic life already shows variations and distinctions, even 
between specimens of the same species.  (HC 176) 24 
 
Despite our human distinctness, we can nonetheless communicate.  Indeed difference 
forms the very motive for communication and political action.  As I will show, Merleau-
Ponty, like Arendt, affirms this initial communicability and shared world inherent in the 
condition of plurality.   
 Natality:  For Arendt, the human condition of natality is the condition of both 
having a beginning and of beginning.  Not only are we born, but we give birth to others, 
to speech and projects.  Like “mortality,” “natality” connotes not merely the fact of these 
events but a consciousness of their unfolding.  When, as natals, we begin, we do not 
merely react to our world, but initiate an action.  “To act,” writes Arendt, “in its most 
general sense, means to take an initiative, to being (as the Greek word archein, ‘to begin,’ 
‘to lead,’ and eventually ‘to rule,’ indicates), to set something into motion” (HC 177).  
                                                 
23 Arendt offers the following longer definition: Human plurality, the basic condition of both action and 
speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction.  If men were not equal, they could neither 
understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the needs of 
those who will come after then.  If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other 
who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood. 
(HC 175) 
24 For more on this issue of personal identity and change, see Paul Ricoeur Oneself as Another. 
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Human beings, for Arendt, excel in that they can set actions in motion; we can plan, 
discuss, and coordinate events that will unfold in the future and build on the past.  Unlike 
plants, beetles, or dogs, human beings act with each other and for the future.   
 Arendt confirms the definitive shift Merleau-Ponty identifies in our view of 
ourselves caused by Descartes.  For her, Cartesian philosophy caused us to lose a view of 
ourselves as natals:  The loss of emphasis on natality means not the loss of nature or 
naturalness, but a loss of world, of orientation toward a plurality.  Descartes instantiated a 
peculiar withdrawal from the public world toward the self.  Arendt writes: “Cartesian 
reason is entirely based on the implicit assumption that the mind can only know that 
which it has itself produced and retains in some sense within itself” (HC 283).  After the 
Cartesian withdrawal, what people “have in common is not the world but the structure of 
their minds” (HC 283).  With this loss of world, philosophy is reduced to “theory of 
cognition and psychology” (HC 293), a concern Arendt shares with and no doubt 
inherited in part from Heidegger.  Descartes placed cognitive structures at the center of 
philosophy, a place that – in Arendt’s view – the public sphere ought to have occupied, 
and thus post-Cartesian modernity lacked a “sensus communis”: “the sense that orients 
and unites all of our five senses: [This sense] fits the sensations of my strictly private five 
senses … into a common world shared by others (Life of the Mind 50).25   Descartes 
turned us from the public world in which our knowledge takes its orientation from the 
others who are always already there from our birth.  Natality, by contrast, turns us toward 
plurality.  
                                                 
25 In her later work, Arendt declares that “what Merleau-Ponty has to say against Descartes is brilliantly 
right” (Life of the Mind 49).   
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 In calling attention to plurality, Arendt objects to the way questions pertaining to 
the Other have been traditionally asked in existential philosophy.  She suggests that if the 
question existential philosophy asks is “Who am I?” then the question is badly posed.  
Rather, we should ask “Who are we?” As she puts it, “[e]xistence is, by its very nature 
never isolated.  It exists only in communication and in awareness of others’ existence” 
(Essays in Understanding 187). For Arendt, “not Man but men live on the earth and 
inhabit the world” (HC 7).  In other words, our existential and phenomenological 
descriptions are doomed if they begin with a single person or even only two people.  We 
always already find ourselves in relation to many unique others: Phenomenology would 
miss something essential in the human condition were it to turn from this aspect of 
facticity.   
 Significant in Arendt’s definition as well as in Merleau-Ponty’s work is 
the association of plurality with “organic life” (see above, HC 176).  There is something 
about being a natural life that inherently means that one belongs to a plurality.  While 
avoiding a discussion of birth and naturalness per se in the Human Condition, Arendt 
herself emphasizes this association between plurality, natality, and nature. Nonetheless, 
for Arendt neither plurality nor natality can be understood as attributes of human nature.  
In the beginning of the Human Condition, Arendt makes clear that the title of her book 
does not at all mean she is undertaking a study of human nature (HC 10).  Claims about 
human nature make metaphysical assertions, but Arendt assumes that metaphysics has 
come to a close (c.f. Life of the Mind).  It is unethical and simply presumptuous to claim 
to know the essence of a person the way you might know the essence of other natural 
facts (HC 10).  Defining human nature is not only a dangerous project, but an impossible, 
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circular one.   As Augustine knew, human nature must be phrased as a question, not 
assumed as a premise (HC 10).  Arendt concludes that we ought to avoid the political 
claims based on human “nature” all together. 26   As Peg Birmingham has pointed out, 
Arendt does admit human facticity into her account of human existence, but in a peculiar, 
obscure way.  By way of illustration, Birmingham cites this passage from Origins of 
Totalitarianism – also one of the first mentions of natality – in which the condition is 
described as including “this mere existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given 
us by birth and which includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds” (OT 
301, cited in Birmingham 71).  For Arendt, naturalness like birth belongs to the private 
sphere of the household, as the Greeks would have it, which must be established before 
we move into the political public sphere.  The only response to this mysterious given is to 
say, with Augustine, “Volo ut sis (I want you to be)” (OT 301, cited in Birmingham 71).    
In short, in Arendt’s view, a natal ontology affirms our mysteriously given facticity, but 
does not appeal to it for rights.27  
As natals, humans are not merely passive ‘natural’ creations, but capable of 
initiating new actions, of making beginnings in the world.  These actions release us from 
the cycle of natural processes (HC 323). For Arendt, both the problem with and promise 
of beginning, as with natality, is “its inherent unpredictability” (HC 191) and its fragility.  
                                                 
26 As Peg Birmingham well describes, although Arendt rejects accounts of human nature on the grounds 
that it might lead certain races or groups to claim a privileged access to some “natural law,” Arendt 
nonethess remains a humanist of sorts (Birmingham 8. See also OT 298).  
27 For Arendt, natality is a political category and possibly an ontological category, but it is never equivalent 
to factual birth (Birmingham 9, HC 9 and 246).   Nonetheless, Birmingham shows that while it may seem 
that Arendt simply “equates the given with zoe, mere life, which she then relegates to the realm of the 
private” (75), in fact, Arendt is always “preoccupied with the double miracle of the event of natality, both 
the miracle of the given and the miracle of beginning” (76).  Birmingham then elucidates the political 
ramifications of this trend in Arendt.  I here point out only the connection between this affirmation of 
givenness by Arendt  and her emphasis on the unpredictability of natality.  Arendt excludes “human nature” 
as a political category.  However, she does not exclude the possibility that our given nature contributes to 
the unpredictable irruption of natal life from the private into the political world.   We simply cannot appeal 
to nature to determine or to secure political rights.  
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When we begin – a life, a speech, an organization – we cannot know the result.  If we 
knew the result, life would be one great game of dominos played by more or less skillful 
planners.  Instead, life in a plurality is quite unpredictable; we just never know what 
other, distinct people, are going to do.  For Arendt, this is not because of our “nature”:   
The fragility of human institutions and laws and, generally, of all matters 
pertaining to men’s living together, arise from the human condition of 
natality, and is quite independent of the frailty of human nature. (HC 191) 
 
Life with other humans is unpredictable not because we are weak, fragile, passive, or 
unpredictable naturally.  Rather, life is unpredictable because we cannot know what 
others will do.28  For Arendt, the question becomes how we can act, understanding our 
distinctness from others and the fragility of action, and yet not lose faith in potential of 
actions organized in concert with others.  
 
 Having established this terminology by way of Arendt, let me makes some initial 
distinctions between her work and Merleau-Ponty’s, each of which I will discuss at 
length in the following chapters.  The most obvious point of contrast between Merleau-
Ponty and Arendt is the former’s discussion of nature and the body.  For Merleau-Ponty, 
as for Arendt, our natality initiates us into a plurality – into a relation to multiple others – 
                                                 
28 Many political efforts, for example, have been made to ensure a stabler political sphere.  Arendt shows 
how with, at the latest, Aristotle, the Greeks began to think of politics as sort of craft so that it resulted in “a 
tangible project, and its process has a clearly recognizable end.  This is no longer or, rather, not yet action 
(praxis), properly speaking, but making (poesis), which they preferred because of its greater reliability.  It 
is as though they has said that if men only renounce their capacity for action, with its futility, 
boundlessness, and uncertainty of outcome their could be a remedy for the frailty of human affairs”  (HC 
195).  The Greeks, like many politicians after them, wanted to make life with other people stable and 
secure.  They wanted to not merely act but to leave a trace of their actions.  They wanted to set something 
in motion – to act – and to insure that things continued along just that trajectory.  Unfortunately, not every 
person who lived after these first Greeks agreed with their vision of the political sphere. 
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but for Merleau-Ponty this occurs first and foremost by way of the body.29  He argues 
that we can see “the body as organ of the for-other” (NC 218).  But this emphasis on the 
body, or on a type of body, comes perhaps dangerously close to associating a plurality of 
humans with a natural species. (In fact, as I will show in chapters 5-7, at the end of the 
Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty does speak of the human species in a non-reductive 
way.)30   
 Merleau-Ponty unhesitatingly connects our natality to our nature.  For Merleau-
Ponty, the fragility of our natality – our conditioning of beginning and having a 
beginning – is dependent on our nature and the Nature in which we find ourselves.  When 
we begin actions, we initiate them, but our initiation depends on a prior initiation into the 
world.  Beginning means being receptive to beginning. Rather than a flaw or failing of 
the human condition, the fragility inherent in natality is its very potential for creativity.  
Were we not receptive to the world – permeable, affected by the world – then we could 
not act.  As I will show, from the Structure of Behavior through the Phenomenology of 
Perception to “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty emphasizes our active-passive receptivity 
to our world of other things and other selves.  This natal receptivity and fragility depends 
quite directly on our natural, incarnate bodily situation in the world.  All life is “auto-
                                                 
29 In discussing the topic of plurality, I approach the broad and long discussed topic of the Other.  To put it 
bluntly, there are many ways to talk about Others and encountering others: Hegel with the Other who 
constitutes self, Levinas with the (primarily) singular Other that transcends and claims the self; Heidegger 
with a work world that indicates Others and the modality of das Man that conditions the self according to 
Others.  I cannot do justice to all these accounts; for an overview of one path onto this problem see Vincent 
Descombes, Le même et l’autre, translated as Modern French Philosophy.  In emphasizing plurality, I 
merely want to highlight that when we find ourselves related to others through birth, we find a relation to 
many others rather than a singular other(s).  A natality ontology describe life as oriented toward such a 
plurality.   
30 Merleau-Ponty speak of the species as a project before us, rather than a fixed and finished category based 
on morphology.  The key to avoiding reductive errors in speaking of “species” will be, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
words, to notice that “there is not a spirit of the species, but a dialogue” (NC 198).  In other words, “It is 
not a positive being but an interrogative being which defines life” (NC 156).  
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poetic,” self-making.  But human life is poetic: we make products, ideas, and institutions 
that outlive us and exceed us as individuals.  These products include even philosophy 
itself.  We must understand philosophy as a poetic action – with all the associated 
fragility and unpredictability of any natal venture – rather than as a mere effect or fixed 
condition.   
 Despite the anti-naturalism in earlier works such as the Human Condition, in her 
later work Arendt actually makes some interesting comments about natural species and 
their orientation to others which at the very least qualify her earlier position and open 
toward a natal ontology that she shares with Merleau-Ponty.  Like Merleau-Ponty, Arendt 
notes a marked turn from exteriority to interiority in Descartes’s work, and both Arendt 
and Merleau-Ponty find that phenomenology – and even ontology – must turn toward 
appearances: toward literal and metaphorical presentations of exteriority rather than over-
emphasizing invisible, interior of experience. 
 These later connections between Arendt and Merleau-Ponty point toward two 
themes that reoccur through the following study: exteriority and our relation to others. 
We might distinguish ourselves from non-living nature in terms of the finitude of our 
mode of being: our mortality.  A living being enjoys a period of life that concludes in 
death; consciousness of this finitude might prompt activity that offers some immortality 
or evasion of this death.  Connections to other generations would appear in relation to this 
project of death-evasion (See Arendt, Human Condition Ch 1 on immortality, and 
Heidegger, Being and Time, Div II).  Or, we might also distinguish ourselves in terms of 
our interiority: as beings who are born, living things distinguish themselves as being with 
an interior life. Living things are subjects, not mere objects (Henry  “Phénomenologie de 
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la naissance” 126-127). 31  We find there is “something like” being a human, a chimp, or 
a bat, to use the words of Thomas Nagel.  Certainly, there is a truth to the claim that 
humans enjoy a certain reflective interiority, not accessible to rocks and less accessible to 
amoebae.  Yet, there is also a risk in over-identifying with our interiority.   In his Nature 
Courses, Merleau-Ponty points out that since Descartes, there has been a peculiar turning 
away from nature as interior to nature as entirely exterior; human, subjective life becomes 
defined almost solely in terms of its interior reflective activity  
 For Merleau-Ponty both “exteriority” and “totality” have decidedly different 
definitions and connotations than they have through the history of philosophy.32  For 
Merleau-Ponty, it is our very particularity, our very contingency and perception rooted in 
natality that redirects us toward our exteriority, our displaying for others as I discuss in 
chapter 7.  Far from abstract discussions of “the other” or “the gaze,” Merleau-Ponty 
grounds his work in investigations into the very structure and activity of the gaze, 
offering studies of the optical nerves of monkeys and the intrauterine development of 
infants (See SB Ch 1, and my Chapter 1 and 6).  By emphasizing contingency, Merleau-
Ponty expresses a continuity between human life and natural life in general.  Merleau-
Ponty presents an ontology, but it is an ontology with an ethical orientation, an ontology 
that claims that our relation to being is fundamentally conditioned by connaissance and 
comportement, our knowing and being born with others and with a world.  In the pursuit 
                                                 
31 As Henry puts it, a rock merely exists in the world, whereas a snake, a mountain lion, or human appears 
with birth. The rock has a “blind, opaque” mode of being (Henri “Phénomenologie de la Naissance” 126).  
32 It would be an interesting project to compare in-detail Merleau-Ponty’s notions of “totality” and 
“exteriority” to those of Levinas in his “Essay on Exteriority,” as Totality and Infinity is subtitled.  For 
Levinas, totality with its Hegelian rational order has dominated the public sphere, a dominance that leads 
Levinas himself to a turn from the tradition of prioritizing the individual, privacy, and autonomy in favor of 
quite the opposite., skirts detailed engagement with facticity and corporeality in its particularity.  Levinas 
suggest that “ethics is an optics,” but it is specifically an optics of a vision “without an image” (Totality and 
Infinity 23).  Merleau-Ponty would no doubt agree with Levinas in some sense of these terms; an excellent 
project would be to develop the point of their divergence on the issue.  
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and presentation of this ontology, Merleau-Ponty never leaves the ontic world, devoting 
meticulous attention to the details of facticity, from the neural structure of the axolotl to 
the historical role of Trotsky in communism.  This generality always describes a 
multiplicity of others.  Instead of depending on the experience of an other to re-direct us 
toward exteriority, for Merleau-Ponty and Arendt, the very fact of visibility itself 
implicates us in a network of others, both present, past, and future.33 Arendt shows us a 
vision of the true public sphere as the site of unpredictable natality.  Merleau-Ponty 
shows the unpredictability of natality conditioning existence at many levels, from the 
perceptual to the personal.  The very movement of history depends on contingency at a 
prepersonal, “natural” level. A totalizing, rational Hegelian history is simply not a 
possibility in a natural, natal world such as ours. Erasing the line between nature and 
culture allows the unpredictability of natality to permeate through all orders of existence.  
                                                 
33 Although I cannot accomplish it here, it would be interesting to pursue the contrast between these two 
thinkers regarding the il y a and the mode of l’on.  For Levinas, what exists first and foremost is the  “il y 
a” (as for Heidegger the es gibt ), the prepersonal fact of being and ilyeite; for Merleau-Ponty, the ground 
of the fact of being is better described as the anonymous mode of the “one,” “l’on.”   Perhaps the mode of 
the one, though prior to a name and particular subjective qualities, still retains an personal quality not found 
in Levinas’s general fact of being-there.  Although “l’on” is third person neutral, it nonetheless seems more 
“personal” than the il y a of Levinas. 
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Ch1  Of Being Born:  
Connaissance, Comportement and the Structure of Behavior: 
 
“The intention of the organism is to know its life.  ‘Is that right?’  
says the dead man.” – Alice Notley 
 
 
Co-naissance: Natal Knowing 
 Our natality initiates us into nature and culture, into a world of things and of 
others.  But this world does not entirely precede us, and we do not simply step onto the 
world as onto a stage.  As natals, we are not born into the world but with the world; 
insofar as we understand other living beings, we do so through a particular mode of 
knowing conditioned by that co-natality. As Paul Claudel says, “We are not born alone”: 
“Nous ne naissons pas seuls.  Naître, pour tout, c’est connaître.  Toute naissance est une 
connaissance”  (149).  As early as the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes 
that this natal fact – that we are born with others, into a plurality – structures our entire 
mode of being and knowing.   
 In this early text, to distinguish the sort of knowing that arises through 
prereflective perceiving and acting, Merleau-Ponty follows Claudel and chooses the noun 
connaissance.34  The subtlety is lost in the English translation so I reproduce the French, 
followed by the standard translation, here: 
Connaître quelque chose, ce n’est pas seulement se trouver en présence 
d’un ensemble compact de données et pour ainsi dire vivre en lui; cette 
<< co-naissance>>, ce contact aveugle avec un objet singulier, cette 
participation à son existence seraient comme rien dans l’histoire d’un 
esprit, et n’y laisseraient pas plus d’acquisitions et de souvenirs 
disponibles qu’une douleur physique ou qu’un évanouissement, s’ils ne 
contenaient déjà le movement contraire par lequel je me détache de la 
chose pour en appréhender le sens. (La structure du comportement 213) 
 
                                                 
34 I am grateful to David Morris for pointing to this passage in the Structure of Behavior.  
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To know something is not only to find oneself in the presence of a 
compact ensemble of givens and to live in it as it were; this ‘co-nascence’ 
[connaissance], this blind contact with a singular object and this 
participation in its existence would be as nothing in the history of a mind 
and would leave no more acquisitions and available memories in the mind 
than would a physical pain or a fainting spell if the contrary movement by 
which I detach myself from the thing in order to apprehend the meaning 
were not already contained in them. (SB 198) 
 
What does not survive translation is the connotation of natality contained within the 
French term for knowing.  “Connaissance” connotes the manner in which one knows a 
street, a person, or the words to a song through familiarity, rather than the way one 
knows, as in savoir, an answer to a question in mathematics or the question “When did 
the second World War begin?”  Merleau-Ponty uses these various terms over the course 
of his text,35 but in the Structure of Behavior, we find a particularly striking distinction 
and emphasis on connaissance and on comportement.  The emphasis reappears 
throughout his work until the Visible and the Invisible. Playing on Claudel’s use of the 
term, Merleau-Ponty sketches out a connection between knowledge, comportment and 
natality.  This connection, made in his earliest work, sets in motion his natal ontology.  In 
each permutation, connaissance takes on a wider application, exceeding the previous.  In 
the Visible and the Invisible, he cites a passage from Claudel that suggests we even 
encounter time and space – the very First Critique Kantian categories – through 
connaissance:  
From time to time, a man lifts his head, sniffs, listens, considers, 
recognizes his position: he thinks, he sighs, and, drawing his watch from 
the pocket lodged against his chest, looks at the time.  Where am I? and 
                                                 
35 For example, he uses “apprendre” : C’est à la fois dans la psychologie et dans la biologie que 
l’appréhension des structures doit être reconnue comme un genre de savoir irréductible à la 
comprehension des lois (La Structure du Comportement 169).  Alternatively, of the same type of 
understanding of the vital order, he uses “comprendre”: “Mais de toute maniere, comprendre ces entités 
biologiques, ce n’est pas note une série de coincidence empirique” (La Structure du Comportement 171).  
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What time is it? – such is the inexhaustible question turning from us to the 
world?” (Claudel, cited in VI 121) 
 
Already in the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty has begun the project of re-
envisioning existence according to natality that carries through his later ontology.  In 
what follows, I will point out how in this early text, Merleau-Ponty bolsters the 
epistemological and ontological shift associated with human natal knowing with 
examples from the animals world, connections that he will continue to draw in the Nature 
Courses.. 
 Rethinking knowing as co-naissance entails a radical epistemological and 
ontological shift.  As mortality for Heidegger circumscribes and redescribes existence, so 
does natality profoundly condition existence and experience for Merleau-Ponty.  Natality 
destabilizes our concepts of “nature” and “culture”: Merleau-Ponty shows that knowledge 
– which seems to be the cultural acquisition par excellence – has arisen from birth, from 
our natus, our natural emergence into the world.  As Merleau-Ponty later says of 
painting, natality “scrambles all our categories” (EM 130).  When phenomenology admits 
that we are not complete, absolute subjects but born into existence, the standard 
terminology of phenomenology fails existential description.  In the Structure of Behavior, 
Merleau-Ponty points out that attending to natality revises even the most basic categorical 
distinctions of Kant: “as soon as nascent consciousness is taken as the object of analysis 
one realizes that it is impossible to apply to it the celebrated distinction between a priori 
form and empirical content” (SB 171).  Understanding knowledge as connaissance, as 
rooted in natality, means rethinking the very dualisms of “nature” and “culture,” 
“physical” and “personal,” dualisms under which we so often categorize human life and 
animal life.  
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Comportement: Behavior as Bearing-With    
 The French title of The Structure of Behavior – La Structure du Comportement –  
hints at the ambiguous totality of nature and culture that Merleau-Ponty pursues 
throughout this and future projects.  “Comportement” etymologically suggest a bearing 
with, a “com-portement,” alluding to the co-development of the living organism in its 
world that is the subject of the text.  The roughly translated English equivalent 
“comportment” gives a similarly subtle connotation in which the physical and the cultural 
are inseparable; for example, one’s comportment at a party includes both one’s physical 
movements and the cultural appropriateness of those actions.  Rather than “behavior,” I 
will use the English “comportment” whenever possible to highlight the ambiguous, 
dialectical unity that Merleau-Ponty finds definitive of living organisms.36 For Merleau-
Ponty, to understand comportment – whether in practice or in a laboratory – we require a 
very special sort of knowledge, different from the sort we use when understanding 
physical systems.  This is a knowledge not of categories and laws, but of structure: “both 
in psychology and biology, the apprehension of structures should be recognized as a kind 
of knowing which is irreducible to the comprehension of laws” (SB 156).  It is a 
knowledge of the lifeworld.  In short, our connaissance helps us understand 
comportment.  Natal perceivers exercise connaissance as they comport themselves and as 
they understand the comportment of others. 
 At the time that he wrote the Structure of Behavior, printed in 1942 but completed 
by 1938,  materialism and vitalism were still at a stand-off (Sallis “Merleau-Ponty: 
                                                 
36 Eventually, we will return to the terminology of “action” rather than either “behavior” or “conduct,” but 
only after we establish how action is grounded in conduct.  Speaking of an action suggests a choice or 
movement in a specific temporal instance rather than the ongoing, overall movement of life, and this 
extended, on-going, and holistic sense of living behavior is central to Merleau-Ponty’s position. 
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Perception Structure, Language” 1).  In a 1933 preparatory study for the Structure of 
Behavior, the young Merleau-Ponty found that “the present state of neurology, 
experimental psychology (particularly psychopathology) and philosophy” were such that 
his work on the nature of perception was required (Sallis “Merleau-Ponty: Perception 
Structure, Language” 7).  The state of research in the sciences diverged so dramatically 
from the sort of philosophical work in the Neo-Kantian Parisian schools that Merleau-
Ponty felt this demanded an investigation.37  As he saw it, the crux of the conflict was 
how philosophy could follow the progress of critical thought but still absorb the work of 
natural science.  That is, phenomenology should ask itself: “Is there nothing justified in 
the naturalism of science?” (SB 4).  If so, how can phenomenology improve to respond to 
the discoveries of naturalism and natural science?  For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology 
could address this debate in a way that much critical philosophy cannot.  In the present 
century, many working phenomenologists still struggle with just these issues, at once 
affirming research in, for example, neurological accounts of perception, but needing to 
match these results or contest these results with lived experience.38   
 What Merleau-Ponty saw already in these early studies was that in order to 
resolve the work of natural science with the work in philosophy, one would have to 
address the status of nature itself.  By nature, in relation to natural science, we usually, as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, mean “a multiplicity of events external to each other and bound 
together by relations of causality” (SB 3)  This was the case in Merleau-Ponty’s milieu, 
and his definition still fits many working definitions of scientists, as innumerable articles 
in popular press display.  But critical thought – by which he means the post-Kantian 
                                                 
37 See Johnson, “Merleau-Ponty and Kant’s Third Critique.” 
38 For just a few examples, see Naturalizing Phenomenology ed. by Petit, Varela et al, or the March 2008 
issue of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ed. by Shawn Gallagher and Dan Zahavi.  
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tradition, broadly construed 39 – has shown that nature as a system of pure physicality, of 
part on part action, does not appear: “There is then no physical nature in the sense we 
have just given to the word; there is nothing in the world which is foreign to the mind” 
(SB 3).  But what, then, is natural science studying? And what is one referring to when 
one says “nature” in phenomenology?  
 Dissatisfied with this détente between phenomenology and natural science, 
Merleau-Ponty attempts to find an alternative.  To borrow a frequent metaphor, Merleau-
Ponty avoids the Scylla of empiricism and the Charybdis of intellectualism, not by 
threading between them, but by choosing another passage altogether.  Traditional efforts 
to navigate this passage have failed by starting from within a dualism, by assuming that 
one must choose either empiricism or intellectualism or some combination of each: that 
is, by assuming the pre-established, inherited limits of these schools of thought.  Without 
veering from the Scylla of materialism to the Charybdis of idealism, phenomenology 
must make the passage the Gestalt theory could not.  To avoid the dichotomy of idealism 
and realism, phenomenology must see what other epistemological options are brought to 
light by rethinking ourselves as natals bearing ourselves and born with the world.   
 Beginning the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty offers, as alternative to these 
dualisms, a dialectical version of our knowledge of Nature.  This knowledge is a natal 
knowledge, dialectically emerging between organism and environment, action and 
perception. No previous theorists, not even the Gestalt theorists, fully understood “the 
thought of relating the content of human perception to the structure of human action” (SB 
                                                 
39 As John Wild notes in the translator’s introduction, by “critical thought” Merleau-Ponty intends the post-
Kantian tradition in general, but not all the thought of Kant himself.  For example, in an important footnote 
which we will consider in detail, Merleau-Ponty indicts Brunschvicg and even the Kant of the First 
Critique, but not the work in the third critique (see SB x and SB 248 note 41).  
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165).  A theory of perception must change when it is “brought … closer to action” (SB 
165).  Bergson, for example, did not understand that these two theories must dialectically 
emerge; thus, for Bergson, “beyond biological action, there remains only a mystical 
action” (SB 163).  In lieu of a “mystical” account of human action, Merleau-Ponty 
proposes a rigorous phenomenology of the dialectical appearance of our knowledge of 
Nature. 
 He begins this project through a phenomenology of the dialectical emergence of 
connaissance and comportement.  To describe his dialectical alternative to dualism, 
Merleau-Ponty turns to metaphors and similes, crossing between the domains of aesthetic 
and scientific knowing.  He argues that comportment resembles a “kinetic melody gifted 
with meaning” (SB 130) or even more precisely, “a melody which sings itself” (SB 159). 
Comportment is “no more composed of parts which can be distinguished in it than a 
melody (always transferable) is made of the particular notes which are its momentary 
expression” (SB 132).  He even argues that even the entire “world, in those of its sectors 
which realize a structure, is comparable to a symphony” (SB 132).   
 Neither Gestalt theory alone nor behaviorism, neither the orders of the “pour soi” 
or the “en soi,” nor that of idea nor thing reveals comportment: “Behavior 
(comportement), inasmuch as it has a structure, is not situated in either of these two 
orders” (SB 125).  Gestalt psychology mistakes the terms of this analogy between 
comportment and the melody.  The Gestalt theorist Koffka, cited by Merleau-Ponty, 
suggests that knowledge of this world-symphony could be acquired in two ways: by 
either diachronically or synchronically tracking the notes played by each instrument (SB 
132).  Analogically, this suggests that knowledge can be had by matching comportment 
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to the movement of parts in time and whole systems to the set of parts engaged at any one 
time.  That is, Koffka suggests that a biologist could study animal comportment by 
simply tracking an abstract pattern of movement.  But Koffka forgets that in order to 
begin such research, the biologist would already have to have identified the animal as 
animal, as alive and meaningful for her project of study.  In oversimplifying the analogy 
in this claim, the Gestalt theorist misses the “Gestalt” of the analogy.  A symphony does 
not have meaning when viewed simply as a pattern; before looking for any instruments or 
players, one would have to have a sense of what a symphony in general is doing.  Gestalt 
psychology remains trapped in materialism, forgetting the meaning of the situation that 
motivates the working scientist.  Merleau-Ponty solicits a particular epistemological shift 
in working scientists and philosophers toward recognizing the living significance of 
action in its situation (SB 161).  
 Theorists like Pavlov claim to have understood behavior purely in physiological 
terms according to a stimulus-response model that, although more complex, is still a 
“chain of automatic reactions” (SB 52).  In fact, Merleau-Ponty argues that despite 
Pavlov’s claims of accessing pure physiology, even Pavlov started with a study of 
comportment.  Before Pavlov entered a laboratory, Pavlov had encountered dogs and any 
number of other living, moving, intending animals.  Pavlov was born in and with a world 
of animals that comport themselves.  Pavlov began his study of physiology after his 
initiation into a natal world. Merleau-Ponty argues that Pavlov could not start with pure 
physiology because “nobody can in fact start with physiology” (SB 60).  The purely 
physical is an abstraction that appears only in reflection, not in the living experience that 
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initiates scientific inquiry.   Nature in itself does not appear even in the laboratory; it is an 
artifact of reflection on the processes witnessed therein.   
 Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that he is definitely not “constructing a metaphysics 
of nature” (SB 161).  Rather, he makes an argument about the emergence of knowledge 
from natal beings through a prereflective bearing-with (comportment in) the world.  This 
natality of knowing conditions understanding not only at the moment of birth, but into the 
laboratory; our co-naissance and comportment motivate us to enter the laboratory.  In 
understanding the total activity of living organisms, we cannot neatly separate the 
physical and mental, natural and cultural. That is, “one cannot discern in animal behavior 
something like a first layer of reactions which would correspond to the physical” (SB 
129).   The “purely” physical does not appear in animal behavior; if Nature were 
equivalent to the purely physical, then pure nature is not discernable in animal behavior 
either.  If Nature does appear, then it is not equivalent to the purely physical.   
 Merleau-Ponty offers much more than criticism in the Structure of Behavior. As 
Alphonse de Waelhens points out in his forward to this text, one might be tempted to say 
that “The Structure of Behavior is above all a negative work which attempts to show the 
inanity or the inadequacy of the answer to the problems of our behavior which are 
contributed by laboratory psychology” (SB xxv).  But this oversimplification of the text 
“would be to restrict outrageously the scope of this book” (SB xxv).  In this early text, 
Merleau-Ponty is concerned with showing the structures of the life world, with showing 
that a scientist, like any person, “spontaneously thinks in terms of an ontology” (xxvii).  
The scientist has grown into this ontological position from her birth; she does not set it 
aside when she walks into the laboratory.  But – to return to de Waelhen’s point – this is 
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not a critique of the scientist per se, a suggestion that she ought to forego all knowledge 
as savoir for connaissance, but it is an argument that philosophy, reflecting on the 
activity of science, should view the scientist as natal and consider the activity of science 
as a natal project.40 
 The Structure of Behavior not only refutes Pavlovian theory of behavior as 
stimulus and response, but proposes an alternative view of an organism as natally 1) 
situated in an environment and 2) motivated.  The reason that an organism’s “pure” 
Nature cannot be located is that an organism naturally appears in an environment, an 
Umwelt.  The organism maintains a dialectical relation with its environment; nature 
occurs in this dialectic, not in abstraction from it.  Pavlovian behaviorism assumes that it 
can understand an organism’s nature outside of the world.  The behaviorist assumes that 
the environment acts on organisms in a straightforward way: a stimulus from the world 
evokes a response from the organism.  The world acts, and the organism re-acts.  But this 
is where living beings differ from non-living systems.  Living organisms do not come 
with ready-made, innate perceptual and action apparati; the world elicits perception and 
action together.  Natural sciences study not things set on top of the world like pieces on a 
game board, but organisms born in environments (SB 129).  An environment, an Umwelt, 
is a meaningful surrounding but it is not totally pre-given or pre-established: in its 
natality, the organism elicits from and is solicited by its environment.  Conduct is not like 
“a key with its lock,” nor is it an “effect” of the world (SB 130).  A physical system tends 
toward rest (SB 147) and can withstand disruption and displacement in space and time.  
                                                 
40 M.C. Dillon argues that Merleau-Ponty’s later explicit ontological project can be seen as implicit in the 
Phenomenology (85).  I extend this claim to include the Structure of Behavior.  
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Unlike physical systems, living organisms pursue and sustain dialectical relation with the 
environment (SB 148). 
 Motivated organisms seek out their world rather than simply reacting to it.  Rather 
than viewing organisms as passive objects stimulated by other external objects in a one-
way causal relation, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we ought to understand the organism as 
engaging “prospective” action (SB 9).  Such animal “prospective action” refers to what 
we might also call more broadly “motivated action.” This sort of action differs from the 
“neutral” action that behaviorism sees; it is the difference between, for example, the 
event of being presented with a glass of water and the event of going looking for a glass 
of water.  If you go looking for a glass of water, the action bears out some total 
signification of in your world; you desired water for some reason.  You did not merely 
react to the presence or non-presence of water in your environment.  A frog grabs at a fly 
because he wants to eat the fly.  This presents a sort of Meno’s paradox41 to behaviorism: 
Prior to the frog seeing the fly, the fly has not “stimulated” the frog. How could a frog be 
stimulated by a fly unless it was stimulatable by flies?  Only prospective action describes 
that the frog does not look neutrally about itself – scanning indifferently for any thing – 
but it looks for flies.  Merleau-Ponty describes this example: 
If I am in a dark room and a luminous spot appears on the wall and moves 
along, I would say that it has ‘attracted’ my attention … Grasped from the 
inside, my behavior appears as directed, as gifted with an intention and 
meaning. (SB 7) 
 
This “gift” of intention is the motivation with which an organism is born.  We cannot 
understand this motivated movement without looking at the environment in which it 
appears.  While it is hard not to focus on a light in a dark room, by contrast it is “very 
                                                 
41 Dillon presents Meno’s paradox as paradigmatic of the sorts of problems that strict empiricism and 
intellectualism fail to address (1-34).  
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difficult to fixate an object in a landscape illuminated by daylight for very long” (SB 36).  
In each case, the environment alters our very perception of the situation and likewise our 
motor action.  A few more examples from Structure of Behavior should help to clarify 
what motivated,  “prospective” action is like.  If  
in a monkey, the internal muscles of the eyeballs are connected with the 
nerve fibers which ordinarily govern the external muscles and these latter, 
on the other hand, with the nerve fibers which habitually govern the 
former, when the animal is placed in a dark room it [still] turns its eyes 
correctly toward a luminous spot (SB 38). 
 
That is, despite the rearrangement of its visual anatomy, the monkey performs the same 
comportment.  The monkey’s physical construction is not like a key in the lock of the 
environment.  Not only is the monkey motivated by the world, but a certain momentum 
carries through the monkey’s comportment.   The momentum of the monkey’s 
comportment carries through changes in its physical structure.  This momentum is what a 
materialist behaviorism cannot well-represent.  It would seem, according to a Pavlovian 
model, that with a different physical construction, the monkey would simply re-act 
differently to its context.  Instead, it seems that the monkey’s comportment is more 
closely associated with its environment; the monkey, in a dark room, has a tendency 
toward a sort of comportment.  Consider another case: if the legs of a certain beetle are 
removed, the stump of the beetle will continue to walk, finding “a new mode of 
locomotion” (SB 39).  The anatomy does not predetermine these animals’ conducts: 
rather, the global structure overrides the local anatomical functions.   Conduct is like a 
piece that is being played on the piano before the moment of the experiment and carries 
on after.  Pavlovian behaviorism cannot describe how new – yet relevant –comportment 
is possible.  The monkey and the beetle do not simply play a pregiven piece; rather, like a 
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jazz musician or a violinist reaching a cadenza, the monkey and beetle can improvise 
with in a range of relevant comportment.  How is it that, through new physiological and 
neurological patterns, an organism generates new methods for existing behavior?  This is 
the question that a natal perspective raises.  
 With a host of examples that I will not repeat here (See SB, Chapters 2 – 3), 
Merleau-Ponty shows how stimulus-response theory has failed as a scientific theory for 
describing behavior.  He summarizes the research in this passage: 
Thus the reflex – effect of pathological disassociation characteristic not of 
the fundamental activity of the living being but of experimental apparatus 
which we use for studying it or a luxury activity developed later in 
ontogenesis as well as phylogenesis – cannot be considered as a 
constituent element of animal behavior. (SB 45) 
 
In a laboratory, it seems that the only thing prompting an animal to act is a stimulus and 
that the only thing an animal can do is passively respond.  But this is a result of the 
restricted environment of the laboratory.42  As the other experiment cited above shows, 
the organism actually has a momentum of comportment that carries over into many 
situations.  Given a different environment, the animal realizes its general bearing toward 
the world through different physiological means.  
 From a simplistic teleology or pseudo-evolutionary biological perspective, we 
might think that organisms have developed to follow certain simple behaviors.  For 
example, people tend to walk on their feet and grasp with their hands; it seems “simpler” 
to do this.  But that oversimplifies the situation – and I mean, precisely, the totality of the 
situation – in which a person walks and grasps.  This situation forms the environment – 
the Umwelt, the world-context – in which the organism was born. The momentum of 
                                                 
42 I am grateful to Noah Moss-Brender for clarifying this point; he describes the stimulus as an “artifact” of 
the laboratory.  
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behavior means that “an order without anatomical guarantee is realized by means of 
continuing organization” (SB 207).  It is not that “simple behaviors are preferred but that 
preferred behaviors are simple” (SB 147).  That an organism was born into an 
environment conditions its entire bearing, its comportment at all times.  The organism 
always com-ports itself: it always bears itself with the world into which it was born.  It 
never “just behaves,” passively reacting to an arbitrary external world.  The animal’s 
forms of comportment accord with a general style of activity, not because certain 
physical “parts” made a whole action easier or because some action required particular 
parts. 
 In his refutation of Pavlov, Merleau-Ponty expresses a crucial insight that informs 
all his later work, and indeed ought to inform our current response to either overly 
empiricist or idealistic descriptions of human nature.  In living beings, perception and 
action are inseparable.  In actual living situations, “the sensorium and motorium function 
as part of a single organism” (SB 36) and not like two static systems running parallel; 
these systems coevolve.   Thus, if what we intend to do is to “think what we are doing,” 
as Arendt put it, and perform a phenomenology of action, then we cannot do this properly 
without a phenomenology of perception.  Moreover, these two theories cannot be 
formulated independently but must co-emerge; we cannot let “science” take care of 
perception while ethicists deal with “action.”  Neither a Cartesian dualism of mind and 
body nor a first critique Kantian dichotomy of an understanding completely distinct from 
sensation is possible in this model.43    
 
                                                 
43 This is a radical revision of the relation between perception and action; many recent studies bear out the 
correctness of these insights (c.f. Nöe Action and Perception), but perhaps fail to take on the ethical 
implications of these revised theories of perception. 
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Human Natality and Connaissance 
 Though Structure of Behavior includes many examples from the animal world, 
Merleau-Ponty also pays close attention to human natality. Merleau-Ponty always 
maintains a distinction between animal conduct and human conduct.  As he clarifies later, 
he has “expressly said that man perceives in a way different from any animal” (PrimP 
25).   Nonetheless, details from animal and prereflective human life reveal “to us the 
permanent data of the problem which culture attempts to resolve” (PrimP 25).  As living 
organisms, animals and humans are both natural, natus, born.  For Merleau-Ponty, 
affirming this continuity of human life with other life forms is very important to the 
progress of phenomenology; to fail to see the differences between conscious living beings 
and all living beings is to make the same mistake as not seeing the fundamental 
difference between living and non-living beings.  At the same time, he never loses sight 
of the fact that humans do complicate their comportment and world-relations in ways that 
animals do not, through, for example, language and tool-making.44   Human beings have 
not only environments but worlds.  Gestalt psychology failed to see this difference of 
kind and not only in degree.  Consciousness is just one more natural structure for Gestalt 
theory which stays within “the tradition of materialism” (SB 136).  This materialistic 
model does not distinguish the total worldview shifts that happen at various orders of 
being, from physical to biological to human. 45   
                                                 
44 In the Nature Courses, as we shall see, Merleau-Ponty makes a slight shift from this attention to the 
uniqueness of the human order per se and turns again to the uniqueness of the living order in general.  
45 For Gestalt theory, “the fact of becoming conscious adds nothing to the physical structures” (SB 136).  
The essentially problematic assumption of the Gestalt theorists for Merleau-Ponty is the postulation of a 
linear continuity from the physical, molecular level to the level of consciousness.  If there is continuity, it is 
like the continuity of geometrical space between point and point, line and line, and plane and plane; but as 
we add each dimension to this analogy, we find that postulating continuity hardly suffices to describe the 
new possibilities of relation and structure.   
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 Human existence makes such intergenerational, interpersonal natal conditioning 
possible in a way not possible for animals.  Humans, for example, make tools intended to 
train future generations or “for preparing others” (SB 175).  These tools meaningfully and 
prereflectively structure the activity using them.  Humans can perceive two orders of 
being at once and retain them. We can perceive a stick as a stick and also the stick as a 
tool for doing something else; when a chimp has finished using a stick as a tool, the stick 
returns to a single order of being (SB 175).  We might think of the classic Heideggerian 
example of the hammer in a workshop as meaningful first as a tool at hand rather than 
some pure object in-itself.  Merleau-Ponty offers his own example of the meaningful 
situation of a football field for the play; the field is not just grass, but a meaningful 
domain of action (SB 168).  The field is meaningfully structured for the player; the grass 
as nature “in-itself” fades in favor of the meaning of the game being played.46 
 But for Merleau-Ponty, better than all these examples of adult perception is the 
perception of children.  The perception of children exemplifies this double vision.  
Heidegger, in overlooking this example, misses some of the epistemological shifts that 
Merleau-Ponty will make by understanding how judgment is rooted in “nascent 
perception.” What is under revision in these investigations is not “child psychology” per 
se; rather, studying children’s nascent perception entails an overall modification of our 
views of action and perception in general.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “we propose to 
show that the descriptive dimension of nascent perception demands a reformulation of the 
notion of consciousness” (SB 169).  Just as the Heideggerian mode of being-at-hand 
appears for all Da-sein, nascent perception conditions all human action and existence, not 
just that of childhood.  The childhood “mode of aesthetic perception which appears 
                                                 
46 See also Thompson 76-77 on how work changes the milieu of the organism. 
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absurd to so many adults should not for this reason be made a part of primitive 
perception” (SB 167).  Our natal perceptual entrances into a world conditioned by a 
plurality conditions all proceeding existence.   
 Children’s perception exemplifies the sort of natally conditioned knowing that 
Merleau-Ponty sees happening in all sorts of adult human activity, from everyday 
perception to scientific judgments.  To children’s perception, the so-called “purely 
natural” or purely physical hardly ever appears: “Nature is perhaps grasped initially only 
as that minimum stage setting which is necessary for the performance of a human drama” 
(SB 168).  Nature in itself does not appear in perception because perception happens with 
action; we do not first need “pure nature” and thus it does not appear.  We need comfort, 
food, affection, learning, all of which we reach out for with our little fists.  When 
children, especially infants, look around the world, they are first and foremost concerned 
with other humans.  Even more specifically, infants concern themselves with the nearest 
human, often the mother: “infantile perception attaches itself first of all to faces and 
gestures, in particular to those of the mother” (SB 166). Before a child can differentiate 
particular colors, recall names, or generalize concepts, a child can identify a face as 
meaningful.  Human perception orients itself, “has as its original object, not the 
‘unorganized mass,’ but the actions of other human subjects” (SB 166). 
 In living experience, humans encounter others first not as a set of qualities or 
characteristics, but as already meaningful living wholes, soliciting action.  Children do 
not need to imaginatively vary and transpose, part by external part, the actions of the 
adult before them onto their own body.  Instead, the body schema of the adult naturally 
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matches their own.  Instead of re-presenting parts of an adult body and inferring meaning, 
a child absorbs meaning in the perceptual action of imitation: 
It is not the resemblance of our own gestures to the gestures of other 
persons which can give to these latter their expressive value: a child 
understands the joyful meaning of a smile long before having seen his own 
smile, that of menacing or melancholy mimicry which he has never 
executed and to which his own experience can furnish no content. (SB 
156) 
 
Merleau-Ponty here begins to establish a thesis that carries forward to the later work: 
prior to reflection and prior even to reflective vision of her own body, a child can 
understand the meaning of an other’s smile.  That is, a child acts on a prereflective, 
natally given sort of knowing: a connaissance.  By the sheer fact of having been born, a 
child can access an anonymous mode of being that gives meaning to an other’s face and 
presents the child herself with a possible range of meaningful actions.  
 In the Structure of Behavior, he makes only the above, brief but far reaching 
claim about childhood; beyond this paragraph he does not develop the implications of 
this prereflective tendency to mimicry.  We will have to trace these nascent thoughts into 
later texts to see the full implication of this attention to child behavior, not forgetting to 
address the fact that we encounter not only meaningful gestures of other people, but we 
encounter speaking others. For the moment, however, it is important to note that by virtue 
of our natality and prior to reflection, we see another in ourselves and vice versa, and the 
world calls out for action.  To defer the problem of relating to others – to see it as 
posterior to the intellectual piecing together of linguistic structures – ignores a more 
fundamental openness to the other and the world.  The world – and our immediate 
environment – interests us: not only are we caught up in a momentum initiated before our 
natality, but we are motivated to act by others.  We understand people not as a collection 
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of qualities that we categorically compile together; rather we understand people through a 
total invested attention to the whole, meaningful movement of human life.  We know – 
connaître – people differently but also earlier than we know – savoir – the answer to a 
test question.  This sort of knowing appears not all at once, out of the blue with clarity 
and distinctness like Cartesian ideas, but from a history of familiarity with a certain 
situation. 
 When I reach for my coat at a party, signifying my readiness to leave, my partner 
responds to my natural and cultural gestures as one meaning; in this gesture the dialectic 
of nature and culture, part and whole, appears in the total action of comportment.  She or 
he understands my comportment through familiarity.  This action does not appear at the 
molecular level of synapses, but at the level of macroscopic motion in the world.  For 
example, both of my physical hands and the activity of “grasping” dialectically depend 
on one another and a world: I have hands because I grasp and grasp because I have hands, 
because I was born into a world that admits of grasping.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it more 
clearly later, “we discover between the situation and the response an internal articulation 
that we understand, but that we cannot reduce to its elements” (NC 140).  Perhaps most 
importantly, I do not have to reflect on my comportment in order to bear myself toward 
my world.  We receive the environment and orient ourselves in the environment through 
an odd combination of passivity and activity (See SB 249).   
 Phenomenological attention to childhood helps show our relation to the world that 
is covered over with adulthood and, more broadly, by objectifying scientific perspectives.  
As adults – whether we are at a dinner party or in a laboratory – when we exercise 
knowledge of other living beings’ comportments, we draw on this co-naissance.   
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 Connaissance and Judgment: From Dualism to Dialectic  
  Like other natural beings, we are born; our connaissance of living comportment 
is thus no coincidence, nor is it illusion.  In Merleau-Ponty’s view, we do not simply 
project meaning structures on the world of living organisms or the physical world.  In 
fact, he argues: 
Every theory of ‘projection,’ be it empiricist or intellectualist, presupposes 
what it tries to explain, since we could not project our feelings into the 
visible behavior of an animal if something in this behavior itself did not 
suggest the inference to us. (SB 156) 
 
Something in the comportment of an animal calls out to our understanding.  But if 
something in the animal comportment in itself calls out for attention, must it not have 
some principle immanent to itself? That is, are we not returning to an Aristotelian-like 
teleological model of understanding comportment?  
 To return to the symphony analogy, are we suggesting the meaningful world is 
orchestrated by some creator?  To extend the analogy in that direction would push 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective to one of divine creation and teleology, 
in its most simplistic of an Aristotelian or medieval finalism.  The world has a certain 
order and meaning because it was put here.  But Merleau-Ponty clearly states that he does 
not advocate a traditional teleological model: the structure of comportment is not in the 
world but for a perceiver (SB 142).  The world has form when we perceive it.  He 
explicitly rejects “both mechanism and finalism,” because “the organism does not 
conspire to actualize an idea, and the mental is not a motor principle in the body” (SB 
184).  This simplistic sense of “finalism” fails to understand that we cannot locate 
behavior in the object or organism: the structure of behavior appears to human 
62 
 
consciousness.  The phenomenological method helps us escape from an Aristotelian 
teleology.  Gestalt psychologists, failing to grasp the profundity of their own their theory, 
slipped into a nearly Aristotelian model of nature; because they did not grasp the total 
shift that happens with living organisms and saw total continuity between the physical 
and vital order, they suggest “that structures can be found in a nature taken in-itself (en 
soi) and that mind can be constituted from them” (SB 138).  Gestalt theorists did not 
make the Kantian Copernican turn.  They forgot that natural forms appear to us.   
 But has Merleau-Ponty, in making this turn, then not turned toward a Kantian 
idealism?  In fact, Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Kant, particularly on this issue of our 
judgment of natural forms, is a complex one.  As Galen Johnson as shown, Merleau-
Ponty does indeed reject the Kantian position of the First Critique; nonetheless, Merleau-
Ponty actively and consistently engages with Kant’s Third Critique throughout his  
career. 47  This engagement, as Johnson argues, points to an affinity between Merleau-
Ponty’s epistemological position and that of Kant’s later position. 48  Consider Merleau-
Ponty’s own comments on the subject as early as the Structure of Behavior: he remarks 
that while rejecting a classical teleology, he does believe that “Kantian philosophy… 
particularly in the Critique of Judgment contains essential indications concerning the 
problems of which it is a question here” (SB 248 nt. 41).  Those problems are the relation 
of “causal thinking,” “the transcendental attitude,” “signification,” “structure,” and 
“Gestalt” (SB 206).  Thus, while the Copernican turn as expressed in the First Critique 
                                                 
47 For such a complete study, see Johnson The Retrieval of the Beautiful: Thinking Through Merleau-
Ponty’s Aesthetics  and “ Merleau-Ponty and Kant’s Third Critique: The Beautiful and the Sublime.” 
48 My interpretation of Kant here assumes that the Third Critique is disruptive of the Kantian system.  This 
is not a novel reading of Kant but it is not the only position one might take on the status of the Third 
Critique.  I am selecting the second among basically two camps: 1) the Third Critique is consistent with the 
First and Second (e.g. Henry Allison) and 2) the Third critique is innovative and/or disruptive (e.g. Jay 
Bernstein, John Sallis, Paul Guyer).   I do not have the space to fully defend my position here, but for a full 
study of the reasons to see the Critique of Judgment as a radical departure, see Guyer and Sallis. 
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might restrict us to an unmediated idealism, the model in the Third Critique addresses 
just the sort of knowing we exercise when apprehending natural forms, including 
comportment.  Just as the connection between the first half of the Third Critique, on 
beauty, and the second half, on nature, has profound implications for Kant, the 
connection between the melody and comportment is no mere passing analogy for 
Merleau-Ponty; rather, it suggests that in understanding comportment, we exercise a sort 
of knowing akin to aesthetic judgment.   
 Like Kant’s in the Third Critique, Merleau-Ponty’s position in the Structure of 
Behavior suggests that human perception apprehends an aesthetic stylization in 
comportment.  Any one moment of comportment indicates a certain principle that 
exceeds and precedes that moment.  Comportment, like the beautiful, points beyond 
itself.  Johnson writes:  
Kant’s doctrine of an aesthetic common sense posits Nature as a system 
whose principle we do not find anywhere in the categories of the 
understanding, the principle of purposiveness. Kant wrote: ‘Under this 
principle, appearances must be judged as belonging not merely to nature 
as governed by its purposeless mechanism, but also to [nature considered 
by] analogy with art’ (Kant, 1987, §23, p. 99). (Johnson “Merleau-Ponty 
and Kant’s Third Critique” pp. TBD).   
 
When I apprehend a beautiful object, according to Kant, I know that its form appears to 
me subjectively, and yet I claim that others must see this form and judge it as I do.49   I 
do not find the conduct of an animal merely agreeable, I find it purposive: the animal’s 
comportment suggests a principle that others can apprehend.  What Merleau-Ponty adds 
to Kant’s position – among many things – is an identification of this sort of knowing, our 
connaissance of natural forms, with our natality.  Our natality initiates us into a world 
                                                 
49 For a more detailed and relevant summary of Kant, see Johnson Retrieving the Beautiful.  
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apparently prepared for our judgment; our natal connection to our world and to others 
suggests to us that others ought to understand the judgments we make of our perception.   
 What receives only a few sentences of reference in this text expands into chapters 
in the Phenomenology.  Merleau-Ponty struggles to find a way out of Kant’s 
epistemological dualism in the First Critique; the alternative to dualism depends on 
viewing knowing as rooted in natality, as connaissance.  Already in the Structure of 
Behavior, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the connaissance we have of an animal’s 
comportement is not limited to understanding animal comportment per se; instead, we 
exercise connaissance in many orders of the life world.  He explains:  
This method of organization of experience is not exclusive to biological 
knowledge.  In history, to understand is also to break up the global 
ensemble of concrete events according to categories, then attempt to rejoin 
the real unity from which one has started. (SB 152)  
 
He even extends this epistemological and ontological shift farther than biology, 
psychology, and history.  He makes the broad claim that the connaissance of living 
beings relies on “a general attitude toward certain categories of objects, perhaps even 
toward all things” (SB 158).  He also call this general attitude of apprehending general 
living activity a “determination of essences” that “is practiced all the time by scientists 
although it is not recognized as such” (SB 244 note 69).   
 In order to escape Kantian dualism – and indeed any dualism – Merleau-Ponty 
argues that phenomenology must rethink knowledge of natural forms as dialectical. Natal 
knowing, connaissance, like comportment, emerges dialectically between an organism 
and its environment.   
  Having redefined natural knowing in terms of a dialectic, we might then ask 
whether Merleau-Ponty has not simply followed critical thought beyond Kant and 
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through Hegel.  If we have left idealism for a dialectic, have we not adopted a sort of 
Hegelianism? Merleau-Ponty does acknowledge that “the notion of ‘Gestalt’ has led us 
back to its Hegelian meaning” (SB 210).  But while Hegel provides an essential critique 
that makes a move toward the dialectic possible, it is not Hegel’s dialectic that describes 
Nature for Merleau-Ponty.  For Hegel, “Nature … is the exterior of a concept” (SB 210).  
Merleau-Ponty affirms that the analogical relation between a living organism and 
consciousness of Nature is likewise analogical to the relation between word and concept 
(SB 210).  But in his model, words are not mere clothing for concepts; the concept as 
concept “has no exterior” (SB 210).  Consciousness “experiences its inherence in an 
organism at each moment” (SB 208).  
 Echoing Hegel, Merleau-Ponty might say “Here is the rose, dance here” (Hegel 
Introduction to Philosophy of Right).  We must attend to the problem of the world as it 
appears to us, here and now, under these historical conditions.  But Merleau-Ponty would 
add further emphasis to the phrase: we are to dance here. We dance with hips, shoulders, 
and body, not only with “consciousness.”  Phenomenology understands the importance of 
the lexical, of “this” world, this life, in which “reference is included in meaning” (SB 
212).  Phenomenology converts worries about knowing particular objects and objectivity 
to emphasis on a general “knowing about the world” that exceeds perception of particular 
objects (SB 212).  From this generalized stance of being in the world, “when I pronounce 
the word ‘this,’ I already relate a singular and lived existence to the essence of lived 
existence” and “these acts of expression or reflection intend an original text which cannot 
be deprived of meaning” (SB 211).  I cannot find way out of the world in order to 
encounter only single objects, single consciousness.  Further, phenomenology notes the 
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mode of givenness and not only the objective content as given.  We take up a 
transcendental attitude in reflection, but it is a phenomenological transcendental attitude 
which does not presume that it can exhaust its subject.  History is not behind us, as for 
Hegel, but before us (SB 206).  And this is the history not of a movement of world spirit 
but “intelligibility in the nascent state” (SB 207).   
 Neither has Merleau-Ponty turned from Hegel to a simplistic naturalism.  In a 
concluding chapter of the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty asks explicitly, “Is There 
Not a Truth of Naturalism?”  He responds that there is a truth of naturalism, but it is true 
only insofar as we have reconceived nature as a dialectical whole (In the later work, 
Merleau-Ponty will re-envision this dialectical whole shift to a dynamic principle and 
eventually to the “flesh”). Where the Hegelian dialectical awakening of consciousness 
happens once and for all in history, the phenomenological dialectic between nature and 
culture appears in all action.  Philosophy cannot rest in its maturity, like Hegel secure in a 
reflective vision of its past.  Phenomenology must return to the prereflective life, the birth 
of thought and action.  Phenomenology, performed and written by natal beings, cannot 
define and comprehend “nature” once and for all any more than we can comprehend 
another person friend or partner “once and for all.”  Rather, Nature defines a sort of 
conversational relationship that, as a natal phenomenologist, I cannot finish but must 
continue to take up.  I am drawn into a co-existence with Nature: 
As we have seen, the behavior of another expresses a certain manner of 
existing before signifying a certain manner of thinking.  And when this 
behavior is addressed to me, as may happen in dialogue … I am then draw 
into a coexistence. (SB 222) 
 
This prereflective, affirmative natal co-existence establishes the ethos in which Merleau-
Ponty’s natal ontology appears.  Again, as Claudel says, we are not born alone.    
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 El Greco’s Freedom  
 Bound as we are to this co-existence, we might begin to wonder what freedom we 
have in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.  Does our natality give us so much momentum that 
we cannot change our path?  Do the others with whom I am born compel me to action?  
In the conclusion of the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty considers a pathological 
condition and the possible conclusions one might draw from it regarding perception and 
freedom in general.  These conclusions – regarding freedom and natality – in the 
Structure of Behavior are less conclusions than signposts that point in the direction of the 
human order and associated complications. This text is only preparation for the rest of the 
philosophical work to be done, applying the revised theory of perception more and more 
widely.   
 Working in broad strokes, in only a few pages, Merleau-Ponty identifies the scope 
of ideas he intends to come under revision: moral theory, death, love of life, and what he 
calls the “staking of a life,” or what we might see as ethically or politically committed 
action (SB 224).  His theory of perception cuts so deeply that he believes “If one 
understands by perception the act which makes us know existence, all the problems 
which I have just touched on are reducible to the problem of perception” (SB 224).  
Perhaps instead of “reducible to,” he might better have described the problem of 
perception as “expanded to” include all these other problems; in either case, he intends 
the vision expressed in the Structure of Behavior to ramify to all corners of philosophy.  
 For example, with this new perspective on perception, he claims that 
phenomenology can revise “moral theory” which had, until his work, generally attributed 
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some a-situational, a-cosmic freedom to the acting subject (SB 223).  Though Merleau-
Ponty hardly offers an entirely new moral theory in these pages, he does begin to sketch 
out how his natal ontology would entail a different notion of freedom.  Freedom, like 
nature and culture, understanding and sensibility, often appears as part of a dualistic 
division of the subject; such dualisms are all disrupted by a natal ontology, freedom and 
nature not excepted.   
 How then might we begin to rethink freedom in a natal ontology?  Merleau-Ponty 
offers an excellent anecdotal problem that cuts across the various disciplines and domains 
under consideration: the origin of El Greco’s paintings.  El Greco infamously painted 
elongated and distorted figures; scholars attempted to attribute the cause of his strange 
style to a certain pathology of vision.  They argued that El Greco’s extreme astigmatism 
“caused” him to see people as stretched out and thus to translate that vision directly to the 
canvas.50  In this case, we have to ask ourselves if El Greco was free to paint as he did: 
Was he free to paint distorted bodies or did he have to paint this way if he was to paint at 
all?  Was his painting revolutionary because he was a great artistic visionary or simply 
because he had strange vision and an ordinary-sized artistic talent for reproducing it on 
the page?  To return to Arendt’s question in the Human Condition, how can we think 
what El Greco was doing? Could El Greco himself think what he was doing or did he 
only do what he had to do?  
                                                 
50 In fact, as recent scholarship has shown, El Greco did not likely have astigmatism; his early work shows 
an artist capable of representing “normal” perception at the same time that he drew the elongated figures 
(c.f. Davies El Greco).  While this does not exactly bear out Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that assumes with his 
opponents a pathology of the visual field, it does sync with his overall position and his later aesthetic theory 
in which painting is always self-portraiture and presentation of perception.  What El Greco painted was his 
perception of his subjects as he perceived them, but this “perception” includes his general style and history 
of being in the world, not just his visual perspective (normal or pathological) onto that world.   
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 The standard scholarship of Merleau-Ponty’s day would argue that it is 
“nevertheless the body … which in the final analysis explains El Greco’s vision; his 
liberty consisted only in justifying this accident of nature by infusing it with a 
metaphysical meaning” (SB 203).  But this would leave us with a poor account of both 
freedom and the body.  
 If El Greco suffered this restriction on his liberty by his body, then we all suffer it, 
Merleau-Ponty concludes.  In Merleau-Ponty’s view it is not “a paradox to say that ‘El 
Greco was astigmatic because he produced elongated bodies’” (SB 203).  Whatever the 
actual facts of El Greco’s physiology, this statement does seem to paradoxically invert 
many standard views of the body.  It would seem that our physical structure to some 
degree decides for us our action; in El Greco’s case that would mean his physiology 
decided how he would paint.  But Merleau-Ponty disputes this position: There is not a 
“physiological explanation” for his paintings. As he has demonstrated throughout his 
work, the purely physiological never appears.  The purely physiological level of vision is 
a “stereotyped unity” (SB 203).  This does not mean that we dismiss the role of physical 
eyes in seeing, but it does mean that we see the activity of vision as part of a larger 
prospective and expressive activity of the human organism.  El Greco was already 
motivated to paint before the problem of his vision was seen in reflective scholarship.  If 
we do not take into account this broader relation to his milieu, then we can see freedom in 
any activity.  In that case a person could be considered free under any external 
conditions; we might even say that subject “realizes unity in slavery” (SB 203).51  The 
body enslaved El Greco, if we see it as an external condition imposed on a mind; in that 
                                                 
51 In the concluding chapters of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty returns to this example of 
the mistake that could lead one to consider a slave as free.  
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case, we could only be free if we could leave our bodies (SB 204).  Instead, Merleau-
Ponty argues, if we are ever free, then we are free as bodies in the world.   
 Via this new vision of the natural body, Merleau-Ponty believes that 
phenomenology has arrived at a new vision of freedom.  In fact, Merleau-Ponty has only 
gestured at an account of freedom in this early text.   But even in his brief concluding 
remarks, he fully recognizes the momentum of his work, although he only begins to 
discuss the consequences in the final pages of the Structure of Behavior.  He sees that his 
theory of perception ramifies into a theory of action: we cannot stop the discussion here, 
but rather are drawn into a discussion of as he puts it here “moral theory” or as I would 
put it, into a discussion of ethics.   
 How does a natal ontology open into ethics?  We will not fully answer that 
question here.  But let us consider what Merleau-Ponty sees as a possibility, as of the 
Structure of Behavior.  He frames his new action-perception theory in relation to critical 
tradition’s historical stance on freedom.  In the critical tradition, one “founds moral 
theory on a reflection which discovers the thinking subject in its liberty behind all 
objects” (SB 223). With an embodied phenomenology, philosophy relinquishes access to 
such a subject but also to the sort of moral theory built on that model of subjectivity.  In 
an embodied phenomenology, human existence can no longer expect, like the Kantian 
subject of the Second Critique, to freely act according to the categorical imperative.  
Instead, “if one acknowledges. . . an existence of consciousness and of its resistant 
structures, our knowledge depends upon what we are,” and in that case,  
… man is not assured ahead of time of possessing a source of morality; 
consciousness of self is not given in man by right; it is acquired only by 
the elucidation of his concrete being and is verified only by the active 
integration of isolated dialectics. (SB 223) 
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Upon letting go of idealism, phenomenology lets go of certain classically formulated 
moral theories.  In order to avoid the passivity of empirical theories of morality, 
phenomenology must also attend to human action as occurring as a Gestalt, comportment 
based on connaissance, rather than a simplistic causal reaction to the environment.  
According to a natal ontology, we cannot secure “ahead of time” a morality; moral 
systems, like all ideas, must co-emerge with our birth.  But, having let go of idealism, are 
we at risk of relativism?  Are we not assured of any moral system?   
 Merleau-Ponty does not answer this question here, nor does he ever directly 
address it.  But, in order to make our natal ontology responsible, we shall have to keep it 
in mind.  We will begin here by reformulating the problem in terms of ethics, rather than 
morality, turning from the domain of rules and regulations toward the domain of 
intersubjective connection.  What we will hope is that a natal ontology will offer, if not a 
moral prescription for action, then direction toward a ground of being that permits ethical 
relation to others.  While we may not know what to do in relation to others, we will find 
that we are not isolated from them; we will find that we are not at risk for the ethical 
pitfalls of solipsism or of skepticism.   
 
Conclusions: Toward the Phenomenology of Perception and Other Selves 
 In the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty shows that to be a natal is to acquire 
a mode of knowing that co-emerges with the world and with others.  As natals, we are 
familiar with our world: we know through connaissance.  Through connaissance, we 
understand the conduct of other living beings as comportement: a bearing with the world.  
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 That said, Merleau-Ponty overextends himself in the Structure of Behavior.  The 
transition from the level of the organism to the level of human practice is not a smooth 
one.  With each level of complexity, the situation is irreversibly transformed.   As 
Barbaras sees it, Merleau-Ponty requires the Phenomenology of Perception to carry out, 
at a human level, the project begun at an animal level in Structure of Behavior.  The 
Phenomenology, Barbaras argues, “comes about in order to confirm on the human level 
this self-exteriority, this obscurity which the analysis of animal behavior revealed” (5).  
Merleau-Ponty will return again and again to orders of complexity introduced by higher 
levels of life and human conduct.  These higher orders introduce a totality that exceeds 
connaissance and yet which motivates it.  Human natals, unlike other natal beings, can 
participate in linguistic and cultural worlds, not only environments.  While Kant gestures 
toward the significance of the sensus communis for aesthetic judgment, he does not ever 
explicitly connect this shared community to the linguistic or cultural world.  Nor does 
Kant ever postulate that the sensus communis conditions our emergence and development 
into that world.  For Kant, we judge beautiful art and nature as if others would find them 
so, but the reason for passing this judgment lies within the faculties of an individual 
person.52  Merleau-Ponty points out that we emerge into a world of others.   
 Following the publication of Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty served in 
World War II.  The texts which were published following the war – and written in part 
during the war – such as the Phenomenology of Perception and his many later courses, 
follow through on the questions posed in the conclusion of the Structure of Behavior but 
with increasing attention to the ethical and political implications of phenomenology’s 
                                                 
52 Dillon points out that to assume that everything is “my” experience is a Kantian mistake while Merleau-
Ponty shows the need to admit anonymous and general experience (88). 
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task.  As he remarks in the conclusion of the Structure of Behavior, he has yet to address 
the “affective perspective” (SB 214); the Phenomenology of Perception develops an 
account of the affective life, applying the Gestalt view of human action and perception to 
subtle situations like sexuality.  In the following chapters, we will consider these 
reflections on the affective life, the progression of the definition of Nature in light of 
these discoveries, and Merleau-Ponty’s explicit discussion of our relation to other selves.  
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Ch 2  Of Being Moved:  
Motivation, Momentum, Freedom, and Nature the Phenomenology of Perception  
  
 
“To act in, its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin .. 
As the Greek word archein ‘to begin,’ …  to set something in motion.”  
– Arendt, HC 177, my emphasis 
 
“I’m now who I’ll be, as I say, but 
 there’s something, therefore, 
 lost to me. ” – Alice Notley  
 
Natality as Momentum and Motive 
 In the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty showed that living things are 
motivated to act.  From the first pages of the text, he offers many examples – of vision 
following a light in a dark room, of a beetle following the melody of its behavior despite 
amputation of its limbs – of life being prompted, being motivated, by its world.  As he 
summarizes in his précis, the aim of this text was to demonstrate the “prospective activity 
in the organism” (PrimP 3).  Merleau-Ponty returns again and again to this theme of 
motivation through the Nature Courses and “Eye and Mind,” but in the Phenomenology 
of Perception, Merleau-Ponty focuses on motivation in human affective life; it is in the 
affective life that we can see how our human life, like all life, is motivated.  Not only are 
we motivated, but we are carried by a momentum; this includes the initial forces set forth 
from our natality and the on-going forces of generality, a plurality of others into which 
we are born.   
 Merleau-Ponty describes the role of natality thus: When he was born “one day, 
once and for all, something was set in motion which, even during sleep, can no longer 
cease to see or not to see, to feel or not to feel, to suffer or be happy, to think or rest from 
thinking” (PP 407).  He describes this motion as a sort of destiny, alluding to a sense of 
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being carried forward by a force beyond what one has initiated personally.  Having been 
born, he writes, “I feel destined to move in a flow of endless life” though he can 
experience neither its sources nor its end and an atmosphere of birth and death 
accompany all the way (PP 364).  A “deep-seated momentum of transcendence” defines 
my existence (PP 376). From birth, natal beings find themselves carried toward “a pre-
objective aim of life” (PP 79) and a “moment of existence” (PP 137).53  Perception of 
depth, for example, happens through a tacit motivation: we cannot synthesis the world 
from two eyes but must already tend towards perceiving it as a unity (PP 259).  My gaze 
traces an object because it is “called forth or motivated” (PP 264). My act is not primary 
or constituting, but called forth or motivated” (PP 264).   
 Let us imagine a natal human being as a skier – among a fleet of skiers – heading 
down a hill.  The skier – a skillful telemarker – navigates obstacles, follows others ahead 
of her through particular routes, and executes turns.  She is moving quickly; she does not 
have time to reflect on each and every one of her actions.  She learned to ski better by 
watching others, by mirroring their motions, by trying to catch up.  Particularly hidden 
are her first actions: she cannot remember her first slip down the hill, she cannot 
remember how she picked herself up or who taught her the first slippery steps.  Our 
existential skier has always been skiing; it is as if she woke up one day and found herself 
already skiing.  But, safely gliding on her trajectory, with some moments of leisure, she 
might reflect on her movement.  She might ask herself how much of her movement she is 
                                                 
53 In the Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty has already provided extensive evidence that biological 
science must attend to motivation in order to understand the behavior of an organism; a simple stimulus-
response theory simply cannot account for the tendency of an organism toward certain styles of behaving 
despite violent changes to the physical structure (examples of the dung-beetle moving despite amputated 
legs, etc).   
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responsible for.  But she is a downhill skier: her meditations accompany her motion.  No 
sooner does she reflect than she makes another choice.  
 What is the source of the momentum of natality described in our analogy?  If we 
were literally skiers gliding down a hill, the force would be roughly the force of our 
initial push plus that of gravity (minus friction). In natal beings, this moment appears to 
include our initial “push” out of the womb, the own kicking life force we each bring, plus 
a sort of general “gravity” of the plurality into which we are born.  We both carry 
ourselves and are carried along by this force of generality; yet Merleau-Ponty emphasizes 
a strange mix of activity and passivity inherent to natal beings.  Natal existence entails 
both an activity and passivity: “our birth or … ‘generativity’ is the basis both of our 
activity or individuality and our passivity or generality” (PP 128). The passivity of 
passive synthesis does not equate to mere acceptance of our situation (PP 427): even 
putting on a pair of downhill skis does not mean you give up control of your existence 
entirely, but it does mean that you active-passively admit into your momentum a force 
beyond yourself.  To carry this analogy perhaps too far, natal beings are metaphorically 
born “with their skis on”: always already on their way downhill with a group of other 
adventures.  
 It seems that Merleau-Ponty has described natality as a very powerful momentum.  
How free, then, is our skier?  How much of her action is due to her nature?  Does the hill 
force her course or does she choose her route?  How does the cocktail of freedom and 
nature that she received with birth, with natality, determine her action?  These questions 
occupy Merleau-Ponty throughout the Phenomenology of Perception toward its 
culminating chapters on freedom and being with others. In the Phenomenology, Merleau-
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Ponty only begins to redefine the dualistic terms needed for his natal ontology.  (The aim 
of this chapter is not to describe a final position for our natal ontology through this text, 
but rather to identify the problems that a true natal ontology must address, and which 
Merleau-Ponty better addresses in the Nature Courses and “Eye and Mind.”)  Perhaps the 
most troubling dualism Merleau-Ponty must re-envision in the Phenomenology of 
Perception is the dualism of nature and freedom.  With our natality, are we merely given 
two parts freedom, one part nature and set off down the slope of the world to manage as 
we can?   
 Far from it, Merleau-Ponty would reply.  Rather, freedom and nature continue to 
interplay and to vary over time; like nature and culture, these terms appear in a dynamic, 
temporally unfolding dialectic.  Natality sets this play into motion.  Our natality situates 
us in a momentum that carries through our many actions and defines the field of action.  
Birth sets us in motion within the field of freedom.  The prepersonal experience of human 
life, animal life, or life in general can be understood as “prejudice in favor of being.” This 
prejudice happens not only at birth but throughout life (PP 254).  This metaphor of 
momentum reminds us that natality does not refer to one moment or an isolated event.  
Natality is an on-going, ramifying event.  Natality is not equivalent to the moment of 
emerging from the womb but is an on-going conditioning of life:  
The event of my birth has not passed completely away, it has not fallen 
into nothingness … for it committed a whole future, not as a cause 
determines an effect, but as a situation, once created leads on to some 
outcome. (PP 407) 
 
Birth pushes us forward on a general trajectory, yet the momentum of natality must be 
renewed.  In distinction to a classical teleological view, beginning in natality does not 
lead to a specific end.  A clarification in relation to Kant is helpful.  Merleau-Ponty sees 
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that Husserl identifies this strength of Kant, taking up the Critique of Judgment, in terms 
of “a teleology of consciousness” (PP xvii).54  This teleology does not equate to an 
Aristotelian teleology of articulation of pregiven goals: that would be a “duplicating of 
human consciousness with some absolute thought which, from the outside, is imagined as 
assigning to it its aims.”  Rather, we see “consciousness itself as a project of the world, 
meant for a world” (PP xvii) and as a movement of life towards the world that draws it, a 
“preobjective aim of life” (PP 79). 
  Like a person gliding down a hill on skis, as natals we cannot go anywhere – the 
force is too strong – but we can redirect our course, adjust our original path.  Of course, 
we have much more control than the figure in this analogy; our “skis” are self-propelling 
and can move in many dimensions.  But our trajectory must still fall within a certain 
range of action.  Not anything is possible, and “I do not choose to come into the world, 
yet once I am born, time flows through me” (PP 427).  The skier may learn something of 
her possibility by reflecting on her actual empirical entrance on the hill, but she will learn 
more if she considers the ongoing play of this momentum with her current movements.   
 Like the skier, we are not only caught up in a momentum, but we are motivated.  
In order to act, Merleau-Ponty writes: “I must be inclined to carry on, and there must be a 
bent or propensity of the mind” (PP 432).  The skier likes skiing; even as she struggles 
through a squall or over a flat plain, she must follow some desire, some motive.  The 
dialectic of freedom and nature appear in her motivation.  In Merleau-Ponty’s view, both 
intellectualism and scientism overlook motivation (PP 448). He identifies two possible 
descriptions of motives by intellectualism and empiricism respectively: empiricism gives 
                                                 
54 Husserl distinguishes between a “telos” resulting from a historically contingent accident and an 
“entelechy,” that inheres in a being.  See Crisis 16.  The latter formulation reappears in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work in the Nature Courses.  
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a “strong” view of motives and intellectualism a “weak” view.  To use our momentum 
analogy, empiricism suggests that the skier is flying down the hill with such a strong 
momentum that she has no power to redirect herself; for the intellectualist, by contrast, 
the skier does not set off with any momentum, but chooses actively each step, like a 
cross-country skier on a flat plain.  If motives are strong – undeniable instincts, for 
example – then we are not free (as in determinism); if motives are weak – things only 
noted in reflection, but not felt as compulsions – then they do not restrict us and we are 
absolutely free (as for Sartre) (PP 434).  In the latter case, for a being with absolute 
Sartrean freedom, motives are so weak as to be irrelevant to understanding responsibility 
for action.  The cross-country skier has chosen her own path across the plain; we can 
learn nothing by looking at the natural geography because it contributed no momentum 
and did not restrict or guide her course. 
 In a natal ontology, by contrast, motives are profoundly important but at the same 
time, not deterministic.  We must attend to motivation as part of the general momentum 
that carries us along as natal beings.  We did not set ourselves in motion; rather we found 
ourselves – since our births – in motion in a world and with others.  Any particular 
motive reflects our general momentum and inherence in the world.  When we look at our 
motives, we notice the momentum of our natality: the fact that the world calls us to act, 
that not all appearances have the same meaning, that some meanings call us toward 
particular actions.  For the normal person, the world motivates him to act: “the normal 
person does not find satisfaction in subjectivity, he runs away from it.  He is genuinely 
concerned with being in the world” (PP 343).  Being in the world gives us the 
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“momentum which carries us beyond subjectivity which gives us our place in the world 
prior to any science” (PP 343). 
 Merleau-Ponty states clearly that to be motivated does not mean you are not free: 
“motivation… does not do away with freedom” (PP 447).  To return to the metaphor of 
going skiing, the skier does not give up her freedom merely by admitting that gravity 
affects her momentum.  Both her freedom and her momentum contribute to her 
movement.  So for a natal being, both the momentum of natality and the freedom of a 
natal being condition action.  Natal, natural existence carries forward along a general 
movement toward a range of possibilities falling within certain parameters that appear 
with birth.  We must remember that “motive and decision are two elements of a situation” 
(PP 259).  Our “motives do not cancel out freedom, but at least ensure that it does not go 
unbuttressed in being” (PP 454).  We may not be able to do anything we wish, but this 
does not mean that we cannot have wishes and sometimes pursue them in the world.  The 
world offers us the choices to which we apply our freedom; this is simply a condition of 
incarnate existence.  
 
The Field of Freedom on the Slope 
 In the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty makes some specific clarifications in 
relation to Sartre on the status of our freedom as he develops his emergent ontology.  As 
Galen Johnson points out, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre profoundly differed in their views 
on the importance of natality in conditioning a life.  In Signs, Merleau-Ponty writes:  
There are two ways of being young which are not easily comprehensible 
to one another.  Some are fascinated by their childhood; it possesses them, 
holding them enchanted in a realm of privileged possibilities.  Others it 
casts out toward adult life; they believe that they have no past and are 
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equally near to all possibilities.  Sartre was of the second type. (SI 25, 
cited in Johnson “The Voice of Merleau-Ponty: The Philosopher and the 
Poet” 88) 
 
Johnson suggests that Merleau-Ponty was of the first type: a person whom childhood 
“possesses.”   Sartre confirms this, writing in his elegy for Merleau-Ponty that the latter 
once told him, “he had never recovered from an incomparable childhood” (“Merleau-
Ponty Vivant” 566).  This difference on the issue of childhood goes beyond mere 
personal squabbles between these thinkers, however, and points to profound 
philosophical differences on the issue of freedom.  For Merleau-Ponty, only natal beings, 
by virtue of the very contingencies limiting their natality, are free.  
  For the absolutely free Sartrean being, we are always free, even to the last 
minute, no matter how many habits or tendencies we may seem to have acquired.  
Although a person tends to be a sadomasochistic and has been for twenty years, he is 
always free – in Sartre’s view – to his deathbed to change into a gentle lover; moreover, 
he is completely responsible for whichever mannerism he chooses.  Thus, for this 
absolutely free Sartrean being, tendency, probability, and generality mean nothing (PP 
442).   
 By contrast, for Merleau-Ponty, “generality and probability are not fictions but 
phenomena” (PP 442).  It is not an illusion that your uncle who has been a drunk for 
years and beaten his children will tend to do so again; no more it is an illusion that your 
friend who has listened generously and warmly to your problems will probably do so 
again.  Likewise, you can see in your own experience a tendency toward a range of 
action; this tending-towards does not limit you to particular actions or even to a definitive 
range of action.  Rather, we simply experience the anonymous generality of perception, 
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and we experience our tendency toward a particular field of action.  To see that field of 
action is to be free: “There is no freedom without a field” (Il faut avoir du champ pour 
être libre) (PP 439).  One must have the room to be free – have a field – but this freedom 
must be in relation to the bounds of the field.   
 But what is this field? How restricted is it? Merleau-Ponty suggests that we have 
an infinite range of possibilities open to us as free beings.  But we might think of this 
infinity as the infinity between 1 and 2 rather than the infinity of all real numbers.  There 
is an infinity of numbers within a range. But the range of our freedom is not as clearly 
bordered as this numerical range: the field of freedom is “without traceable borders” (PP 
454).  We might think of it as the line in a chaotic system: the edge of a wave is distinct 
from the air, but its border permutes infinitely at various scales, changing over time.  
Though you cannot trace the border of a wave crashing in the ocean, you can perceive the 
wave as distinct from the air and the sky and even from other waves.  The natal being’s 
field of freedom is like this wave. It is not absolutely defined, but neither is it arbitrary 
(PP 45).  
 Unlike Sartrean beings, we cannot expect absolute freedom, but we should not 
mourn it.  From birth, perception initiates us into action; we cannot un-initiate ourselves 
or wipe clean our personal slate.  Our freedom depends on this perception history, but it 
is not reducible to it:  “My first perception, along with the horizons which surrounded it, 
is an ever-present event, an unforgettable tradition; even as a thinking subject, I still am 
that first perception, the continuation of that same life inaugurated by it” (PP 407).  For 
Merleau-Ponty, if freedom appeared equally in all actions – if there were no delimited 
field of freedom – then it would be worthless.  To have freedom inherently in all actions 
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would make freedom equivalent to nature.  We would be naturally free.  No action would 
be less free than another.  It would be literally impossible to lose your freedom.  Taking 
this concept to its logical end results in several absurdities, according to Merleau-Ponty.  
First of all, a slave is would be free as the master.  He asks us to consider the difference 
between a slave who stays within his chains and one who breaks them; if these two 
possible actions – staying in the chains or breaking them – are equally expressions of 
freedom, then freedom seems meaningless (PP 437).  Not only would the slave be as free 
as the master, but any individual would be as free earlier in time and later in time.  He 
writes: “a freedom which has no need to be exercised because it is already acquired could 
not commit itself” (PP 436).  There are two parts to Merleau-Ponty’s statement: 1) We 
acquire our freedom: it is not given to us “by nature,” and 2) We are free insofar as we 
exercise our freedom.  To say that nature does not “give” freedom should be taken in the 
same sense that nature does not “give” us knowledge.  Our natural emergence in the 
world does provide us with some cognitive structures for acquiring knowledge; it does set 
us in motion in a world of other knowers, but nature does not offer us a box labeled 
“knowledge” packed with empirical facts on the way out of the womb.  Likewise, nature 
does not give us freedom; we must learn to act freely.  
 In order to distinguish some actions as less free than others, we must restore risk 
to action.  Freedom requires the risk of commitment: once you plunge down the hill, you 
cannot walk back up; once you swerve right around the tree, you will have to lean in to 
compensate for that choice.  You are free enough that you have choices.  That said, you 
cannot expect that making a choice will have no effect on your future freedom.  Once you 
make one choice, not all future choices will be equally open.  As Bachelard says of 
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Bergson in his positivism, Merleau-Ponty might say of Sartre: such a philosophy can say 
“nothing of risk, absolute and total risk … the strange emotional game that leads us to 
destroy our security, our happiness or love” (27).  For Bachelard, Bergson’s philosophy 
of plenitude is so full, it cannot account for difference or absence and thus for new action.  
Likewise, Merleau-Ponty might say of Sartre, he cannot understand the risk of 
commitment because he does not acknowledge the continuity of action carried through a 
life.  Not all choices will be open in the future; once you make many bad choices to abuse 
a loved one, you will tend to do it in the future.  You will be less likely to do good.  You 
will still have choice, of course; habit does not take us from the realm of probability into 
the realm of determinism.  But if you have tended to argue with your mother for thirty 
years, you will tend to argue in the next situation with her.  If freedom were a passive, 
natural possession, there would be no risk in choice.   
 Not only does freedom require commitment, it requires ongoing commitment. 
Instances of coming to awareness “are real only if they are sustained by a new 
commitment” (PP 455).  An intellectual awareness of one’s capacity to save a friend is 
real only if you sustain the revelation by committing to saving the friend.  If you could 
not actually save the friend despite your best efforts, then you were not actually free to do 
so; if you only thought about saving the friend but did not— your character was too 
selfish to let you risk yourself – then you were not actually free to do so.  Freedom 
happens, consciousness happens; we cannot think these events, we can only accomplish 
them. 
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The Steepening Slope: Sleep, Sex and the Affective Life as the Site of Dialectics
 Accomplishing our freedom is not equally easy in all situations.  In certain 
situations – for example, in which we slip or fall into love or sleep – we find ourselves 
dealing with the forces of natal momentum.  The natural slope along which we move 
steepens; the source of our movement seems to come less from ourselves than from our 
or world or from others.  It seems our only choice is to pull up sharply – not to fall asleep 
– or to give ourselves up to the moment: take the plunge and be carried into sleep or to 
love.  
 Merleau-Ponty focuses on these moments in the affective life when the slope 
grows steep.  In these moments, the question of what nature – in contrast to freedom or 
culture – contributes to existence is raised because we must act and yet our action follows 
a certain passivity.  We must choose how to proceed, but we are not entirely in control of 
our momentum.  Such a choice made in the speed of the moment may not be completely 
well informed – the skier cannot stop to do a geological survey of the slope or a physical 
retracing of each curve in her trajectory – and so in reflection, we call into question the 
contribution of our motive and momentum.  These moments of the affective life – falling 
in love and into sleep – exemplify the dialectical intertwining of nature and freedom and 
nature and culture.  If we want to see what nature actually is, then we must look at it in 
time, in human life: we must witness the “birth of being” that is “only for us.”  This sort 
of being that is for-us appears in affective life (PP 154).    
 For Merleau-Ponty, just as childhood offers insights into the natality of our 
cognitive life, our erotic life offers insights into the affective life in general.  Looking at 
moments in which people are erotically engaged enables us “to see how a thing or a being 
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begins to exist for us through desire or love” (PP 154).  When we are prereflectively 
motivated by sexuality, we cannot disentangle physiology and psychology, nature and 
culture.  Like the patient who experiences a phantom limb, we find ourselves generally 
affected both psychically and physically, unable to say where the limits of our natural 
body and our psyche lie.  
 Being in love “summons all the subject’s resources and concerns him in his entire 
being” (PP 379); like sexuality, love is “dramatic” because it requires our whole life’s 
commitment to it (PP 171).  Merleau-Ponty says the question is:  
But just why do we do this?  Why is our body, for us, the mirror of our 
being unless because it is a natural self, a current of given existence, with 
the result that we never know whether the forces which bear us on are its 
or our – or with the result that they are never entirely either its or ours. (PP 
171, emphasis in the original) 
 
Yet again, Merleau-Ponty draws our attention to the powerful momentum of our natality 
– the “current” of our “natural self” – and the fact that we can never cease to be carried 
by it.  Within each whole, committed life, both freedom and nature are at work; in the 
moment of action, we can never discern how much of each affects us.  When I tell 
someone I love her, I do not “decide” it abstractly; rather, I find a movement carried 
forward almost without my permission.  Thus I can say that “when I told her that I loved 
her, I was not ‘interpreting,’ for my life was in truth committed to a form which, like a 
melody, demanded to be carried on” (PP 378).  If I am playing a violin sonata and I am 
directed to complete an improvised cadenza, I cannot play just anything in carrying out 
the piece.  I can, however, play an infinite variety of notes.  Yet as I play, I commit 
myself to the preceding notes, and new notes follow from these notes.  Likewise, when I 
fall in love with someone, I follow through a momentum already rushing through life; I 
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do not “imagine” that momentum any more or less than the patient with the phantom 
limb imagines the missing leg.  The real and the virtual, psychic and physical 
codetermine my experience.  Love works “out its dialectic through me” (PP 381).  Love 
engenders momentum that carries forward, and which I may find various techniques for 
expressing.  But I cannot doubt its force.  Love is not a mere thought but a force affecting 
me and expressed by me; I can be certain of it because “I perform” it (PP 383). Not only 
in the case of love but in the case of meaning in general, “there would be neither thought 
nor truth but for an act” (PP 385). Merleau-Ponty does not mean a “thought act,” some 
abstract intending consciousness, but an act in the world expressing truth.  Even a 
hysteric who reimagines her world experiences it as if it required a certain type of 
commitment; she hears a different sonata playing and commits herself accordingly.  
 In the section on sexuality in the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty describes a 
young woman who loses her voice after her mother forbids her to see her beloved. The 
girl has lost not merely physical contact with her lover; she has lost her whole lover and 
indeed her own self who loved that person.  She has lost a whole world that called out for 
her to express herself.  Her loss of speech is not actively or consciously self-imposed.  
She loses her speech “as one loses a memory” (PP 163).  She can no longer speak; she 
passively lets herself lose the ability to express herself.  Can we hold her responsible for 
this action?  Was she free to choose it?  Merleau-Ponty connects the passivity and 
activity in this moment to a similar active-passivity in sleep, comparing her prereflective 
loss of speech to the experience of falling asleep.  When we fall asleep, we coax 
ourselves into losing our conscious selves.  We tell ourselves that we are asleep and we 
gradually let ourselves be asleep; like Dionysian dancers, we gradually become one with 
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the myth we speak (PP 163).  Falling asleep, like sexuality, exemplifies the passivity that 
inheres with our freedom in certain actions.  We must train ourselves to give ourselves up 
to a general way of being in order to fall asleep (PP 163).   
 On the one hand, to sleep is natural: our very bodies, our very facticity requires 
that we sleep if we are to live.  Yet we sometimes fail to coincide with this apparently 
“natural” desire.  Sometimes we are free to sleep or not to sleep; sometimes we are not 
free to not sleep.  Our freedom to fall asleep depends not on some absolute agency but on 
our being in a situation: “We remain free in relation to sleep and sickness to the exact 
extent to which we remain always involved in the walking and healthy state, our freedom 
rests on our being in a situation, and is itself a situation” (PP 164).  By pretending to fall 
asleep, we may eventually fall asleep.  By coaxing ourselves into the anonymous mode of 
existence – sleep – we are no longer receiving or perceiving the world in the same way.  
In a similar but not identical situation, the hysteric changes her very experience of the 
world through her comportment of fear.  
 The conclusions from these claims about the affective life are wide-ranging.  
Merleau-Ponty claims that we cannot separate perception from action, action from truth; I 
see a car coming and I leap aside.  My leap means it is true that the car was coming.  
Thus, “the only way … into sincerity is … taking a blind plunge into ‘doing’” (PP 382).   
 But here we approach the aforementioned problem: sometimes I choose to fall 
asleep and sometimes I merely fall asleep.  Sometimes my natural tendency toward sleep 
takes over.  Does acknowledging the powerful participation of subjectivity in constituting 
nature mean that we cannot distinguish natural, preconscious actions from conscious 
ones?  Do we have the ability to lose ourselves, to lie to ourselves, and to change our 
89 
 
reception to the world in relation to these categories as well? If we can so fool ourselves 
that we change our very perception of the world, perhaps we are not responsible for our 
actions.  This seems like a dangerous possibility.  If we can be as pathologically confused 
about, for example, our political world as the hysteric is about her sexual world, or 
Schneider is about the state of his limbs, how can we be politically responsible?  
 Merleau-Ponty seems to recognize this and yet, accommodating the issue, he 
seems to recant some of his basic claims about the relation of nature and culture in a natal 
ontology.  Consider the following example in which Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction 
between certain personal acts and acts of sensation.  He argues that seeing blue is not like 
deciding to be a mathematician: “I can see blue because I am sensitive to colors, whereas 
personal acts create a situation: I am a mathematician because I have decided to be one” 
(PP 215).   
 Does this not suggest that we can distinguish some basic biological nature from a 
more complex, cultural, and personal level of intentionality?  Does not our affective life, 
our sensitivity to the world, still condition our actions outside of the realm of personal 
control?  If so, we could understand ourselves as more or less responsible for certain 
personal acts than certain acts of sensitivity.  It seems we would be natals, gliding along 
with our momentum, but occasionally capable of defeating the momentum.  How are we 
to sort out this contradiction in his text and perhaps in experience? 
 There are at least two issues at play in this apparent contradiction. On the one 
hand, within the Phenomenology Merleau-Ponty troublingly does retain a certain dualism 
in his use of “nature” vs. “culture”; on the other hand, his efforts in this text point toward 
his new description of “Nature” developed in the Nature Courses and later.  
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 Let us consider the latent dualism first.  In this early text, Merleau-Ponty retains 
not only the terminology of “consciousness,” as he critically points out in his own later 
working notes in the Visible and the Invisible,55 but a firm distinction between nature and 
culture.  More importantly, for a natal ontology defining itself by understanding “nature” 
though its etymological connection to birth, Merleau-Ponty appears to use the terms 
“nature” and “natural” inconsistently.  On the one hand, in the Phenomenology, Merleau-
Ponty makes some comments that suggest a pointed rejection of naturalism on all 
grounds. For example, he remarks that Gestalt psychology fails to fulfill its potential 
because “it has never broken with naturalism” (PP 47) and that phenomenology will not 
succeed until it avoids “unhelpful reversions to causal thought and naturalism” (126).  He 
declares that “man is a historical idea and not natural species” (PP 170), as if to banish 
naturalness from the discussion of human existence.  This would seem to suggest that 
naturalism per se must be abandoned.  Reductive, simplistically causal naturalism is 
certainly something to avoid.  On the other hand, in the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty 
also uses the term “nature” and “naturalism” in a positive way, associated with his own 
method.  He implicitly begins to hint at his own definition of nature in contrast to the 
standard use associated with reductionist or empiricist naturalism.  For example, he 
identifies his aims as attending to the “natural translation” of eye movement and the 
“natural formations” of the subject and the “natural context” of perception (PP 48).  
Again, in the “natural attitude of vision … I make common cause with my gaze” (PP 
227). He mentions the positive goal of rediscovering “the natural and antepredicative 
unity of the world and our life” (PP xviii).  Also, he tries to understand the “natural 
situation” of which we are conscious (PP 62). 
                                                 
55 See Barbaras 17 and VI 183. 
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 In one sense, he suggests that we can never distinguish this “basic” nature from 
our total nature.  The body “is a natural self, a current of given existence, with the result 
that we never know whether the forces which bear us on are its or ours – or rather that 
they are never entirely either its or ours” (PP 171).  We can never sort out natural 
behavior” from cultural comportment: “It is impossible to superimpose on man a lower 
layer of behavior which one chooses to call ‘natural,’ followed by a manufactured or 
cultural world.  Everything is both manufactured or cultural in man” (PP 189).  In another 
sense, however, he occasionally seems to suggest that “nature” refers to some basic 
condition of human existence that we must exceed or transcend.  He argues, for example, 
that “speech is the surplus of our existence over natural being” (PP 197).  Although he 
notes that we do “fall back” into the natural existence we were attempting to outstrip, he 
suggests that speech is a movement “beyond nature.”  He comments also that “I never 
live wholly in varieties of human space, but am always ultimately hooked in a natural and 
non-human space” (PP 293). He even suggests that the “natural world … can always be 
discerned underlying the other [human world], as the canvas underlies the picture” (PP 
293).  So it seems there are two levels of space, natural and human.  But, on the other 
hand, he imagines that the very positing of two levels of space causes trouble for our 
understanding of space: “human spaces present themselves as built on the basis of natural 
space” but they are not (PP 294).  Perception manages to at once present nature as 
apparently in-itself and simultaneously hide the act of presenting it so.  Again, he notes 
that the body can give “significance not only to the natural object, but also to cultural 
objects,” as if we could clearly distinguish cultural objects from natural ones ( PP 235).   
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He says that “a conventional algorithm … will never express anything but nature without 
man” (PP 188).56   
 Whence this confusion?  Is there nature and culture or only perception?  Has 
Merleau-Ponty simply failed to notice how inconsistent his use of the terms is?  Or is he 
consistently using the terms in more than one way?  I would argue that frequently 
Merleau-Ponty does indeed ambivalently employ the terms “nature” and “natural” in this 
early text – as evinced above –  and that this is not an instance of rich ambiguity of 
language, but rather representative of a transitional period in his thinking of Nature. 
Barbaras confirms my view – developed below – that in the Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty remains tied to dualistic terminology (16).57  On the other 
hand, if we look closely at certain uses of the term “nature” in these studies of the 
affective life, we find that he does provide hints toward a new use of nature that he 
pursues in the later course on nature.  
 
Natality Happens Temporally: Beyond Dualism to Dialectic 
 Although the terms “nature” and “culture” trouble us with their historical 
opposition, we do not need to eliminate these terms in order to think through Merleau-
Ponty’s natal ontology.  Rather, we should recognize that they collectively form not a 
                                                 
56 Here his later work provides a hint that this is a pejorative, limited sense of nature that he will reject: in 
Prose of the World, he devotes a chapter to showing the natural emergence even of mathematics and 
algorithms.   
57 Barbaras points out that Merleau-Ponty remains within a Cartesian framework insofar as he gives special 
priority to the appearance of my body for me.  That is, in the Phenomenology of Perception, “everything 
depends on how one’s own body, on which intentional transgression is based, is apprehended” (36).   It is 
Cartesian to see our body as the only part of Nature to which we have access.  While Merleau-Ponty has 
been known as the phenomenologist of the body par excellence, in a sense, we foreclose his later project if 
we over-emphasize the personal body, especially as we attempt to understand Nature.  Nonetheless, in the 
Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty begins the project of opening up the body, finding it permeable to its 
world and others.  The next chapter, for example, will focus on his efforts to open up the personal body to 
the bodies of others.  
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dualism, but a dialectic (PP 237), as he already outlined in the Structure of Behavior.  In 
the Phenomenology, he situates this dialectic in time.    
 At times one pole or the other of the dialectic can overwhelm experience: nature 
can overtake culture or culture, nature.  There can be a “sublimation of biological into 
personal existence” and vice versa (PP 84).  Not only does the nature-culture dialectic 
work in this way, but so do all relevant dialectics: nature-freedom and personal-
prepersonal. There are times when the prepersonal body might overwhelm the 
motivations of the personal body and vice versa.  Again, moments of the affective life 
with the “slope grows steep” clarify the issue at hand.  For example, when bombshells in 
World War II exploded around him, Saint-Exupéry completely identified with his body, 
but only as a “source of life” with no motivations contrary to that impulse (PP 84).  Saint-
Exupéry’s momentary battlefield experience, however, contrasts sharply with his 
experience in daily life.  During his daily life, walking the streets of Paris, the body’s 
problems demanded attention (PP 84).  Sometimes his prepersonal life dominated; other 
times his personal acts commanded his life.  
 Essential in this example is how the dominance of the biological or cultural could 
change over time.  Temporality makes this sublimation and oscillation – i.e. the 
movement of the dialectic – possible.  According to the Phenomenology, to avoid 
dualism we must understand that as temporal beings, we can comprise not only acts in 
which the personal rules, but acts in which the biological rules. That one pole of 
existence can dominate does not mean that we can precisely distinguish or disentangle 
the biological or natural from the cultural.  “Biological” life always has meaning: “even 
reflexes have a meaning, and each individual’s style is still visible in them” (PP 85).  
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Natural or biological life does not appear “in itself” but in time with culture.  Merleau-
Ponty retains the distinctions between nature and culture, but he does not thereby suggest 
that we can ever access one without the other.  This dialectic is not an illusion philosophy 
can get past to achieve access to pure nature, nor does the dialectical emergence of a 
concept make it arbitrary. To call, for example, sexuality “dialectical” does not reduce it 
to an illusion: “the dialectic is not a relationship between contradictory and inseparable 
thoughts; it is the tending of an existence towards another existence which denies it, and 
yet without which it is not sustained” (PP 168).  In Merleau-Ponty’s dialectical view of 
nature and culture in action, an action can have many meanings but not arbitrarily any 
meaning.  Some meanings can dominate: we can see “one gesture as ‘sexual’ , another as 
‘amorous,’” etc. (PP 173). As he says only a few years later in Humanism and Terror, 
“[a] dialectical world is a world on the move where every idea communicates with all 
others …all the same, it is not a bewitched world where ideas operate without any rule, 
where at any moment angels become devils” (HT 120).  
 Merleau-Ponty adopts this dialectical model of nature as he rejects dualism, but it 
is not only a dualism inherited from Descartes, but also from Kant and Spinoza.  He 
rejects not just a dualism of mind vs. body, but of activity vs. passivity, of nature vs. 
mind.  He explicitly poses this problem to himself and his readers in Spinozistic terms:  
He argues that “the dualism of naturata and naturans is … converted into a dialectic of 
constituted and constituting time” (PP 240).  This dialectic is particularly apparent in 
perception.  When we attend to perception, we are directed toward our natality, to the 
very natality of “the constituted,” of whatever is constituted for us.  Instead of a 
constituting naturans, we find “a dialectic of the naturata and of the naturans, of 
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perception and judgment” (PP 45).    As he puts it in his précis of the Phenomenology, “I 
am not a universal thinker [naturant].  I am a thought which recaptures itself…which 
feels itself rather than sees itself… which creates truth rather than finds it” (PrimP 22).  
The problem of a Spinozism results from beginning with a dualistic notion of thinking as 
action and sensing as passive.  In lieu of this clean break between activity and passivity, 
Merleau-Ponty offers a receptive perceiving being.  As he puts it: “The perceiving subject 
is not this absolute thinker; rather, it functions according to a natal pact between our body 
and the world” (PrimP 22).   In this natal pact, the perceiving subject appears between the 
world and the body, drawn out of herself into the world and drawing the world into 
herself.  Thus, it is by admitting natality into ontology that Merleau-Ponty avoids a split 
between naturans and naturatus.  Our sensitivity, our tendency toward the world, and our 
temporality all depend on our natality.   
 As in the Structure of Behavior, admitting our natality takes us out of a dualistic 
relation to nature.  Objective thought can never grasp this first step in avoiding 
Spinozism.  For objective thought, “it will never be intelligible that the subject should be 
both naturans and naturatus” (PP 365).  Merleau-Ponty rejects this dualism as he rejects 
a dualism of nature and culture, for itself and in itself (PP 215), subject and object, or a 
prior and a posteriori (PP 220).  Why must he reject dualism? As in he showed in the 
Structure of Behavior, a dualistic division between matter and mind – between behavior 
and meaning – does not serve life science either in the guise of the working biologist 
struggling to explain what Pavlovian behaviorism cannot, or the working 
phenomenologist struggling to explain what Cartesianism cannot.  From the perspective 
of the working scientist, for example, it is impossible to understand how the subject 
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“should be both naturans and naturatus, both infinite and finite” (PP 365).  But in 
experience, Merleau-Ponty argues, we simply find this to be the case: we are both finite 
and infinite, active at the very moment of passivity.  He goes so far as to state that beyond 
this paradox “there is nothing to understand” (PP 365).  However impossible overcoming 
dualism might seem to objective thought, or Spinozistic thought, contemplating this is the 
task of phenomenology.    
 For Spinoza, the active, divine productivity of naturata occurred once and 
eternally.  But, Merleau-Ponty argues, in human existence this productivity is not 
accomplished once and for all.  Rather, as human beings we participate in a continual 
effort over time.  In human existence, although we may aim toward the eternal, the 
timeless, we are in fact caught up in time: 
There is here [in human existence] indeed the summoning, but not the 
experience, of an eternal natura naturans.  My body takes possession of 
time; it brings into existence a past and future for a present; it is not a 
thing, but creates time instead of submitting to it.  But every act of 
focusing must be renewed, otherwise it falls into unconsciousness. (PP 
240) 
 
Again, like the skier we find that the momentum of our natality echoes through the whole 
movement of our life.  We cannot entirely perceive this momentum, but we do enjoy 
some understanding, though it is never absolute:  
It is true that I find, through time, later experiences interlocking with 
earlier ones and carrying them further, but nowhere do I enjoy absolute 
possession of myself by myself, since the hollow void of the future is 
forever being refilled with a fresh present. (PP 240) 
 
As natural beings, we are “not… in Hegel’s phrase, ‘a hole in being,’ but a hollow, a fold, 
which has been made and which can be unmade” (PP 215).  We are made of the same 
stuff of nature, and yet we struggle to make nature appear “over there.”  Just as our 
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molecules gathered together at our birth and disentangle themselves on our death, so our 
existences coil and contract around an order and then relax.  We must make a continual 
effort to keep a grip on the world: “the perceiving subject undergoes a continued birth; at 
each instant it is something new” (PrimP 6).   
 The effort of this continual birth hides from us, as invisible as our ability to 
remain upright and oriented to up and down.  But without that effort on the part of our 
whole being we would lose that sense of a world. Therein lies the revelation and pathos 
of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology: as natals, our beginnings are lost to us.  We discover 
ourselves to be beings whose origins indicate a momentum and an inherent motivation; 
but in the same moment of discovery, we realize that a view of our original nature, of our 
origin, is forever unattainable.  Like Proust, as he turned toward his childhood, we find 
that we do not coincide with our beginnings – the new experience of the madeline not 
only reminds the narrator of his childhood, but points to the distance of the narrator from 
the first experience. At the same time, our ever-elusive natal begins to occultly influence 
each present action, each perception.  
 Yet the fact that we participate in the birth of the world does not mean that we are 
the author or inventor of the world.  Like the skier, as natals we participate in our 
movement through the world, but we also realize that we do not make the world possible: 
we are “not the condition of its possibility.”  Instead, perceptual structure “is the birth of 
a norm and it is not realized according to a norm” (PP 61).  This norm transcends each 
individual subject and points beyond each toward a movement initiated before birth.  
What objective science misses when it posits a “natural geometry” is the “original 
relationship of motivating” that happens between selves and the world (PP 265).  Our 
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naturalness – natural self, natural space – impels and compels us: “existence rushes 
towards it and being absorbed in it, is unaware of itself” (PP 287). Phenomenology 
studies the “advent of being to consciousness,” the gathering of this momentum behind 
and around us (PP 61).   
 Again, we return to our theme of natality.  Phenomenology properly practiced 
attends not to static structures, static norms (of nature or culture), or static 
consciousnesses. Rather, phenomenology bears witness to the birth of these norms in an 
individual: that is, to the genesis, the natality, of personhood.58  In bearing witness to the 
birth of the norm in the individual, phenomenology finds that this birth – like literal birth 
– points beyond itself toward a life already in motion with others and with a world.  
 Phenomenology, in attending to this perpetual beginning in perception, shows that 
natality conditions our being throughout our lives, not only at their factical beginning.  In 
perception appears our natal moment and also our freedom, also continually reborn.  This 
freedom – like nature – does not appear in itself, in one moment.  A natal being finds her 
freedom over the course of many actions; her freedom cannot be understood in terms of 
one isolated event.  Freedom has to carry forward along the natal trajectory.  The 
trajectory corresponds to what Merleau-Ponty calls “a bent or propensity of the mind” 
(PP 432).  (Later, he will associate this trajectory with “style,” with all its artistic 
connotations.)  This emphasis on continuity and commitment in relation to freedom, takes 
the discussion of action from an understanding of a single action toward an understanding 
of action over the course of a life.  Our choices appear in the whole of our lives (PP 438).   
                                                 
58 And as shown later in Chapter 5, even more carefully practiced phenomenology witnesses the historical 
emergence of such norms across time.  At the time of the Phenomenology, however, Merleau-Ponty had not 
yet fully made this turn toward generative phenomenology. 
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 This emphasis on wholeness conditions Merleau-Ponty’s entire ontology; in the 
Nature Courses, he devotes many lectures to considering and reconsidering “totality” in 
living beings.  But this is not the “bad” totality that Levinas critiques in Hegel or even 
Heidegger.  Rather, totality for Merleau-Ponty is precisely what escapes and exceeds 
attempts at totalizing thought.  We have missed the phenomenon of totality – always 
excessive – if we think that we have total access to it.  We will return to this excess and 
the problem of totality in the discussion of the Nature Courses: we have only embarked 
on this theme so integral to the permeable and integrated life of the natal.  For the 
moment, let us imagine that in the case of freedom in action, we might see Merleau-
Ponty’s emphasis on wholeness as describing the wholeness of a life.  In that context, 
ethical choice can only be understood in relation to a whole life, much like a Greek virtue 
ethics model.  As for Aristotle, from childhood one acquires habits, experiencing a 
certain “sedimentation of life” that leads to certain tendencies and sets of choices.  This 
sedimentation and set of habits does not simply limit our freedom: because we have the 
habit of being antagonistic, does not mean we are not free not to be antagonistic.  Rather, 
“unless there are cycles of behavior, open situations… we never experience freedom” (PP 
438).   For choice – at the personal level of projects and action – to be possible, we must 
already have the basics of action down: “Higher-order behaviors give a new meaning to 
the life of the organism, but the mind here disposes of only a limited freedom; it needs 
simpler activities in order to stabilize itself in durable institutions and to realize itself 
truly as mind” (PP 4).   
 The Olympic-qualifying skier, as she twists and turns and flies, “disposes of only 
a limited freedom” – that available as one glides down a hills – but she realizes this 
100 
 
freedom into unthought forms, patterns, and routes.  She capitalizes on a stability she has 
acquired at the basic level of skiing.  She does not need to constantly reinstitute the basic 
form of skiing and this very instituted habit permits her more complex motion.  Likewise, 
phenomenologists need not always be consciously aware of perception, but 
phenomenology can learn much about the possibility of higher orders of reflection, 
cognition, and creativity by revisiting the birth of higher levels of action. 
 In considering a life as a whole, we may wonder if we can see a pattern, an 
overall aim or goal; but again, the totality to which a natal ontology directs 
phenomenology exceeds it.  A natal ontology does not describe us as passively following 
a pre-given causal telos that phenomenology – or any life science – might identify.  
Science cannot show “If I was destined to be me” based on my parts (PP 431).  My 
existence, my “I,” unfolds in a situation.  I unfold dynamically in time, carried forth by 
the momentum of my natality.  A static (or dead) body is not a body for existential 
philosophy (PP 431) any more than for a medieval Thomist.  I am more than the sum of 
the parts of my body: “I” happen in a situation.  For example, “I” cannot be identified 
with a particular static set of molecules, even if those molecules are those in my genome.  
“I” have no identity that can be diagnosed by genetics prior to my unfolding in the world. 
Though we may wish to define an element of human nature by, for example, “finding the 
gene” for intelligence or athletic ability, such information cannot explain “nature” as it 
appears to us in our natal momentum.  Just as a topographic map will not help the skier 
manage a difficult pass as she flies along, the information about my genome will not help 
me – in the moment – know the source of my anger, joy, or intention.  As the discussion 
of actions in terms of sexuality show, we cannot distinguish this “natural process” or 
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identify a definite, pre-given aim of action. That said, we can still trace out general 
movements of the dialectic, styles of being (acting) in the world:  
Although our body does not impose definite instincts upon us from birth, as it 
does upon animals, it does at least give to our life the form of generality, and 
develops our personal acts into stable dispositional tendencies.  (PP 146) 
 
Human nature, like nature in general, appears with a certain identifiable styles and 
momentum.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it bittersweetly at the end of the chapter on 
sexuality, “no one is saved and no one is totally lost” (PP 171). 
 Any human action happens with the ambiguous unity of the art work. An action is 
individual; in relation to its situation “its meaning is not arbitrary and does not dwell in 
the firmament of ideas: it is locked in the world [like a poem] printed on some perishable 
page” (PP 150).  Actions appear like paint flung at a canvas, a confluence of intention 
and chance, directed ambiguously at expression.  Our nature appears in this totality, as 
does our freedom, but not distinctly.  We cannot look at the canvas of our lives and see 
“freedom” there and “nature” there like two distinct colors.  Freedom and nature are both 
aspects of the dialectical movement of the whole style of the work. Merleau-Ponty will 
return again and again throughout his later work, including the Nature Courses and “Eye 
and Mind, to the connection between the form of a human life – and indeed life in general 
– to the form of an art work.  Already, as we saw in the Structure of Behavior (See 
Chapter 1), Merleau-Ponty compared behavior in general to a melodic movement.  Now, 
in the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty again turns to art to describe the dialectic of nature 
and freedom.  Merleau-Ponty considers human bodies as exhibiting the same sort of 
stylistic unity of an art work: “the body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but 
rather to a work of art” (PP 150).   
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 In this, Merleau-Ponty departs from our “skiing” metaphor, leaving the realm of 
sheer activity for the realm of poetic and artistic activity.  A human life follows a 
motivation and partakes in a momentum that generates, takes up, and reforms meaning.  
Whereas the skier moves down the hill for the sheer pleasure of movement, the painter 
moves her arm across the canvas for the sake of the art work as well as the pleasure.  The 
skier, like the painter, has stylized movements, but the painter leaves a record of her 
stylized movement on the canvas.  
 At any given moment, we can witness this style if we turn toward our natality: 
“We are, as Proust declared, perched on a pyramid of past life, and if we do not see this, 
it is because we are obsessed by objective thought … in old age a man is still in contact 
with his youth” (PP 393).  The movement of our natality is still with us: the first 
momentum and our first motivation still show their force in every gesture.  Is it a 
coincidence that Proust forms the central example for Merleau-Ponty’s chapter on 
temporality? That making art of life and life of art become almost confused in Merleau-
Ponty’s work?  So much form, so much beauty, such excess does he see in each natal life, 
that the very effort of living becomes the effort of writing poetry, of making art. 
 How far are we to take this analogy? How much does Merleau-Ponty expect of a 
person in the midst of living?  Does he expect us to both live at the speed of the skier 
rushing down the hill, caught in momentum, but to execute our movements with the 
intention of a painter?  Comparing the movement of life to that of art suggests the 
insertion of criteria of judgment, beauty, and intention into the very practice of action.  If 
we compare action to an art work, then we might consider extending that analogy to 
judging the action as we judge an artwork.  Just as there are good and bad, successful and 
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unsuccessful poems or paintings, there are successful and less successful actions.  From 
there, we might consider how we understand right action as judged over the whole of a 
life and personal style.  Again, we return to the model of Greek virtue ethics; an action 
would be kalon, beautiful when performed well.   
 In this sense, the analogy to artwork might be troubling on two counts if taken too 
far.  First, the analogy suggests that someone might be able to see the total style of our 
life and judge it.  In regard to this, we must remember that, for Merleau-Ponty, totality 
always exceeds perception and even phenomenological reflection; he would thus not hold 
the actor herself responsible for also being the spectator to her action, the painter 
responsible for criticism.  But in regard to the analogy, one might also argue that an art 
work implies an artist; the painting itself is not free.  We must wonder then, if in drawing 
this connection between art and life, Merleau-Ponty imagines us to be the effect of some 
hidden painter, again suggesting a teleological model of life.  Or should natals understand 
themselves as both painters and painting?  Even then, as painters, how much freedom do 
we exercise?  In an extensive footnote at the end of the chapter on sexuality, Merleau-
Ponty happily extends the dialectical description of personal affective life to a theory of 
history and politics (PP 171).  Can he move so blithely from the affective life to the level 
of history?  It seems he has leapt from the microscopic movement of an individual life 
toward the macroscopic movement of history without considering the more every-day 
size movement of life between one or two individuals.  Between a description of action in 
personal affective life and action in history, we require a more explicit account of 
personal and ethical action.  Merleau-Ponty has shown that at the level of personal action, 
each natal encounters a troubling and realistic ambiguity between freedom and nature. 
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Were this ambiguity to be amplified to the level of history and politics, it would grow 
even more troubling.  Can one excuse Hitler because, as a natal like the rest of us, he was 
caught up in a momentum that exceeded him?  He could not see what freedom and what 
nature motivated?  However Merleau-Ponty might insist on a “good ambiguity,” some 
clarity seems necessary.   
 One might worry that only a very careful phenomenologist can navigate this good 
ambiguity, while the person in the midst of ethical choice cannot find a ground for 
discerning right action in her ambiguous situation.  Has Merleau-Ponty simply skirted the 
problem and retreated into an unhelpful ambiguity? Certainly we hope this is not the 
case.  We can be sure that he himself recognizes this problem insofar as he pursues these 
issues through the end of the Nature Courses. These questions preoccupy Merleau-Ponty 
as he refines his natal ontology, not only here in the Phenomenology but again in the later 
work, especially the discussion of evolution.  Unfortunately, in the Phenomenology, 
Merleau-Ponty does not provide enough details to illuminate his view on how to 
approach the ethics of action.  
 He does however devote many pages and much reflection to our natal connection 
to others.  If our natal ontology is to acquire a ground for ethical relation from the 
Phenomenology – or find it lacking – then it may be from the discussion of relations with 
others which I present in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusions: Natality means Nature and Others on the Inside 
 In the final pages of the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty says, in the words of 
Saint-Exupéry, “Your act is you” (PP 456).  Action must be the final arbiter of our 
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responsibility, but each action appears over time, like a brush stroke across a canvas.  Just 
as we cannot judge a painting from one brush stroke, so we cannot judge a life from one 
moment.  And yet it seems that in the moment of action, we cannot see the canvas.  This 
painter cannot see her strokes; like the famous video of Picasso “drawing” a bull with a 
light in mid-air but no canvas, the painter must feel the action from the inside.  Like the 
skier, she guides her movement from within, without a view from above, navigating 
within the parameters of her natal momentum.  Prereflective, theoretical knowledge of 
nature’s contribution to action is unavailable in the moment of action: we can only sense 
our general practice of taking up situations.  Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty does suggest 
that – like Saint-Exupéry reflecting on his war experience – we can assess, in 
retrospective reflection, whether nature or cultural dominated in the affective life.   
 Affective life reveals how the world is for us although most of the time the natural 
world appears to be in itself, without need of us.  The affective life reveals the view of the 
skier on the slope rather than the view of the mountain from above.  At first glance, it 
seems that our naturalness was the part of our existence that we were not responsible for: 
How could we be responsible for involuntary actions or hold others responsible for their 
actions?  How can we hold the skier responsible for her speed on a steep slope?  In 
reflection we might note the dominance of the physiological or the psychological, but 
“when reintegrated into existence, they are no longer distinguishable respectively as the 
order of the in-itself, and that of the for-itself” (PP 87).  As we look at these moments in 
the affective life, it seems that we cannot so clearly distinguish between a nature “over-
there” and the nature that we have generated.  No more than the patient who experiences 
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the phantom limb can disentangle physical sensation from psychological past, can we 
completely distinguish natural from cultural in experience.   
 Although Merleau-Ponty retains a distinction between nature and culture, his 
dialectical vision of this pair differs from dualistic models: The difference lies in the 
ontological value given to the distinctions between nature and culture (this issue will 
continue to haunt Merleau-Ponty through the Nature Courses).  Is this distinction – 
apparent in reflection – more real than the prereflective unity?  In turning his 
philosophical attention to this problem, Merleau-Ponty turns from pure phenomenology 
toward ontology.  He asks about the ontological status of the difference between nature 
and culture in experience.  He argues that we cannot leave our natality, our original 
ambiguous lived experience, and finally emerge as adult Kantian subjects.  We will never 
emerge into a world in which we can finally judge the a priori and a posteriori.  That 
distinction is not more real than the prereflective unity in action.   We cannot know this 
in the moment; as with nature and culture, we find that freedom and nature dialectically 
condition us.  But the lack of this privileged knowledge in prereflective existence – the 
lack of a true Kantian critical standpoint – does not absolve us from action or even from 
understanding the situation. We cannot escape meaning in existence, but we are not lost 
in a sea of any meaning.  We always commit ourselves to meaning -- to sexual meaning, 
linguistic meaning, economic meaning -- even though we do not know what motive in 
our choice originates in ourselves or outside us, from our nature or culture.  Meaning is 
not given but taken up: when something has significance, “chance is transformed into 
reason; in so far as it is the act of taking up a de facto situation” (PP 171).  Ontology 
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becomes a project of describing the taking up and expression of meaning: a project of 
attending to the poetic productivity of a natal life. 
 Nature lies at the heart of subjectivity as well as around it. Nature happens not 
only “over there” but within me: “I am thrown into a nature, and that nature appears not 
only as outside me, in objects devoid of history, but it is also discernable at the centre of 
subjectivity” (PP 346).  Nature refers not to the “slope” only, to some pregiven, static 
structure beneath existence.  Rather Nature refers to the entire unfolding drama of the 
metaphorical situation: to the many skiers, to the dynamic play in time of their 
movement, to their desire to move forward and to whatever movement set them on their 
way.  The skier perceives all this; she perceives Nature not just beneath her, but within 
her, around her, before her.  Like the skier, we do not have time to reflect completely on 
our next movement because we are in time, in natural time.  The analogy of the skier 
amplifies the sense of speed in our dialectic, but the comparison is precise: we cannot 
reverse our direction in time nor willfully stop, even for philosophical reflection.  In this 
sense, phenomenology is at once clarified as pure description; it is simply the fact that, as 
natals, we cannot know Nature per se, in the moment of action, but also shown to be a 
practice situated in natural time.   
 At the center of subjectivity for Merleau-Ponty is perception.  Perception, rather 
than a private activity, directs us toward an excess, a context in which we find ourselves.  
If we attend to perception, to feeling – sentir – we find that it “does not belong to the 
order of the constituted”: “it represents for us what is ‘anterior to’ the mind, evokes the 
latter’s birth” (PP 45).  The excess of perception points toward expression; the center of 
108 
 
subjectivity points toward intersubjectivity.  This is why Merleau-Ponty says that 
“philosophy’s center is everywhere and its circumference nowhere” (SI 128).  
 The excess of perception points us toward the essential generality and plurality of 
existence: this is the momentum that the skier senses accompanying her down the hill.  
She senses herself caught up in a movement and drawn ahead of herself by a motivation: 
“each time I experience a sensation, I feel that it concerns not only my own being, the 
one for which I am responsible and for which I make decisions, but another self which 
has already sided with the world” (PP 216).  The sensation of some specific color, for 
example, “arises from sensibility which has preceded it and which will outlive it, just as 
my birth and death belong to a natality and mortality which are anonymous” (PP 216).   
 Perception – bound to our natality – belongs to an anonymous existence, Merleau-
Ponty states.  What is this anonymous existence like?  What is my experience of it like?  
Perhaps more importantly, what does it do for my experience of others and how do others 
condition my experience?  
 It is this problem Merleau-Ponty turns in the chapter on “other selves” in the 
Phenomenology and which I will address next.  
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Ch 3 Of Being with Others: 
Natality and the Atmosphere of Humanity in the Phenomenology of Perception 
 
“Knowing who you are is good for one generation only.”  
Flannery O’Conner, “Everything that Rises Must Converge” 
 
 
 Merleau-Ponty opens the chapter “Other Selves and the Human World” in 
Phenomenology of Perception with a discussion of two themes: nature and temporality.  
In the very first line of his chapter on being with others, he immediately situates that 
topic in relation to nature: “I am thrown into a nature, and that nature appears not only as 
outside me, in objects devoid of history, but it is also discernible at the centre of 
subjectivity” (PP 346).  Why begin a discussion of relations with others by mentioning 
nature?  What does it mean to approach the other through “nature”? And how does 
“nature” orient us toward temporality? Merleau-Ponty tells us here that nature appears at 
the center of subjectivity, but this subjectivity is not only my subjectivity, but subjectivity 
in general, a mode of being that I share with other subjects.  This “atmosphere of 
humanity,” as he calls it, both motivates us and adds to our momentum through the 
world.  It is this anonymous, shared subjectivity with its temporal orientation that 
Merleau-Ponty connects with nature, not only in this passage, but throughout the 
Phenomenology of Perception.  Without slipping into reductionism, Merleau-Ponty 
approaches personhood via nature, all the while asking us to rethink what “nature” itself 
might be.  
 We will begin by looking at what Merleau-Ponty has to say explicitly about 
relating to others.  Following this close reading of the chapter “Other Selves and the 
Human World,” we will situate this discussion in relation to questions of nature, retracing 
Merleau-Ponty’s path in the Phenomenology.  In following his style through this text, we 
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intend to acquire some sense, some orientation, that will guide us through his later 
courses.  
 
Plurality: The Natural Atmosphere of Humanity  
 In “Other Selves and the Human World,” Merleau-Ponty performs a meditation 
on his own existence and its origins, embarking on reflection much like that of Descartes 
in his first Meditation.  Yet Merleau-Ponty makes several un-Cartesian choices as he 
performs his meditation according to his natal ontology rather than Descartes’s dualistic 
and metaphysical ontology.  Let us follow Merleau-Ponty on these meditations which 
lead him toward his expression of the existence of others.    
 In the opening lines of Meditation 1, Descartes famously doubts the opinions of 
his youth.  When Descartes looks back on his childhood, he sees only a wealth of 
untruths, of things he can happily ignore now that, as a fully formed adult, he knows 
better:  
Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had 
accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that 
consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly 
doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of 
undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, 
and of commencing anew… (Descartes 13)  
 
For Descartes, childhood has finished; indeed, “several years” separate him firmly from 
that youth and its strange opinions.  Like Sartre, Descartes is one of the people whom 
childhood “casts out toward adult life; …[who] believe that they have no past and are 
equally near to all possibilities” (SI 25, cited in Johnson “The Voice of Merleau-
Ponty…” 88).  Descartes explains that he feels he has finally reached a present that 
allows him to know completely his past: “I was waiting until I reached a point in my life 
111 
 
that was so timely that no more suitable time for undertaking these plans of action would 
come to pass” (13).  From his fully formed, adult mind, Descartes can confidently assess 
both the past and the future, where he will “build a firm and lasting foundation for the 
sciences” (13).  Descartes finds no reason to doubt the possibility of accomplishing this: 
no unpredictability shadows his future.  His natality does not trouble his present; his 
present does not natally erupt into the future. 
 In the tradition of Descartes, Merleau-Ponty begins his chapter on other selves by 
also turning toward his youth.  Like Descartes, Merleau-Ponty does not simply follow the 
Scholastics in taking for granted the training of his youth and experience: he does not 
assume that experience has already led him to definitive knowledge.  But nor does he, 
like Descartes, reject his childhood.  He considers his own existence by first looking back 
and then forward.  He looks back on his childhood:  
It is at the present time that I realize that the first twenty-five years of my 
life were a prolonged childhood, destined to be followed by a painful 
break leading eventually to independence.  If I take myself back to those 
years as I actually lived them and as I carry them within me, my happiness 
at that time cannot be explained in terms of the sheltered atmosphere of 
the parental home; the world itself was more beautiful, things were more 
fascinating, and I can never be sure of reaching a fuller understanding of 
my past than it had of itself at the time I lived through it, nor of silencing 
its protest. (PP 346) 
 
Merleau-Ponty marvels at both the distance and proximity of childhood. In retrospect, he 
finds that twenty-five years seem to have flown by, yet when he experienced those years, 
the time passed slowly: the time of childhood was “prolonged” and “sheltered” from the 
speed of adult life.  Merleau-Ponty wonders both at the intimate sense he has of that past 
and also his estrangement from it; he cannot live those years again nor perceive them as 
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he perceived then, and yet his current perception emerged from that time.  Merleau-Ponty 
marvels at the absence and presence of his own origins in his current life.    
 Merleau-Ponty finds that his current existence and opinions cannot be untwined 
from his past, enabling him, like Descartes, to dismiss entirely a set of past opinions.  
Rather, his present existence is indicative: Merleau-Ponty’s existence is an indicative 
pronoun, a “this,” which anonymously gestures towards antecedents that ironically both 
follow and precede him.  His present life points backwards toward his birth and forward 
toward new possible experiences.  This general, temporal indicativeness – this status of 
being a “one” whose existence distends and protends – appears to have something to do 
with Merleau-Ponty’s nature.  In fact, Merleau-Ponty here identifies nature with 
temporality itself. 
 Temporal dispersal defines Merleau-Ponty’s nature: he finds that his “voluntary 
and rational life… merges into another power” and this power is “natural time” (PP 347).  
Due to his nature, he finds that he will “never manage to seize the present in which I live 
with apodictic certainty” because his existence disperses itself temporally, forward and 
backwards (PP 347).  His natality institutes this temporal nature: “Such is the lot of a 
being who is born, that is, who once and for all has been given to himself as something to 
be understood” (PP 347).  But identifying this fundamental structure of temporality does 
not isolate Merleau-Ponty in his projects as mortality isolates Dasein.  Nor does the 
meditation on his nature isolate Merleau-Ponty as it does Descartes.  Merleau-Ponty’s 
natal – rather than mortal – temporality unites him with others.  As born, Merleau-Ponty 
also finds that he is not alone in living this peculiar temporal, natal existence.  In his 
meditations on being with others, Merleau-Ponty finds himself among other beings who 
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are similarly dispersed in the world.  He finds that he lives in “an atmosphere of 
humanity” (PP 347).   
 What is this atmosphere of humanity?  What is it like?  What gives rise to it?  
What is it to live to alone, not even with one other, but among many others?  Through 
these questions, we come to crux of the problem that occupies Merleau-Ponty through 
this chapter, the book, and (as I shall argue in succeeding sections) his later work on 
Nature:  
[H]ow can the word ‘I’ be put into the plural, how can a general idea of 
the I be formed, how can I speak of an I other than my own, how can I 
know that there are other I’s, how can consciousness which, by its nature, 
and as self-knowledge, is in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode 
Thou, and through this, in the world of the ‘One’? (PP 348) 
 
That is, what is the meaning of belonging to a plurality?  And how do we come to 
understand ourselves as part of a plurality?   For Merleau-Ponty, the answer to this 
question cannot be that we construct the plural from the singular.   We cannot integrate – 
in the sense used in calculus – from the “I” to the “one” nor the “we”: we lack the terms 
to extrapolate from the original function to any other.  To use another mathematical 
example, we cannot derive depth from a point: we must first begin in a three-dimensional 
world and within that world, define plane, line, and point.  Descartes suggested that depth 
was a derivative dimension, but for Merleau-Ponty it is the “first dimension” (EM 140, 
emphasis in the original).  Likewise, the mode of the “One” and the “We” are not 
derivative but primary ways that existence is given to us.  Already in the Phenomenology 
of Perception, Merleau-Ponty unfolds subjectivity and finds at its natal heart not only 
nature but others. 
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 Merleau-Ponty highlights the plurality of others – in contrast to the appearance of 
one other – as what must be investigated.  The problem of understanding “others” cannot 
be approached by understanding a singular other; rather, as Merleau-Ponty’s chapter title 
suggests, we must study other selves, in the plural.  I cannot understand the body of 
another as a singular object, but I also cannot look on the bodies of many other people as 
a collection of objects or even a collection of subjects.  Merleau-Ponty writes: “The 
constitution of the other person does not fully elucidate that of society, which is not an 
existence involving two or even three people, co-existence involving an indefinite 
number of consciousnesses” (PP 349).  If we first reduce the problem to the facing of a 
singular other – as for Hegel or even Levinas – we miss out on the phenomena of the one, 
the anonymous “someone” who uses the pipe, the spoon, or the body.  The Hegelian 
struggle for dominance, Merleau-Ponty writes, depends on a prior natal co-existence:  
With the cogito begins that struggle between consciousnesses, each one of 
which, as Hegel says, seeks the death of the other.  For the struggle ever to 
begin, and for each consciousness to be capable of suspecting the alien 
presences which it negates, all must necessarily have some common 
ground and be mindful of their peaceful co-existence in the world of 
childhood. (PP 355) 
  
Hegelian dialectical thought does not suffice to describe the embodied natal ground of 
that thinking.  Idealism, even as disrupted by Hegel, cannot describe the phenomena of 
the plurality.  But no more can objective thought. We cannot approach the problem of 
plurality through objective thought: there is “no place for other people and a plurality of 
consciousnesses in objective thought” (PP 350).  We cannot integrate a plurality through 
the Cartesian definitively singular subject, nor can we derive plurality from a multiplicity 
of objects.  Neither pure objectivism nor pure subjectivism, neither empiricism nor 
idealism, can give us plurality.  Far from the fallenness of Heideggerian das Man, 
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plurality refers to a being-with akin to Mitsein, yet Merleau-Ponty describes the genetic 
and corporeal emergence of plural being-with in a way quite foreign to Heidegger. 
 How can we approach this elusive phenomenon of plurality?  In the 
Phenomenology of Perception, the answer is: via the body.  In his later work, Merleau-
Ponty gradually modifies this emphasis on the personal body for an emphasis on the 
flesh.  Nonetheless, in the Phenomenology, by emphasizing the corporeal over the ideal 
as the ground of relations with others, Merleau-Ponty makes an important transition 
toward his account of plurality in his natal ontology. 
 
The Natural Body, Anonymous Existence, and the Nature of Other Selves 
 All of the Phenomenology of Perception’s study of the body leads up to this 
study; as he puts it, in the chapter on “Other Selves” that appears near the end of the 
book, “What we have said about the body provides the beginning of a solution to this 
problem” (PP 349).  The problem has arisen due to the reductive assumptions of 
objectivism and idealism.  For objective thought, “the body of another, like my own, is 
not inhabited, but is an object” (PP 349).  By contrast, in the phenomenological view of a 
natal ontology, one inhabits the body of another.  Through the anonymous mode of the 
one – through my natal connection – I can inhabit the other’s body.  I cannot know the 
other completely: this would be the mistake of extreme objectivism or subjectivism.  
Both of these positions would assume that total knowledge of the other is available (albeit 
in a different manner). But, for Merleau-Ponty, while I cannot totally know the other, I 
can feel the “co-existence involving an indefinite number of consciousness” (PP 349) in 
which we both share.  The personal body bears the marks of both culture and nature; the 
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body is lived from the inside and witnessed from the outside.  The body participates in 
the world of objects as well as the life of subjects.  My body, like the bodies of others, 
appears for me as an object, but the body also “withdraws from the objective world, and 
forms between the pure subject and the object a third genus of being, [and] the subject 
loses its purity and transparency” (PP 350).  
 When Merleau-Ponty turns toward his origins, he also turns toward his body.  The 
body in general indicates a past and a future: the body is the site of the indicative 
temporality.  Merleau-Ponty sees in his flesh the mark of a past and the mark of a future.  
We might imagine that were Merleau-Ponty a pregnant woman he could stare at his own 
omphalos – his origin – and he would see beneath it a gestating new omphalos, the site of 
being that will go from him into the world.  Though we use the navel metaphorically 
here, the body carries this mark literally in the flesh of the navel; the navel marks the 
organ of our natality just as eyes literally give us vision.  We do not have to be pregnant 
women to discover in our bodies the mark of our natal origin in others and our natal 
connection to others.  In the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty speaks quite 
directly of an “umbilical bond” (VI 107).  In the Phenomenology, he grounds this 
apparently metaphorical description in the very flesh of the body.  
 But as Merleau-Ponty meditates, he does not idealize or romanticize his body.  He 
does not pretend to be a pure corporeality, a raw fleshy animality alone among Western 
philosophers.  To be embodied is not necessarily to be naked.  Merleau-Ponty’s body is 
clothed, seated in a chair, using a pen.  These cultural accoutrements mean that his body 
does not require the literal presence of other bodies beside it to be connected to others.  
Rather, his natural body accumulates a patina of culture; he matures according to the 
117 
 
cultural atmosphere around him. The atmosphere of humanity in which Merleau-Ponty 
finds himself emanates from the cultural objects around him: “Just as nature find its way 
to the core of my personal life and becomes inextricably linked with it, so behavior 
patterns settle into that nature, being deposited in the form of a cultural world” (PP 347).  
Were Merleau-Ponty to assume that the body ends at the line of one’s actual flesh, he 
would foreclose the very phenomenology of embodiment he attempts.  But this is the 
very strength of Merleau-Ponty’s position: my body is hardly entirely only my own, but 
the bodies of others are also possessed and understood by me.  The anonymous body that 
goes between us does not limit our relation to others but enables it.  We can glimpse 
obliquely this anonymous body as it appears in cultural objects.  
 Where Descartes finds himself alienated by the cultural world exemplified in the 
objects surrounding him, Merleau-Ponty finds himself together with others even when he 
appears to be alone. Descartes, as he meditated on his existence, doubted all the objects 
around him: his dressing room and its contents (c.f. Descartes 14).  For Descartes, his 
“dressing gown” and the “sheet of paper” in his hands mean nothing: he approaches the 
objects after bracketing all meaning, all cultural, historical, and personal contexts.59  
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, affirms that these objects indeed exist, but that these cultural 
objects point beyond themselves.  This cultural world comprises a range of visible, 
partially visible, and as-yet invisible objects. Merleau-Ponty notices he understood 
                                                 
59 For Michel Henry, this represents the very phenomenological strength of Descartes’s text.  After 
performing the epochē, do you mean epoché Descartes indicates beyond his own empirical body, beyond 
all bodies, the fundamental phenomenological apperception that accompanies existence: “the obscure act of 
the infinite passion of a blind volition… or, if you like, ‘life.’” (“Videre Videor” 40).  We can imagine that 
Merleau-Ponty would object to this position on several grounds – we will return to this in his critique of 
Descartes in the Nature Courses – but not the least because Henry, like the early Husserl, overlooks the 
thickness and occlusion of the body.  We cannot complete the epochē, we cannot step out of our skins and 
encounter pure apperception.  
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himself as first and foremost not alone, but amidst a world of cultural objects that 
indicated, in absentia, others who were there before him.  When he looks around himself, 
he notices that the object calls up its user: “Someone uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon 
for eating, the bell for summoning” (PP 348).  The pipe does not point to one particular 
other individual, but a plural community of like others.   
 Perhaps most importantly for a natal ontology, Merleau-Ponty notes that such 
cultural indicators and the community they indicate have always been with him. 
“Culture” is not something that arrives with adulthood anymore than nature is something 
left behind in childhood.  We are born into a world populated by such objects: “The child 
finds them around him at birth like meteorites from other planet.  He appropriates them 
and learns to use them as others do, because the body image ensures the immediate 
correspondence of what he sees done and what he himself does” (PP 354).  We, of 
course, hear echoes of the Heideggerian work-world with which Merleau-Ponty was well 
familiar.  But where Heidegger emphasizes the use and meaning of these culturally fore-
grounded objects, Merleau-Ponty notes the role of the body and nature in their 
appearance.  It is the child’s body – in all its natal fragility and receptivity – that permits 
this initial acquisition of a world (however he might later reflectively alienate himself 
from that world by taking a class in philosophy and performing Cartesian skepticism).  
These cultural objects appear against the background of nature, Merleau-Ponty notes; 
nature likewise appears as a background in contrast to the foreground of personal 
perception (PP 347).  Like any background and foreground, these two appear together. 
The site of their appearance is the human body.  He writes:  
The very first of all cultural objects, and the one by which all the rest 
exist, is the body of the other person as the vehicle of a form of behavior. 
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Whether it be a question of vestiges or the body of another person, we 
need to know how an object in space can become the eloquent relic of an 
existence. (PP 348) 
 
Prior even to language, our prereflective taking up of cultural objects is enabled by our 
natal, embodied relation to others.   
 Already in the examples I have used, the prevalence of childhood and infancy in 
this phenomenology of embodiment is apparent.  But why is this?  What is it about the 
moments of our lives closest to our birth that tell us so much about our nature?  Is 
Merleau-Ponty suggesting that children enjoy some privileged proximity to Being?  
 I do not think this is the case for Merleau-Ponty, nor should it be the case for a 
careful natal ontology.  We are interested in finding the meaning of being numerous in 
general, not in mourning some lost connection to others. We find in adults both a sense 
of connection to others and a sense of alienation (and we will return to the question of 
whether Merleau-Ponty fully addresses the latter).  That said, we can also witness, both in 
adult life and in child life, a prereflective relation to others.  
 In general and not only in childhood, we do not have to determine by analogy 
what life shares our mode of being.  Through a phenomenology that attends to 
embodiment, we understand vision in general “not a ‘thinking about seeing,’ to use 
Descartes’ expression, but as a gaze at grips with a visible world, and that is why for me 
there can be another’s gaze” (PP 351). But it can be useful to genetically attend to our 
entrance into the world, when we find that we consistently act prereflectively on the 
affirmation that others share our world.  If we truly “grasp again on visible bodies those 
forms of behavior which are outlined there,” then we do not face the problem of “other 
consciousnesses” (PP 351).  Turning back toward our natality can divert us from 
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problems possible only by beginning from an adult consciousness where Descartes 
himself began his meditations.  
 Our prereflective “grip” on the world is particularly evident in childhood.  That 
the perception of others as others genetically precedes reflective understanding of these 
beings as “consciousnesses,” can be seen by considering childhood development: “A 
baby of fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers between my 
teeth and pretend to bite it.  And yet it has scarcely looked at its face in a glass, and its 
teeth are not in any case like mine” (PP 352).  The baby cannot yet perform reasoning 
“by analogy” nor would this reason be of very much help, given how her body differs 
from the adult philosopher who plays with her fingers. Instead, “ ‘Biting’ has 
immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance.  It perceives its intentions in its body, 
and my body with its own, and thereby my intentions in its own body” (PP 352).  Not 
only do we not “reason by analogy” like Cartesians, we do not reduce others to objects 
like a Hegelian.  Merleau-Ponty clearly pays tribute to Hegel’s account of the dialectical 
emergence of consciousness, but, as indicated above, he ultimately finds this account 
flawed.   Hegel forgets our thickness, our opacity: he forgets knowledge I have of myself 
insofar as I am a body.  I already know that I am not transparent to myself any more than 
others are.  For the embodied being, “the others can be evident to me because I am not 
transparent for myself, and because my subjectivity draws my body in its wake” (PP 
352).  
 The mechanism of the phenomena Merleau-Ponty here describes has recently 
been more clearly understood as the result of mirror neuron firing: such neurons allow 
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my body to literally move with the desires and actions of others.60  Merleau-Ponty’s 
insights also confirm certain findings in child psychology, although as John O’Neill 
suggests, these studies affirm not Lacan’s mirror phase per se, but the prereflective 
affirmative relation to others that precedes the phase (O’Neill 6).  Whatever the genetic 
origin – physical or developmental – we find ourselves inhabiting a world made 
meaningful by their structure.  In Merleau-Ponty’s words, these structures mean that 
when I encounter another person “this world may remain undivided between my 
perception and his, [so that] the self which perceives is in no particularly privileged 
position” (PP 353).  “My” very possessive relation to “my” perception dissolves; the 
other’s movements guide mine before these gestures rise to the level of reflective and 
possessive consciousness.  
 In this natal situation, the body points backwards toward its natal origin in other 
like beings but also forward toward its expressive life with others.  According to 
Merleau-Ponty, even Piaget, the famed child development psychology, failed to give 
enough credence to the natal origin of perception.  I quote at-length his important critique 
of Piaget:  
At about twelve years old, says Piaget, the child achieves the cogito and 
reaches the truths of rationalism… Piaget brings the child to a mature 
outlook as if the thoughts of the adult were self-sufficient and disposed of 
all contraction.  But in reality, it must be the case that the child’s outlook 
is in some way vindicated against the adult’s and against Piaget, and that 
the unsophisticated thinking of our earliest years remains as an 
indispensable acquisition underlying that of maturity, if there is to be for 
the adult one single intersubjective world. (PP 355) 
                                                 
60 These neurons help us both to make sense of the actions of another and to mimic it.  As Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, the neurons involve more than mimicking which on its own would be useless: “Why should an 
individual copy an action made by another individual? … If an animal observing a conspecific eating some 
food imitates its movements, it will never get food …”   (Rizzolatti 55) The neurons reflect shared desire 
and intention, not pure movement per se. Such neurons are common around the mouth, for example, firing 
in response to movement of hands with objects.   
122 
 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, Piaget’s developmental studies can implicitly suggest a 
telos; he implies that that the adult achieves some more authentic, complete world-
relation.  Certainly, we should not abandon the subtleties that only adult consciousness 
can achieve: few children do multi-variable calculus, write evolutionary theory, or 
compose truly profound poems.  But if we forget the birth of such capacities, we also 
forget some aspect of their nature.  If we forget the genesis of adult thought, we forget its 
generativity; if we assume that all thought was always mature, we forget that thought can 
mature.    
 
Natals Are Not Skeptics 
 Merleau-Ponty says that the child’s outlook is “vindicated against the adults.”  
But in what way precisely is the child’s outlook philosophically vindicated?  One of the 
most striking things about the child’s outlook is its commitment to the world; the adult, 
not the child, is a skeptic.  Children do not doubt the ability of their caretakers to 
understand their needs; the child demands milk or attention, assuming that others can 
acknowledge and respond to this need.  Before doubting whether communication can be 
fully understood, the child communicates.  Before retreating into the willful privacy of 
adolescence, the child reaches out to everyone around her and assumes that these other 
beings share her world.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it,  
[T]he child lives in a world which he unhesitatingly believes accessible to 
all around him: He has no awareness of himself or others as private 
subjectivities, nor does he suspect that all of us, himself included, are 
limited to one certain point of view of the world. (PP 355)   
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Of course, we might say that this represents a childish egoism – perhaps every child is a 
megalomaniac, as Freud says – and indeed this can also be true; the child does not stop to 
reflect on the effect of her desires on others.  But what is important to Merleau-Ponty is 
that the child assumes and affirms that others can understand her desires, and even before 
that, that these others exist.  If the child were to act – ethically or unethically – she would 
first of all already have acknowledged the existence of others.   
 This prioritization of the prelinguistic, embodied connection to others marks one 
of the differences between Merleau-Ponty from Lacan and other psychoanalytic models 
of natality.  As O’Neill has noted, “According to Lacan, the acquisition of 
intersubjectivity is achieved only at the level of language, or in the symbolic order”; for 
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, “all individuality and every specific sociality presupposes an 
anonymous intersubjectivity that is the ground of our figural relations with things and 
persons in-and-as-our-world” (8).61 
 Merleau-Ponty, of course, does not fail to notice that language also connects us to 
others.  He states clearly: “There is one particular cultural object which is destined to play 
a crucial role in the perception of other people: language” (PP 354).  In dialogue, I find 
that my thoughts and those of an other are “woven into a single fabric” and “Our 
perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world” (PP 355).    
When children learn to babble, they will often watch not the mouth of the person 
speaking, but the eyes of the speaker (CA 14).  In the lectures on child development, 
written just after the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty explains that in the “Cartesian 
                                                 
61 For another reading of the connection between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, see Silverman “Cézanne’s 
Mirror Stage.”  Silverman argues that in “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty  presents the artists as 
reversing the process of disintegration begun in Lacan’s mirror state (273).  Whether or not we agree with 
this particular claim, Silverman clearly demonstrates Merleau-Ponty’s familiarity and engagement with 
Lacan on these moments of child development.  
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tradition, there is no plane on which consciousness and language meet” (CA 3).  The 
Cartesian split, of course, occurs between mind and body, but perhaps unexpectedly it 
was Descartes who put language on the side of the body, so that for Descartes “language 
arises from the order of things and not from the order of the subject” (CA 4). 62  For 
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, “Language is neither thing nor mind, but it is immanent and 
transcendent at the same time” (CA 6).  Language is a wholeness into which we are born.  
Though this might initially sound Heideggerian, as Merleau-Ponty will later clarify in the 
Nature Course, in Heidegger language is almost supernatural, exceeding and preceding us 
like the gods; this move by Heidegger only avoids the mystery and slips into reifying 
“gnosis” (NC 87).  Heidegger’s or any philosophy that pays too much attention to 
language misses the dialectic of Nature at work in language.  What is mysterious is not 
language in itself but that we – with our very fleshy beings – generate and regenerate 
language with each birth through our natal connection to others.    
 For an example of this wholeness in its concrete, contingent form, consider the 
phenomena of babbling.  When children learn language, they learn by babbling.  
Babbling, “the ancestor of language,” is “spontaneous with respect to its environment” 
(CA 11).  Babbling involves a codevelopment of neural and anatomical features.63  
German children babble “in German”; they play in the tone and rhythm of the language 
                                                 
62 Husserl and Sartre had re-posed the Cartesian problem; Merleau-Ponty struggles with the relation 
between Husserl’s possibly Cartesian position on language and de Saussure’s.  For Husserl, the physical 
aspect of a sign can be separated from its meaning; for de Saussure (at least according to Merleau-Ponty), 
the physical sign, spoken or written or moved, is inseparable from its physical manifestation.  Gesture – 
explicitly excluded by Husserl in the Logical Investigations – is a primary example of the unity of meaning 
and physicality (Merleau-Ponty does argue, perhaps rightly, that the Husserl later abandons his position on 
grammar).   
63 C.f. Guasti.  
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rather than with distinct signs.64  For Heidegger, language is the path to the gods; perhaps 
this path follows a babbling Bavarian stream, but it does not seem to follow actual 
babbling, burping children.  
 Of course, Merleau-Ponty does owe much to and share much with Heidegger (a 
genealogy would be a project in itself) and in this case, his debt is apparent in his 
emphasis on the power of language to solicit us into being.  The acquisition of language 
“is a development toward an end defined by the environment and not preestablished in 
the organism” (CA 14).  Merleau-Ponty’s natal view presents language as a realm of new 
possibility with a power to invite new speech and action, where for Sartre and other 
Cartesians, “the word has no ‘power’; it universalizes and summarizes what already 
exists” (CA 4).  Rather, a child learns language – learns in language – as we learn the 
meaning “of a new writer who, at first, is not understood, but who little by little becomes 
understandable” (CA 29).  Merleau-Ponty critiques the linguist Jakobson for reducing 
language acquisition to an intellectual process (31); we learn not because of innate 
intellectual capacity but because of our whole vital motivation and relation to others.  
Neither in language nor in gesture nor in empathy do we represent the other in ourselves. 
As he will put it later, we understand the other as flesh through “an anonymous visibility 
that inhabits us both” (VI 142). Revitalizing a childlike vision – rediscovering our “natal 
pact” (See PrimP 6) – allows us to avoid an abstract philosophy of being and nothingness 
in favor of a natal philosophy, a philosophy of being born. 
 Merleau-Ponty never loses sight of language as fundamentally important evidence 
of our relation to others; he returns to this theme throughout his work in explicit 
                                                 
64 The examples Merleau-Ponty chooses from early developments in linguistics are generally not 
contradicted by current research and in fact anticipate advancements in research on primate and human 
language acquisition.  See, for example, the work by Bloom in Language Acquisition. 
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philosophical commentary and by allusion to writers and poets.  Nonetheless, Merleau-
Ponty also suggests that language is not the only evidence of our relation others or our 
capacity to merge our subjectivities with the wakes of others.  Reflective linguistic 
articulation of our connection to others presupposes an orientation toward others, a 
receptivity that permits expressivity.  Overemphasizing language as the moment in which 
I find myself in a plurality covers over the very multiplicity that constitutes a plurality.   
 Merleau-Ponty never suggests that turning toward prereflective life – toward our 
natality – admits us into unproblematic relations with others; the body does not offer a 
transcultural, transpersonal clear medium.  Language does not cause the problem of other 
selves, nor does it resolve it.  Instead, attending to our natural natal connection to others 
shows that the chasm between my self and other selves runs even deeper than I thought.  
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
The conflict between myself and the others does not begin only when we 
try to think ourselves into the other and does not vanish if we reintegrate 
thought into non-positing consciousness and unreflective living; it is 
already there if I try to live another’s experiences, for example in the 
blindness of sacrifice.  I enter a pact with the other, having resolved to live 
in an interworld in which I accord as much place to others as to myself.  
But this interworld is still a project of mine, and it would be hypocritical 
to pretend that I seek the welfare of another as if it were mind, since this 
very attachment to another’s interest still has its source in me. (PP 357) 
 
Even if I spontaneously decide to give up my self – my very life – for the other, I, in the 
privacy of my life project, I nonetheless make this choice.  Even the most generous act of 
human love is not perfect love: it does not “cast out fear” as the biblical John says.  We 
must still fear that this love is not reciprocal, that the other does not fully understand our 
love, that the other does not want our love.  Merleau-Ponty imagines a tragic couple “in 
which there is more love felt on one side than on the other” (PP 357).  Can this couple 
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simply draw on their prereflective connection to others and clarify this imbalance?  
Unfortunately no, Merleau-Ponty responds.  No phenomenology can study its way out of 
the facts of this situation or any situation.  
 To return to our natal emphasis, we can imagine this attempt at sacrifice and love 
as the love of a parent for a child (rather than that between lovers, as Merleau-Ponty 
mentions).  As a mother or father, I might seek the welfare of my child “as if it were 
mine,” but I find only that I can never give this gift.  Since the child’s very conception, 
the child appeared on the other side of a gap, un écart, in being.   
 But Merleau-Ponty cautions against too much skepticism: before we can even 
have these doubts, before we can even worry whether our child wants our sacrifice or our 
lover meets our desire, we can affirm that we do acknowledge these other selves.  This 
affirmation depends on our natural natality.  Merleau-Ponty explains that before we 
reflect on the authenticity of the other’s recognition of us (or vice versa), we first 
acknowledge the other: 
But first we need to know how it has been possible for me to posit the 
other.  In so far as I am born into the world, and have a body and a natural 
world, I can find in that world other patterns of behavior with which my 
own interweave, as we have explained above.  But also in so far as I am 
born and my existence is already at work and is aware that it is given to 
itself, it always remains on the hither side of the acts in which it tries to 
become engaged and which are forever mere modalities of its own, and 
particular cases of its insurmountable generality. (PP 357-358) 
 
Anonymous, general natal existence both enables and delimits our relation to other 
selves.  The body does not offer a shortcut to others; generality does not mean unity.  
Merleau-Ponty states clearly: “The generality of the body will never make it clear how 
the indeclinable I can estrange itself” (PP 358).  But it is through our very estranging I, 
our very difference from others in our plurality that we can come, for example, to love 
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others.  If we could perfectly love others, we would only enjoy in ourselves “the love 
which God has for himself through me,” Merleau-Ponty says, paraphrasing Spinoza (PP 
359).  We do experience love for others insofar as we experience others as distinct, as 
other.  Others are not just a concept indicated by cultural objects; others truly open up a 
gap in the world.  As struggling phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty says, we must not 
abandon description of these experiences merely because they pose difficulty.  Rather, 
“We must say of experience of others what we have said elsewhere about reflection: that 
its object cannot escape it entirely, since we have a notion of the object only through that 
experience” (PP 359).  
 However impossible to fully describe our experience of others, we nonetheless 
notice that we do experience others.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it most concisely, “I can 
evolve a solipsist philosophy but, in doing so, I assume the existence of a community of 
men endowed with speech, and I address myself to it” (PP 360).  As an adult, I can deny 
skeptically my relation to others, but I can only do so in a natural language: that is, a natal 
language, one inherited with by birth.  Even were I to say nothing, my refusal to 
communicate speaks in a community of speakers: “the refusal to communicate … is still 
a form of communication” (PP 361).  Even to avoid physical contact with others, I must 
notice the difference between a human and a rock; I must set out to avoid others.  I can 
only leave the company of others; I cannot begin without others.  Only a rock, only the 
inimitably neutral stars can be alone; solipsism is only possible for someone who exists 
“without being or doing anything, which is impossible” (PP 361).  
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The Social, Plurality, and the First-Person Plural: History and the Real Battlefield 
for Nature  
 Having shown that phenomenology cannot leave off describing others, we are still 
left to wonder exactly what Merleau-Ponty has to say about our relations with others.  He 
says that we cannot doubt others; solipsism is not an option.  What, then, are our options?  
As phenomenologists looking for the meaning of being numerous, we have discovered a 
few things through our reading of the Phenomenology of Perception.  We have found that 
the body indicates others, nature and culture, and that the intentional threads that tie us to 
these phenomena are loosest in childhood.   
 Merleau-Ponty makes the suggestion in this chapter of the Phenomenology that 
for more detail, we must turn to what he here calls “the social.” As phenomenologists, 
“we must return to the social with which we are in contact by the mere fact of existing” 
(PP 362).  We saw above that the social – at least in the terms of the Phenomenology – 
refers to what we here call a plurality.  Merleau-Ponty calls it also a co-existence: 
“society… is not an existence involving two or even three people, but co-existence 
involving an indefinite number of consciousnesses” (PP 349). Phenomenology cannot 
restrict itself to the description of one consciousness – not even one temporally unfolding 
consciousness – because then phenomenology would miss the very phenomena that its 
language lets it explore.  The social, however, he already notices does not present itself 
clearly as an object: “Prior to the process of becoming aware, the social exists obscurely 
and as a summoning” (PP 362).  The social appears with the occlusion of subjectivity.  In 
this chapter, we have also called this phenomena “plurality,” or the subject’s relation to 
multiple others.  In Merleau-Ponty’s later work, he leaves off reference to “the social” in 
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favor of the term “flesh.”  We can already see the motivation for doing so in this chapter 
in the Phenomenology.   “The social” connotes the object of study of sociology.  But the 
phenomena to which Merleau-Ponty directs phenomenology cannot be confused with that 
object.  He makes clear: “Primarily the social does not exist as a third person object” (PP 
362).  Plurality cannot be studied by looking from the third person at other people’s 
relations to each other, as sociology attempts.  Plurality does not refer to a “they” or a 
“them”; plurality is a stance that I take up with others, as a “we.” 
 Arendt’s objections – though distinct from those of Merleau-Ponty – to the 
terminology and techniques of “the social” and “sociology” are helpful here.  For Arendt, 
the social, in contrast to the political, denotes a belonging to a group of others who are 
like us.  Arendt traces how, over the past several centuries in Western cultures, 
“membership in a social class replaced the protection previously offered by membership 
in a family” (HC 256). Identifying a belonging-to a social group commits us to a group of 
others like us: like our family.  But for Arendt “men cannot become citizens of the world 
as they are citizens of their countries…The rise of society brought about the simultaneous 
decline of the public as well as the private realm” (HC 257).  Instead, we must be 
properly political citizens, participating in a sphere of difference.  
 Merleau-Ponty, in identifying the “atmosphere” of humanity, appears to have 
pointed toward intersubjective domain that makes such political projects possible.  In this 
chapter of the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty shows that he foresees the connection to 
the political realm, although as in the Structure of Behavior, he does not fully explore its 
implications.  He turns to concrete, political moments to exemplify “the social” which, 
following Arendt, we will continue to refer to as “plurality.”  These examples come from 
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war and revolution: “the Russian peasants of 1917” and “the Battle of Waterloo.”  What 
phenomenology – in contrast to sociology or history – must study is the view of the 
actors in this history, not the view of these actors from above:  
The historian who is not engaged in the battle and who sees it from all 
angles … thinks he has grasped it in its essential truth.  But what he gives 
us is no more than a representation; he does not bring before us the battle 
itself since this issue was, at the time, contingent. (PP 362) 
 
The battle of Waterloo was, at the time it was lived, contingent: it was open-ended.  
Action had not been performed; Fabrice, standing on the battlefield, had to make a 
choice.  This choice depended on taking up an attitude toward the situation.  The 
historian pretends to present us the definitive account of experience by virtue of being 
disengaged.   
 But what does that purportedly disengaged perspective tell us of experience?  We 
are all engaged in the world, if not literally engaged in “battles.”  What phenomenology 
ought to study is this mode of engagement in which we are with others.  Looked on this 
way, plurality  
is at one with all problems of transcendence.  Whether we are concerned 
with my body, the natural world, the past, birth or death, the question is 
always how I can be open to phenomena which transcend me, and which 
nevertheless exist only to the extent that I take them up and live them; how 
the presence to myself (Urpräsenz) which establishes my own limits and 
conditions every alien presence is at the same time depresentation 
(Entgenewärtigung) and throws me outside myself. (PP 363-364) 
 
In this passage, Merleau-Ponty alludes to Husserl’s Crisis, as marked in a footnote.  We 
should consider the ramifications of this allusion at several levels.  First, this allusion 
confirms that at this stage in his oeuvre, Merleau-Ponty had already read Husserl’s Crisis 
and noted its relevance not only for philosophy of science or history, but for the 
fundamental problems of phenomenology.  This influence persists through Merleau-
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Ponty’s methodological innovations in generative phenomenology in the Nature Courses 
and “La Philosophie Aujourd’hui,” as I will show.  Second, Merleau-Ponty raises the 
issues of the Crisis in the context of very concrete reflections on history; for Merleau-
Ponty, our natal connection to others conditions action, including concrete political 
events such as the battle of Waterloo.  Whereas for Arendt we must emerge into the 
political arena as fully-formed adults, free from the constraints of the family, birth, and 
death, Merleau-Ponty suggests a more permeable boundary between the household and 
the political sphere.  We never set aside our fleshy, natal connection to others; this 
connection may even be the ground of action with others, including political action.   
 Recovering our natal connection to others is no armchair philosophical project; 
rather, a natal ontology should reorient us on the very battlefield of history.  At the same 
time, our natality arises from a particular natural and historical situation, with all its 
contingencies.  As natals, the actors on the battlefield of Waterloo, no less than the 
Communists taking to the streets in post-war Paris or the worker priests, could not do 
anything – as natal, they were not “free” in Sartre’s sense65 – but no more were they 
passive witnesses to their situation.   
 Merleau-Ponty has here taken up a theme, discussed in the last chapter, to which 
he will return again and again in more detail through his later work.  That is, how we can 
take up our situation and act, without overlooking our very natal contingency?  We can 
say at once, “I did not choose to be here” – I did not choose to be born, let alone here and 
now, with these people – and yet we still chose our actions.  We say that we are natural – 
that we have bodies that determine us and which we did not determine – and yet we are 
responsible. In part, this responsibility rests on our natal affirmation and connaissance 
                                                 
65 See Chapter 2, 
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of others like ourselves.  We do have a natal affinity for beings like us; we do know 
which beings are other selves.  This affinity does not tell us how we should act: but it 
does indicate that when we act, our connaissance of the comportement of other natals 
implicates us in a life beyond the life of a single body.   
 The Phenomenology of Perception published just after World War II contains 
numerous references to political consequences and war-related examples.  One mention 
in the preface gives us a sense of how broadly and politically Merleau-Ponty intends his 
new vision of nature to be applied. He argues that when we adopt his wider view of 
intentionality, we can take in not merely the objective facts or qualities of an object but 
its “unique mode of existing,” whether it is “a piece of wax” or “all the events of a 
revolution” (PP xviii).  He moves from the classic Cartesian example of the object of 
reflective philosophy – a piece of wax – to an example that would have concerned his 
contemporaries worried about Marxist and revolution.  The events of a revolution are as 
much, if not more importantly, the object of phenomenological thought than concrete 
objects around us.  
 Throughout the Phenomenology, not only in the chapter “Other Selves and the 
Human World,” he persistently returns to the theme of war. Many footnoted examples 
come from Saint-Exupéry’s account of living through bombing in the war (c.f. PP 84).  
Where did Schneider receive his pathological injuries? In the war: “After all Schneider’s 
trouble was not initially metaphysical, for it was a shell splinter which wounded him in 
the back of the head” (PP 126).   War events also primarily mark out temporality for 
Merleau-Ponty at a personal level.  He writes that he can know he had a “suit made 
before the armistice, since no more English cloth has been available since” (PP 418).    
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 If the sequence of the subjects addressed in the Phenomenology are any indication 
of priority – and I think they are – then we can be sure that the events of revolution are 
possibly even more important for phenomenology to contemplate than the objects of 
everyday life, like Descartes’s wax.  The concluding and climactic chapter of the 
Phenomenology applies the distinctions and theories developed throughout the book to 
the subject of revolution.  Most of the chapter on freedom examines the situation of 
revolution as its primary example: he looks at possible Marxist revolution in Russia and 
also the French revolution and Napoleonic response. He presents the example of a 
prisoner who battles being tortured (PP 454).  The fundamental examples of questions of 
freedom allude to war: “Shall I risk my life for so little?” (PP 456).   
 Sounding a bit like Wittgenstein’s infamous end to the Tractatus, Merleau-Ponty 
concludes the Phenomenology by indicating that he must be silent.  Instead of offering 
more reflection, he turns to a citation from Saint-Exupéry’s Pilote de Guerre because he 
can say no more philosophically.  He writes: “what is here required is silence, for only 
the hero lives out his relation to men and the world, and it is not fitting that another speak 
in his name.”  After philosophy has called our attention to the nature of action, it remains 
to us to act in the world, as Saint-Exupéry acted. As Saint-Exupéry says, “Your abode is 
your act itself.  Your act is you” (PP 456).  “You” are who commits to an action, who 
takes up a situation and lives it.  Even in inaction or silence, you commit yourself.   
 The implication is that phenomenology, from a descriptive project, leads to real 
action and a practical change.  Yet we cannot say that a natal ontology offers a 
prescription for action in a plurality.  Merleau-Ponty writes he has rediscovered “the 
natural world, the social world… as permanent field or dimension of existence: I may 
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well turn away from it, but not cease to be situated relatively to it” (PP 362).  A natal 
ontology cannot tell us what to do in relation to others, but it can reveal that we do not act 
alone.  For Merleau-Ponty all our action with others – from one on one, mother to child 
action, to action of a historical scale – arises from the very movement of human 
perception.  As we are motivated to perceive light crossing a dark room, so we are 
motivated to act on a microscopic and macroscopic scale.  Both “idealism and realism… 
falsify the motivational relations existing between the external and internal worlds, and 
make this relationship unintelligible” (PP 364). 
 We shall have to uncover a new relation between the external and the internal; we 
shall have to rethink our very interiority and exteriority as we rethink according to a natal 
ontology.  What exactly it is to have nature inside us and to express externally our 
interior life will motivate Merleau-Ponty’s work throughout the Nature Courses. Yet 
already in the Phenomenology, he understands that our natal existence initiates us into a 
world of action and yet so conditions us that we are receptive – and thus passive as well 
as active – in this world of others.   
 
Conclusions  
 The Phenomenology of Perception points us toward the phenomena of the One, 
the anonymous mode of being; the text also suggests that this modality is defined by a 
temporality shared by each individual being is capable sharing this mode with a plurality 
of others.  But where does this mode of the one come from?  What is the origin of this 
original and originating modality?  These questions are not answered by the 
Phenomenology of Perception.  These questions lie outside the domain of static 
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phenomenology – which might describe the experience of being or acting in the mode of 
the one – but also of genetic phenomenology which describes the acquisition of this 
modality in a single human existence.  The one points beyond the history of an individual 
perception.  In inquiring into the origin of the one in a self, we find that we trace the 
invisible umbilical cord toward other selves; moreover, these other selves include not just 
those specific individuals with us at any given moment, nor even any indefinite number 
of individuals living synchronously at this moment.  Rather, we find ourselves 
umbilically connected toward a past and a future of other like beings, each tugging on our 
intentional cords.  The womb of the world has given birth before; our siblings await us 
outside.  We cannot meet them inside.    
 As we emerge – never fully – into exteriority, we find that we shelter a new 
interior hollow.  This hollow surges forth; it bears our life, our projects and our children 
into being.  It feels like us, but we can’t see it.  Like a gestating child inside a pregnant 
mother, being kicks: who gave it motion?  
 In pursuit of this question in the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty turns to 
Schelling, then Bergson, and finally the later Husserl.   
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CH 4 – Retrieving Nature’s Interiority: Toward Poetic Phenomenology 
 
“I hide myself within a flower.”  
– Emily Dickinson 
 
 
To and From Cartesian Ontology: the Loss of Nature’s Interiority 
 In the “Philosopher and His Shadow,” Merleau-Ponty makes the following 
remark about the task of phenomenology as he sees it: 
What resists phenomenology within us – natural being, the ‘barbarous’ 
source Schelling spoke of – cannot remain outside phenomenology and 
should have its place within it.  The philosopher must bear his shadow, 
which is not simply the factual absence of light. (Signs 178)66 
 
This essay appeared in Signs, published between the Phenomenology and the Nature 
Courses.  As Barbaras points out, this period marks a transition in Merleau-Ponty’s 
thinking from a philosophy of consciousness, via a study of language, and toward a truly 
ontological position in the later work.67  In this transitional essay, Merleau-Ponty 
describes a new sort of philosophy, a phenomenology that would avoid past dualisms.  In 
this new sort of thinking, “we do not have to think about the world and ourselves in terms 
of the bifurcation of Nature and mind” (SI 162).  This new thought would carry out the 
project envisioned in the Phenomenology of Perception: it would restore nature to the 
heart of subjectivity.  This new thought would address Nature without being equivalent to 
“naturalism,” at least in any sense practiced by other philosophers so far, and certainly 
not in any reductive or simplistic sense.  Instead, paraphrasing Husserl, Merleau-Ponty 
describes his new phenomenological thinking this way: “It is the science of Nature, or in 
a deeper sense, a certain philosophy which gives birth to the natural sciences and which 
                                                 
66 Barbaras identifies this passage as marking a transition in Merleau-Ponty’s later position (77). 
67 c.f. Barabaras, Ch. 4. Dillon argues that there is not a leap but a development from Merleau-Ponty’s early 
thought to his later work (85). 
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comes back to the pure I and to the correlative, ‘things simply as things’ (blosse Sachen)” 
(SI 162-163).  Beyond the classic formulation of phenomenology as a return to the things 
themselves, Merleau-Ponty here characterizes phenomenology as a science of Nature.  
But what is this new study of Nature like?  What is the “Nature” that is studied?  This is a 
Nature that correlates to the natural attitude, not naturalism per se.  Just as “the natural 
attitude itself emerges unscathed from the complaints which can be made about 
naturalism” (SI 163), so Merleau-Ponty’s new study of Nature aims to recover Nature 
from a history of objectification by naturalism.  Phenomenology cannot aim for a 
Romantic return to some pure Nature, but rather must attempt a productive generation of 
this sense of Nature.  
 In the above mentioned essay, Merleau-Ponty only postulates this as a project; in 
the Nature Courses, he embarks directly on a retrieval of this sense of Nature.  As he 
mentions in the above quotation, this Nature – apparent in the natural attitude – is the 
same Nature that forms Schelling’s “barbarous source.”  The Nature that Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to describe in the Nature Courses – and indeed in his later ontology – is “an 
object that is not an object at all; it is not really set out in front of us.  It is our soil [sol] – 
not what is in front of us, facing us, but rather, that which carries us” (NC 3).  In this 
view, Nature is not what we understand and objectify in reflective thought, but “what has 
a meaning, without this meaning being posited by thought: it is the autoproduction of a 
meaning” (NC 3).  This is the Nature in us – at the heart of subjectivity, as stated in the 
Phenomenology of Perception.68  This is the Nature into which we are born as natals, and 
the Nature to which we give birth.  In the view of Nature that Merleau-Ponty is in the 
                                                 
68 See Chapter 2.  
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process of developing in the Nature Courses, subjectivity has an exteriority and Nature an 
interiority.   
 In Aristotelian finalism, Merleau-Ponty finds some of the first articulations of 
Nature as following its own interior motivation.69  For Aristotle, natural bodies in general 
– not just persons – had intentions, orders, destinations; in Aristotle, as Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, “a qualitative idea of destination is attached to Nature” (NC 7).70 That is, natural 
bodies performed their teleological destinies, more or less successfully realizing these 
inherent aims.  In short, for Aristotle, Nature had an interior life. It is as if in the history 
of Western thought, Nature was originally like a child with a rich, inner, imaginative life.  
As Merleau-Ponty continues to show throughout his history, with the “maturity” of 
Western thought, Nature lost this inner life.  Nature was reduced to what we could say 
about it or what we could say about our own interventions in Nature.   
 Aristotle’s De Anima also offers a method for studying Nature, particularly 
through the affective life.  In the De Anima, Aristotle describes two possible types of 
study: the study of the student of nature and the study of the dialectician.  These two 
perspectives are assumed to be in contrast and in conflict.  For example, when answering 
the questions “[w]hat anger is.  The one would say it is a craving for revenge, or some 
such thing, while the other would say it is a boiling of the blood and heart around the 
heart. Of these, the one gives an account of the material, the other of the form and 
meaning” (403b10).  The purported student of nature studies only the matter while the 
                                                 
69 In the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty begins his study of Nature in the origins of Western philosophy 
with Aristotle and the Stoics.  This beginning does not mark an absolute beginning: one might also trace, as 
Heidegger did, origins of phusis in the Pre-Socratics or Plato (See Introduction to Metaphysics, Chapter 1).   
70 In his recent translation of the De Anima, Joe Sachs calls this interior tendency toward a destination 
“being-at-work-staying-itself,” a rendering of Aristotle’s term entelecheia.  Although he does not use the 
term in the cited section of the Nature Courses, the term entelchy reappears in Merleau-Ponty’s own work 
as well as in Husserl’s.  See my chapter 6.  
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logician or dialectician, by contrast, ignores these physiological details and focuses 
instead on the intention of the angry person: Anger happens when a person desires 
retaliation.  Aristotle determined that the true student of philosophy of nature must study 
both accounts, addressing both the physiological state and the psychological states that 
cause anger.  Aristotle recognized that the account of the so-called “student of nature” 
alone would not suffice unless paired with the insights of the dialectician (403b 10a).  
That is, to understand the affective life, we must include both the account of how and of 
why.  But Aristotle’s methodology applied not only to the study of human nature, of 
human souls, but to the study of en-souled, living beings in general.  A proper study of 
Nature attends not only to the parts or processes of Nature, but to ends of these processes: 
to the totality that appears to the being who reflects on that totality.71 
 In Merleau-Ponty’s view, such a notion of Nature, and with it the proper method 
of the study of Nature, has been excised from Western philosophy.  Merleau-Ponty – like 
many others – primarily holds Descartes responsible for this unfortunate situation.72   
                                                 
71 Merleau-Ponty argues that in the Aristotelian model, “nature still remains narrowly constructed in 
proportion to man” (NC 7).  The philosopher himself had the privileged position of witnessing the 
orientation of Nature.  Like a poor psychotherapist, the Aristotelian measured the intentions of her patient 
only on her own terms.  Sachs disagrees, arguing that in his Physics and De Anima, Aristotle, unlike his 
predecessors, considers life to be purpose, and thus precisely not a purpose relative to human kind. 
Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty does affirm that Aristotle at least noticed this interiority of life in a way that 
his predecessors did not. 
72 Certainly, though common, Merleau-Ponty’s critical reading of Descartes is not the only possible 
reading.  Michel Henry, for example, provides an alternative reading, drawing on the Replies and 
Objections as well as the Passions of the Soul that rehabilitates Descartes as a “material phenomenologist” 
who instituted consciousness as we now understand it (and, significantly for Henry, simultaneously the 
unconscious) (See “Videre Videor” in Genealogy of Pscyhoanalysis).  Henry draws on some of the same 
passages in Descartes which interest Merleau-Ponty – the claim, for example, that the soul, not the eye, 
sees – but finds in them evidence of phenomenological attentiveness that Merleau-Ponty does not.  Henry’s 
account, however robustly presenting Descartes, still restricts itself to 1) a single consciousness, 2) an adult 
consciousness, and 3) a consciousness primarily occupied with thinking, not with acting.  All of these 
restrictions would seem to Merleau-Ponty unhelpfully reductive rather than a necessary result of the 
phenomenological epochē.   Henry approaches the objection Merleau-Ponty poses, writing that “Unless we 
suppose that the most essential being of man consists in mathematical activity and that the child occupies 
itself with preparing for the College Boards in the womb, we must recognize that the ‘thought’ here in 
question is not ‘understanding’ in the strict sense but revelation in its most original form, the mute 
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With the Cartesian turn, philosophy lost the rich Aristotelian tradition that attributed an 
interiority to Nature.  This was a traumatic event in the history of Western thought; it is a 
trauma that Western thinkers since have, for the most part, either consciously or 
unconsciously failed to recognize.  Merleau-Ponty proposes attempts to interrogate the 
Western tradition, locating this traumatic loss.  
 Merleau-Ponty suggests that phenomenology probe this question of Nature in 
manner akin to psychoanalytic inquiry.73  In the first of the Nature Courses, Merleau-
Ponty is engaged in the interrogation of Nature that he describes in the Visible and the 
Invisible as “an ontological psychoanalysis” in contrast to an “existential psychoanalysis” 
(VI 270)74.  This method of inquiring he refers to as “dialogue” and “interrogation.”  And 
who is the subject or patient of this inquiry?  In one sense, the patient is Nature itself: not 
the concept of Nature, but the complex of ideality and existence that is the totality of 
Nature. In the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty explains that we can see “the whole of 
nature … [as] our interlocutor in a sort of dialogue” (PP 320).   In a working note in the 
Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty instructs himself to do a “psychoanalysis of 
Nature: it is the flesh, the mother” (VI 267).  In the same note, he remarks: “‘ Nature is at 
the first day’: it is there today … It is a question of finding the present, the flesh of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
immanence of its first being-to-self, in the affectivity of pure self-sensing” (Henri “Videre Videor” 33).  
Nonetheless, Henry suggests that it is the same activity in the child and the adult: thinking refers to an 
immutable “mute immanence.” 
73 Merleau-Ponty’s attitude toward psychoanalysis changes over the course of his career.He had a negative 
view in the Structure of Behavior, but by the time of the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty was familiar with 
and respected the work of at least Freud.  As Barbaras explains, Merleau-Ponty, who wrote an introduction 
to a book on Freud and consistently engages with the developing field of psychoanalysis throughout his 
career, envisions the reciprocal informing of psychoanalysis by phenomenology and vice versa (273).  
74 Barbaras identifies this passage (276) but only by way of contrast and comparison between Merleau-
Ponty and Freud.  He does not relate this practice to Merleau-Ponty’s ontological claims about Nature.  
However, in light of Merleau-Ponty’s working note dates only a month earlier that he will attempt a 
psychoanalysis of Nature, it seems important to draw together these two statements.  Moreover, as we have 
seen and will see throughout this project, for Merleau-Ponty any concept of Nature implies an ontology: 
concept of Nature is “always the expression of an ontology – its privileged expression” (NC 204).   
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world (and not in the past) an ‘ever new’ and ‘always the same’” (VI 267).  Each chapter 
takes up a different “interrogation,” a questioning partnership with various thinkers.  
Thus, in another sense, Western thought that conditions current human existence itself is 
the patient interrogated.  He suggests that our current attitude and concept of Nature 
contain traces of the past of Nature.  As a patient’s present attitudes and relationships 
toward people in her life bear out patterns established in childhood, so Western 
philosophy’s present relationship to Nature bears out patterns established early in its 
history.  Merleau-Ponty does not clarify his partner in this dialogue; rather he lets the 
partner appear in the midst of the history he traces.  
 Although Merleau-Ponty imagines the loss of a certain sense of Nature, this does 
not leave him or us without hope as phenomenologists.  In one sense, Cartesian 
metaphysics and post-Cartesian naturalism have occluded the Schelling-like un-thought 
ground of thought, and this marks a definitive loss.  Phenomenology can never 
Romantically recover a past sense of Nature; nonetheless, this un-thought Nature is not 
completely foreign to us.  It is true that we cannot see the Nature Merleau-Ponty intends 
phenomenology to seek.  But we cannot see this Nature in exactly the same way that we 
cannot see our own faces; just as we might indirectly understand our own visage – in the 
face of an other, through touch, through expression – so we can indirectly discover this 
Nature.  Merleau-Ponty sets in motion the process of accomplishing this by 
phenomenologically reflecting on the traumatic history of Nature, in hopes of regaining a 
new sense of Nature.  No more than psychoanalysis promises a return to childhood does 
he expect phenomenology to provide us with an “authentic” or original access to Nature.   
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 In conversation with Merleau-Ponty, I here recapitulate his history of Western 
thought.  In retelling this history – like a patient retelling an early childhood or traumatic 
event – I attend to what stands out in Merleau-Ponty’s own account and in my own 
reiteration.  What of the gaps in this account?  He has drawn a strong line through the 
history of Western thought, substantiating his position with a rich genealogy.  But that 
history has some marked lacks: Nietzsche appears not at all, Hegel is hardly mentioned, 
and Augustine and neo-Platonists do not precede Descartes.  Certainly few authors beside 
Whitehead outside the continental European tradition make an appearance: no Emerson, 
Thoreau, or Wittgenstein.   Are these sins of omission, insignificant gaps for the sake of 
concision, or significant of some more careful selection? On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty 
indeed had to chose a concise set of authors, manageable in his lecture course; his 
selections reflect his personal and historically conditioned selections (thus, the omission 
of, for example, Thoreau).  On the other hand, his reading of these authors allows him to 
dialectically generate his own view; likewise, I have not covered all the authors discussed 
by Merleau-Ponty, but only the accounts most stressed by him or those significant in 
describing his natal ontology.  Among these authors, I emphasized those concerned with 
science, particularly life science.75 This type of engagement with the life sciences 
prefigures Merleau-Ponty’s own method and also the implications of his 
phenomenology.76  Like Arendt, he attends to the co-emergence of life sciences in 
                                                 
75 Certainly Augustine and the neo-Platonists before Descartes emphasized the inward man over the 
hypostatic body.  But Descartes makes use of this view of the person as mind – animus – to enable the 
practice of natural science by eliminating problems of consciousness and interiority from the pure 
exteriority that nature science considers.  Schelling wrote not only a nearly-phenomenological account of 
the appearance of Nature, but also a treatise on physical and life science issues.  Nietzsche certainly offers a 
strong critique of dualist metaphysics, but not one that he presents in the context of emergent science.   
76 It is worth noting the many parallels between Merleau-Ponty’s history and that offered by Marjorie 
Grene and David Depew offer in Philosophy of Biology.  These authors admit the selectivity of their 
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general: developments in biology and innovations in existential philosophy or in physics 
condition one another.  This by no means justifies Merleau-Ponty’s account as a complete 
history, but it does highlight significant genealogical precedents to the poetic 
phenomenological practice that Merleau-Ponty envisions.    
 Significantly for our project here, the lost Nature after which we seek corresponds 
to our natality.  In the opening lines of the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty explains that 
what has been lost in the history of Western thought is the more fundamental meaning of  
“Nature” as “nascor, ‘to be born’” (NC 3).  That is, we have lost the meaning of Nature 
as birth: concomitantly, we have lost a view of ourselves as natural both from our births 
and from our generative activity of giving birth to speech, action, and reflection.  As 
natals, we are born into Nature as we are born into our very bodies; interior and exterior 
intertwine.  In Merleau-Ponty’s new naturalism, phenomenology investigates this natal 
intertwining.  After Aristotle, Schelling, Bergson, Husserl, and others saw this lost sense 
of Nature, and each made an effort at retrieval.  Merleau-Ponty retraces the thought of 
each of these thinkers, but none has fully articulated the sort of phenomenology of Nature 
that would satisfy Merleau-Ponty.  
 But what exactly did Descartes do to Nature? What happened to Nature’s 
interiority? What replaced Aristotelian finalism?  We might think that it was entirely 
replaced by a mechanistic view of cause: Perhaps, with the scientific revolution and the 
shift to one unified sense of cause across disciplines, finalism was simply eliminated 
toute courte.  But Merleau-Ponty argues that finalism did not disappear so neatly: it was 
not “rejected, but sublimated in God” (NC 8).  As one might sublimate but not eliminate 
                                                                                                                                                 
account and yet argue that this very selection process expresses the methodological problems in philosophy 
of biology that they see as historically arising (xvi). 
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a powerful childhood memory of desire, Descartes simply transferred the impulse toward 
finalism into metaphysics, sublimating all those qualities into an inaccessible, other-
worldly God.   
 As a perfect and complete being, the Cartesian God himself has no need to reflect 
on ends or aims of Nature. With the sublimation of finality into God, “the word ‘finality’ 
no longer retains any meaning except for man” (NC 9).  Oddly, the omnipotent Cartesian 
God throws humanity back on itself, as Arendt puts it (HC 280).  Merleau-Ponty 
describes the effect of the Cartesian God this way: 
[God] sealed us in the union of body and soul.  Thought is in humans, 
because it is in God, who made us what we are.  God refers us to our 
situation of being created; He sends us toward the world.  Philosophy is 
leaning against God.  It does not see God, but it takes support from Him, 
and the philosopher finds in the authority of this the justification of his 
attitude of a man turned toward the world. (NC 130) 
 
Ironically, it seems that in a certain sense, for the Cartesian “the point of view of God and 
the point of view of the human are indiscernible” (NC 130).  God gifted humans with 
unerring – when used within its proper domain – intellect that could view the mechanism 
of Nature as clearly as a clock-maker could view the inner workings of a clock.   
 Where for the Aristotelian or the Scholastic the formality of Nature pointed back 
toward God’s intervention, for the Cartesian the appearance of the world does not provide 
evidence of anything but a process of parts on parts; Nature does not reveal its intentions.  
Assuming that one had insight into this totality of Nature rather than only its part would 
be to truly equate the human view to that of God.  Thus, in another sense, the 
perspectives of the Cartesian God and the human definitively differ.  The meaning of 
Nature for God is absolutely inaccessible.  The appearance of any formality in Nature 
which would previously have been attributed to a finalism of Nature in itself is an 
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illusion.  All Nature for itself is reduced to objectified nature for us.  Nature “no longer 
has any orientation” (NC 10).  Descartes purifies Nature into extension (NC 126).  It is 
placeless, faceless, mindless, and directionless, an endless movement of part on parts 
with no meaning unless we witness it.  Nature has no secrets anymore: Any intentionality 
attributed to Nature finds its way back to the Cartesian mind.  Nature is only “the exterior 
realization of a rationality that is in God” (NC 10).  We find a sort of “ontic inertia in 
essence” (NC 13).  Rather than admitting the dynamic, evolving existence of Nature, 
Descartes limits Nature to a quiet, static, infinite thing, patiently neutral until we turn our 
attention toward it.   
 It is at the end of the Meditations, in a passage which Merleau-Ponty cites at 
length, that Descartes definitely restricts the reference of “nature.”  In this passage, 
Descartes compares the human body to the mechanism of a clock.  An Aristotelian might 
speak of the nature of the body or the clock in terms of what it is for: for example, it is 
the nature of the clock to tell time. The clock might perform better or worse in relation to 
this norm.  But this use of the term “nature,” Descartes decides, is “simply a label which 
depends on my thought” (Descartes Meditations, cited in NC 14).  Instead, he will use 
“nature” only to refer to “something which is really to be found in the things themselves” 
(NC 14).  In Descartes’s view – and in many succeeding views – “nature” must refer to 
what is entirely independent of us.77  If we made Nature relative to us or Nature relative 
to itself or to any norm, then we lose access to a neutral, objective natural world that we 
can study with physical or life science.  Nature does have ends, but these are relevant 
only to God (who, in any case, does not need us to know them).   
                                                 
77 With the simple change of a Latin letter, from anima to animus, as Joe Sachs puts it, Descartes restricts 
the category of “soul” to what we now call mind: to human mental activity (“Introduction” On the Soul 5). 
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 In one sense, this is Descartes’s great revolution.  But, in another sense, it marks a 
trauma to which succeeding philosophies must respond.  In order to bolster this peculiar 
view of Nature, Descartes requires a substantial God.  When he revisits the Cartesian 
revolution in the second course on Nature, Merleau-Ponty enigmatically states that “God 
is the keystone” to understanding Nature (NC 134).  But this statement offers no solution 
to the problem of Nature, nor postulates any theological or confessional position; instead, 
it identifies a site of investigation in the current structure of the concept of nature as it has 
resulted from the Cartesian history.  Descartes served as a principle architect on the 
edifice of Nature that we inhabit; he placed God as a keystone, but this was a choice, not 
a necessity.  “God is the keystone” for the edifice of Nature in the sense that “God” is the 
name written on the stone supporting the Cartesian concept of Nature as it stands.  “God” 
marks the site on which the entire concept depends. If phenomenology is to inquire into 
the structure of this concept, into the history of the construction of Nature, then it will 
need to understand what role this concept plays.  Just as in a building, the fact that the 
concept needs a keystone points back to the metaphorical “forces of gravity” that demand 
structures of a certain type. The presence of the keystone of God in all these philosophies 
of nature points to these absent forces.  As a result, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
phenomenology should ask,  
What is this weight of Being, this global contact that we try to transfer 
unto Nature and societies but without ever succeeding in it? We must 
perceive it, not as presence, but as absence, as always sustaining a taking 
of responsibility, an action. (NC 134) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty this inevitable, omnipresent weight is what philosophy must reflect 
on. We take responsibility for the weight we give the keystone.  The importance of God 
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in ontology only points outside of itself toward problems in understanding Nature in 
relation to a Judeo-Christian and Cartesian history.  
 In facing the dualistic structuring of Nature by the Christian tradition, Descartes 
chose a particular methodology contingent on a Judeo-Christian foundation. In Merleau-
Ponty’s view, this monotheistic tradition must avoid either mechanism or finalism in 
describing Nature (NC 130).  Limiting Nature to mechanism would miss the hidden ends 
of Nature for God; permitting finalism in appearances would allow humans access to a 
God’s eye view.  Thus, the tradition oscillates between a positive theology and negative 
theology, between a situation in which God is clear and the world is nothing and one in 
which God is obscure and the world is nothing (NC 133).  Cartesian thought likewise 
oscillates between two methods of solving this problem of nature: between an objective 
ontology in which everything is given and an ontology of existence in which God hides 
beyond essences (NC 128).  God is either nowhere in the world or everywhere in the 
world: 
If we allow two planes of reality, one interior to God, the other exterior, 
we are led to something like a polytheism, and if we allow only one plane, 
we are led to pantheism.  Every effort of monotheism will be to seek an 
escape route from this dilemma. (NC 133)  
 
Cartesian thought runs like a scaffold, zigzagging to hold up twin pillars of Judeo-
Christian thought.  Rather than splitting Nature into an inaccessible God and an illusory 
world, phenomenology should attend to Nature as it is given: “we must not veil the 
ontological mystery, nor mask the difference that separates the biblical, providential God 
from the Christian God, who in his last words protests ‘Why have you abandoned me?’” 
(NC 134).  In some sense the Christian tradition aided and abetted Descartes, complicit 
with Cartesian dualism.  But in another sense Descartes unfairly beset a tradition whose 
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central tenets depend on the message of the incarnation.  The Christian message of the 
incarnation emphasizes the miracle of birth into corporality in this world; as Arendt 
points out, the gospel message “a child is born unto us” encapsulates the condition of 
natality (HC 247). Nonetheless, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, whatever potential Christianity 
may or may not have had for properly expressing Nature, it has been irrevocably 
intertwined with the history of Cartesian thought, turning philosophy from the very 
mystery it ought to investigate.    
 Descartes’s dualism institutes a certain “strabismus” into philosophy: Cartesian 
ontology is a philosophy “necessarily worked over by doubt and a certain strabism.  This 
strabism we see best in the dilemma of Being and Nothingness” (NC 127).78   Barbaras 
calls this Merleau-Ponty’s charge of diplopia, leveled at Descartes but also the early 
Husserl, Sartre, and any thinker who does not attend to the natural intertwining of the 
transcendent and immanent in perception and corporeality.  Merleau-Ponty perhaps 
cruelly alludes to both Sartre’s philosophy and his visual disability of strabismus in 
which Sartre’s two eyes do not work in coordination.79  But the important suggestion is 
that it is Sartre’s his philosophy not merely his vision that suffers from strabismus; the 
philosophical lens that looks at Being cannot be coordinated with the lens that looks at 
Nothingness.  The for-itself and in-itself are absolutely different from Sartre.  But more 
importantly perhaps for the history here, Descartes’s work is the pathological cause of 
this Sartrean strabismus.   
                                                 
78 See Introduction on this term.  Merleau-Ponty revisits the charge of strabismus in the Visible and the 
Invisible, in a note that says his project will include “Reflection on Descartes’s ontologies – the ‘strabism’ 
of Western ontology” (VI 166).  
79 On Sartre’s visual impairment, see Annie Cohen-Solal, 38, 50.  Sartre describes himself as suffering from 
“strabismus” like his friend Nizan (50). 
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 Merleau-Ponty asks us to look at this unending effort of Cartesian thought, and 
indeed the entire preceding and proceeding tradition efforts, and consider to what forces 
this movement responds.  The concept of Nature is “always the expression of an ontology 
– its privileged expression” (NC 204).  Descartes’s concept of Nature reveals his dualistic 
ontological presuppositions.  But Merleau-Ponty cannot simply knock the Cartesian and 
Judeo-Christian edifice of Nature to the ground and start again.  Merleau-Ponty has to 
renovate the concept of Nature, as he renovates the entire Cartesian ontology.  Or, to 
return to the psychoanalytic model that Merleau-Ponty also employs to describe his 
methodology, phenomenology must figuratively offer therapy to Nature.  Given its 
structure and history, phenomenology must help Nature improve and develop.  In this 
model, Nature is like a living person with history that both enables and disables its 
present relations.  
 If phenomenology can illuminate the Cartesian trauma in Nature’s history and its 
consequences, perhaps phenomenology can rehabilitate the concept of Nature, rather than 
abandon discussions of human nature, as Merleau-Ponty’s contemporaries – Sartre, de 
Beauvoir, Arendt, and Heidegger – suggest.  Perhaps, in lieu of a strabismal vision, 
phenomenology can find a more coordinated, natural vision, a “binocular philosophy,” as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it (NC 134).   Human beings exercise binocular vision in concert 
with certain actions: upright posture, grasping hands, general motility.  Vision and action 
co-develop.  Likewise, when philosophy metaphorically exercises a binocular vision, it 
must do so in concert with a type of action and responsibility for that action.  When we 
look with this binocular philosophy, we perceive Nature “not as presence, but as absence, 
as always sustaining a taking of responsibility, an action” (NC 134).  By turning toward 
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the natural vision with which humans are born, phenomenology discovers a prereflective, 
natural coordination both of action and perception, and action and responsibility.  The 
advantage of rehabilitating rather than abandoning the concept of Nature lies here.  With 
a binocular philosophy, Nature is naturally coordinated with ethical responsibility, just as 
perception coordinates with action.  This aim distinguishes Merleau-Ponty’s natal 
ontology from those of his contemporaries.  Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological method 
turns to the prereflective unity of action and perception and also to the ontological co-
emergence of Nature and ethics.  Binocular philosophy reveals  “the metamorphosis of 
brute being, the giving birth” of meaning (NC 134) that happens before nature and 
culture, freedom and nature, nature and responsibilities are divided in dualistic or 
strabismal philosophies.  
 
 
Further Trauma: Kantian Division of Nature 
 But Cartesian dualism is not the only dualism that besets Western thought: The 
trauma effected by Descartes is hardly the last or most recent event in the history of 
philosophy’s relationship with Nature.  In Merleau-Ponty’s view this tendency runs 
through many modern and later authors.80  In Leibniz, for example, the same sublimation 
into God occurs.  Leibniz’s God is moderately more interventionist in that he selects the 
best possible world, but Leibniz, “no more than Descartes,” succeeds in separating God 
and matter (NC11).  In the same manner, Spinoza split nature into naturans and naturata: 
“Thus, all that could be interior to Nature takes refuge in God” (NC 9).  Merleau-Ponty 
even argues that Cartesian positivism “fulfill[s] itself with Spinozism” (NC 13).  The 
                                                 
80 For the sake of simplicity, I shall continue to refer to the “Cartesian” attitude toward Nature, but it must 
be understood as the cumulative effect of a long history. 
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Cartesian model runs deep: All of these thinkers effect a similar sublimation of Nature.  
Later schools of thought – “naturalism, humanism, theism” – all respond to this Cartesian 
rift (NC 135).  These apparently distinct schools of thought in fact overlap and intertwine 
so that “these three words have lost all clear meaning in our culture, and they ceaselessly 
pass into one another” (NC 135).  Locating them in relation to these schools, Merleau-
Ponty argues that Kant, Schelling, and Bergson each attempt various extreme responses 
to the Cartesian trauma.  
 After Descartes, perhaps the most influential figure on of the Western concept of 
Nature was Kant.  For Merleau-Ponty, Kant’s philosophy falls into the rough category of 
humanism – more specifically, “philosophical anthropology” (NC 136) – and he finds 
that such humanist thought “tends to make the problem of Nature disappear” (NC 136).  
Rather than actually attending to Nature, humanism attributes everything in the situation 
of “human” and “Nature” to the human.  In the transcendental aesthetic of the First 
Critique and in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant describes Nature as 
“the whole of the objects of sense,” as Merleau-Ponty puts it, thereby reducing Nature to 
the correlate of sensation, “a fortuitous factual assemblage” behind which hides “an 
unknowable being, an ontology of the in-itself” (NC 136).  In Merleau-Ponty’s view, 
Kant’s first critique, rather than truly razing knowledge to its foundations, only 
perpetuates the Cartesian view with new terms.  With Kant, the mind of a God who 
determines Nature is simply replaced by the human mind (NC 36).  Nature, as Kant puts 
in the Prolegomena, is “the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to 
universal laws” (Prolegomena 42).  The subject provides these laws, and thus “it is the 
human subject who carries Being” (NC 21).   
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 Merleau-Ponty identifies in Kant the same pathologies affecting Descartes and 
Spinoza, manifested in new form.  Descartes sublimated Nature into God, but Kant, like a 
patient who decides she must be responsible for all the troubles in her world, turns the 
problems of Nature back toward human existence.  Like different patients, Kant and 
Descartes react to the pathological disassociation of Nature in two ways: One blames 
another for all her problems; the other blames herself.  In the First Critique, the human 
subject splits into activity and passivity, understanding and sensibility.  These two 
faculties remain absolutely distinct until Kant readdresses them in the Critique of 
Judgment.  In that sense, the divisive move of the First Critique “appears as the return to 
a naturans that operates in us” (NC 22).   
 Yet Merleau-Ponty does not abandon Kant.  Rather, he sees two possible 
interpretations of Kant’s view of Nature: first, as impoverishment of Nature by 
formulating it as a human construction, or second, as enrichment of Nature, insofar as we 
see Nature as a principle which precedes us and lives within us.  As in the Structure of 
Behavior, Merleau-Ponty sees resources in the Critique of Judgment not available in the 
First Critique.81  The Critique of Judgment, Merleau-Ponty argues, “is an attempt to 
connect these two meanings” along with the two faculties split in the First Critique (NC 
23).  In this Third Critique, Kant acknowledges that aesthetic judgment is not well 
described by an absolute dualism between sensation and understanding.  Being for-itself 
cannot be completely divided from being for-us.  Of particular importance for the history 
traced here toward a natal ontology is Kant’s discussion of interiority and exteriority.  In 
the second half of the Third Critique, Kant re-introduces a sort of finalism, noting that in 
living things, as in beautiful art, we have a tendency to “acknowledge a finality” (NC 25).  
                                                 
81 See my Chapter 1 and, again, Johnson, “Merleau-Ponty and Kant’s Third Critique.” 
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Living things appear to carry their own cause within them: “There is an interior in the 
exterior” (NC 25).  Kant has glimpsed the post-Cartesian problematic loss of Nature’s 
interiority, and, stepping sideways rather than fully backpedaling through the First 
Critique, he approaches this problem.  In judging the activity of living things, we find 
ourselves faced with the sort of interiority that Descartes excluded from Nature.  Kant 
must attribute this apparent interiority to the human subject (as in the first critique) or 
else manage a different account of this interiority. Rather than only passively following 
laws of nature, living things appear to self-legislate.  The apparent final causality of 
living things contradicts the causality attributed to the First Critique Kantian subject.  We 
cannot have two types of cause at work: a self-legislating teleological cause and a 
categorically imposed cause.  Thus, Merleau-Ponty argues that, for Kant, “There is an 
antinomy between causality and finality” (NC 25). Even the apparent finality of a blade 
of grass, Kant says, cannot be explained by mechanistic causality of an entirely exterior 
Nature: 
It is absurd for men to hope that someday some Newton will come forth 
who could make it understood that it would be only the production of a 
blade of grass according to natural laws that no intention ordered. (Kant, 
Critique of Judgment, section 75, cited in NC 288, nt. 10) 
 
But perhaps such a Newton has stepped forth.  One might argue that this Newton who 
does describe a blade of grass according to natural laws is Charles Darwin.  Darwinian 
evolutionary theory claims to provide a naturalistic account of both mechanical and final 
cause (Thompson Mind in Life 131). 82 Perhaps Kant merely failed to anticipate Darwin; 
or perhaps – and this would be a truly philosophical mistake – he failed by offering an 
inflexible dichotomy between two causalities.  Perhaps Darwinian evolution is to 
                                                 
82 Grene and Depew also make this comparison between Newton and Darwin (1-3). 
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causality what non-Euclidean geometry and relativity are to Newtonian space and time.  
Alternatively, perhaps Darwinian evolution has not actually offered such a complete 
account of causality as it might seem.  I return to this question and Merleau-Ponty’s own 
assessment of Darwinism in Chapter 6, but it is important to note the direct relation 
Darwinian thinking has to the Kantian model with which Merleau-Ponty – like other 
post-Cartesian thinkers of Nature – wrestles.  
 For the moment, let us focus on how the question stood for Kant: in lieu of 
restoring the intentionality of final cause to God, can we attribute it to the human subject? 
This would still require explanation: how can our faculties judge two types of cause, 
mechanistic and final?  For Merleau-Ponty, it is precisely this dualistic dilemma facing 
Kant that must be avoided.  Instead of persisting in the terms of the dualistic antinomy, 
Merleau-Ponty says that we must “think another foundation of Nature” and “consider as 
thinkable an architectonic in which this kind of break between causality and finality 
would not exist” (NC 25).  We cannot revise the terms of the First Critique but instead 
must abandon that dualistic architectonic entirely.  The Cartesian model of Nature 
required a repeated effort to buttress a flawed dualism; the dualistic split between active 
and passive faculties in Kant’s First Critique perpetuates efforts to hold up a flawed 
architectonic.  Instead of persisting in dividing perception into activity and passivity, we 
must seek the pre-reflective ground of flesh that precedes dualistic divisions.     
 All of this is to say that Kant himself remains mired in the dualism of his own 
invention or re-invention.  Though Kant “foresees the transformativist thought,” he backs 
away from the abyss.  Where he might have embarked on a study of the “supersensible 
understanding,” Kant instead returned to the human sphere; his is a profoundly 
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humanistic philosophy in Merleau-Ponty’s view (NC 26).  Kant “reintroduces the concept 
of finalized Nature, despite the Cartesian reduction.  But it is only the finality of human 
being” (NC 26).  Human being, as freedom, opposes nature and completes it (NC 26).  
Not only does Kant remain a humanist, but he fails to appreciate even the historicity of 
the human being.  For Kant, things are “immutably determined, as if it were possible to 
grasp the moment in history when there would no longer be history” (NC 29). 
 Merleau-Ponty hints, however, at a way that a Third Critique Kantian model of 
Nature might be improved: through Gestalt theory.  In these same passages, Merleau-
Ponty leaps historically from Kant to a mention of the Gestalt theorist Goldstein, noting 
that Goldstein brings up Kant’s Third Critique sense of finalism.  Here we see 
foreshadowed the move that Merleau-Ponty himself makes with regard to Nature later in 
the Nature Courses: Building on Kant’s notion of judgment combined with Gestalt 
psychology, he develops a phenomenological version of totality to account for the 
apparent finality of Nature.  This is a persistent theme of the Nature Courses in which 
Merleau-Ponty gradually refines his view of this prereflective ground of judgment.  
 In generating his own version of Nature that goes beyond Kant’s, Merleau-Ponty 
will have to avoid not only dualism and humanism, but also an a-historicism.  He has 
been sensitive to the problem at least since his encounter with Husserl’s Crisis that 
helped him to a phenomenological method which takes account of historicity and 
generativity of existence in and with Nature.  Merleau-Ponty’s aim is “to discover a new 
meaning of the word ‘Nature’ as the residue that we cannot eliminate, as, e.g., the 
romantic idea of a savage Nature” (NC 35).  The savage Nature, or brute Being, persists 
as a theme throughout his later work in the Visible and the Invisible, as the flesh and 
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vinculum of existence.  The relation to history saves him from any easy Romanticism or 
mysticism, but he does recognize the efforts of the post-Kantian Romantics as moving 
toward the domain that he will articulate.  In particular, he found strong genealogical 
roots to his own position in that of Friedrich Schelling, who also saw the need to push 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment.  
 
Schelling, the Romantics, and the Poetic Retrieval of Nature  
 The Romantics felt the trauma of the Kantian distancing from Nature, but among 
them, perhaps only Schelling – who took “his point of departure from section 76 of the 
Critique of Judgment” – went in the direction that Merleau-Ponty advocates (NC 26).  
Rather than remaining within the terms of either Kantian, Spinozistic, or Cartesian 
dualism, Schelling dares to modify the underlying ontology in order to accommodate 
Nature.   
 Schelling moves to restore interiority to Nature that had been objectified by the 
transcendental subjectivity of the First Critique.  Schelling sees the potential in the 
domain that Kant identified in the Third Critique but from which he shied away.  In 
Schelling’s vision of Nature, much like Merleau-Ponty’s, “Nature is both passive and 
active, product and productivity” (NC 38).  In Nature, he sees “there is a priority of the 
Whole over the parts.  A causality is not added from the outside to this inside” (NC 39).  
Living things display a self-motivated totality visible only at the level of the whole, not of 
each of their parts.  But this natural productivity, or generativity, is not just something 
added and from the outside, sculpted by a third party: “[T]here is a difference between 
artistic technique and natural production” (NC 39).  At the least Schelling’s natural 
productivity differs from pre-modern models of art: Where the modernist sculptor stands 
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outside her work, the post-modern artist might install herself within it, making her life 
and performance part of the work (a work that was, in turn, born from her thought.)  The 
human being stands within Nature like this post-modern installation artist.  Likewise, 
Nature reciprocally lives within human existence and is born from its productivity.  
Nature, rather than only the product of cognition, gives birth to cognition, a generative 
activity that we can feel. For Kant, any such natural productivity would have to be “only 
a dream,” but Schelling says “What Kant, at the end of his discourse, conceived of as a 
dream, I want to live and feel” (NC 39).  
 In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Schelling’s model is limited because he still turns to 
God, albeit a different sort of God, to account for the interiority of Nature.  With 
Schelling, God is not infinite, perfect, and thus absolutely better and removed from this 
world.  Rather, “the relation between the finite and the infinite is not such that we can put 
them in a linear order, and we cannot say that one has priority over the other” (NC 37).  
This is what Merleau-Ponty calls Schelling’s “circular thought.”  Although at first blush 
this might sound like an insult, Merleau-Ponty approves of the honesty of the circularity.  
Schelling himself acknowledges the circularity: “Nature becomes a circle which returns 
into itself, a self-enclosed system” (Ideas 40).  In Schelling’s circular thought, we find 
that “God is not known apart from experience, but we take hold of him in the finite” (NC 
47).  Where Descartes’s dualistic architectonic required God as a distinct keystone to 
unify a dualism, Schelling’s circular architectonic disperses God throughout the structure.  
The weight of being that we set out to explain and to support is transferred throughout 
Nature.  In this architectural choice, Merleau-Ponty believes Schelling went farther even 
than Hegel: Schelling thought “at a higher level of rigor than did Hegel because of his 
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concept of the empirical; the identity of the finite and the infinite is thought by him in a 
more decisive way” (NC 47).  The architectonic shift, removing the keystone of God, 
shifts the weight of being and the responsibility for it throughout Nature, and that Nature 
includes ourselves.   
 With this shift, we find ourselves with a new burden in philosophy and reflective 
thought in general. In Schelling, contrary to Spinoza’s absolute division, “the relation of 
naturans and naturata is no longer a one-way relation with a singular meaning” (NC 37).  
Instead, these two aspects dialectically co-constitute one another.  Schelling affirms 
existence over essence, recalling post-Kantian idealism to a “barbaric principle” that 
precedes reflective thought (NC 38-39).  Where Kant postulates a sort of teleology, for 
Schelling “Nature is not properly teleological” any more than it is completely 
mechanistic (NC 39).  Merleau-Ponty points out that Schelling, like Bergson, expresses a 
“hostility to both mechanism and finalism equally” (NC 39). Schelling wants to describe 
a generalized sense (as in the French sens) that permeates existence, that would lead us 
back from exteriorization and essentialized concepts toward a living Nature flush with 
interiority.   
 Expanding slightly on Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Schelling can clarify 
what is at stake in this discussion.  Schelling agrees that there is a systematic, rule-
following Nature outside us, but he does not find that acknowledging this would answer 
the most important philosophical questions: namely, what is existence lived within 
Nature like? Or, how should one act, living a natural life?  Instead, he argues that 
philosophy must study our relationship to that systematic Nature, particularly how it 
appears within us: 
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We grant you in advance all our explanations of how such a purposive 
Nature has come to be actual outside us… By that you have explained to 
us virtually nothing; for we require to know, not how such a Nature arose 
outside us, but how even the very idea of such a Nature has got into us. 
(Schelling Ideas Trans. by Harris 41) 
 
Descriptions of the lawfulness of Nature outside us and the origin of that Nature do not 
describe our relationship to that Nature.  As Schelling puts it, “For the existence of such a 
Nature outside me is still far from explaining such a Nature in me… that is just the object 
of our question” (Ideas Trans. by Harris 41).  The problem of understanding Nature 
interior to us reciprocally relates to understanding the interiority of Nature outside us.  
Once we reflectively distance ourselves from our prereflective union with Nature, then 
we cannot understand how Nature can have an interiority: “As soon… as I separate 
myself, and with me everything ideal, from Nature, nothing remains to me but a dead 
object, and I cease to comprehend how a life outside me can be possible” (Schelling Ideas 
Trans. by Harris 36).   
Schelling notes that it is not as easy to escape Nature as Descartes might hope.  In 
fact, “nature releases no one freely from her tutelage; there are no native sons of 
freedom,” as one translator puts it (Ideas Trans. by Harris 10). Perhaps better for our 
purposes here is the translation, “no one is a son of freedom from birth” (Schelling Ideas 
Trans. Hayden-Roy 168).83  Freedom is acquired as we turn away from our birth, our 
naturalness.  This move away from Nature is first step of philosophy; after initiating its 
existence in contrast to Nature, philosophy “assigns reflection only a negative value” 
(Schelling Ideas Trans. Hayden-Roy 169).  With this negative philosophy, we are led into 
the Kantian dichotomy and Jacobi’s objections to Kant’s system: How can we understand 
the relation between the things themselves and our representations of them if not 
                                                 
83 Both of these are translations of the text as collected in F.W. J Schelling, Sämtliche Werke.  
161 
 
causally? The Kantian “things themselves” ought to be beyond the application of the 
category of causality (Schelling Ideas Trans. Hayden-Roy 171).  In this model, freedom 
absolutely contrasts with Nature.  Schelling argues that such negative philosophy misses 
the fact that “we wanted to know that originally there is no separation” between 
representations and things, freedom and nature (Ideas Trans. Hayden-Roy 171).   Only 
Spinoza, Schelling believed, had seen that philosophy need not oppose mind and Nature.  
Instead, when it proceeded honestly from experience, philosophy “grasped the finite 
immediately in the idea of the infinite… and found the former only in the latter” (Ideas 
Trans. Hayden-Roy 174). For Schelling, negative philosophy interposes freedom between 
ourselves and Nature.  We lack the capacity to step absolutely outside this world to 
reflect on freedom.  We thereby alienate ourselves from Nature insofar as we are free.   
But we might call the terms of alienation by different names than Schelling does.  
In more contemporary terms, we might say this is the opposition of culture and nature.  
This may seem like an inexact parallel; certainly we also have the term “freedom” today.  
But let us consider the parallel in terms of what is at stake in relation to Nature; in this 
translation appears the crucial shift of a natal ontology.  For German idealists and 
Romantics, the concern was how to describe human existence as Natural while at the 
same time preserving freedom.  To legitimately designate the purview of human 
responsibility, they felt it necessary to justify human freedom.  Today, in legitimating 
human responsibility, we more often encounter this opposition between nature and 
culture.  Culture is what people now commonly appeal to when they want to describe the 
acquisition of qualities that go “beyond” Nature or are opposed to Nature.  Culture refers 
to whatever we create beyond what we come into the world with.  We often ask whether 
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we can be responsible for natural qualities; how, for example, could I be responsible for 
tendencies that are genetically encoded?  While we may approach the problem through 
different terminology than the nineteenth century Germans, we broach the same site of 
inquiry: insofar as we see ourselves as natals – as born and as natural – how can we be 
responsible for our actions?  If we can trace the origin of some action or attribute to 
culture, then we perceive it as malleable in opposition to the fixed characteristic of 
Nature.  We sense that we want to hold people responsible for their actions and thus 
require that people act according to non-natural, acquired motives and structures.  But it 
is just this misconception about Nature as something fixed and opposed to variable 
culture (or unpredictable freedom) that a natal ontology revises.  
For example, I might see my capacity to reflect in writing as differentiating me 
from an animal; I can set out my intentions for the day or for my classroom or for my 
political situation.  Unlike an animal, I can see the origins of certain of my qualities in my 
genetic code; I can consider the responsibility of reproducing these patterns and passing 
them to my children.  I thereby claim to have a special, reflective relation to the “nature” 
in me and that I, by reflecting on my genome, am not reducible to it.  My genome arose 
through mechanistic causality, but I, from my special reflective point of view with my 
special cultural tools, am not bound by the same causality.  Appeal to culture offers an 
alternative to natural causality. Through cultural tools for reflection, I am free to make 
choices about my genome, perhaps even to alter it or to alter that of my children. 
Even in this most contemporary of scenarios, we retain the dualistic opposition of 
free subjective and objective nature, but rephrase it in terms of culture and nature.  Nature 
may have found its way into our “selves,” into our very bodies and even into the 
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conditioning of the minds that arise in those bodies, but postulating a firm boundary 
between culture and nature apparently assures us that nature has not found its way into 
freedom.  As Merleau-Ponty has argued since the Phenomenology of Perception, 
phenomenology should bear witness to the Nature at the very heart of subjectivity.    
Schelling foresaw the obverse of the situation.  When we ascribe to ourselves 
special non-Natural qualities, we lose sight not only of the Nature in us but of the same 
sort of qualities in Nature itself.  Recalling the sense of Nature that has been lost is 
Nature as nascere, as being born: we have lost sight of Nature as natality.  When we lose 
sight of our natality, we acquire only a falsely secure notion of responsibility.  We have 
only defined culture, like freedom, negatively and cannot address the true philosophical 
problem: As Schelling asks, how they are originally unified? Or, as Merleau-Ponty wants 
to know, how do they prereflectively coincide?  As soon as we interpose culture between 
ourselves and Nature, we cannot understand life outside ourselves as truly life.  We can 
reflectively re-constitute it as life, analytically determining that we must understand it as 
life, but we do not see ourselves as truly arising from the same ground as this life.  
Significantly, “life outside” a self includes other selves.  Thus, without a positive account 
of the interiority of Nature and exteriority of human existence, we cannot describe how 
we can experience others as natural beings and part of an ethical situation.   According to 
Schelling’s view and the related view that Merleau-Ponty develops, insofar as we retain 
the restrictive dualistic relation to the Nature in us we also retain a limited relation to 
Nature outside us, including other natural selves. 
It is in this revision that Schelling offers a corrective to the post-Cartesian history 
of Nature that denied interiority to Nature.  As free, cultured beings, we reserve the right 
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to be the only interiority in Nature.  Interiority only appears and can only be verified 
through cultural artifacts: speech, writing, and works.  Were we to grant an interior, 
intentional moment to Nature, then we would lose our special status as absolutely free 
beings.  Moreover, how could we verify any interiority, our own or Nature’s, if not 
through cultural artifacts?  
What are we to do about this détente? For Schelling, we must turn back, before 
dualistic division, to study the ground between ourselves and Nature.  We should ask, 
“What then is that secret bond which couples our mind to Nature, or that hidden organ 
through which Nature speaks to our mind or our mind to Nature?” (Schelling Ideas 
Trans. by Harris 41).  Schelling appeals to a metaphysical ground beyond personal mind.  
Merleau-Ponty, however, articulates this effort of Schelling’s in his own 
phenomenological terms: “What Schelling means is that we rediscover Nature in our 
perceptual experience prior to reflection” (NC 39).  Merleau-Ponty sees in Schelling’s 
ontological shift one that he develops in his own ontology.84  Performing a bit of 
ventriloquism on Schelling, Merleau-Ponty argues that we must avoid both a heavy-
handed Kantian idealism and a reductive empiricism.85  Merleau-Ponty even claims that 
Schelling seeks a “phenomenology of prereflexive Being,” which would be a quite 
Merleau-Pontian project (NC 41).  It does seem true that Schelling, in his own way, 
understood the primacy of perception and turned philosophy from the reflective life 
toward the world and the prereflective life.  He argued that pure reflection should never 
                                                 
84 See Patrick Burke “Creativity and the Unconscious in Merleau-Ponty and Schelling” on the relation 
between Merleau-Ponty’s later aesthetics and Schelling’s project. 
85 Not only does Merleau-Ponty share with Schelling a resistance to dualism, but he shares a reference to a 
wild, brute, or first Nature that precedes and exceeds objective accounts.  Schelling points to an “erst 
Natur” that is “the fundamental stuff of all life and of every existing being, something terrifying, a barbaric 
principle” (NC 38, Merleau-Ponty citing K. Lowith’s book on Nietzsche’s relation to Schelling and other 
German Romanitcs).  This erst Natur prefigures Merleau-Ponty’s “brute being” associated with the flesh in 
the Visible and the Visible. 
165 
 
be an ends but only a means (Ideas Trans. by Harris 11).  Schelling saw that “perception 
teaches us an ontology that it alone can reveal to us” (NC 40).  Through this hidden 
organ, we could find the prereflective coordination of freedom and action, of perception 
and action: the coordination of natural, binocular vision. 
For Schelling, as for Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical community often makes 
two errors in regard to Nature: the alleged opposition of subjectivism and objectivism, or 
of idealism and reductive realism.  Schelling’s move away from this false dichotomy 
depends on recognizing our natality: the fact that we are born (and thus natural) and the 
fact that we give birth (and thus create Nature).  Such reciprocity is a key component in 
the relationship of natality and Nature in this account.  As Merleau-Ponty observes, again 
rephrasing Schelling, “it is in my own nature that I find the originary state of the 
interiority of things” (NC 40).  The Kantian subject transcended the world too 
completely, leaving fleshy objectivity behind; the dogmatic realist fails to see her own 
participation in the birth of Nature.  I quote at length Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
natality in Schelling’s view of Nature: 
Now for Schelling, everything is born starting from us; Nature is lent to 
our perception… We are the parents of a Nature of which we are also the 
children.  It is in human being that things become conscious by 
themselves; but the relation is reciprocal: human being is also the 
becoming-conscious of things. (NC 43) 
 
Rather than producing or owning or constructing Nature, Nature is lent to our perception.  
In a mixture of activity and passivity, we receive Nature, like a gift or a child.  As in the 
psychoanalytic metaphor, Nature is better understood as a person or persona, rather than 
as either pure object or subject. One does not “own” or “construct” a child that one raises, 
but rather cares for her or him, and for some time.  On the one hand, you are absolutely 
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responsible for the life of that child, but on the other hand, the child has a life of her own, 
and it would be irresponsible to completely lay a claim to it.  The metaphor continues: 
each of also began as children, brought into the world, lent to the world, before we could 
claim responsibility for life.  And yet from these beginnings, we develop into beings 
responsible and conscious in and of our world: again, a reciprocity of freedom and action.  
Metaphorically, we find that we give birth to Nature and to consciousness of Nature, 
while we are also born from Nature and from a latent consciousness in Nature.  Rather 
than actors or sufferers of Nature, we participate in its life with a strange mix of activity, 
passivity, and responsibility. 
It would be a mistake to assume that our “naturalness” is equivalent to passivity 
or some fixed state.  If we are to get beyond the dualism of freedom and nature or nature 
and culture, then we must describe that ambiguity of activity and passivity both in 
ourselves and in nature.  Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology also shares with Schelling’s 
philosophy this active-passive view of human existence.  As Schelling puts it, the 
question becomes “And what is that within me which judges there to have been an 
impression made upon me?  Again it is I myself who, insofar as I judge, am active, not 
passive” (Ideas Trans. Hayden-Roy 175).  Merleau-Ponty adds to Schelling’s 
observations the insights of Gestalt theory.  As Merleau-Ponty has shown since the 
Structure of Behavior, we do not take in mere data from the world, we perceive 
structured, meaningful wholes; we find that the world solicits our attention.  We do not 
merely passively receive material, but are turned toward general ranges of meaning that 
interest us.  A natal ontology argues that we ourselves are both Natural and free, active 
and passive.   
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We find ourselves again facing the problems addressed in Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment.  Are we prompted to judge Nature as formal because of objective or subjective 
structures?  Do we attribute the formality of natural life only to structures in the object (as 
in traditional aesthetic and teleological theories), or do we attribute the meaning only to 
the play of faculties in the subject (as in the sublime)?  How can we talk about our 
ambiguous passive/active participation in perception?  How can we talk about the 
interiority of Nature? By what method, with what tools, can philosophy or any reflective 
individual proceed in understanding the interiority of Nature? Or, as Merleau-Ponty puts 
it, “what will the organ of philosophy be?” (NC 44).  What language will this new natal 
ontology speak? 
 
Methodological Shift: The Risk of Romanticism   
 For Schelling, the answer is art.  Art and poetry will be the language of 
philosophy of Nature.  Merleau-Ponty describes Schelling’s view thus: “The philosophy 
of Nature needs a language that can take up Nature in its least human aspect, and which 
thereby would be close to poetry” (NC 45).  Art points toward the ground of human 
existence before it is reflectively divided into dualism.  As Kant explains in the Critique 
of Judgment, by reflecting on art, philosophy can consider the site of activity where “the 
understanding is at the service of the imagination” (NC 46).  In the moment at which one 
gives birth to art or when one judges art,86 we find a “reconciliation of passivity and 
activity” (NC 46).  These are just the two elements that were polarized as absolutely 
different in Kant’s first critique.  In artistic activity, the artist does not step back into 
                                                 
86 Certainly Kant does not conflate aesthetic judgment with creative activity.  Scholars of Kant have 
discussed how much his aesthetics can be considered an aesthetics of creation or reception (c.f. Bernstein).  
It would be an interesting project to consider whether Merleau-Ponty himself has conflated them. 
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reflective thought to worry about the difference between Nature and herself, inside and 
outside, subjectivity and objectivity.  In the movement of artistic creation, “everything 
happens as if thinking were a natural thing” (NC 46).  This is the same discovery we 
make when we turn toward our natality: we find ourselves to be natural things, naturally 
birthing Nature.  Artistic production is another moment of this birth, this generative 
activity.  In addressing this productivity, “Schelling’s philosophy seeks to restore a kind 
of non-division between us and Nature considered as an organism” (NC 46).  
 The risk in Schelling’s move toward poetry and artistic reconciliation is the risk in 
much of Romanticism in general: Philosophy gives up the rigor of critical reflection for 
thoughtless reunification with an imagined, ideal relation to Nature.  Following Schelling, 
phenomenology might slip into a vitalism or mysticism, projecting a “magical” animism 
into what ought to be nature-in-itself.  Philosophy might devolve into poetry.  As Patrick 
Burke puts it, we might wonder, “Is there not some other, perhaps less poetic way – and 
thus, it would seem, more philosophically respectable – to describe this ancient current… 
this genesis that is genesis?”  (Burke 197).  Merleau-Ponty recognizes this critique and 
remains wary of it.  He sees that Schelling “has a bad reputation,” partly due to Hegel and 
perhaps partly due to the “obstinate” character of Nature in Schelling (NC 49).  The 
character of Nature is so mysterious, so occluded and opaque, that the philosopher might 
be reasonably put off by its resistance to inquiry.  Nature might be so foreign to our 
rationality as to indeed become something irrational that can only be investigated 
irrationally.   
 Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty sees in Schelling if not a perfect solution, then a 
correct aim of inquiry and a correct method.  The potential risks are “less the philosophy 
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of Schelling than the dangers to which it is exposed” (NC 49).  Schelling does not simply 
assume that art will magically restore us to a blissful, childlike, primitive relation to 
Nature: Complete retrieval of some past state is not possible.  In Merleau-Ponty’s view, 
Schelling admits that the proposed retrieval and non-division “is inevitably broken by 
reflection” so that the return “to a non-division can no longer be primitive non-division 
and must be conscious” (NC 47).  The conscious retrieval applies to both the philosopher 
and the artist.  The working artist today does not enjoy pure, Romantic, Dionysian 
possession by Nature; rather, with conscious effort, the artist lets creative movement 
happen.  Likewise, the philosopher cannot hope to return to a prereflective mystical state 
from which she can view authentic Nature, but neither must Nature remain completely 
distant and unapproachable.  The philosopher must consciously cultivate an attitude of 
openness to the excessive totality of Nature, as opposed to an attitude of viewing Nature 
as a collection of smallest parts.  This attitude does not offer mystical access to Nature, 
nor does it reveal the complete content of Nature.  To return to the analogy of Nature as a 
personality, we do not expect to know the complete contents of a person’s mind just by 
attending to a person as whole. But, in attending to a person as a whole, living, 
psychologically complex being, we do come to know things that would not be revealed in 
the attitude of objectifying science, however useful that study might be for other 
purposes.  For Schelling, the attitude the philosopher ought to take in relation to Nature in 
order to know its “personality” is much like the attitude the artist takes: Neither provide 
fusion or union with Nature, but both offer something that a reductive science does not.   
 At the same time, phenomenology does not merge with artistic activity.  Merleau-
Ponty argues that the cultivation of poetic consciousness in Schelling “does not mean that 
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art is confused with philosophy and that the experience of the artist is confused with that 
of the philosopher” (NC 45).  For Schelling, the projects of philosopher and the artist 
differ: The former “looks to express the world, the artist seeks to create it” (NC 46).  But 
the two converse without hierarchy.  It is just that philosophy cannot think of itself as 
absolutely independent of existence and experience, nor does it lose its autonomy as a 
discipline: 
Schelling does not believe that philosophy has to expect everything from 
itself and not rely on any other experience, religious or artistic… There are 
experiences that teach something to philosophy, but that does not mean 
that philosophy has to lose its autonomy. (NC 46) 
 
By attending to the attitude of artists, philosophy can learn new methods while still 
applying them in its own distinct project.   
 But what is that project?  What could it mean for philosophy to “express” the 
world or Nature rather than create it (like an artist) or to objectify it (like reductive 
science)?  In fact, Merleau-Ponty begins by asking at the opening of the course, why 
should we or can we speak about Nature? On the one hand, Nature seems all that is 
opposed to speech, all that is not discourse; on the other hand, how could we talk about 
Nature except through the slippery structures of discourse?  (NC 3)  Speaking to an 
audience steeped in post-structuralism, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that many might 
object to the possibility of even giving an account of nature.  If Nature is so elusive and 
mysterious a character that it escapes all objectifying science, it seems philosophy as well  
will be in trouble when trying to express Nature’s character.  The very project of 
expressing the Nature assumes that there is something like Nature and that it is possible 
to express it.  Until the project is undertaken we do not even know who Nature is.  It is a 
bit like assuming that there is someone in the forest when you are not there, and then 
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going out to find that person.  Whenever you are in the forest, this person is not; 
whenever you do not seek this person, she is there to be found.  Likewise, we assume that 
Nature is whoever or whatever we are not.  As soon as philosophy objectifies Nature, it 
has lost Nature.  Whenever we go out to seek Nature, Nature itself immediately escapes.  
 Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that any philosophy that attempts what Schelling’s 
does “is perpetually in tension and seems perpetually to be caught in a circle” (NC 47).  
This is the same circle that Descartes found himself in when trying to catch himself in the 
act of doubting: Descartes found that he was both subject and object.  But for Merleau-
Ponty this circular thinking is the only acceptable version of the cogito:  
… this act grasps itself in its own operation [a la oeuvre] and thus cannot 
doubt itself...[is a thought]  which feels itself rather than sees itself, which 
searches after clarity rather than possesses it, and which creates truth 
rather than finds it. (PrimP 22) 
 
This admittedly circular thought humbly understands that it “began in time” (PP 22); 
acknowledging this beginning – without knowing it or encompassing it – brings thought 
from brash certainty toward subtle insight.  Schelling circles around the site that Merleau-
Ponty believes phenomenology must aim at: reflection on the prereflective life.87  
But the problem remains.  How should philosophy proceed? By what method can 
phenomenology reflect on the elusive prereflective life? The phenomenologist who 
wishes phenomenology to be a science might recoil at the direction Merleau-Ponty’s 
argument is leaning.  Does this not lead to exactly the sort of problems that Merleau-
Ponty worried might be the outcome of Schelling’s work – a mysticism or degeneration 
into poetry?  While taking both those disciplines seriously, we do not need to worry that 
                                                 
87 Nonetheless, Schelling’s circle still stands outside time: phenomenology will reveal life as unfolding 
temporally, as form that appears not only in space but also, inseparably, in time.  As we will see in the next 
chapter, Merleau-Ponty will modify Schelling’s circular philosophy into a spiral.   For the moment, let us 
concentrate on Schelling’s insights into prereflective life and the method needed to address this life. 
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phenomenology becomes poetry.  But nor does it remain an abstract discipline.  To 
clarify what the new phenomenological project might be, let us consider itless as a shift 
into poetry than a shift from a theoretical to a practical discipline.  In that shift, we will 
have to include the shift included in Kant’s “pure” reason to “practical” reason: the 
poetic, generative phenomenological attitude toward Nature that Merleau-Ponty suggests 
is also an ethical stand in relation to Nature. When we see ourselves as natals, we see 
ourselves as living in Nature but also Nature living within us.   
Taking up a new understanding of Nature entails taking up a new way of living in 
and with Nature.  For Schelling, “Naturphilosophie is in no way a theory, but rather a life 
within Nature” (NC 47).  In recognizing Nature in this way, we find ourselves with a 
double injunction: “Not only must Nature become vision, but human being must also 
become Nature: ‘Philosophers, in their visions, became Nature’” (NC 47, citing 
Schelling).  Philosophy, quite concretely, lives in Nature – in natal beings – because 
philosophers themselves are born.  This may seem so obvious as to be a banal 
observation.  But Merleau-Ponty has shown us that this most obvious fact about 
philosophy has too often been overlooked; to admit this fact, indeed facticity in general, 
into phenomenology has profound philosophical implications, both methodological and 
epistemological. Phenomenology must entertain a total shift in a way of life.  Taking on 
this new phenomenology is not a “theoretical” project.  The evidence of 
phenomenology’s success would appear in lives, not only in texts.  In this, a natal 
ontology departs from hermeneutics in its restrictive sense.88  To Schelling, reflection 
only in and of itself was a sort of sickness (Ideas 11) ; to remedy that sickness, 
                                                 
88 Certainly Heidegger and Ricoeur have shown that hermeneutics might extend beyond textual 
interpretation to interpretation of the lived world: for example, from literal translation to linguistic 
hospitality in general, as Ricoeur describes in On Translation.  
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phenomenology must be open to a new life within Nature and to acknowledging the life 
of Nature in phenomenologists themselves.  Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology would be 
taken up as a ethical practice, not a theory; new criterion for judging phenomenology 
would be required.  One would study phenomenology not for theoretical knowledge, but 
as Aristotle might put it regarding ethics, in order to become good.  Phenomenology 
would prescribe an ethos, a manner of living together with other natals and natural life.   
These are bold claims.  A phenomenology that emphasizes natality shows itself 
through a life lived attentively and expressively with others.  The expression of a view of 
Nature is a life in Nature with natural others.  A natal ontology would be a sort of 
ecological standpoint, a way of standing within and with Nature.  Although I cannot take 
on the project here, one might envision ecological and biopolitical implications.  With 
such sweeping questions in mind, in the following pages, I trace Merleau-Ponty’s own 
methodological innovations toward a poetic phenomenology to accompany his natal 
ontology.  
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Chapter 5: Beginning Elsewhere:  
Generative Phenomenology and Poetic Phenomenology  
 
“Epistemology 
 
 If there is nobody to share the world with, 
 There is no world.” 
 
 -Paul Durcan 
 
 
 With the turn to a natal ontology, the practice of phenomenology changes.  
Because nature and culture, naturalism and ethics, are no longer divided, phenomenology 
cannot perpetuate methodological practices based in such dualism.  More precisely, I 
argue that the shift to a natal ontology entails a two-fold shift in the phenomenological 
method, evident in Merleau-Ponty’s later work.  The first methodological shift is a turn 
toward poetry and art: in order to avoid the dualism of Descartes and Kant, Merleau-
Ponty follows Schelling, turning to poetry, arguing that phenomenology must see itself as 
an expressive – and therefore productive – practice.  I have sketched this history in the 
previous pages and pursue it further here.  Merleau-Ponty’s later methodological 
innovation also entails a situation of the phenomenological practice in history.  But why 
does a shift toward Nature have to do with a shift toward the historical?  It would seem 
these are opposing movements: either we understand human being as natural or as 
historical.  What does history have to do with natality?  
In fact, natality and historicity co-emerge as human conditions.  This is evident 
whether we follow Arendt’s definition of the terms in the Human Condition or if we 
simply phenomenologically attend to their appearance.  As Paul Ricoeur so elegantly 
points out, some of the first histories are accounts of generation: accounts of birth and 
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lineage, the chains of “The son of, the son of…” recounted in Genesis and Numbers.89 
Natality reorients us not only to our natal – natural – origins, but to the situation of 
thought as emerging from others. Just as an individual is born from and into a world of 
others, so thought is born.  Moreover, these “others” who condition existence are not all 
present with us at the moment, but spread throughout history: these others appear with us 
diachronically as well as synchronically.   
 In what follows, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological method shifts 
with his ontology to take into account historicity and poetic productivity.  Drawing on the 
method of the later Husserl and the practices of artists and writers, Merleau-Ponty 
develops what I call his “poetic” phenomenology that takes a stance in relation to its 
world, holding itself and life science in general responsible for its productive relation to 
Nature.    
 What is a poetic phenomenology? How does it differ from other styles of 
phenomenology or from Schelling’s poetic consciousness and indeed from poetry itself?  
In one sense, a poetic phenomenology shares much with Husserl’s “generative 
phenomenology,” as Anthony Steinbock has described the method of the later Husserl; I 
argue that Merleau-Ponty was aware of and intended to practice the method that Husserl 
advocated in the Crisis.  However, Merleau-Ponty was influenced not only by Husserl, 
but by art and poetry, and it is by drawing on these practices that Merleau-Ponty provides 
a positive model for the practice of life science where Husserl might have remained at the 
level of critique. My aim is not to show the limitations of Husserl, but only what 
                                                 
89 On such first histories based on accounts of generation, see Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 109-
111. 
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Merleau-Ponty could accomplish by developing these innovations which in any case 
came at the end of Husserl’s career and life.   
  
Husserl’s Crisis and the Birth of Generative Phenomenology      
 Before we can appreciate what Merleau-Ponty draws from artistic practices, let us 
consider his innovations in the phenomenological method, particularly in relation to 
Husserl.  “Generative” phenomenology concerns problems of “genesis.”  As Merleau-
Ponty puts it in the last of the Nature Courses, “problems of genesis… put the very fabric 
of being into question” (NC 243).  One question for this project is, of course, how are 
genesis and generativity related to natality?  In other words, how is poetic 
phenomenology related to generative and to genetic phenomenology?   
 Let us briefly consider these terms – “static,” “genetic,” and “generative” –  in 
relation to phenomenology and then begin to encounter Merleau-Ponty’s efforts at each. 
These three types of phenomenology correspond roughly to stages of development in 
Husserl’s thought – as Steinbock details – and also to domains of investigation.90  In the 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty claims explicitly that after Husserl, 
phenomenology must take up the project of a “phénoménologie  genétique” (PP 7), that 
is, a phenomenology that inquires into origins.  As Steinbock shows, the most progressive 
phenomenology happening when Merleau-Ponty wrote was thought to be such “genetic 
phenomenology.”  Yet, as Steinbock painstakingly points out, “genetic” phenomenology 
does not extend to all the topics that Husserl himself eventually tackled;  genetic 
                                                 
90 C.f. Home and Beyond, 34.  Others have found that Steinbock does not do justice to Husserl’s early 
work, essentially arguing that static phenomenology can consider a range of phenomena that Steinbock 
admits.  See Burt Hopkins, Review of Steinbock.  However, as we will see, Merleau-Ponty himself 
identifies these three periods of development in Husserl and models his own method on what he values in 
the later period.  
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phenomenology cannot investigate constitution beyond a constitution within a single 
monad or ego.  Genetic phenomenology cannot extend to the intersubjective and 
historical phenomena of birth and generation; for that, as Steinbock puts it, we would 
need a “generative phenomenology” to revise and double back on “genetic” and “static” 
phenomenologies .   
In a sense, one cannot truly study genesis through genetic phenomenology; a 
perspective on genesis itself is required.  This phenomenology would be a “method of 
questioning back [Ruckfrage] into the founding layers of validity ‘and therefore a 
question back into genesis’” (Steinbock Home and Beyond 41).  This “questioning-back” 
of Husserl’s prefigures Merleau-Ponty’s own terminology of “interrogation” in “Eye and 
Mind,” as well as the emphasis on dialogue and dialectic that we have seen.  A generative 
phenomenology cannot proceed along a straight line toward a definitive end of life 
science, but must interrogate its own progress. This phenomenology understands the 
circle which Schelling identified: when we recognize ourselves as natals and natural, we 
find that we have given birth to Nature as well as being born from it.  Yet for Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty, this interrogative questioning-back does not inscribe a vicious circle; 
rather, phenomenology, like other sciences, spirals in time, turning back toward its past 
but never actually finding itself in the same place.  Let me initially put it this way, posing 
a hypothesis I continue to investigate in this and the following studies: the fact of natality 
raises the problem of genesis, but specifically orients these problems to a historical being 
for whom they are meaningful.91  A natal ontology aims toward not an account of life or 
the generation of natural life per se, but an account of belonging to natural life and the 
                                                 
91 In the following chapter, I take up the problem of genesis in regard to animal and human development in 
particular, as Merleau-Ponty examined it in the Nature Courses. For the moment, I focus on the 
methodological problems for phenomenology in relation to historicity.  
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meaning of this belonging for the practice of life sciences (in which I include 
phenomenology).  This ontology requires a phenomenological method that attends to the 
historical, generative, and expressive unfolding of such a life. 
While Husserl did not use the word “generative” to characterize his work, what he 
is doing in the Crisis of the European Sciences sets the ground for a generative 
phenomenology and begins to move beyond a strictly genetic model (Steinbock Home 
and Beyond 46).92  As Thompson summarizes, genetic phenomenology “focuses on 
individual development without explicit analysis of its generational and historical 
embeddedness” (33).  By contrast, generative phenomenology self-consciously considers 
the life-world and “the historical, social, and cultural becoming of human experience” 
(Thompson 33).  Turning toward natality fundamentally alters the aims and methods of 
phenomenology.  If we take birth and death as “constitutive occurrences,” then “the 
scope of phenomenological analysis must extend even beyond genesis” of a single 
subject (Steinbock “From Phenomenological Immortality to Natality” 34, hereafter cited 
as “Natality”).   Birth points us beyond even a synchronic intersubjectivity and towards a 
diachronic intersubjective community.  As Steinbock puts it, generative phenomenology 
points toward “geo-historical, social, normatively significant lifeworlds” (“Natality” 34).  
                                                 
92 Steinbock acknowledges that other interpreters of Husserl, namely Klaus Held, have remarked on the 
shift toward intersubjectivity and the “plural and social sphere,” but in Steinbock’s view Held’s account 
does not see how radical the shift toward “homeworld” is (Home and Beyond 221).  Rather than an 
intersubjectivity plurality composed of many individuals – as described in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation – a homeworld comprises a community, a phenomenon first an foremost existing in the 
collective.  Steinbock offers the examples of collectives such as “a demonstration, a ball game, a wedding” 
(Home and Beyond 221).  In this sense, I find that Steinbock aims at a similar sense of plurality in relation 
to natality as Arendt.  The plurality to which we belong cannot be derived from or composed from multiple 
individuals; rather, a plurality always precedes and solicits these natal beings into existence.   
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The smallest unit of this intergenerational homeworld, for Husserl and Steinbock, is the 
home “of mother or parent and child” (“Natality” 35).93   
The question then arises: did Merleau-Ponty himself make such progress?  Did he 
transition from genetic to what Steinbock calls generative phenomenology?  If he did, did 
he explicitly name or identify this new method?  I believe the answer is yes, he did make 
this move past genetic phenomenology, though the transition was not made explicit until 
his work in the 1950s into the early 1960s; furthermore, I believe he had established his 
own terminology for the type of broadened phenomenology that Steinbock identifies.  He 
calls this type of phenomenology variously “φ” phenomenology in the course on 
Husserl’s Origins of Geometry or “binocular” and “poetic” in “Eye and Mind” and the 
Visible and the Invisible.  Using the terminology of “poetry” and “poetics” to define his 
phenomenological method is not merely a pleasant way to loosely associate Merleau-
Ponty with Schelling; were it only this there would be no reason to depart from 
Steinbock’s already established “generative phenomenology.”  Identifying and 
maintaining a relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and artistic or 
poetic practice becomes increasingly important for Merleau-Ponty, who predominantly 
draws on artistic and literary models for a non-objectifying relation to Nature in a way 
not present in Husserl.   
In “La Philosophie Aujourd’hui” (1958-1959), a course given just prior to the last 
Nature Course, Merleau-Ponty recapitulates some of the work on Nature and sets those 
                                                 
93 With generative phenomenology, we uncover an asymmetrical relation between past and future.  As 
Steinbock has pointed out, when we understand existence only in terms of this monodic self-constitution – 
that is, if we restrict phenomenological study to a static or even genetic study of the emergence of the 
subject – we find a symmetry of past and future.  However, when we include birth in the range of topics 
under phenomenological study, we find that an asymmetry appears.  For Steinbock, natality points to the 
mystery of the past birth and mystery of the future (“From Phenomenological Immortality to Natality” 39). 
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claims within his broader goals, providing an indication of how the study of Nature fits 
into a phenomenological project as a whole, particularly in relation to Husserl’s 
development.   In this course, Merleau-Ponty himself divides Husserl’s work into three 
periods correspondent to the divisions Steinbock makes: the periods of the Logical 
Investigations, of Ideas I and II, and the Cartesian Meditations  (PA 66-73).94  In the first 
period, he notes Husserl’s turn from positivism and psychologism toward a 
phenomenology of “things themselves” and essences.  In the second period, Husserl 
deepened these studies, moving from philosophy of subjectivity toward a philosophy of 
experience (PA 68).   Instead of admitting the possibility of immediately accessing 
essences, as in the first period, Husserl next notes the appearance of essence in time and 
the ambiguous complexity of passive synthesis (PA 68).  The impossibility of completely 
grasping either the self or essences is problematized by temporality: “The subject escapes 
itself in trying to seize hold of itself or seizes hold of itself only in escaping” (PA 69).95  
Through the Cartesian Meditations. Husserl circles more intently around the problem of 
the possibility of the reduction, especially (PA 70).  With the Cartesian Meditations, he 
notes a profound shift in Husserl’s method vis à vis the constitution of ideality.  The 
reduction appears increasingly progressive, involving “more steps” (PA 70).   
 For Merleau-Ponty, a tension in Husserl’s published material to this point 
indicates an unresolved, problematic status of Nature in phenomenology and relates to 
                                                 
94 The reading given in this chapter does not purport to be an entirely just or charitable reading of Husserl 
per se; my aim is to present the significance of Husserl’s work for Merleau-Ponty.  As I described in the 
introduction, Merleau-Ponty presents his own view in dialogue with his predecessor, allowing his method 
to emerge dialectically rather than directly, as he himself describes in “The Philosopher and his Shadow” 
(SI).  Contrasting Merleau-Ponty’s later methods to these earlier efforts of Husserl provides clarification of 
Merleau-Ponty’s intentions, not a “correction” of Husserl.  In order to fully appreciate why Merleau-Ponty 
turns to visual artists and poets for methods in the phenomenology of Nature, we must see what he felt was 
lacking in the available methods; another more robust reading of unpublished Husserl, for example,might 
suggest innovation in his work.  
95 All citations from La Philosophie Aujourd’hui are my translations from French. 
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the necessary methodological shift.  As always for Merleau-Ponty, the status of Nature is 
indicative of an ontology; insofar as Husserl’s view of Nature shifts, so shifts his 
ontology. In particular, Merleau-Ponty notices an unresolved tension in Husserl’s 
definition of Nature in Ideas II. He even claims that by the end of Ideas II, Husserl is 
“visibly embarrassed” by the contradiction (NC 79).  According to Merleau-Ponty, 
Husserl does try in the Crisis and other later works to correct this but this in fact yields 
two contradictory definitions of Nature, one ideal and one contingent.  First, Husserl 
describes Nature as “‘the sphere of pure things,’ the ensemble of things that are only 
things” (NC 72, citing Husserl Ideas II).  This is an ideal Nature at which all science 
aims: “There is in every scientist, or even in a perceiving individual, a step toward a 
conception of this sort” (NC 72).  But later in the same text, Husserl redescribes Nature 
as 
… that with which I have a relation of an original and primordial 
character… the sphere of all the ‘objects which can be primally present 
not just to one subject, but, if they are primally present to one, can be 
given identically as primally present idealiter to all other subjects…’  (NC 
78, citing Husserl Ideas II).   
 
In this second definition, Nature appears in relation to an intersubjective community.  
Merleau-Ponty finds that this second definition accords with Husserl’s later text, “The 
Earth Does Not Move,” on the special status of the earth for human knowledge.96 In this 
later text, as well as in the Crisis, Husserl attends to the community or plurality in which 
the idea of Nature arises.  Specifically, the idea of Nature arises on this earth, through this 
historically emergent community.  This conclusion disrupts the system of transcendental 
idealism at which Husserl originally aimed; it is as if within his own work, Husserl had to 
                                                 
96 See Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, ed. Lawlor.  On Husserl’s work in this text, see also John 
Sallis, The Force of Imagination, 178-180.   
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once again make the transition from Kantian transcendental idealism to Schelling’s 
productive and poetic version of consciousness.  Husserl, like Schelling, responded to the 
specter of transcendental idealism; Merleau-Ponty identifies this project in his two 
predecessors and considers his own project to be a continuation of these attempts (NC 
71).  If Nature emerged specifically on earth and in relation to humans specifically, then 
humanity constituted a Nature contingent on that community and that location in the 
universe: the earth.  Nature is not equivalent to the earth, nor to the universe; as Arendt 
points out, it is the “universal” standpoint that attempts to ignore the specificity of the 
earth.  Rather Nature is a dynamic principle that has emerged on earth from natal beings.   
 In the opening pages of the Human Condition, Arendt also comments on the 
special status of the earth for the natal.  Although I have no evidence that she read the 
Husserlian text to which Merleau-Ponty refers,97 the similarity of the discussion is quite 
striking.  She claims that humans have attempted a “two fold flight from earth” – 
epitomized by our attempt at space travel – attempting to leave the earth for the universe 
and the world for the self (HC 6).  In the modern and post-modern era, humans imagine 
themselves as first and foremost selves with access to a universal standpoint, forgetting 
their natality on this earth and among this plurality.  Natality points us to the problems of 
genesis that generative phenomenology must take up.  For both Arendt and Husserl, 
humanity has forgotten both the specificity of the earth and the emergence of thought in a 
plurality.  Thought is born into a world of others and must orient itself toward this birth.   
                                                 
97 Her definitive biography makes no mention of Arendt reading Husserl’s later texts or even much of his 
work after her dissertation (See Cohen-Solal).  However, Arendt was in contact with Heidegger by the 
1950s when she wrote the Human Condition.  Thus, it seems most plausible that Arendt understood 
Husserl’s ideas through Heidegger or even had access to the texts through him.  Arendt, in any case, has 
quite a tendency to allude to authors and ideas without footnotes or citation. 
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In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Husserl recognizes this in his later work.  In the final 
period of Husserl’s thought, phenomenological thought, finding itself “born in a 
preceding life,” is “obliged to supply its act of birth (naissance)” (PA 70).  All 
phenomenological reflection arises from a preexisting, preceding life already in flow: this 
flow of life extends beyond the individual and into the preceding generation that gave 
birth to that individual and to the language and science that she practices.  In other words, 
upon admitting its natality, phenomenology becomes generative phenomenology, 
conscientious of the birth of existence not only within the individual but across 
generations. 
In his course notes on Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry” – a course which 
complements both “La philosophie aujoud’hui” and the Nature Courses, as Lawlor points 
out (ix) – Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the project of a phenomenology of Nature  
…is not intemporal… It is the interrogation of a tradition, i.e., of what is 
given as constructed by man, as ‘spiritual,’ not natural, being, as 
engendered and therefore as born.  (NO 19)  
 
Let us parse these complex claims.  First, the project of studying human being is itself 
temporal.  A tradition emerges over time, over generations, but also investigating a 
tradition occurs over time.  Not only does human existence define itself temporally in 
relation to the beginning and ending of the life of an individual, but in relation to the life 
of a tradition.   
 Generative phenomenology reveals that individuals take up a Nature begun before 
their birth.  As Bernard Waldenfels has put it, one finds that “one begins, but coming 
from elsewhere”(34). In the poetic phenomenology that Merleau-Ponty develops, natality 
also points toward this plurality, this “beginning elsewhere.”  As Waldenfels points out, 
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this is the great insight of Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on creative expression.  We find our 
freedom not through absolute Kantian autonomy but in our capacity to respond to the 
world.  Rather than agents, we are responsive patients.  In Waldenfels’s words, “In this 
respect the human being is not only an ‘animal which has a logos,’ but also an ‘animal 
which endures a specific pathos’ (34).   
In this fact of “beginning elsewhere” inheres both a passivity and an activity.  
This ambiguity of passivity and activity happens on several levels of existence: 
perceptual, reflective, prereflective, linguistic, temporal.  For example, “beginning 
elsewhere” at a perceptual level entails an active-passive receptivity to the world, as 
Husserl famously elaborated on in his Active and Passive Synthesis Lectures.  We “begin 
elsewhere” in that we begin when we are prompted by the world to begin.  Consider 
when the event of “watching something” begins: our eyes actively follow a light moving 
across a dark room, and yet that light draws the attention of our gaze.98    The event of 
gazing begins before we consciously or reflectively notice that we are gazing.  The event 
begins even before our eyes prereflectively turn toward the light; yet we also could not 
turn toward the light at all were we not so constructed as to be sensitive to light.  At all 
these various levels, the gaze “begins elsewhere” and includes both a passivity and an 
activity.  
Yet condition of “beginning elsewhere” is not limited to the active passivity in 
individual perception. We are prereflectively prompted by the environment (Umwelt)– 
and thus begin elsewhere – but we are also prompted by a world (Welt) of others.  In 
Merleau-Ponty’s words, “The universal is not the concept but this perception in flesh and 
blood, foundation of my relation with others” (NC 78).  Phenomenology must recognize 
                                                 
98 c.f. SB Ch 1, and my chapter 1. 
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that perception encompasses the influence of history and language that shapes this world 
of others.  We begin elsewhere in language and history; we begin before “we” are 
conscious of ourselves.  Individuals take up ideas and innovate; thus, they are somewhat 
active, but they are not “the initiators.” New thought in life science begins with 
receptivity to what has already begun elsewhere in science.  Unlike Kantian 
transcendental idealism which considers a-historical subject who actively impose 
categories on the universe, generative – and poetic – phenomenology describes a living 
being who emerges in history and language, solicited into relationship with Nature. 99     
  
Plurality and Generativity 
 Yet such insights of the Crisis regarding historicity lead Husserl to turn to the 
problem of intersubjectivity and the possible paradoxes it raises: when the 
phenomenologist notices the undeniable participation of the “I” in the transcendental, she 
also notices the the participation of a plurality of subjects in constituting the 
transcendental (PA 84-85).  The transcendental I leads beyond itself. Rather than 
attaining access to absolute ideal thought, phenomenology realizes an “générativité 
spiritual” (PA 84, citing Husserl’s Crisis).  Upon broaching the problem of 
intersubjectivity – or, to use my terms here, “plurality” – phenomenology understands 
itself as generative and as participating in an already ongoing generation of the ideal.  
Philosophy circles around the site of our generative activity, unable to transcend it for an 
ideal realm.  With this understanding, “philosophy is already in a recognition/rebirth [une 
                                                 
99 In the first Nature Course, Merleau-Ponty argues that when phenomenology discovered passive 
synthesis, it could no longer pretend to a transcendental idealism like Kant’s: “Kant ignores ‘inferior 
degrees of constitution’” whereas Husserl “wants to understand what is nonphilosophical, what is 
preliminary to science and philosophy” (NC 71).   
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reconnaissance]” (PA 85).  Philosophy returns to the birth [á la naissance] of 
philosophical life (PA 87).   
 By emphasizing the role of the plurality and indeed natality (as naissance) in 
constituting Nature, Husserl undermines his own original definition of Nature, but also 
improves upon that definition.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “Husserl rehabilitated the idea 
of Nature by this idea of jointure100 to a common truth that subjects would continue but 
of which they would not be the initiators” (NC 78).   
 This new philosophy occurs “at the jointure of men”: “à la jointure des hommes” 
(PA 88).  This jointure, the suture, is not a thing, but the site where an “event” takes place 
he remarks (NC 251).  Alluding to his own new terminology of the flesh and also to a 
history of describing the union of the body and soul, Merleau-Ponty situates post-Crisis 
phenomenology in the flesh and musculature of world and its intersubjective structures.  
Elaborating on this metaphor, he refers to this site of jointure as the “vinculum.” In 
anatomy, “vinculum” refers to connective tissue; this living substance connects “parts” of 
the body.  In mathematics, a vinculum is a “straight line drawn over two or more terms, 
denoting that these are to be considered as subject to the same operations of 
multiplication, division, etc., by another term” (OED).  Merleau-Ponty exploits both 
meanings.  As he puts it in the third Nature Course, “There is a unique theme of 
                                                 
100 Merleau-Ponty here uses “joint” and elsewhere “jointure” (NC 70, 251, and à la jointure in La Nature 2, 
11) to describe the intersection of the horizontal and vertical orders. In French, the term can be used both 
anatomically and or structurally/technically, as in carpentry (See Le Robert Collins).  In English, the word 
can also refer concretely to the joining of two materials, or the metaphorical joining of, for example, the 
body and the soul, as Chaucer uses in one of the first cited instances (See Oxford English Dictoionary).  
Interestingly, Greeks hypothesized that the soul might be some sort of “harmony” or harmonia which, as 
Joe Sachs points out, “originally means the sort of joining, such as mortising, that is done in carpentry”; 
Aristotle considers such hypotheses in the De Anima (On the Soul 65, note 11).   
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philosophy: the nexus, the vinculum ‘Nature’-‘Man’-‘God’” (NC 203).101  The vinculum 
is the site at which all his later work aims: he notes that in the second Nature Course he 
studied the juncture of “physis-logos” and that in the third course, he finally considers the 
entire triad of “physis-logos-history” (PA 37). These two sets of three terms, “Nature-
Man-God” and “physis-logos-history,” that make up the vinculum are subject to the same 
operations.  Phenomenology investigates these operations.  This juncture, this vinculum, 
is the site of ontology and includes  “categories of substance, of subject-object, of cause” 
(PA 37).   
 With the Crisis, Husserl identified this living flesh of the world, with its ideal 
bones and empirical tissue, its intersubjective ossature.  This flesh is not only structures 
but animates.  Its whole living body is already in motion.  Husserl’s “Lebenswelt,” life-
world, becomes here literally a world that is alive.   Human existence both gives birth and 
is born from this flesh; phenomenology studies this life world from the inside.  If 
Husserl’s insights in the Crisis are taken seriously, then phenomenology cannot continue 
to speak of “subjects” or “minds” as the topics of study.  Nor can phenomenology speak 
of cognition in abstraction from historical, political, and ethical situation.  In other words, 
when we take seriously our natality – our location in an intergenerational as well as 
intersubjective world – we cannot speak about human existence in abstraction from its 
location in the life-world and Nature.  In all of this, Merleau-Ponty leads phenomenology 
toward a new ontology – “not as a determination of essences or significance but of our 
                                                 
101 If Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is to be taken up in a contemporary context, the vinculum must be 
understood as occurring at the intersection of “Nature –Human – God” not with “man.”  I return to this 
remark in Chapter 7 in the context of feminist critiques of Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the visible.  For 
the moment, note that gender exemplifies the intertwining of phusis and logos; thus, a gendered term 
cannot restrict one of the terms of the intertwining.  I hope that I offer an elucidation of Merleau-Ponty’s 
view on the matter; if not, I offer a suitable correction.  
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kinship, our coexistence”: “Ontologie universelle, non plus comme determinations 
d’essences ou signification que nous constituons, mais comme notre parenté, notre 
coexistence” (PA 89).  Phenomenology witnesses human kinship to life in general, to life 
as “coexistence,” as Merleau-Ponty puts it.  To see this kinship with other life is “not a 
return to finalism,” emphasizing what animals are for us, but an affirmation of what links 
us with other forms of life (PA 89-90).  To turn toward this phenomena is not to admit a 
“residue of pre-science in science, as the Cartesian ontology would have thought” (PA 
90).  Instead, a truly living science that studies life must acknowledge that it arose from 
the same life world, both participating in its generation and born from it.  Biology arose 
because we are living things, living among other living things.  We generate the ideals 
that we apply to the life world, but we are also born, literally, in the manner of that life 
world.  Science is enveloped in this life world: “The universe of physics is enveloped in 
that of life and not the inverse.  And as that of life is enveloped in that of man, 
conscientious biology tends toward philosophy” (PA 91).   
 Husserl revitalizes Nature by conceiving it as generated in the life-world and 
generative of the life-world; attending to this envelopment in plurality is the hallmark of a 
generative phenomenology.  Generative phenomenology thus also leads to a different 
sense of Nature than does objectifying science.102  In the life-world, Nature appears not 
as a set of abstract laws (as for Kant) but as a dynamic principle co-emergent with human 
existence.  On this new definition, Nature must be understood in relation to the plurality 
of the life-world: or as Thompson puts it, the “interconnectedness of generations” (33).   
                                                 
102 As Thompson puts it, “the life-world is subject-relative in the sense that it is bound to human 
subjectivity.  This is in contrast to ‘objective nature’ as conceived by science, which is arrived at through 
logical and theoretical abstraction.  Nature so construed is an abstraction” (34). 
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In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the insights of the Crisis ramify through all disciplines 
that attend to Nature, to all life sciences. Today, we might include among the “life 
sciences” the disciplines of cognitive science and evolutionary biology.  The problem that 
Husserl noticed is particularly evident in the efforts of evolutionary biology and of 
cognitive science (disciplines that themselves increasingly overlap, even as they are ever 
more specialized) that make claims about what human “nature” is while at the same time 
increasingly emphasizing the malleability and temporality of the human species.  Husserl 
saw the crisis of rationality already in 1939, and Merleau-Ponty foresaw its special 
consequences in the life sciences.  
Merleau-Ponty cites the build-up to the Second World War as a profound 
influence on the movement of Husserl’s thought from the second period into the final 
period:   
Husserl resented fascism [and] … He wanted to show that this crisis [of 
rationality] was motivated… that the existential crisis should not be 
judged on high by philosophy, as if philosophy bore no responsibility. (PA 
72) 
 
Merleau-Ponty held philosophy – as he believed Husserl did –  profoundly responsible 
for the crisis of modern rationality.  Merleau-Ponty describes how Husserl, much like 
Arendt in the Human Condition, attempted to trace the origins of modern world 
alienation through a failure of philosophy. After noticing this historical deformation of 
rationality, Husserl postulates that philosophy must rise again like the phoenix (PA 72).  
In its new life, philosophy would be conscious of itself as non-philosophy, as open onto 
the life-world.  For Husserl, Arendt, and Merleau-Ponty alike, the Second World War 
pressurized the atmosphere in which philosophy was practiced; no longer could 
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phenomenology pretend to practice a purely descriptive discipline.  In this situation, 
silence as much as speech counted as action.   
 Thus, as Merleau-Ponty describes it, in this third period of Husserl’s work, 
phenomenological practice becomes not only generative but also ethically and politically 
responsible.   As Schelling suggested, a turn toward natality entails a shift in both theory 
and practice, toward a life lived with Nature.  The life scientist deploys her views of 
Nature into a politically and ethically charged life-world.  If life science claims a special 
position from which to view a “mind” in itself or “nature” in itself, it fails to take 
responsibility for those categories in so far as they appear for us, for life science in life 
scientists.  Indeed if, for example, a working cognitive scientist asserts that she has gotten 
behind appearances to the thing in-itself, “mind,” she discredits her own creative activity.  
   
Productivity and the Confusion of Making and Knowing   
 It seems a noble goal to recognize the creative, expressive activity of life science. 
But does this not reduce life science to making a second Nature, like art, rather than 
reflecting Nature itself? If phenomenology attempts to be conscious of rationality as a 
sedimentation, as a “historical institution” (Stiftung historique), can it continue to speak 
“rationally” of a shared human rationality? But would science not then be confusing 
making with knowing, artifice with evidence?  Merleau-Ponty and Arendt’s similar yet 
distinct responses to this problem clarify the approach I advocate here. 
In the Human Condition, Arendt worries that science has long confused making 
with knowing: homo faber confused making with knowing until the only knowledge 
humans could rely on was knowledge they produced themselves.  Arendt argues that 
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certain post-Cartesian trends in science and philosophy brought thinking and making 
increasingly close together.  In this she agrees with Merleau-Ponty, declaring that “what 
Merleau-Ponty has to say against Descartes is brilliantly right” (LM 1 49).  Yet where 
Merleau-Ponty follows Schelling in asking us to acknowledge our productive generation 
of Nature, Arendt worries about the prevalence of productivity.  Where “productivity” is 
a figure of poeisis for Merleau-Ponty, for Arendt “productivity” is a figure of 
instrumentality and fabrication.  She thinks not that we have overlooked productivity, but 
that we are enraptured with it and with the structure of our own minds.  With Descartes, 
philosophy is reduced to “theory of cognition and psychology” (HC 293), no longer 
capable of speculating on a shared world that has been thought out of existence.  
Cognitive structures now occupy the center of philosophy, a place that the public sphere 
ought to have occupied in Arendt’s view.  After the Cartesian withdrawal into the self, 
“What men now have in common is not the world but the structure of their minds, and 
this they cannot have in common, strictly speaking” (HC 283).  Modern humans share 
“common sense” but not a sensus communis.  What was lost was  
… the sensus communis... a kind of sixth sense needed to keep my five 
senses together … [This sense] fits the sensations of my strictly private 
five senses – so private that sensations in their mere sensational quality 
and intensity are incommunicable – into a common world shared by 
others. (LM 1 50) 
  
For Arendt, Descartes turned us from the public world in which our knowledge takes its 
orientation from the others who are always already there from our birth.  Cartesian 
science left us navel-gazing, entranced by ourselves but forgetting the origin of ourselves 
in others.  Where the omphalos studied by our self-centered reflection ought to have 
reminded us of our natality, we instead remained entranced with our own minds and our 
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own activity.  For Arendt, the telescope exemplifies this post-Cartesian shift: humanity 
apparently extended the reach of its vision to the before unseen universe, and what 
resulted was not increased security founded on a wider range of knowledge, but increased 
insecurity in the form of Cartesian doubt.  The modern emphasis on instruments confused 
thinking with making.  With Galileo’s invention of the telescope, we are sure only of 
what we put into the world and can doubt the rest.  Citing Alfred Whitehead to whom 
Merleau-Ponty also pays careful attention, Arendt writes: “Cartesian reason is entirely 
based on the implicit assumption that the mind can only know that which it has itself 
produced and retains in some sense within itself” (HC 283).  As thought was confused 
with action “in order to be certain one has to make sure, and in order to know one had to 
do” (Arendt HC 290).  Kant himself began this shift toward knowledge as creation when 
he wrote, “Give me matter and I will build a world from it, that is, give me matter and I 
will show you how a world developed from it” (Kant cited in HC 296).  “Productivity” 
and “creativity” were the highest values of what Arendt calls the homo faber who so 
unfortunately emerged following the Cartesian doubt and the invention of the telescope.  
 For Arendt, Bergson represents the development of productivity in homo faber 
par excellence, but problematically so.  While declining to embark on a full reflection of 
his work, Arendt makes the following broad claim 
[Bergson’s] insistence on the priority of homo faber over homo sapiens 
and on fabrication as the source of human intelligence… could easily be 
read like a case study of how the modern age’s earlier conviction of the 
relative superiority of making over thinking was then superseded and 
annihilated by its more recent conviction of an absolute superiority of life 
over everything else. (HC 305, note 68) 
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Nature is not just a fabric from which we can cut whatever we want, Arendt argued.  
Bergson’s philosophy represents the valuation of creativity and making over collective 
action for Arendt.  
 Perhaps even more troubling to Arendt than the telescope or Bergon’s thought, is 
the rise in experimental science.  While the telescope left us seeking certainty in 
instruments we made, experimental science left us as passive witnesses to nature as a 
collection of processes.  Arendt writes: “The shift from the ‘why’ and ‘what’ to the ‘how’ 
implies that the actual objects of knowledge can no longer be things or eternal motions 
but must be processes” (HC 296).   As instrumentation became experimentation, homo 
faber became homo laborans: when natural science had reveal all of nature as a process, 
humanity could see itself as following a natural process.  Where post-Cartesian humans at 
least saw themselves as a source of knowledge, experimental process-oriented science 
finally, “deprived man as maker and builder of those fixed and permanent standards and 
measurements which, prior to the modern ages, have always served him as guides for his 
doing and criteria for his judgment” (HC 307).  When people could no longer trust the 
products of their own making, there was no need to value those products in and of 
themselves.  Thus, the only sort of activity left to humans was laboring; the life of action 
and even the life of work fell away.     
 Arendt’s solution – if she offers one – to the alienated post-modern condition, to 
the crisis in rationality that Husserl described, is to bring thought into action.  Not only 
ought we to act but we ought to think what we are doing; in particular, we ought to think 
through meaning in the human sphere.  By contrast, 
the action of the scientists, since it acts into nature from the standpoint of 
the universe and not into the web of human relationships, lacks the 
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revelatory character of action as well as the ability to produce stories and 
become historical, which together form the very source from which 
meaningfulness springs into and illuminates human existence. (HC 324) 
  
For both Arendt and Merleau-Ponty, reflecting on our natality helps us avoid viewing 
ourselves as passive byproducts of natural science.  Science might be lead to 
objectification is through the move to ideality; Merleau-Ponty notes the particular 
problem of the creation of a “second nature” in the history that Husserl traces in the 
Crisis (PA 75).  This second nature is the aforementioned realm of ideality and 
abstractions; Western thought generated this second nature and placed it between the 
reflecting subject and her objectivity.  The post-Cartesian thoughtless obsession with this 
“second nature” concerns Arendt.  Abstraction insulated the subject from seeing actual 
Nature in herself.  Rather than turning toward that Nature, the subject could reflect only 
on the nature that she herself had generated.  Neither Arendt nor Merleau-Ponty are 
satisfied with the Kant of the First Critique who would see Nature as “made” by an active 
understanding distinctly separate from passive sensibility.  
That said, Merleau-Ponty differs from Arendt on the relation between natality and 
human nature and also on the relation between productivity and knowledge.  Although 
both Arendt and Merleau-Ponty agree on the failings of Kant of the First Critique, 
Merleau-Ponty follows Schelling rather than even the Kant of the Third Critique.  Arendt 
suggests that we might attempt a sort of thinking that is not tied to the cycle of 
production; the spectator, like the indifferent Kantian judge, might be the best qualified to 
think. 103    By contrast, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we might better succeed by 
attending to our productivity as part of an expressive act, one that is inherently passive as 
                                                 
103 See Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy which contains notes toward what would have been the 
third section on “Judgment” to complete Life of the Mind. 
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well as active.  Where Arendt sees productivity as an absolute activity, an effort to 
impose meaning on the world, Merleau-Ponty articulates a more subtle sense of 
productivity that understands human actions as fundamentally encompassing passivity.   
Rather than slipping into a speechless state of wonder in the face of Nature, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests, following Husserl, that phenomenology take positive action and 
outline a plan for life science.  For Merleau-Ponty –in contrast to Husserl – life science 
might follow artists and interrogate Nature without objectifying it.   What Arendt calls 
the confusing of making and knowing Merleau-Ponty calls “operational thought,” a 
category he discusses in detail by way of contrast with painting in “Eye and Mind.”  
Operational thought is productive thought that equates Nature with the ideal objects of 
science (EM 122).  Operational thought runs the risk that Arendt predicts in the Human 
Condition for all “making” as knowing.  By reducing all of Nature to its own artificial 
products, operational thought cannot be certain of anything beyond its own production.  
Or, as Merleau-Ponty state the problem, “to say that the world is, by nominal definition, 
the object x of our operations is to treat scientist’s knowledge as if it were absolute, as if 
everything that is and has been was meant only to enter the laboratory” (EM 122).  As he 
puts in the Nature Course, “operationalism knows ahead of time what it will find.  It will 
only ever find physico-mathematical relations; it restricts Being to what for it is 
manipulable” (NC 203).  But for Merleau-Ponty the existence of operational thought does 
not foreclose the potential of productivity and creativity in science as it seems to for 
Arendt.  For Merleau-Ponty as for Husserl, phenomenology, having recognized the crisis 
in the sciences, can attempt to assess the relation of the first Nature to the second nature 
of reflection and abstraction, and our participation in generating this second nature.   
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In Husserl’s view – and I think Merleau-Ponty’s – phenomenology must rise to 
the occasion, acknowledging this crisis of aliened rationality and yet not abandoning its 
creative and expressive project.  In the first lines of “La Philosophie Aujourd’hui,” 
Merleau-Ponty makes reference to the penultimate lines of Husserl’s Crisis (PA 39): 
Husserl calls for “a heroism of reason that will definitively overcome naturalism” so that 
“the phoenix of a new inner life of spirit will arise” (Husserl Crisis 192).  Husserl 
bemoans the state of the sciences, particularly psychology, whose practitioners “do not 
see that from the very beginning they necessarily presuppose themselves as a group of 
men belonging to their own environing world and historical period” (Crisis 187).  How 
can we –or can we ? – have a science that is conscious and conscientious of the 
normative, historical development of truth?  The trouble is not with rationality per se; 
understanding rationality as historically constituted does not mean that we abandon 
rationality (as many caricatures of phenomenology suggest).104  Rather, as Husserl puts 
it, “the reason for the downfall of a rational culture does not lie in the essence of 
rationalism itself but only in its exteriorization, its absorption in ‘naturalism’ and 
‘objectivism’” (Crisis 191). Or, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, the trouble is with “naturalism” 
insofar as it becomes operational.  Science hopes to make progress by stepping outside of 
nature, by making all study focused on an objective world, “over-there,” peering out into 
nature but never mingling with it.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it in the open line of “Eye and 
Mind”: “Science manipulates things and gives up living in them” (EM 121).  Science 
gives up living in things: that is, letting the natural world have an inner life.  If we make 
                                                 
104 C.f. Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained.  
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an object of nature, we fail in the same way as we fail when we make an object of a 
person: we foreclose a whole range of meaning.105   
To better describe the positive program of action suggested by himself and 
Husserl for the life sciences, Merleau-Ponty looks beyond the phenomenological and 
ontological traditions and toward philosophy of science.  In the work of Alfred North 
Whitehead, Merleau-Ponty finds an echo of his own critique of the practice of science. 
Merleau-Ponty focuses on a crucial insight of Whitehead’s: we must relinquish a certain 
assumption that Nature is hidden behind ordinary perception.  Nature does not hide 
behind the veil of ordinary perception; Nature is not a Hegelian totality that life science 
can aim to apprehend.106  For Whitehead, Nature appears not only in the microscopic – at 
the molecular or sub-molecular level – nor only in the macroscopic – at the astrophysical 
level – nor only in proportion to standard human perception.  Nature crisscrosses all these 
domains.  Neither the physicist nor the biologist nor the humanist has exclusive access to 
Nature.  Rather, to understand Nature, phenomenology must consider how it is that 
Nature can appear at all of these levels.  Whitehead draws attention to the perceiving 
person without reducing Nature to an effect of the subject.  Let me offer some examples 
                                                 
105 One can study another person as an object: one can notice a hair color, a genotype, or the functioning of 
neural pathways.  All of these investigations have their place in the study of other humans.  A neurologist 
may “objectify” human nature in order to locate patterns and structures visible from the outside.  But were 
a neurologist to so objectify her patient that she forgot the neural pathways belonged to another person, she 
would fail at the ultimate aim of the practice of her science: she practices neurology in order to improve the 
lives of human beings.  She looks for neural structures of perception: she must have experience of 
perception and of perceiving beings in order to set out on her research.  This macroscopic goal motivates 
and guides her practice, and to forget the living situation in which neurology arises could possibly lead to 
poor scientific practice and ethical choices.  She would not, for example, want to so objectify her patients 
that she forgets that her patients could feel pain or that she was looking at vision in order to heal blindness. 
106 Or, as Merleau-Ponty himself puts it in Signs, “we seek not to restrict or discredit the initiatives of 
science but to situate science as an intentional system in the total field of our relationships to Being” (Signs 
152). 
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of how a natal ontology, applying Merleau-Ponty’s insights into Whitehead, would 
redirect the attention of a life scientist.107 
First, consider a barge passing in front of the Louvre.108  If we were to study this 
phenomenon scientifically, we would divide the form into events.  But then, we might 
give “reality” to these events rather than the ongoing duration that we first perceived.  
That would be a mistake, putting “the cart before the horse” (NC 120).109  We are 
mistaken when we assume that Nature hides behind everyday perception: Nature includes 
both everyday, macroscopic perception and scientific, microscopic perception.  Next, 
consider the event of a sunset110 :  
The red glow of the sunset should be as much a part of nature as are the 
molecules and electric waves … What we ask from the philosophy of 
science is some account of the coherence of things perceptively known. 
(Whitehead 37) 
 
Life science looks at the “coherence” for the incarnate being.  In Merleau-Ponty’s natal 
ontology, a concept of Nature is neither only a set of physical principles nor only a 
description of perceptual qualities.  Nature refers to the jointure across these orders of 
perception or, as Merleau-Ponty calls it, at the “vinculum,”at the intersection of the 
vertical and horizontal. 
Finally, consider the example of perceiving a distant star, another example offered 
by Merleau-Ponty and similar to those addressed by Whitehead.  We know that the star 
                                                 
107 Whitehead’s work (and Merleau-Ponty’s commentary) focuses primarily on the status of space and time 
in science; rather than digress into that history, I offer examples, drawing on allusions that more easily 
illuminate of view of Nature in general.   
108 This is Merleau-Ponty’s own example in his lecture (NC 114). 
109 A similar mistake might be made in evolutionary theory where there has been a tendency to describe 
organism as artifacts; while this view provides a useful “explanatory heuristic,” we cannot give undue 
ontological status to this view, inherited from finalist theologies (Thompson 210).  At the same time, we 
should not assume that the macroscopically evident relations between well-adapted organism and 
environment are mere illusion, behind which hides a more authentic mechanistic Nature.   
110 This is Whitehead’s own example that I believe illuminates Merleau-Ponty’s position although he 
himself does not remark on this particular passage. 
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we are seeing in the night sky may well have died out or radically change many millennia 
earlier.  Acknowledging this difference between the star as it appears and the star as it 
was leads us to attribute more reality to one or the other.  We might say that the event that 
appears to us only echoes some “real” event that occurred in the past.  In that case, “Real 
Nature” hides in itself.  But we should not “bifurcate” Nature into “the nature 
apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of awareness” (Whitehead 
38).  We cannot disentangle the folding of time itself from the folding of time for us:  
If we perceive in the present a star that no longer exists, then we perceive 
in the present that which in fact is past.  But we must not figure that the 
critique of unique emplacements consists in saying that our present and 
the existence of the perceived star are two flashes of one same event… 
Whitehead invites us to conceive of nonserial relations between space and 
time. (NC 115) 
 
There is no linear sequence to be unraveled; there is no place outside of time from which 
one could perceive this sequence.  Instead, there is “a certain thickness to time” (NC 
115).  Assuming a hidden, real “event” bifurcated into a past and a present, “to think 
Nature as a process from the event to the object is to take our ‘abstractions for reality’” 
(NC 116).  To avoid these mistakes, we must refer “to perception in the state of its 
coming-to-be or birth” (NC 116, reference to Whitehead Concept of Nature).   
 Again, attending to our own natality reinvigorates our sense of Nature.  We do not 
merely access Nature but participate in Nature’s birth at all levels of perception.  At the 
same time, rather than attributing ourselves a special status outside of Nature as its 
maker, we see also that “perception is made starting from the interior of Nature” (NC 
117).  In other words, “There is nothing between me and the Nature that I perceive” (NC 
116).  There is no empty space, no between self and Nature.  Unlike Descartes in his 
bedroom chamber, we cannot seal ourselves away from the natural world: there is no 
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place outside of space and time to which we can retreat.  We are enveloped in the life 
world. Without returning to Aristotelian finalism, Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology 
suggests that a philosophy of Nature would do well to apprehend the link between, to use 
Aristotle’s terms, the views of “student of nature” and “the dialectician,” or in more 
contemporary terms, the views of the cognitive scientist and those of the existential 
phenomenologist.  Nature appears to both: this is the “ontological mystery” that we 
cannot veil.  Drawing on Whitehead’s work, Merleau-Ponty directs a phenomenology of 
Nature toward this fabric of the real whose grain and pattern can be studied by quantum 
mechanics, biology, or phenomenology.  Phenomenology entertains a generalized shift in 
attention toward the vinculum and acknowledges that we have participated in the birth of 
Nature at all these levels.   
 In this sense, phenomenology works poetically, conscientious of its creative and 
expressive activity.  In so doing, phenomenology becomes poetic.  In making connection 
to poeisis, Merleau-Ponty offers not only a critique of science, but a specific alternative 
model for relating to Nature.  Husserl’s call to arms alone will not suffice; to be more 
than a protest cry, phenomenology must also show how science can next proceed.  If 
objectifying, exteriorizing rationality leads to the crisis, what sort of rationality would be 
better? What are non-objectifying rational judgments that allow for interiority like?  
Other disciplines can retain a freedom that science does not, and these disciplines may 
shed light on how working science can better attend to brute existence.    
Merleau-Ponty hardly intends to reduce life science to expression identical to art-
making.  But he does require that life science attend to the artifice inherent in the project 
of science.  Life science must learn from art and poetry not a new method per se – not 
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how to stand in the laboratory as Cézanne stood on the hill before Mt. Arles – but a 
responsibility for its productivity.   As a creative discipline, science exercises poeisis, 
making meaning as well as taking up the meaning of the world in which it finds itself. 
Painting, Poetry, and Poetic Phenomenology  
 Fully cognizant of the generative phenomenological project Husserl called for, 
Merleau-Ponty sets out to practice the sort of phenomenology that might “definitively 
overcome naturalism” but perhaps without the bravado of “heroism” that Husserl called 
for.  Science had already performed too many bold, heroic gestures in the face of Nature; 
a more subtle method would be called for.  Both Heidegger and the later Husserl circle an 
“un-thought” or “a silence” (NO 13-14).  Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty advocates a 
circling around Nature’s silence, rather than a filling up of this silence.  As he puts it – 
albeit roughly – in the notes on the Origins of Geometry: “The unthought can appear only 
through contact.  History of φ <‘philosophy’> and ‘the poeticizing of the history of < 
“philosophy”>’ (Husserl)” (NO 15).   Such phenomenology is “constructed by 
Erzeugung < ‘production’>” and it thereby can “unveil the Ursprung < ‘origin’> of 
passivity” (NO 16).  By admitting the productivity of life science, we find passivity at the 
core of this activity; we find that even our life science began elsewhere.   As Leonard 
Lawlor puts it, this practice is “always preparatory even though we speak of it as 
something done, is always concentrated in the person of the philosopher” (Introduction to 
Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology 14).   
 A poetic phenomenology acts poetically insofar as it does not take meaning as 
“ready-made” in prose but changes language poetically. Through an ultimately discursive 
discipline – phenomenology – poetic phenomenology aims at that domain which 
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precedes and exceeds language, that which “precedes its objectifying power” (Barbaras 
196).  Representing this prediscursive realm requires innovative discourse.  The very 
person of the philosopher is implicated in what is best described as a practice – not a 
theory – insofar as the expression of prereflective, corporeal, and historically conditioned 
being only appears to such a being also at the level of ordinary perception.   
 The term “poetic” must be understood in its broadest sense, inherited from the 
Greek; poeisis refers not to a specialized practiced limited to high “art” contexts, but 
fundamental human productivity.111  This expanded definition of “poetry” can be 
understood best by contrast with prose, although only by way of convention.  “Prosaic” 
writing is any writing that only reuses already established meaning structures, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s view.  In fact, both great prose and poetry per se can display this 
generative meaning-making.  For Merleau-Ponty, the important thing is to acknowledge 
productivity: 
Communication in literature is not the simple appeal on the part of the 
writer to meanings which would be part of an a priori of the mind; rather, 
communication arouses the meanings in the mind through enticement and 
a kind of oblique action… Perhaps poetry is only that part of literature 
where this autonomy is ostentatiously displayed… Prosaic writing, on the 
other hand, limits itself to using, through accepted signs, the meanings 
already accepted in a given culture… When a writer is no longer capable 
of thus founding a new universality and of taking the risk of 
communicating, he has outlived his time.  It seems to me that we can also 
say of other institutions that they have ceased to live when they show 
themselves incapable of carrying on a poetry of human relations – that is, 
the call of each individual freedom to all others. (PrimP 9) 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, “poetry, as the work of metaphor, has an ontological meaning 
comparable to that of painting; it leads back to the originary experience” prior to 
                                                 
111 In this sense, Merleau-Ponty shows his debt to Heidegger, especially his work on the German 
Romantics.  As evinced by his many essays on and allusions to poetry, Merleau-Ponty takes this discipline 
quite seriously.  Poetry describes not a specialized art form whose products are found only in small 
bookstores, but rather a generalized type of generative human activity. 
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reflective objectification (Barbaras 196).  The appearance of many metaphors in Merleau-
Ponty’s own writing shows itself to be no mere coincidence.  These metaphors, far from 
mere felicities of language, are gestures toward the excess that goes before and pushes 
forth language.112  Merleau-Ponty continues to make this contrast in his unfinished Prose 
of the World, but in the Nature Courses he also specifically clarifies it in relation to 
Schelling’s work.  Schelling, in contrast to Fichte, aims at a “nonprosaic conception of 
consciousness,” or a “poetic consciousness” (NC 50).  This poetic consciousness notices 
not only its own activity but its passivity; poetic consciousness feels itself rather than 
only knowing or positing itself.  But perhaps more importantly for our discussion of 
natality, poetic consciousness takes note of its own origins and its own productivity: 
“poetic consciousness recognizes that it does not possess its object totally, that it can 
understand it only as a creation, and that it creates clarity by an operation that is not 
deductive but creative” (NC 50).  In Schelling, Merleau-Ponty sees a subtler sense of 
consciousness itself, a sense that Merleau-Ponty develops phenomenologically.  As 
evident in the above passage in his précise, poetic consciousness reminds us of the call of 
the freedom of “all the others”  in the plurality on each individual consciousness (PrimP 
9).  Poetic phenomenology thus suggests a study of conscious existence situated in 
history and with others.    
Poetic practice is not limited to poetry per se.  Rather, as suggested by the Greek 
poeisis, this a general type of human action.  Another discipline that maintains a loose, 
non-objectifying relation to Nature is painting.  In his 1961 essay “Eye and Mind,” as in 
the courses leading up to it, Merleau-Ponty again takes up the project of Husserl’s Crisis.  
Science, he sees, has been and is “an admirably active, ingenious and bold way of 
                                                 
112 I return to several key metaphors – pregnancy and vision – in Chapter 7.  
204 
 
thinking” (EM 121).  But that boldness comes at a cost: in boldly assuming it could 
discover things, science also assumed that all the world could be treated as an object 
“predestined for our ingenious schemes” (EM 121).  In haste to learn something about 
nature, science had to assume that it could learn something, that nature spoke its language 
of objectivity and mechanistic causality: that is, that nature had no inner life.  Like a 
charismatic conversationalist who takes a room by storm, science began its interrogation 
of Nature by speaking first.  Caught up in its own bold discourse, science loudly and 
forgot that Nature had an inner life, a complex psychology, failing to note that Nature 
was not speaking back.  Nature was a shy subject, too easily objectified.  Merleau-Ponty 
argues that – as Husserl and then Arendt predicted – by the mid-twentieth century 
science, had reached a crisis.  The only things science knew about Nature were things 
that science itself had said of the object it created. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the painter, by contrast, retains a special talent for not 
objectifying her world.  The painter interrogates Nature through the circuit of eye and 
mind, hand and vision.  Merleau-Ponty there discusses painting not only to illuminate 
painting for painting’s sake, but because he finds this practice to be perhaps fundamental 
to “all culture” (EM 123).  While this essay provides some insight to the practice of 
painting and to the study of aesthetics, it also offers a generalizable model of 
interrogating Nature that Merleau-Ponty hopes science as well might adopt.  Cezanne’s 
paintings remind us not just that Mt. St. Arles is beautiful, but that “Nature is on the 
inside” (EM 125).  Given the historical shift toward Nature as entirely exterior that 
Merleau-Ponty recounts in the first Nature Course (see Chapter 4), this statement must be 
taken quite seriously.  The painter is able to admit an interiority to Nature that life science 
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can no longer admit.  How is this?  It is because the painter equally admits that Nature is 
interior to subjectivity, to corporeality.  Painters make explicit and accept that they began 
elsewhere and that they produce work; there is no shame in inspiration nor in production.  
Forgetting productivity leads to “all sorts of vagabond endeavors” in science.  
Experimental sciences “represent themselves to be autonomous, … [but] their thinking 
deliberately reduces itself to a set of data-collecting techniques” (EM 121).  Purportedly 
achieving neutrality, science has only covered up its own production of these techniques; 
these techne are designed to collect information for someone: this someone is not any 
being, but a living scientist herself, implicated in the results of her study.  
Rather than objectifying the world, the painter interrogates that world.  Paintings 
offer “the gaze traces of vision, from the inside, in order that it may espouse them” (EM 
126).  The painter presents not mere images of objects but a trace of her natural vision as 
a painter.  He “takes his body with him” and “it is by lending his body to the world that 
the artist changes the world into paintings” (EM 123).113  The painter “is entitled to look 
at everything without being obliged to appraise what he sees” (EM 123).  Painters 
manage to practice a “secret science” and to approach “the world without determining 
that world ahead of time as absolutely in-itself or for-itself (EM 124-125).  Nature 
inhabits the painter as she inhabits nature.  Her vision includes the movements of her eyes 
and her hands and her reflective consideration about the painting.  The world prompts her 
to paint, and a certain passivity inheres in her very eyes that cannot help but be drawn 
along by the world: “The eye is an instrument that moves itself, a means which invents its 
own ends; it is that which has been moved by some impact of the world, which it then 
restores to the visible through the traces of a hand” (EM127).  Painters can admit that 
                                                 
113 On how Cézanne lends his body to the landscape, see Silverman, Texualities,162-174. 
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their work is motivated; painting can admit that each of its techniques “is a technique of 
the body” (EM 129).  
A painter shows this history of motivation, of motive vision.  She shows, in pain 
that others condition her very vision.  Painters “have so often chosen to draw themselves 
in the act of painting” because this moment reveals the mystery of vision (EM 130).  In 
self-portraiture, the painter feels that her body “can include elements drawn from the 
body of another,” that other bodies see her body that sees itself (EM130).  It is thus that 
“painting scrambles all our categories” (EM 130).  Through self-portraiture, painters 
engage in a sort of healthy navel-gazing.  In reflecting on their own visibility, they notice 
the mark of nature and others in their own body.  They see the omphalos prominent in 
their flesh that presents itself to be seen by their own eyes and others.  Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that in fact all painting is “autofigurative” insofar as it practices this presentation 
of visibility and productivity (EM 141).  In contrast to the painter, when the Cartesian 
looks at himself, 
The Cartesian does not see himself in the mirror; he see a puppet, an 
‘outside,’ which, he has every reason to believe, other people see in the 
very same way, but which is no more for himself than for others a body in 
the flesh. (EM 131) 
 
It might be reasonably objected that painting, as much as life science, has a history that 
includes technical innovation, from Renaissance perspective techniques to the twentieth 
century’s acrylic paint.  But in Merleau-Ponty’s generous view,114 such technical 
innovations never defined the project of painting itself: “The truth is that no means of 
                                                 
114 For many reasons Merleau-Ponty may be said to describe not painting itself but an ideal painting.  
Merleau-Ponty hardly considers the economic and historical conditions that motivate particular painters; he 
is no art historian.  As Magritte protested, Merleau-Ponty’s thesis “hardly makes one think of painting” in 
the sense of the discipline that succeeds or fails in New York’s Chelsea galleries (Johnson Merleau-Ponty 
Aesthetics Reader 336).   For my purposes here, however, the idea is in fact not to describe painting per se 
but a type of practice possibly available to all those engages in creative disciplines whether painting, 
poetry, or science.  
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expression, once mastered, resolves the problems of painting or transforms it into a 
technique” (EM 135).  For Merleau-Ponty, technical skill is not confused with ideality in 
painting as it is in science.  I think Merleau-Ponty is too generous in this idealistic vision 
of painting, which certainly takes place within an economically and politically fraught 
life-world as well.  I think one can only charitably interpret his work as descriptive of an 
aim or ideal for life science or for any creative, expressive practice.  He rightly points out 
that post-Cartesian science may have become too entranced with its own techniques, 
forgetting that creative activity is at work in the development of these techniques.   
 For Merleau-Ponty, the ideal painter is aware of technical creativity.  The painter 
acquires technical skills in order to better let herself be moved by the world.  The painter 
keeps open the circuit between eye and mind which is “a crossroads of all the aspects of 
Being. [Where] ‘A certain fire wills to live… a leaping spark, it arcs the gap in the circle 
it was to trace: the return to the eye, and beyond’” (EM 147, citing Paul Klee).  This 
circuit of eye and mind criss-crosses the flesh.  This permeability to the world allows 
painting to occur, but it is also what allows all cultural activity to occur.  Most 
significantly, “there is no break at all in this circuit; it is impossible to say that here nature 
ends and the human being or expression begins” (NC 147).  Painting scrambles all our 
categories, including the categories of Nature and culture, animal and human, expression 
and perception.   
Merleau-Ponty implies that science would like to step out of this messy domain; it 
would like to be an ideal art practiced by ideal beings.  Indeed “how crystal clear 
everything would be in our philosophy if only we would exorcize these specters … brush 
them to one side of an unequivocal world!” (EM 130).  But these specters, these rent 
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beings include scientists themselves, and in fact, “even science learns to recognize a zone 
of the ‘fundamental,’ peopled with dense, open rent beings of which an exhaustive 
treatment is out of the question” (EM 149).  If science can accept this domain, then it will 
find that like painting, it has an open-ended, infinite project ahead of itself.  Thus 
recognizing the interrogation undertaken by painting and in healthy science does not 
reduce either science to painting, nor does it take away the unique project of science.  
Merleau-Ponty recognizes that this might seem to be the case.  He anticipates the possible 
reaction of a disappointed reductionist and responds:  
What, says the understanding, like [Stendhal’s] Lamiel, is that all there is 
to it? Is this the highest point of reason, to realize that the soil beneath our 
feet is shifting, to pompously call ‘interrogation’ what is only a persistent 
state of stupor… But this disappointment issues from that spurious fantasy 
which claims for itself a positivity capable of making up for its own 
emptiness.  It is the regret of not being everything, and a rather groundless 
regret at that. (EM 149)  
 
This is a groundless regret because it forecloses the very project of science itself.  If 
science could be everything, could know everything, then science would come to a close.  
It would truly be the end of history that Hegel predicted.  But instead of persistently 
being disappointed, Merleau-Ponty suggests that science rejoice that no such finality has 
come or will come.  Our natality secures for us an endless science, as unfinished and un-
finishable as the domain of art.  Heidegger turned toward a description of truth as “a-
lethia,” as clearing rather than an assertion, but this turning does not mark a failure of 
phenomenology to account for truth.  Rather, his phenomenology attended to the 
limitations and conditions of attending to truth.  Likewise, when Merleau-Ponty asks us 
to recognize the contingencies in which science emerges and suggests interrogation as a 
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model of inquiry, he offers not critique but affirmation of a creative beginning in life 
science.  
Evolutionary Theory, Productivity, and Bergson’s Creative Evolution 
The comparisons and contrasts between painting and science in general set the 
stage for Merleau-Ponty’s critique of evolutionary life science in particular.115  This 
comparison can be seen in a key analogy between painting and evolutionary theory in 
Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution, a text to which Merleau-Ponty devotes much 
attention. 
Like Merleau-Ponty, Bergson attempts to show that neither mechanism nor 
finalism sufficiently describes the movement of life in evolution.  In the face of the 
failure of these two methods, Bergson proposes a refining of consciousness that would 
see past the illusions of stasis and absence to see the positive flow of life and mind in life.  
According to Bergson himself, Darwinian evolutionary theory purports to account for the 
generative movement of life, but its methods can sometimes preemptively limit the 
definition of life to morphology.  Darwinians like Herbert Spencer attempt to understand 
evolving life through a reconstructive, paleontological perspective (Bergson 364).116  But 
this method does not attend to the actual genesis of life: it cannot see the flux of life 
itself.  For Bergson, Spencerian Darwinism is like a child piecing together a picture that 
has been cut into pieces; she may recombine the pieces into an image, but the generative 
                                                 
115 I focus on this problem in the following chapter.  
116 Spencer was a follower of Darwin who actually coined the phrase “survival of the fittest.”  This phrase 
and indeed Spencerian Darwinism in general represent a caricature, albeit a classic one, of Darwin’s work.  
Bergson’s criticism may not be as valid if applied to more subtle, recent Darwinian theories.  In a sense, 
molecular biological studies of genome mutation could be seen as looking the generative activity of life 
itself, rather than only piecing life together a retrospective, macroscopic view as Spencer did.  But, as we 
will see in the next chapter, this microscopic view fails to consider movement of life at higher orders of 
beings.  Merleau-Ponty, if not Bergson, certainly critiques this model as well.   
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“act of drawing and painting has nothing to do with that of putting together the fragments 
of a picture already drawn and already painted” (Bergson 364).  Instead of studying 
generation, Spencerian Darwinism accounts only for difference in forms rather than the 
process of becoming those forms.117  For Bergson, a true evolutionary philosophy 
understands a “radical becoming” (273) in the on-going flux and duration of life.118  In 
the metaphor of a painting, this type of philosophy would be a “learning to paint” rather 
than piecing the painting back together retrospectively.  The philosopher attunes herself 
to the movement of life, as a learning painter attunes herself to the brushstrokes and 
gestures in the movement of painting.  For Bergson, as for Merleau-Ponty, when we 
understand human life itself as evolved, we can no longer attempt only to view evolution 
from the outside.  This is not only a theoretical aim but a practical constraint.  A life 
scientist cannot work like the child who pieces together the painting after the fact because 
the “painting” of human nature is still being painted.  Rather, the life scientist who 
intends to describe human nature from the inside must attune herself to the generative 
activity of “painting” itself, that is, to the movement of evolving life itself, as lived from 
the inside.  As one must learn to paint in order to understand the genesis of painting, in 
Bergson’s view so must life science “establish contact with the creative effort” of mind in 
order to understand the evolution of mind in life (Bergson 370).   
Bergson attempts this without returning to teleology; he builds on the aspect of 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment which concerned both Merleau-Ponty and Schelling.  
Bergson himself puts it this way: “It is within the evolutionary movement that we place 
                                                 
117 This transition from biology as morphology to biology as a study of temporal and dynamic life will 
reappear in my later discussion of Arnold Gesell.  See Chapter 6. 
118 It would be an interesting project to consider whether Thompson’s “enactive evolution” accomplishes 
what Bergson envisions, and if not, what else Thompsons accounts for.  See Thompson 201, 217. 
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ourselves, in order to follow it to its present results, instead of recomposing these results 
artificially with fragments of themselves” (364).  Such a philosophy of life is inseparable 
from a philosophy of knowledge (Bergson xiii).  The isomorphic fit of mind to life is no 
coincidence but due to the “generative cause” of intellect (Bergson xv).   Mind and life – 
knowing and living – emerge from the same source for Bergson. 
Let us translate Bergson’s terms to Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology. Merleau-
Ponty shares Bergson’s commitment to a theory of life that approaches theory from 
within life itself, affirming Bergson’s crucial insight that Nature must be seen as involved 
in a “reciprocal envelopment” with human nature.  This reciprocity can be seen, for 
example, The mode of “l’on” – the “atmosphere of humanity” – that humans share with 
their species. Bergson attempts to think of perception in the mode of “an impersonal 
third-person On,” as Merleau-Ponty puts it (NC 56).  As evolving beings, we emerge into 
a life conditioned not only by an immediate, present world of embodied others, and we 
sense the echo of the general movement of life in our perception. We are not “projecting” 
when we see this movement of life.  Projection is only a problem for the Cartesian, as Joe 
Sachs points out (7).  For the Cartesian, it is clear what the “I” is, and thus there is the 
risk that characteristics of the “I” be projected onto other life; for Merleau-Ponty, by 
contrast, the ontological mystery of life persists, not resolved by the assertion of an “I” or 
“mind” that might project a world around it.  The Cartesian ontologically assumes a real, 
substantial distinction between the movement of mind and of life; Bergson teaches us, 
and Merleau-Ponty follows him, that we need make no such assumption.  As Thompson 
puts it, a natal ontology locates the “hard problem” at the level of life, not at the level of 
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consciousness (236).  Bergson and Merleau-Ponty likewise suggest that the hard problem 
is to understand the affinity of our life with other life, the fact that mind arises in life.   
Not only does Bergson guide phenomenology beyond a Cartesian dualism of 
mind and life, but in Creative Evolution he reminds life science that life must be as 
defined according to its appearance in time.119  Natural life institutes time and temporal 
structures.  Because life structures itself for some future, futurity is instituted as a 
structure of life.  Natural life works over and establishes the institutions in which life 
evolves.  Or, as Arendt might put it, in terms of human life, existence happens according 
to certain changeable conditions, not pre-given, fixed natures.  In other more Merleau-
Pontian terms, natural life inscribes institutions, “Stiftung, as Husserl would say”  (NC 
59).  These institutions are as broad as time and Nature themselves.   
In addition, Bergson reminds us of one of the important tenets of evolution 
theory. Merleau-Ponty rephrases the insight thus: “there is not a foreman who directs 
evolution, because there is not a worker, or rather, there is not a distinction between 
them.  In the natural operation, the end is immanent to the means” (NC 59).  In Merleau-
Ponty’s view, a certain vein of evolutionary biology – “pensée américaine” as he puts 
it120 – has forgotten this.  Such evolutionists [mis]understand life only in terms of 
techniques oriented toward specific aims; a flower, for example, “has developed (sic) its 
nectar…. For the specific intention of attracting insects” (PA 42).  Evolutionary biology 
implicitly – though never explicitly – treats the flower as if it were an artisan, crafting its 
                                                 
119 Husserl, of course, also transformed phenomenology with his work on time. But Bergson’s L’evolution 
Creatrice  published in 1909 preceded Husserl’s Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness given between 
1905 and 1917, undergoing various revisions and editing by his students Edith Stein and Heidegger (See 
edition edited by John Brough, 3-4). In the French-speaking world, Bergson’s work made some of the first 
forays into temporality and – of particular important to Merleau-Ponty’s work and my own – specifically 
discussed life, not only consciousness, as a temporal phenomena.  
120 Merleau-Ponty quotes several phrases in English in this passage from an article in a biology journal. 
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own structure with intention.  In this way, evolutionary biology “without finalism, speaks 
the language of finality” (PA 42).  Oddly, biology manages to speak of finality while still 
within a science that also speaks the language of mechanistic causality, a mix of “blind 
necessity and artificialism” (PA 43).   
Let us try to better understand this.  In order to apprehend the tendencies of life at 
this macroscopic scale, biologists import metaphors that echo finalism.  At the same time, 
the only form of cause consciously postulated by these scientists is mechanistic cause.  
This finalism and the tendency to sublimate it has been inherited due to the history I 
recounted in the previous chapter; to maintain an orderly, Cartesian part-on-part 
causality, science must sublimate all other types of causality to God or the realm of 
metaphysics, which is subsequently dismissed.  On the one hand, Nature cannot have any 
interiority because Nature has been defined as pure exteriority, and life science cannot 
postulate any macroscopic, structural types of causality.  All of those structures are mere 
appearance for us, and behind them lies the “true” objective, mechanistic nature with 
only parts and no structures.  On the other hand, life scientists cannot truly see 
themselves as natural.  Were their concepts of Nature to have emerged naturally, they 
would have no special status for revealing what is behind the veil of appearances.  This 
contributes to the crisis in the human sciences which persists even decades after Husserl’s 
Crisis announced it.  Merleau-Ponty worries that life science may already have reached a 
point at which knowing and making, poeisis and noesis have been irrecoverably 
intertwined, covering over the inherited techniques for addressing Nature. 
Merleau-Ponty sees this covering-over of artifice especially in the evolutionary 
biology of his day.  In “La Philosophie Aujourd’hui,” he identifies what he see as two 
214 
 
major aspects of the crisis: a crisis of rationality in terms of inter-human relations that 
corresponds to a crisis of rationality in relation to Nature.  He notices this most obviously 
in two then-recent developments: neo-Darwinian evolution theory and the atomic bomb.  
Each of these developments involves a peculiar combination of “naturalism” and 
“artificialism” (PA 42). In both cases, technology is no longer “only the application of 
science, but the condition of science” (PA 42).  A similar mix of artificial technique and 
naturalism appears in neo-Darwinian thought. Through the methodological lens of 
evolutionary biology, an organism has certain “devices” that permit its “success” within 
essentially competitive environments (PA 42). 
Supposedly, with our human artifice, we have uncovered “natural” things.  But in 
fact, such artificialist thinking entails an “extreme re-covering of nature”; or, Merleau-
Ponty also puts it, a re-veiling of Nature: “extrême refoulement de la Nature par 
artificialisme et << retour du refoulé>>” (PA 43).121  Rather than “uncovering” Nature 
by discovering its supposed “intentions” in evolution, we have only re-veiled Nature with 
this artificial finalism.  We have trapped ourselves in a sort of dream world, or “horror 
museum,” and attribute all the creations therein to Nature when in fact we have 
manufactured them (PA 43).  Paradoxically, we affirm and negate nature: we purport to 
acknowledge its creativity, but in fact, we only affirm what we have put into nature.  In 
order to get out of this crisis, Husserl asks science to acknowledge that the generation of 
ideality in time does not discredit it as ideality.  The fact that a certain view of life has 
emerged over time and might have emerged otherwise does not discredit it as a science.  
                                                 
121 This phrasing continues the psychoanalytic metaphor –  “refoulement” is the standard French 
translation of Freud’s Verdrangung or “repression” – and reinforces Merleau-Ponty’s connections to the 
psychoanalytic movement, particularly through Lacan. I am grateful to Jeffery Bloechl for pointing out this 
connection. For a standard use of the term see Laplance and Pontalis, 392-396, and for Lacan’s use of the 
term see  Écrits, 386-387. 
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Where evolutionary biology fails, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, is in such reflection on its 
own methodology.   
Though inspired by Bergson, Merleau-Ponty critiques his work, albeit not as 
harshly as Arendt.   Merleau-Ponty would save the spirit if not the letter of Bergson’s 
position.  He argues that Bergson “oscillate[s] between a spiritualism… and a 
materialism,” always tending toward a positivism (NC 55).122  In a sense, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that Bergson fails to see the complexity of his own insight.  Although he 
introduces a rich sense of temporality into a phenomenology of Nature, Bergson oddly 
omits history, so intent is he on describing a positive life force (NC 67).123   For Bergson, 
productivity merges with product and he makes “of life an undivided principle pursuing a 
goal” (NC 60).  His élan vital is so powerful and transcendental that actual bodies and 
contingent details are mere obstacles to its forceful project: even “the nervous system is 
compared by Bergson to a ‘vise’ that would impede consciousness from completely 
realizing itself” (NC 62).  In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Bergson postulates a continuity 
between human life and animal life that would have worried Arendt: he “admits a unity 
of species at the origin, the unity of the vegetative and the animal” (NC 53).  In the end, 
                                                 
122 For Merleau-Ponty, Bergson goes too far in a sort of positivism of life that forgets the nothingness, the 
non-being that accompanies all intuitions.  Merleau-Ponty is not alone in seeing this failure of Bergson; 
Bachelard expresses a similar critique in the Dialectic of Duration, confirming Merleau-Ponty’s suspicions 
(Bachelard 24).  For Merleau-Ponty, human existence is a fold, a hollow; certainly, it is a hollow in 
material, in positive stuff, but it nonetheless essentially folds over on itself.  Sartre, of course, went too far 
in the opposite direction: he saw existence as only nothingness without location in materiality  (NC 66).  
While Merleau-Ponty does not go the way of Sartre, neither does he content himself with the positivism of 
Bergson.  Both Sartre and Bergson retain terminology that ties them to dualisms, to the unending reversals 
of materialism and idealism, positivism, and negativism.   
123 In Thompson’s words, this is the mistake of a “structuralist” version of evolution. He cautions that a 
structuralist view— Bergsonian or otherwise – does not go far enough if it overemphasizes “ahistorical 
laws of form over historical pathways in evolution” (211).   
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Merleau-Ponty rather damningly concludes that “Bergson does not hesitate to confuse 
God and evolution” (NC 63).124   
Merleau-Ponty draws on Bergson’s thought, emphasizing temporality and 
evolution, and yet he tempers Bergson’s vision.  Influenced by structuralism and the 
masters of hermeneutic suspicion –  Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud – Merleau-Ponty sees a 
complexity emerging in the human order.  He suggests a “jointure” of the reflective life 
and the prereflective life, an affinity of animal and human life without reducing the 
former to the latter.  He does not suggest a unitary life “force” moving through all of 
them.  Frustrating and complex as this may be, it is the project of a phenomenology of 
Nature to attend to human existence as the life in Nature that institutes Nature.  Our 
evolution into the world includes the history of reflective as well as prereflective 
existence. For Merleau-Ponty, we must remember that as natural beings we participate in 
a historically unfolding situation, not in an ahistorical natural process, as for Bergson.125  
Nature is not the “stuff” that we are given to work on nor the sheer capacity to produce.  
Again the connection between Nature and natality clarifies the status of Nature.  Human 
natality does not happen once: it is an ongoing condition.  Likewise, Nature is not a fixed 
state nor a pre-given, complete principle: 
                                                 
124 The trouble with Bergson’s work, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, is methodological: what method does 
Bergson propose to investigate life? What exactly would be the criterion for establishing “contact with the 
creative effort”?  In his discussion of Bergson, Merleau-Ponty addresses an objection that might be leveled 
at Schelling or Bergson or perhaps even Merleau-Ponty himself: is this a sort of animism or mysticism?  
Bergson himself explicitly rejects this.  For Bergson, actual animism would entail attributing a 
metaphysical status to the movement of life which he does not.   To suggest that the world contains forms 
that offer themselves to our perception does not mean that these forms substantially sustain themselves 
when not perceived. Merleau-Ponty charitably interprets Bergson’s efforts thus: Bergson only wants to 
“think perception according to perception, and no longer according to a realist perspective” (NC 54).  I 
charitably interpret Merleau-Ponty as advocating a shift in the phenomenological method that would, 
unlike Bergson’s work, offer a rigorous phenomenology of perception that takes into account our situation 
in a temporally evolving species.  What is essential to take from Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Bergson is this 
methodological shift.   
125 Merleau-Ponty devotes an entire course to “institution,” though I will not digress into that discussion 
here. 
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Living nature is thus a principle of finite unity that comes to terms with a 
contingency, which does not dominate it but is charged with realizing 
itself in this contingency and thus with undoing itself.  Between the 
producer and the product, there is a necessary discordance that we cannot 
regret, because it constitutes the very realization of life. (NC 61) 
 
Life is initiated into a world structured for it: “life is like a bouquet that opens 
itself” (NC 59).  The flowers of the bouquet, like fruit, temporally “dehisce” into the 
world, neither entirely “active” nor entirely passive.  The world solicits the flower to 
unfold: chemicals in the air affect the structure of the flower that is in turn structured to 
be opened by the world.  In dehiscence, an action occurs but its initiation lies as much 
with the world as with the flowers themselves.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it in the Visible 
and the Invisible, like Bergson he is “not a finalist” because he envisions Being as active-
passively involved in such “dehiscence” (VI 263, 265).  The same active/passive 
dehiscence occurs in human existence as in floral existence.  Phenomenology should 
attend to “the fabric of our life, attend from within to the dehiscence (analogy to that of 
my own body) which opens it to itself and opens us upon it” (VI 117).    Human being 
institutes and is instituted into more complex structures than the flower, but this does not 
mean that we differ from the flower radically, as for-itself from in-itself. Like a fruit, a 
human emerges with a permeable skin, affected by its world, structured from the 
molecular to the macroscopic level to ripen into that world.   
Phenomenology cannot fail to address the new order of total transformation 
caused by history, language, and the ethical, political community.  This is the problem 
that generative and then poetic phenomenology faces: how can we, through natural 
science, study Nature when Nature is co-emerging with? into? ourselves?  To return to 
the problem raised at the beginning of the chapter, how could phenomenology speak of 
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the existential condition of plurality in connection with natural speciation without 
disregarding the fact that we are the natural species who generated the very terms 
“species” and “Nature”?   
Here a point of difference between Merleau-Ponty and Arendt’s views on natality 
will further clarify the overall methodological shifts that Merleau-Ponty’s poetic 
phenomenology suggests. To distinguish “natality” as an existential condition from 
physical birth, Arendt distinguishes between two instances of natality: first natality and 
second natality.  First natality refers to the event of being born and to natural tendencies 
and gifts which are part of the private human sphere (HC 62); second natality, linguistic 
natality, refers to the capacity to give birth to projects in speech and action, particularly 
political projects, after the necessities of life were mastered (HC 30-31).126  Without 
digressing into a discussion of Arendt, it seems safe to say that Arendt herself focused 
almost entirely on second natality while avoiding discussions of first natality which 
happened in the private sphere and depended on human naturalness.127   
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, engages in a detailed study of both Arendtian first 
natality and second natality.128  Phenomenology cannot separate first natality from 
second natality; to do this would entail returning to a dualistic version of human nature, 
as if speech emerged only in fully-formed, non-natural adults.  To separate the events of 
                                                 
126 See Birmingham 28-30. 
127 For a detailed account of this tendency in Arendt – and indeed a resuscitation of her views on nature – 
see Peg Birmingham’s Hannah Arendt and Human Rights. 
128 Insofar as we associate second natality with speech and political action, Merleau-Ponty’s work 
progresses from a discussion of first natality in Structure of Behavior and the first part of Phenomenology 
of Perception toward a discussion of second natality in the latter part of the Phenomenology through his 
later work such as Adventures of the Dialectic, “Eye and Mind,” and the Visible and the Invisible.   
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first and second natality, would again separate “Nature” from “nurture.”129  While Arendt 
assumes that we can differentiate between the birth of action in public and in private, 
Merleau-Ponty finds action in all spheres to arise from a prereflectively historically and 
linguistically conditioned existence.  In the Phenomenology of Perception and the lecture 
on the acquisition of language, Merleau-Ponty witnesses the emergence of speech with 
the development of individual bodies.130  In this Merleau-Ponty follows Heidegger and 
Husserl in always understanding human being as conditioned by historicity.131 Arendt’s 
firm distinction between first and second natality suggests that humans emerge 
completely formed from their first natality and that second natality in the political sphere 
does not reciprocally affect that original birth. If we retained Arendt’s terms, then the best 
we could say is that “first natality” and “second natality” dialectically condition human 
existence.  But even the dialectical model of nature-culture or first-second natality fails to 
fully describe the richness and the complexity of the phenomena of natality.  While we 
must study both first and second natality, we should also not conflate these two moments 
without considering how the complexities of second natality reciprocally affect first 
natality.  To attend to this properly requires poetic phenomenology. 
For Merleau-Ponty, if we saw perfect continuity from first natality through second 
natality, we would make the same mistake as Gestalt psychologists with regard to the 
different orders of existence from physical to psychological (SB 136).132  In the Structure 
                                                 
129 Birmingham suggests that one might translate this problem into Heideggerian terms as the Augenblick of 
Da-sein that at once appears historically and understands itself temporally.  Arendt refers to the Augenblick 
but does not seem to bring to bear the full sense of historicity intended by Heidegger (Birmingham 31).  
130 See Chapter 2 on the Phenomenology of Perception and Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language 
131 As Birmingham points out, this correction of Arendt’s thinking by Heideggerian thinking might have 
been welcomed by Arendt herself (33).  
132 Gestalt psychology, though making profound progress in introducing the notion of form, restricted itself 
to a materialism by seeing no difference between structures at the physical level and structures at the 
psychological level.  For Merleau-Ponty, theorists like Kofka Kafka? intended this as progress that would 
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of Behavior, when comparing human existence to all living existence, Merleau-Ponty 
speaks of a “human order,” not of a “mental or rational order,” in addition to a physical 
and vital order because a person is not an “animal” plus “rationality” (SB 180-181).  To 
extend this into an analogy, we might think of vitality and humanness as different 
functions rather than as constants or variables.  A living being is not “physicality plus 
vitality” but the function vitality performed on the function physicality.  Likewise, a 
person is not “vitality plus rationality” but the function rationality performed on vitality.  
We cannot simply subtract rationality from personhood to find some base animality.  
Consciousness, rationality and language – all aspects of the function “human” – have 
fundamentally transformed the whole.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “Either mind is 
nothing, or it constitutes a real and not an ideal transformation of man” (SB 181).  As in 
an algebraic expression, the order of operations encapsulates simple transformations into 
secondary, tertiary, and quaternary mutations that cannot easily be retraced from the final 
product.  At each level of application, we cannot miss the complexity that the new whole 
reciprocally introduces onto its parts and vice versa.  Poetic phenomenology must attend 
to this reciprocity; what remains to be seen is how it can accomplish this without being 
caught a uselessly vicious circle. 
 
Conclusions:  Ramifying Natality and Motivated Life Science 
 Given this confusion and fusion of Nature and artifice – nature and culture, 
nurture and nature – in evolving human nature should we not give up on the term 
                                                                                                                                                 
make psychology a science contiguous with the rest of science (SB 136); what they missed is what they 
themselves emphasized: the higher orders of life, such as consciousness, refigured the other orders.  Today, 
we might say the same of adaptionist evolutionary theories like those of Dennett and Dawkins: they miss 
the unique structural permutations of biological and conscious life on physical structures.   
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“Nature” altogether, as Arendt suggests?  Merleau-Ponty does not.  Instead, as often the 
case, he instead admits a certain ambiguity into the term, or as Whitehead puts it, he lets 
Nature have “ragged edges.”  As Whitehead himself put it, “Nature-philosophy must not 
construct Nature but let it construct itself” (NC 120, citing Whitehead).  For Merleau-
Ponty as for Whitehead, Nature is both “an obscure principle” and “a creative principle” 
(NC 120).  Nature eludes clarity but definitely includes creativity and productivity; it is a 
“for-itself,” not like a Hegelian consciousness, but an on-going process “that subtends all 
creation” (NC 121).  
 The concept of Nature has “ragged edges” because it is incomplete.  But rather 
than viewing this incompletion as a failure of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty suggests 
life science see it as an ongoing possibility, an event that life science participate in and 
take responsibility for.  His phenomenology strives not for “a metascience or secret 
science, but rather a reading of science itself as a certain (reduced) ontology” (NC 206).  
This does not make science “wrong,” but like Nature itself, only incomplete.  Life 
science must not leap to conclusions about Nature, putting an end to this history as Hegel 
precipitously put an end to art: “The natural must not be a lazy postulate” (NC).  Certain 
scientific theories –  such as the phlogiston model of oxygen or Coghill’s theory of 
development133 – fade and are replaced by newer, more precise models.  But this process 
of transition reflects the poetic activity of science, not its mistakes.  As he puts it in “The 
Algorithm and the Mystery of Language” in relation to mathematics, “We are trying to 
show not that mathematical thought rests upon the sensible but that it is creative” (Prose 
of the World 126).  The result of an algorithm, this “synthesis is the result of the 
development of my knowledge and not its precondition” (Prose of the World 127).  
                                                 
133 See Chapter 6.  
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Where for Kant such synthesis occurred a priori, for Merleau-Ponty, taking Kant’s 
insights even further through Husserl shows that particular synthetic conclusions of 
science could only occur in history, after the accumulation of centuries of creative, 
expressive efforts.  Merleau-Ponty summarizes it this way:  “If creations are not 
permanent acquisitions, it is not just that, like all things, they pass away: it is also that 
they have almost their entire lives before them” (EM 158).   
I would argue that the crisis Merleau-Ponty saw in the evolutionary biology of his 
day has only become more acute in a contemporary context.  The crisis persists whenever 
life science draws conclusions that preemptively assume Nature is an object fixed in 
space and time rather than open-ended and incomplete.  For example, upon discovering 
the genome, certain life scientists claimed to have found the “language gene,” without 
waiting to see that the genome does not rest, a fixed object, to be attached to lifeworld 
structures like language.134  In a contemporary context, we can modify not just the 
philosophical concept of Nature, but what we previously thought of as ‘Nature itself’: we 
can modify both our genome and our definition of genome.  We find ourselves 
responsible for both our definition and the distinction that it institutes between a 
purportedly “natural” element and the “cultural” context in which it appears.  We nurture 
our nature as we practice life science. But, just as Husserl does not advocate abandoning 
rationality, neither Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms nor my own mean that phenomenology 
needs to abandon relations with the study of evolution.  Instead, life scientists, like poets, 
must see themselves as responsible for the view of Nature produced. Life science does 
not casually explore a possible Nature outside of the actual Nature deployed into the 
politically and ethically fraught life-world.   
                                                 
134 In later pages, I discuss epigenesis and recent investigations into the malleability of the genome.  
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The life scientists must recognize themselves as motivated to work. We 
participate in the same confluence of motivation and motion that Merleau-Ponty 
described in the Structure of Behavior studies of eye movement, through the 
Phenomenology of Perception reflections on the affective life.   The life scientist is seized 
upon by her world, much like the artist. The artist and the scientist alike respond to the 
life-world according to the active-passive synthesis that enables perception and 
expression.  As Patrick Burke has put it, for Merleau-Ponty as for Schelling, the artist is 
seized upon by the world, and possibly “driven to production … even against an inner 
resistance” (Burke 191).  This seizure is analogous to the “operation of grace” on the 
mystic.135  The world seizes the artist: possessed by the divine gift, he paints and 
“everything he paints is an answer to this excitement and his hand is nothing but the 
instrument of a distant will” (VI, cited in Burke 191).  
This is a powerful analogy between art and religious possession, given that 
Merleau-Ponty also compares artistic practice to scientific practice. It seems one thing to 
describe a painter as possessed by the world and another to so describe the practicing 
scientist this way.  But in making this analogy Merleau-Ponty does not make 
metaphysical claims about a supernatural deity or force in art: rather, he seeks to better 
describe human existence as it corporeally comports itself with its life-world.  He finds 
these possibly metaphysically weighted terms – possession, gift of tongues, divinity – the 
best approximation to describe the artist’s receptivity to the world.  In making this 
comparison, Merleau-Ponty does not abandon philosophy but rather takes up its tradition.  
These tropes have long been associated with not only artistic and poetic production, but 
                                                 
135 Burke cites this passage from the Visible and the Invisible: “our fleshy eyes have the gift of the visible 
as it was once said that inspired men had the gift of tongues” (VI, cited in Burke 191).   
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with philosophy itself, since Plato’s Phaedrus described the manic state of the lover of 
wisdom.  Merleau-Ponty makes a similar comparison but in a post-metaphysical context.  
He asks us to witness the productivity of artists and consider whether it does not, 
phenomenologically, echo that of those possessed by religious fervor.  Likewise, he asks 
us to witness the inspired scientist and ask if she does not share a certain comportment 
with the inspired artist.  Each is motivated to work.  Motive lives not only in the world 
nor only in the artist, but in their relation.  Motive does not equate to cause, as one might 
say it does for a materialist like Hume.  As Merleau-Ponty remarks in the 
Phenomenology, motivation does not cancel out freedom but is its condition, and freedom 
likewise is the condition for responsibility.136  Motivation unfolds in the relationship 
between artist or scientist and her particular situation.  Each stands in a relation of 
wonder, as Arendt or even Descartes himself might put it: wonder is the first passion.137 
Philosophical reflection becomes a thaumatology of this initial and ever-renewed 
motivation to work by the world.  But this does not mean that science gives up ideality, 
any more than noticing Beethoven’s motivation to write the “Ode to Joy” effaces the 
unique act of its creation.   
In his notes on Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, Merleau-Ponty poses just the 
question the critical reader might now want to ask of him: “Is that still ‘philosophy?’” Or 
instead, “Is drawing near to speech, speaking, seeing, thinking presently … a ‘mysticism’ 
without God”? (NO 49).  These are the same questions we might have asked Schelling or 
Bergson.  But he replies quite clearly, “No: it is not extraphilosophical ... All of 
speculation is necessary in order to discover a sense for this prespeculative Being” (NO 
                                                 
136 See Chapter 2. 
137 See HC, Chapter 6, and Descartes’s  The Passions in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, I: 358. 
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49).  The project of turning toward the prereflective life, toward natality in plurality, lies 
not outside philosophy but within it.  The question then, for philosophy, is what it can say 
about this.  If we can never step out of the circle – if we are always the artist, never the 
critic – how can we reflect on our definition of Nature?  Or, as Merleau-Ponty asks: “But 
what we will say about it? [i.e. Nature] Everything that we will say about it will be in 
principle false.  Silence?” (NO 49) It seems that because the revelation of poetry appears 
not in discourse about it but in the act of its making, reflective philosophy can say 
nothing.  We would be in the trap of Derrida’s “White Mythologies”: speculative 
philosophy would seek the place outside of metaphor, of poetry, and if we failed to find 
one, we could only speak metaphorically, poetically.  Merleau-Ponty’s response, 
however, differs subtly from Derrida’s;138 in his lecture, he responds, “But the φ < 
‘philosophy’> replaced by art, poetry, life? No, because they speak only silent. φ  < 
‘Philosophy’> as the thematization of this speaking silence” (NO 49).  The disciplines 
exchange and interweave, but we can differentiate them and their tasks.  They interweave 
dialectically and productively (NO 45).  Husserl’s reflections on the practice of geometry 
do not replace the practice of doing geometry, although the reflections might renovate 
and renew it.  Just as the artist must ultimately take responsibility for the art work – while 
at the same time admitting that she was “inspired”— so the scientist does not give up 
responsibility by admitting to inspiration by her particular natural, cultural, and historical 
situation.   
 At present some of the most transformative and perhaps controversial 
developments in life science’s conception of Nature and particularly human nature are 
                                                 
138 Or perhaps echoes certain interpretations of Derrida, though not the simpler or dominant interpretation 
that I will accept here.  In doing so, I follow Paul Ricoeur’s response in Rule of Metaphor, Ch 8.  
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occurring in evolutionary biology.  Biology – indeed life science in general – has become 
a study of temporally and dynamically emerging relationships, rather than a study of 
fixed forms; I discuss the early stages of the shift as Merleau-Ponty witnessed it in the 
following pages.  It is to his investigations into this area that I turn next.  
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Chapter 6   Totality:  Animality, Genesis and Development  
 
“There is a history in all men's lives 
Figuring the natures of the times deceas'd;  
The which observ'd, a man may prophesy 
With a near aim, of the main chance of things  
As yet not come to life, who in their seeds  
And weak beginning lie intreasured.   
Such things become the hatch and brood of time…” 
- Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II 139 
 
 In a sense, the climax of the Nature Courses is the concluding discussion on 
development and evolution.  Evolution! the thoughtful phenomenologist might say with 
alarm.  Phenomenology can’t broach that subject.  What does that have to do with poetic 
phenomenology?  How can phenomenology speak of human being in terms of speciation 
and not fall into reductive, objectifying terms?  “Species” traditionally denotes a fixed 
type, a category, objectively perceivable.  Speaking of the human species would seem to 
lead us to the very situation Arendt envisioned the study of human nature would always 
lead to: Seeking to catch sight of human “species” would be a futile and even harmful 
attempt akin to jumping over our own shadow.   
 However difficult or impossible speaking of the human species might seem to the 
phenomenologist, other life scientists do speak of the human species in a contemporary 
context.140  Biology, cognitive science, and philosophy might work on models of human 
life that depend on a view of the human being as an evolving species like any other 
biological life form.  However critically it might respond, phenomenology must consider 
                                                 
139 Arnold Gesell cites part of this passage.  See Gesell 481.  
140 For example, the subtitle to Steven Pinker’s popular The Blank Slate  is “The Modern Denial of Human 
Nature.”  Such a denial indeed seems to be a modern, arising in the early part of the twentieth century 
through the very group of thinkers under consideration here.  Pinker’s work – however correct or incorrect 
as philosophy or science – now has a hold on the contemporary mind, as evinced by its popular reviews in 
journals from Nature to the New York Times.  In the light of this contemporary problem, I offer the 
accounts of these modern thinkers.  
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these issues if it is to respond to contemporary life sciences that are indeed occupied with 
studying human beings as part of an evolving species.  Let us take “evolving species” to 
mean roughly our participation in a group of organisms with shared tendencies and to the 
changing of these shared tendencies over time, including changes at a phenotypical and 
genetic level.141  Let us see if, following Merleau-Ponty, we can find a way to speak 
phenomenologically of belong to a life that emerges in this way, without falling into a 
dualism of nature and nurture, or nature and culture. 
 Merleau-Ponty engages with the then-contemporary discussions of evolution and 
culls a description of “species” that has an “ontological value,” as he puts it, but avoids 
objectivism (NC 189).  This rehabilitation of speciation is essential to his “new ontology” 
of visibility or voyance (Carbone 31).  As Carbone puts it, playing with Merleau-Ponty’s 
own terms, the change in the concept “species” “helps to characterize that ‘ontological 
mutatation’ … in relation to the concept of Nature” (33).142  I will show that this view of 
“species” is in fact similar to Arendt’s sense of “plurality”; both Merleau-Ponty’s non-
reductive sense of species and Arendt’s plurality are discovered through our natality and 
our visible orientation toward others and implicate us into ethical relations with others. (I 
return to each of these characteristic in turn in this and the following study.)  In these 
lectures, Merleau-Ponty brings a phenomenological eye to then-current developmental 
and evolutionary biological studies and connects them to phenomenological work on 
intersubjectivity, further substantiating the relationship between natality and plurality.  
                                                 
141 To track the changing definition of the term “species” would be a task in itself.  Grene and Depew, for 
example, argue persuasively that Aristotle used the term to refer not to fixed classifications but to revisable 
–and oft-revised – categories (18).  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “species” took on a more 
robust and fixed sense, unambiguously denoting groups branching out from the tree of life (19).  In a sense, 
Grene and Depew suggest that Aristotle’s more malleable sense of “species” is more suited to 
contemporary, epigentically-informed accounts of speciation.  
142 Carbone here cites Merleau-Ponty, who claims in the Nature Courses that phenomenology must see “the 
necessity of the ontological mutation” (NC 204 ). 
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These are not mere passing references but sustained discussions of evolution which carry 
over into the Visible and the Invisible.143 Merleau-Ponty dares to speak of the human 
“species” and other natural species without falling into a reductive view of life or 
existence Arendt fears, in the Human Condition, that any discussion of human nature 
might slip into.  In the second and third of the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty suggests a 
jointure across the human and animal orders of existence.  This jointure is particularly 
apparent in the genesis of animals, in their development. Rather than highlighting 
animality in contrast to human existence, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the continuity of 
human and animal experience as he does not in the Structure of Behavior, where he 
identified only the physical, vital, and human orders.144  Studying animality per se allows 
Merleau-Ponty to focus on the emergence of interiority in Nature.  By the end of the 
courses, he even considers the possibility of an “animal culture” (NC 198).  By 
implication, he suggests the animality of culture, taking another pass at erasing the 
definitive line between “nature” and “culture” as he has since the Phenomenology of 
Perception; as he puts it in the Visible and the Invisible, in his later work he finds “The 
distinction between the two planes (natural and cultural) is abstract: everything is cultural 
in us … and everything is natural in us” (VI 253).  I will return to the perhaps frustrating 
ambiguity that this statement might suggest.  For now, let us note that it implies that 
though the study in this Nature Course at first appears to be a discussion of totality in 
relation to animal development per-se, it has definite implications in the sphere of human 
                                                 
143 For just a selection of the many references to evolution, evolutionary theory, and speciation in the 
Visible and the Invisible, see VI 172, 226, 223, 256, 265. 
144 See Thompson 449, note 2. 
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action.145  No easy delineation between human life and life in general, natural life and 
cultural life, can be assumed.   
 The continuity between animal and human life implies also that human freedom 
(as a part of human life) arises from the organic form, in the very structure of animal 
behavior.  In Hans Jonas’s words, life’s independence of form from matter constitutes no 
less than the very freedom of the organism.  Jonas admits that this may seem like a broad 
and counter-intuitive claim: “One expects to encounter the term [‘freedom’] in the areas 
of mind and will, and not before: but if mind is prefigured in the organic form from the 
beginning, then freedom is” (Jonas, Phenomenology of Biology, cited in Thompson 151).   
Merleau-Ponty makes clear that the descriptions of animal life that I will discuss below 
are intended to also describe human life:  
… the human universe is not the product of freedom in the Kantian sense, 
that is, event-based freedom which is attested to in a decision; it is, rather 
a structural freedom.  In brief, it is the theme of the melody, much more 
than the idea of a nature-subject or of a suprasensible thing, that best 
expresses the intuition of the animal. (NC 178) 
 
Like Thompson, Merleau-Ponty here locates the “hard” problem, not at the level of 
consciousness or mind, but at the level of life (223-224).  In understanding actions in the 
animal or human sphere, we exercise the same sort of judgment that the biologist 
exercises in understanding the behavior of an animal.  These actions emerge within a 
total style of being, not according to some pre-given telos nor – as is more tempting to 
propose in the case of animals – according to an instinctive reaction to an environment. 
                                                 
145 Bryan Smyth cautions that Merleau-Ponty nonetheless prioritizes the human sphere.  He finds that 
Merleau-Ponty does not consider human relations to animals, for example, in an ethical way; that is, 
Merleau-Ponty does not define, in his words, an  “ethical interspecific coexistence” (172).  Indeed, I would 
agree that Merleau-Ponty makes no claims in this regard.  I think, however, this represents less a failing on 
Merleau-Ponty’s part than a differentiation of his project.  In the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty does not 
offer a prescription for human ethical coexistence either.  He is concerned with establishing the ontological 
condition for such coexistence, not with making prescriptions about it.  
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 Merleau-Ponty’s insights depend on the fact that his natal ontology non-
reductively views existence as generative and oriented toward a plurality.  Merleau-
Ponty’s approach is “non-reductive” because he always situates life within an excessive 
totality.  Since his pre-Structure of Behavior work on Gestalt theory, Merleau-Ponty has 
emphasized the need to phenomenologically attend to the whole, to the total situation in 
which a natal being lives.  Merleau-Ponty shows that we must attend to the totality of life 
at various orders of existence, from the genetic to the individual to the plural.  He 
reminds us in the Nature Courses, for example, that the totality of an organism,  
… is not a sum of instantaneous and punctual microscopic events; it is an 
enveloping phenomenon … . In between the microscopic facts, global 
reality is delineated like a watermark, never graspable for objective-
particular thinking, never eliminable from or reducible to the microscope. 
(NC 207) 
 
The totality of the organism is an “enveloping phenomenon”; it is therefore not a totality 
that the organism can witness completely.  Merleau-Ponty speaks not of the standard 
Western metaphysical sense of totality so critiqued by Levinas; the totality of natal 
animals precisely includes a “relations with a surplus,” as Levinas puts it ( Totality and 
Infinity 22).  The natal being finds itself situated in a totality; Merleau-Ponty would 
affirm, as Levinas describes, that there is no place in this enveloping totality from which 
one might “promote the claims of a subjectivity free as the wind” (Levinas Totality and 
Infinity 22).  Totality, in Merleau-Ponty’s description, is also not a macroscopic 
phenomena: totality does not elude perception simply because it is too large in space.  
Notice in the citation above that Merleau-Ponty claims the totality of the organism also 
appears in the microscope: it is “never eliminable from” even microscopic study.  At the 
same time, this totality cannot be reduced to evidence apparent from the microscopic 
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perspective.  Totality haunts visions with a surplus whether viewed from a microscopic or 
macroscopic angle.  
 The totality of the organism’s situation must be understood as temporally 
unfolding.  In the last hundred to two hundred years, as biology emerged as a rigorous 
science, the recognition of the temporal situation of biological life has taken on increased 
importance.146  Merleau-Ponty remarked on several key innovations in developmental 
biology that had been made in the decades preceding his second Nature Course – from 
the 1930s and through the 1950s. 
 
Temporality and the New Biology  
 In this second course, Merleau-Ponty reassesses the state of the life sciences in 
comparison to when he began his work in the Structure of Behavior, particularly 
emphasizing the shifts in developmental and evolutionary biology.  In the late 1950s, 
Merleau-Ponty claimed that though the debate between vitalism and materialism has not 
vanished, biology has come to take seriously some notions that would be, in his words, 
“unclassifiable” according to the traditional dichotomy (NC 139).  In the Structure of 
Behavior, Merleau-Ponty rejected simple stimulus-response theory for a more subtle, 
gestalt view of behavior.147  Twenty-five years later, he re-articulates this view that 
intentional behavior is inexplicable in terms of either only the organism’s actions by itself 
or only the action of the environment on the organism: 
                                                 
146 Grene and Depew argue that in fact Aristotle himself already saw the need to understand life as 
temporally unfolding.  This is evident in his division of his studies into the Parts of Animals, a morphology 
of spatial forms, and the Generation of Animals, a study of “the diachronic development of individual 
organism in and through the process of generation” (26-27).  Sachs, as well, in his translation of On the 
Soul, stresses that one must understand the “form” of living being to refer to an on-going activity of “being-
at-work-staying itself” rather than a spatial structure immanent in matter (See Introduction to Book 1). 
147 See Chapter 1.  
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We discover between the situation and the response an internal articulation 
that we understand, but that we cannot reduce to its elements: this is the 
school of intentional behavior… by reincorporating meaning, the notion of 
behavior remains something anchored in a body, but the body is no longer 
a machine. (NC 140) 
 
 New attention to the temporal comportment of organisms changed the very basic 
practices of biology.  Biology once focused almost entirely on morphology: the form of 
individual animals as fixed adult species or forms. Biologists turned their attention to the 
emergences of these forms.  As child developmental theorist Arnold Gesell, whom 
Merleau-Ponty studied, puts it: “When Goethe coined the word Morphologie he was 
thinking particularly of the shapes of skulls and flowers” (471).  But G.E. Coghill, Gesell 
and his contemporaries who interested Merleau-Ponty recognized that one must study the 
co-emergence of behavior and form over time.  Their discoveries in morphology emerged 
in parallel with innovations in evolutionary theories, eventually converging with these 
discoveries.  According to the new developments in biology, animal life could not be 
properly understood only by examining spatial forms fixed in time.   
 Merleau-Ponty refers to a series of experiments – now more easily repeated 
digitally and confirmed by more detailed research148 – by A. Michotte, an experimental 
psychologist working in Louvain, influenced by both Gestalt theory and 
phenomenology.149  Michotte’s projected images suggest various causal relationships 
occurring in time to the viewer; Michotte was convinced that causality, rather than 
inferred from experience (as Hume suggested) or intuitively apprehended from nature in 
                                                 
148 See for example, Wolff “Dynamics and the perception of causal events,” 555 – 587, and Young, 
Beckmann, and Wasserman, “The pigeon's perception of Michotte's launching effect,” 223 - 237. 
149 See Perception of Causality, iv-v. 
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itself, is understood because of particular spatio-temporal formal configurations.150  In 
the experiment that most interested Merleau-Ponty, the figures either hook toward one 
another or dilate, and these faint movements give the impression of life.  The subjects 
who watch the experiment “do not say that this schema makes them think of something, 
but that they perceive a living thing” (NC 154).  They see something living and 
animallike no matter what their experience with actual animals: that is, the tendency to 
perceive animal life is inherent to perception, not acquired by inference from experience.  
Playing on the Kantian term, “schema” here describes a temporally unfolding structure 
felt by subjects rather than a fixed structure that intervenes between cognitive categories.  
The subjects “wince, like we have when we find a caterpillar where we weren’t expecting 
it” (NC 154).  They sense that this is a living being because its movement suggests a 
future: not just any future, but a future limited by a certain style and tendency of 
movement.  The living organism balances precariously in the present; we perceive this 
teetering instability that the organism tends to correct.  When we “consider the organism 
in a given minute, we observe that there is the future in every present, because its present 
is in a state of imbalance” (NC 155).151 
 This imbalance appears in the very spatio-temporal formal structure of the 
organism. The capacity for perceiving this dynamic structure of life inheres in perception 
but is not reducible to perception.   Michotte’s work reinforces the emerging consensus 
                                                 
150 “We do not, according to Michotte, see one billiard ball cause another to move either because we 
intuitively apprehend a fact of nature or because past experience leads us to see the event in this fashion, 
but because the spatio-temporal organization is such that it directly unleashes this impression in us” 
(Translator’s Introduction to Perception of Causality vi). 
151 References to Michotte reappear in the Visible and the Invisible, marking his work as of more than 
passing interest to Merleau-Ponty.  Merleau-Ponty even remarks that “ ‘life’ in Michotte’s experiments 
exemplifies the flesh” (VI 250). See also VI 178. 
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that one cannot understand life by studying phylogenetic trees and the fixed morphology 
of various dead species.   
 Particularly exemplary of this new view of biology are studies of developing 
organisms, both human and animal. Merleau-Ponty points out that the irreducibility of the 
totality – so important for a non-reductive view of life – is “particularly striking in 
genesis” (NC 207).  That is, in the generation and growth – in the natality of – an 
organism from birth, we can see more obviously the need to attend to the totality.  In the 
Nature Courses considered here, Merleau-Ponty develops his natal ontology through 
studies of genesis, both of an individual organism and of a plurality of organisms.  
Studies of the generation of life are relevant to his ontological project because, as he puts 
it, “problems of genesis… put the very fabric of being into question” (NC 243).  
Nonetheless, he reminds the phenomenologist that such reflection is undertaken in order 
to elucidate the meaning of these studies for a life lived in relation to them: 
… philosophy is not concerned with genesis [per se], with empirical 
circumstance; it is not from them that comes that which is engendered – 
Scheler – but this would suppose essence descending into existence, the 
transcendental order perpendicular to the horizontal order of facts: Where 
is the joint152 of this welding?  It is this suture or seam that interests us in 
genesis, not the ‘conditions of existence’ for themselves. (NC 229) 
 
Events of genesis show the “suture” of the horizontal order of life with the vertical order 
of reflective on that life.  Genesis stretches the flesh of the world and shows these seams 
and fibers: Nature, living and emerging temporally, and our ideal concept “Nature,” 
vertically ex-static in relation to this temporality.  Merleau-Ponty’s ontology aims not to 
offer insights into the process of genesis, but into the meaning of belonging to such being 
in which genesis appears.  As we reflect on the relation between genetics and 
                                                 
152 Again, Merleau-Ponty alludes to the jointure, the vinculum, the event that is  the intersection of vertical 
and horizontal, and to the tradition of so-describing the participation of body and soul.  
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development, we might want to keep in mind these priorities.  Nature emerges in a 
totality that includes a plurality, and, as natals ourselves, we study Nature in order to 
understand the existential meaning and responsibility of belonging to this totality that 
generates Nature. 
 
Genesis and Animal Development 
 To exemplify the complex, irreducible relationship between organism and world, 
Merleau-Ponty recounts a famous 1929 experiment on the axolotl lizard by a pioneering 
neuroembryologist G.E. Coghill.153  Merleau-Ponty describes the axolotl lizard as “a very 
long lizard, about seven inches, which as a tadpole lives in the water, then, once it has its 
four legs, develops on land” (NC 141).  The axolotyl, now often studied for its 
regenerational abilities, exhibits neotyny, meaning that although it is an amphibian, it 
reaches sexual maturity without metamorphosing; this makes the amphibian an 
interesting test case for developmental studies.154  Merleau-Ponty describes how at first, 
the tadpole has no motility, but it does have a sensory system. When it moves on land, its 
rear legs develop first, prompting a movement to which the developing front legs adapt: 
“In brief, the local reactions are enveloped in a narrow way in the total behavior” (NC 
141).  As the axolotl develops from an embryo, its nervous and motor systems grow 
together.155  We might think that the lizard has a sensory system before it acquires motor 
skills and so the development of the lizard depends ultimately and entirely on its nervous 
                                                 
153 See Coghill’s major work, Anatomy and the Problem of Behaviour. 
154 C.f. www.axolotyl.org, and Armstrong and Malacinski. 
155 Originally, the “cells are of the same kind, and what distinguishes them is the direction of conduction: 
toward the head or toward the tail, following from which they are motor or sensory” (NC 143).   Merleau-
Ponty sees this as a result of “gradients.”  Though “gradients” as Merleau-Ponty imagined them are in fact 
an out-dated concept in biology, the co-development of sensory and motor systems still holds.  
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system.  Rather, the neural and motor systems dynamically co-develop, so that “for the 
axolotl, to exist from head to tail and to swim are the same thing” (NC 144).  
 Reinforcing the themes of Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty explains, 
expanding on Coghill, that axolotl’s development shows that “there is no difference 
between the organization of the body and behavior, since the body is defined as the place 
of behavior” (NC 146).  As a result, Merleau-Ponty identifies the comportment of the 
axolotl with its very existence: for the axolotl to exist as axolotl and to swim “are the 
same thing” (NC 144).  The structures of the behavior, integrated into their environment, 
are inseparable from the body of the organism itself.  Comportment, far from an ideal 
projection, inheres in the very existence of the animals: it “appears as a principle 
immanent to the organism itself” (NC 145).  The totality of comportment is not an 
illusion any more than the body of the organism is an illusion.   
 Cohill’s embryological studies reveal that a reductive view – one that understands 
the organism in terms of simplest parts, independent of the situation – fails to describe the 
self-organizing momentum of the organism.  This is the same sort of momentum that 
Merleau-Ponty described in the Phenomenology in relation to human affective life156: the 
motion of the organism is motivated and caught up in a momentum.  The comportment of 
a living organism points to an excess, a momentum beyond itself which contributes to the 
movement of the individual organism. As we saw in the Structure of Behavior, analysis 
cannot reduce the development of the organism to a set of smallest parts at the chemical 
level which simply cause a developmental reaction in the organism; in so doing, analysis 
would miss the momentum of the situation, the environment of the organism.  Instead, 
particular reactions only emerge in relationship to total comportment: these “local 
                                                 
156 See Chapter 2. 
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reactions are implicated within local behavior” (NC 142).  A bottom-up view of the 
organism explains the total situation no better than a top-down, teleological view of the 
organism.  No prescient neural system organizes the development of the organism from 
the top down.  Following Coghill, Merleau-Ponty explains these particular developmental 
phenomena in terms of an outdated model of gradients, but the basic conclusions still 
hold for more current version of embryological development.157   
 Without access to the details of the underlying mechanisms, Merleau-Ponty saw 
the need to study development as a cycle between organism and environment.  Today, his 
insights have been confirmed by the theories of epigeneis, which means roughly “outside 
genetics” (Jaenish 245).158     While some early geneticists mistook the genome for a 
fixed, pre-given set of traits, epigenetics shows that the environment and other factors 
influence the expression of certain elements of the genome.  Contrary to the common 
assumption that genetic encoding indicates inevitable expression of a “hard-wired” trait, 
epigenetics shows a more subtle interaction between organism and environment.159  
Merleau-Ponty himself notes a connectionto epigenesis (NC 152), but at the time he 
wrote, “epigenesis” referred roughly to the theory that animal forms emerge and develop 
rather than simply unfolding into a pre-given form.160  Today, biologists have clarified 
the genetic mechanism of this process through morphogens,161 describing how epigenetic 
suppression and expression allow for cellular differentiation from stem cells (Jaenish 
                                                 
157 Merleau-Ponty describes the development thus: “The first behavior of the animals is thus organized 
under preneural gradients: the nervous system emerges from a preneural dynamic” (NC 143). 
158 For further, in-depth discussion of epigenesis and development in particular, see Robert. 
159 For an excellent summary of the relevant features of epigenetics to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
see Meecham and Papageorgiou. 
160 On this history, see Jablonka and Lamb.  
161 Morphogens – literally “formgiving” – are “ a particular type of signaling molecule that sets the 
positional value of a cell by forming a concentration gradient across the developmental field in which the 
cell resides” (Tabata 620). 
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245).162  In this process, a morphogen does not directly equate to a certain morphology; 
rather morphogens create an environment that tends to cause certain gene expression, 
according to a sort of feedback loop, a cycling of molecules that gradually condition the 
emerging form of the organism. Epigenesis can also condition gene expression in adults 
(Jaenish 245) and differentiate gene expression in genetically similar organisms such as 
twins.    
 As Merleau-Ponty so clairvoyantly puts it, “What is ‘genetically’ first is not 
necessarily transcendentally first… Genesis truly understood must show a relation to the 
whole” (NC 229).  He uses the world “genetically” here most likely to refer to the general 
sense of the temporal history of a living being, but we can also understand this sentence if 
we twist his meaning a bit and use “genetically” in the sense of “what is given in the 
genome.”  As Darian Meacham and Anna-Pia Papageorgiou point out, Merleau-Ponty 
himself had already determined that “the distinction between the two plans (natural and 
cultural) is abstract,” and thus, Merleau-Ponty would no doubt affirm that “neither the 
corporeal event of the epigenetic marker, nor the field of latent sense that is opened by it 
can be thought independently of it” (Meacham 71).  Genetics informs an account of 
natural life, but even genetics cannot be thought independently of the situation in which 
genes are expressed.  Genes express themselves in relation to a totality that encompasses 
not only the organism, but the plurality of like organisms, and also the environment 
broadly construed.  Genetics alone does not suffice as an account of Nature; human 
                                                 
162  Coghill and his contemporaries – and therefore Merleau-Ponty – did not yet understand which 
molecules caused which sorts of developments nor how they caused gene expression, but they did 
recognize that the chemical makeup of a cell is polarized and that certain features emerged in relation to 
these variations.  Currently, biologists postulate that gradients of morphogens allow cells to speed up 
development. The concentration of a particular morphogen molecule in an area of a cell prefigures the 
future development of the cell by affecting gene expression in certain cells: “A morphogen signal is 
transduced through an intracellular signaling cascade to the nucleus, where it regulates the transcription of 
target genes in the receiving cells” (Tabata 628). 
240 
 
existence cannot be understood through an appeal to a “genetic” account that forgets the 
total being in which genetics emerges.   
 While I do not claim that Merleau-Ponty had prescient insights into genetics per 
se, he does express a precocious understanding of the implications of this new, more 
dynamic view of biology.  He saw the shift in biology from a static study of forms to a 
dialectical study of life in an environment.  Perhaps because his work preceded the 
explosion of genetic theory, he could grasp the basic tenets and link them to 
phenomenology; this process of interdisciplinary work becomes increasingly difficult 
with the specialization of each field.  In any case, Merleau-Ponty situates current 
developments in relation to a phenomenology of Nature that can shed light on what these 
new theoretical developments into Nature mean for the humans investigating them.  In 
short, Merleau-Ponty argues that “the nervous system is not the last explanation” for life 
(NC 142).  Today, we might say the same of the genome.  “Nature” cannot be neatly 
identified with genome as if either were fixed or raw material.  Rather, the dynamic 
nature of this developmental system leads us to understand the living organism as system 
that unfolds in time, not a pre-given, final form that must simply be unpacked.  The 
organism’s Nature is not just some final outcome of genes, but the dynamic system of 
momentum across time.  An organism moves forward from its natal momentum.  Coghill 
saw that before there is a neural system to call for certain behaviors, there must already 
be a momentum toward the development of the neural system. Neither pure mechanism 
nor pre-given teleology describes the embryonic development of the organism.163   A “ 
                                                 
163 As Dewitte points out, while classical teleology is certainly rejected, it may be reasonable to retain the 
contemporary biological use of the term “teleology” (95).  Husserl distinguishes between a “telos” resulting 
from a historically contingent accident and an “entelechy” that inheres in a being.  See Crisis 16. Merleau-
241 
 
‘reference to the future’ thus already exists in the embryo” (NC 144).  This reference to 
the future is like the pattern established in a melody that protends into the improvisational 
cadenza that follows; as Meacham puts it, it is the institution that comportment 
reinstitutes again and again (68-69).  Merleau-Ponty describes this as the “unfurling of 
behavior” (NC 144), alluding again to the metaphor of the bouquet that opens itself.  The 
axolotl dehisces into the world, its behavior unfolding like the petals of a flower.  
External conditions might stunt or prevent this unfurling or alternatively hasten and 
enhance it.   
 To return to our theme of natality, we can now see how a living – natal – 
organism differs from non-living matter in its emergence into its environment.  An 
“embryo is not simple matter, but matter which refers to the future” (NC 144).  The 
animal begins elsewhere (has momentum) and aims elsewhere (is motivated).  The 
contingencies in an organism’s environment are both the condition of possibility and the 
conditions limiting the organism’s existence and freedom.  This co-emergence constitutes 
the natality of the axolotl.  The axolotl experiment exemplifies the “coupling of a co-
defined self-pole and environment-pole” that emerges at the vital level of the natural 
world in Thompson’s paraphrase of Merleau-Ponty (Thompson 75).  Rather than 
passively submitting to an exterior world, an organism organizes its environment and at 
the same time, the organization of the organism depends on solicitation by the 
environment.  Life distinguishes itself from other aspects of the natural world – such as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ponty makes similar use of the term “entelechy” and “endogenous” structure of cause; add semi-colon or 
delete “see”? see in Michotte’s experiments, for example (NC 154). 
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candle flame or a waterfall – because organisms shape the “physiochemical environment” 
according to a certain “quiet force,” an “inertia” in their comportment (NC 177).164      
 The organism, as natal, defines itself as a momentum through that environment.  
This momentum carries the organism not just toward some particular final end, but a 
range of new, unforeseen possibilities.  The axolotl is natural insofar as it is born and 
tends toward not only death but its project of life.   
 
Totality and Human Development - Gesell and Embryology 
 This discussion of lizard development may seem too far removed from the human 
existence to link the animal to the human, but in the same Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty 
expands the discussion to describe human development.  After relating Coghill’s 
experiment, Merleau-Ponty links this work to another famous early study of human 
embryological development by Gesell.  Where Coghill considered particular cellular 
differentiation in animals, Gesell studied nascent behavior in embryos, neonate, and pre-
mature infants.  Gesell innovatively studied this infant behavior through freeze-frames of 
a film of infant movement.165  He argued that, while the gestures of infants might seem to 
be made at random, in fact they nascently express behavioral tendencies (471). In this 
way, Gesell led biology, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “back to this side of the frozen 
                                                 
164 We can see self-organization not only between an organism and an environment, but within an 
organism.  Life maintains itself internally as well as externally.  Thompson offers many examples of 
cellular organization, but Merleau-Ponty himself also cites a study that shows the similarity between “the 
physiological activity of tissue repair and the behavior activity of the animal that repairs its dwelling” (NC 
179).  The process of repairing a scar entails a migration of cells within the organism in an orderly fashion 
that has “the character of finality and of nonfinality: finality, since it is under the dependence of the wound; 
nonfinality, since it suffices that the wound does not have a manifest existence so that it is not produced” 
(NC 179).  This “intraorganic activity” merges with behavior itself (NC 180).  This spiraling principle of 
Nature unfurls within and without an organism.   
165 Gesell called his method “cinemanalysis” and considered this method to be “ a kind of dissection which 
anatomizes the patterns of behavior” (Gesell 473).  Although Gesell considered his method a “morphology” 
in that he studied certain gestural forms, he found that these forms must be understood as unfolding in time.   
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structure that anatomy reveals” (NC 151).  Gesell’s experiments show, as Merleau-Ponty 
summarizes, that “all movement exercised by the embryo is the anticipation of a behavior 
which will be taken up by the child at a higher level” (NC 148).  At the same time, these 
nascent behaviors do not explicitly prescribe to future behaviors.  Interestingly, Merleau-
Ponty notes that Gesell “uses the metaphor of weaving in connection with this” (NC 
149).  As the behavior of the embryo emerges, it emerges as surprisingly as a design 
appears on a loom: the movement of the weaver seems to have nothing to do with the 
final image. As Merleau-Ponty remarks: “The design must appear with a certain surprise, 
to the extent that it is born of the meeting of threads which have the air of having nothing 
to do with it” (NC 149). 
 For Merleau-Ponty, Gesell’s work shows the same reciprocity between 
developing human and environment as the other experiments show between other 
organisms and environments.  The body of the infant suggests certain behavior forms, as 
if to assert certain forms and anticipate its future; at the same time, the body opens on to 
the environment, malleable and changeable.  Gesell even inferred that morphogenesis, 
like that in Coghill’s lizard, accounted for the preneural conditioning of cellular behavior 
(NC 148); as epigenetic studies now demonstrate, this is indeed the case.  Current 
research in embryology and neonatal studies bears out many of the conclusions of 
Gesell’s work. 
Genesis Points toward Ontology and Diachronous Totality  
 Yet for Merleau-Ponty, developmental studies are not conclusions in themselves.  
Instead, they only point toward further philosophical – specifically ontological – 
problems.  As he puts it, these developmental studies are “the index of a problem, not 
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responses” (NC 151).  This problem is the status of totality: what is the ontological status 
of this motivating momentum that appears in natality?  Noticing the tendencies of 
developing organisms, we might be tempted to speak of “hidden powers” and return to a 
sort of vitalism (NC 152).  These studies suggest not that “the future is thought in the 
present” (NC 153).  Instead, the coupling of organism and environment reminds us that 
we also cannot comprehend what an organism is by assessing it as a fixed form at any 
given time: “There are adherences between the spatial parts of the embryo and the 
temporal parts of its life” (NC 152).  Noticing the dynamic unfolding of life, we ask: 
“What status must we give totality?  Such is the philosophical question that Coghill’s 
experiments pose, a question which is at the center of this course on the idea of nature 
and maybe the whole of philosophy” (NC 145). 
The possible appearance of a totality in Nature may be “the whole of philosophy”: 
This is quite a claim and requires some unpacking.  Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
nature – carried out in the Structure of Behavior and in these Nature Courses – along 
with his phenomenology of human action and perception – in the Phenomenology of 
Perception – suggest collectively that life science can only understand its topic if it 
attends to totality.  In ignoring or affirming this excessive totality, life science – 
phenomenology or biology – implicitly makes an ontological claim.  In reflection, 
phenomenology may distinguish nature from culture, but it cannot forget that prior to 
reflection, such a distinction does not appear.   
 The more careful the phenomenology of Nature, the more elusive seems the 
totality in which life appears. Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on Coghill’s and Gesells’s 
works show that phenomenology must attend to the totality of animality as emerging in 
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time, and likewise to human development as emerging in time.  But each of these 
examples considers totality only in relation to a single organism and its world.  In the 
Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty also shows that phenomenology must attend to totality 
between organisms and other organisms, both synchronously and across generations.  It is 
addressing this totality that brings phenomenology toward reflections on evolutionary 
theory.  Merleau-Ponty, drawing on the work of the above theorists and some neo-
Darwinians, calls into question the classical Darwinian view of organism.   
 
Totality in Plurality - Trouble with Darwin 
 In current biology, theories of animality are now inseparable from theories of 
evolution.  Merleau-Ponty saw this interdependence and its significance for a 
phenomenology of Nature.  Depending on the view of the organism, different views of 
evolution will be possible and vice versa.  As Merleau-Ponty describes, “Darwinism 
[was]… reborn around 1930 with Fisher and Wright” (NC 245).  These thinkers 
calculated the rate of speciation and change through studies of population mutation rate.  
But they assumed a constant rate of “fitness” of an organism for its environment, as if the 
only thing that mattered were the pre-given genetic material, failing to account for 
behavior in an environment.  This work, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, is “thought without 
rigor [that] is a shrinking back from the architectonic, to the pluri-dimensionality of 
Being” (NC 246).  In Merleau-Ponty’s view, these neo-Darwinians could not accept the 
complexity of the situational totality.166  They wished for the sort of life they could study 
                                                 
166 In what follows, when I refer to “Darwinism,” I mean the state of Darwinian evolutionary theory as of 
1960 when Merleau-Ponty studied it.  More current evolutionary theories may not deserve all of Merleau-
Ponty’s criticisms.  I do, however, consider his summaries of evolutionary theory at the time to be 
sufficiently accurate accounts that accord with my own understanding of Morgan, Simpson, Portmann and 
other neo and post-Darwinians.  
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statistically, outside of a situation.  In a sense, they invented this life and studied it, and 
imagined that their results could be reapplied to actual life in-situ.  But in their 
oversimplification, they missed the phenomena of life itself.  This ideal is “science” but 
these theories also “drain the facts” (NC 246).   
 The best model of neo-Darwinism that Merleau-Ponty finds is what we now call 
“the Modern Synthesis,” or, as he puts it, “the ‘synthetic theory of evolution’” (NC 244).  
This theory improves upon classical Darwinism by merging the macroscopic theory of 
selection with microscope work on genetics and on embryology.  Originally these 
theories were thought to contradict one another; embryology and epigentics were seen as 
a slippery slope back toward a Lamarckian view of a malleable organism.167  In fact, as 
we have seen above, this view of the organism as malleable in relation to its environment 
advanced evolutionary theory. 
 More importantly for Merleau-Ponty, Darwinian evolution redefined life in terms 
of its context in an environment with other life (NC 244).  With Darwinian evolution, 
biologists understand life as “not only of the individual, but of the biosphere or of the 
world life” (NC 244).168   
 For a classical Darwinian, the intentional unfolding of the organism in the 
environment has definite meaning: This behavior of all possible behaviors succeeds in 
                                                 
167 On this connection to Lamarck see Meacham 67, or Pray 14. 
168 In fact, as Thompson shows, evolutionary biology still splits around this issue of the priority of 
individual and ecology in defining life; some theorists – most extremely, the proponents of the Gaia 
hypothesis – argue that we can only define life in relation to other life, and indeed to the complex of life in 
an ecosystem, particularly the overall ecosystem that makes up the entire earth (119-121).   The definition 
of life includes integration into the biosphere.  Other thinkers – such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel 
Dennett – argue that science can define life in relation to one organism or a chain of organisms:  Something 
is alive if it organizes itself, perpetuates itself, and generates similar self-perpetuating, robust systems 
(Thompson 120).  Merleau-Ponty appears to have conflated the neo-Darwinian definition of life with an 
ecological view of life.  This ecological view corresponds to his own view of life in general as participating 
in the flesh of the world.  Rather than separable and distinct from its environment, life appears as a fold in 
the flesh of world.   
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this environment.  Behavior and its particular relation to an environment are not an 
illusion.  But the classical Darwinian approach transfers all intentionality to the 
environment while at the same time retaining only a mechanistic account of cause.  
Darwinism thus 
suppresses the problem… . Darwinian thinking gives the actual world the 
power to determine the only possible.  Yet the exterior world exists only 
partes extra partes; it would engender the whole of behavior by the 
summation of elements.  (NC 175)  
 
If biology appeals to speciation to account for behavior, it only skirts the problem.  
Traditionally, biologists determined species by comparing the forms – the eidos, essences 
or ideas – of living things.  Darwinian evolution shows the mutability of species, and thus 
that biologists must now attend to species not only as a certain form, but as successful 
comportments, succeeding or failing as enacted in time in a particular environment.  The 
real question is, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “How will such an individual participate in 
the idea of its species?” (NC 176).  Thus, Darwinian evolution improves understanding of 
natural life by admitting its mutability, temporality, and relation to a diachronous totality.   
 But classical Darwinism falls short of fully appreciating the reciprocal influence 
of the organism on its environment.  While appreciating Darwinism as an improvement 
over biology as a study of fixed morphology, Merleau-Ponty nonetheless has critiques of 
even this most then-forward thinking version of evolution in the Modern Synthesis.  
Animals develop not only morphological traits, but behaviors in relation to environments.  
These behaviors are not selected “by” the environment. (This would transfer a mysterious 
élan vital to the environment.)   Animals intentionally emplace themselves in an 
environment, rather than passively submitting.  In classical Darwinism, as Merleau-Ponty 
describes it, the environment simply selects the fit animal from fixed morphologies.  The 
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environment issues an ultimatum and organisms must either submit or die: “The axolotl 
swims because if it didn’t, it wouldn’t exist.  The ultimatum of the milieu to the organism 
explains the adjustment of the organism to the milieu” (NC 151).  The new dynamic 
studies show that instead, “Behavior is neither a simple architectural effect nor a sheath 
of functions … it sketches out its milieu (Umwelt); it contains a project in reference to the 
whole of its life” (NC 151).   
 For example, Merleau-Ponty describes how a crab can use a sea anemone to either 
camouflage itself or, alternatively, consume the anemone as food.169  The crab 
determines alternative meanings of its surroundings (NC 176).  The environment, which 
includes sea anemones, does not simply act unilaterally on the crab: the crab chooses 
either to eat the anemone or to employ it for other intentions.  The crab adopts a certain 
orientation toward the environment and opens new meanings and possible behaviors for 
itself: “the animal defines its territory as a privileged emplacement” (NC 176).170  There 
is an inertia in the animal,” a tendency to stay in motion along a trajectory (NC 177); 
unlike other physical objects, living things gently reorganize their environment to 
accommodate this trajectory.  But organisms cannot guarantee themselves this trajectory; 
always, they open onto the environment in which they act and they “began elsewhere” in 
that environment.  Uexküll’s crab may make a poor choice, eating an anemone that it 
ought to have saved to camouflage itself from an incoming predator.  Or, born in an 
                                                 
169 The studies of this crab by Uexküll is also mentioned in Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics, 261-264, although the editors of the Nature Course claim that Merleau-Ponty would not have 
known of this work.  Carbone also remarks on this connection (c.f. 29, 36).  It would be fascinating to 
further research and compare Merleau-Ponty’s account with Heidegger’s account, both for philosophical 
and historical reasons.  
170 Thompson describes the environment-organizing activity as “sense-making.”  Sense-making capacity 
combined with adaptability distinguishes living things from other “robust systems.  Robust systems also 
conserve “identity through material change, but life can also “assimilate and accommodate to the 
environment” (Thompson 148).   
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unlucky time and place, the crab’s habits may not benefit it against new, unforeseeable 
predators or changing ocean temperatures.  But the surging-forth of an environment for 
the crab is not an illusion: the crab has taken actions whose meaning only appear across 
time and space. 
 Animals do not just organize themselves and maintain that organization over 
time.171 Instead, they enjoy a certain “independence of form from matter,” as Hans Jonas 
puts it (cited in Thompson 152).  Although the actual molecules of water, carbon, and 
nitrogen vary over time, a plant nonetheless maintains its form, independent of this 
change.  This defines self-identity of the life form in relation to its environment.  
Identifying sense-making capacity and adaptability as criterion for life in general means 
that we can see a “deep continuity” between “mind and life,” to use Thompson’s terms. 
In short, “there is not a break between the planned animal, the animal that plans, and the 
animal without a plan” (NC 176).  Again, rather than a radical break between animal and 
human life, we find a permutation and a difference in degree of innovation, not of type.  
As Merleau-Ponty puts it, in the behavior of the crab “there is a beginning of culture.  
The architecture of symbols that the animal brings from its side thus defines within 
Nature a species of preculture” (NC 176).  In ignoring the effect of the organism on its 
environment, Darwinism forecloses the possibility of understanding this animal 
“preculture” and, by implication, human culture in its more complex forms. 
 Another way that we can express Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Darwinism is that 
the trouble with standard evolutionary theory is that it prioritizes mortality over natality.  
                                                 
171 In that sense, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of life distinguishes itself from even the most generous 
account of Aristotelian philosophy of life where life is a being-at-work-staying itself (see Sachs).  Living 
things do not simply work at maintaining a pre-given state of being, but determine their mode of being in 
conjunction with their environment and can maintain a range of modes of being through a variety of 
strategies. 
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Darwinian thought means “a factor of life replaced by a factor of death” (NC 244).  To 
the question, “What is life?,” the Darwinian can only respond, “It is what did not die,”  
according to Merleau-Ponty.172  Darwinian thought resolves “the problem of knowing 
where a certain resolute being comes from by showing how other beings are not” (NC 
244).  For Darwin, the environment, the milieu, simply decides whether or not certain 
structures survive.  If a certain structure exists in an environment, then the environment 
has chosen it to be existence.  By implication, there is some “idea according to which the 
milieu discriminates that which allows or does not allow the survival of the organism” 
(NC 151).  Classical Darwinism transfers agency from the organism to the environment, 
forgetting the reciprocal influence of organism on environment.   
 This prioritization of mortality as the factor of selection is not supported by 
current epigenetic research; Merleau-Ponty again identifies a key problem with simplistic 
Darwinism through his natal ontology.  As genetics advances to more subtle 
understanding of genotype and phenotype, heredity and epigenetics, biology 
accommodates an increasingly flexible view of the organism.  Even by 1960, geneticists 
saw there were “several genes for one single character, several characters for one single 
gene… there are ‘potentialities of development’ which are inherited” rather than a simple 
one-to-one correspondence of trait and genome (NC 248).  But even these advances, this 
“making-supple of genetics allows [science] to seal off a gap between the theoretical 
schema… and the facts” (NC 248).  No matter how “supple” genetic theory becomes, it 
cannot become a theory of Nature if it restricts itself to a single scale of study that 
                                                 
172 Merleau-Ponty appears to have correctly assessed evolutionary theory insofar as I am capable of 
assessing it myself.  Were evolutionary theory shown to be capable of orientation toward natality, then I 
would welcome correction of Merleau-Ponty’s view and my own on this point.   
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assumes an objective and objectifying standpoint.  Ontological value must be restored – 
or given for the first time – to the excessive totality of Nature.   
 Valorizing mortality over natality, neo-Darwinism could only see life 
retrospectively and negatively: it misses the unpredictability of natality.  Life is a 
capacity for initiation, for beginning and freedom in a certain stylistic range, not a mere 
avoidance of or lack of death.  The Darwinian animal is selected based on how useful its 
adaptations are for not-dying in its environment.  When animals develop certain 
behaviors – for example, making a nest – these behaviors are originally activities that, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s description  
… do not have an object; they come to hook onto an object without being 
oriented toward this object… The heron one day perceives leaves, falls in 
front of them in a sort of ecstasy, then executes the behavioral stratagem 
of accumulation of leaves for the nest and then falls back to calm.  It is not 
that the instinct is yet there, but that it is announced by partial relations. 
(NC 191) 
 
The appearance of nascent future behaviors in present behaviors refers to something in 
the organism, not just for us.  He puts it like this:  
[T]he outlines of the organism in the embryo constitute a factor of 
imbalance.  It is not because we humans consider them as outlines that 
they are such, but because they break the current balance and fix the 
conditions for a future balance. (NC 156) 
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Bergson, for example, missed this imbalance: he failed to note 
the lack in the present that indicates the future of the organism. Natality would have 
different meaning were it not so fragile and inseparably linked to mortality and 
temporality.  Bergson sees absence “only in the mind” not in the natural world, but 
Merleau-Ponty points out that “in biology, absence has a signification: the death of an 
organism” (NC 66).  This death coincides with a lack of productivity: a lack of the 
ordering and instituting of life.  Sometimes when we perceive a lack of ordering and 
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beginning in the natural world, this is not just a lack in our perception: Nature itself lacks 
that order.  Nature includes not just the activity of life, of the élan vital expressing itself 
in matter, but the cessation of life.  If we do not acknowledge this difference, then we fail 
to see the true miracle of natality.173  In this oversight, Bergson misses the phenomena of 
Nature itself: natural life is limited.  Instead of viewing life as an all-powerful élan vital, 
“the reality of life that we would have to recognize would be limited” (NC 157).  
Structures inhere in organisms, not just our perception.  We cannot aim behind or below 
the unreality of perception toward some more true reality at a molecular or submolecular 
level: “The notion of the real is not necessarily linked to that of molecular being” (NC 
157).  Instead, for us the problem of the real appears at the level of the living thing.   
 When an animal comports itself, a tension arises between activity and meaning-
in-the-world.  This a productive tension: “This tension meets the object not so much 
because it is directed toward it as because it is a means capable of resolving the tension, 
as if the object intervened … as if it brought to the animal the fragment of a melody that 
the animal carried within itself” (NC 192).  Merleau-Ponty compares the tug of instinct 
on animal life to dream life:  “There is an oneiric, sacred, and absolute character of 
instinct… both an inertia and a hallucination, oneiric behavior, capable of making a 
world and of picking up any object of the world” (NC 193).  This tug tightens into a 
“tension that wants to find relief without knowing why” (NC 193).  A norm tugs on 
behavior but does not prescribe behavior; the tension might resolve itself through some 
unforeseen permutation.  The organism has the capacity to generate new possibilities: its 
natality does not stipulate a life, but orients it and sets it in productive tension with its 
world.  As Sean Kelly and Thompson have stressed, this tension around a norm is 
                                                 
173 On Merleau-Ponty’s view of Bergson’s Creative Evolution, see Chapter 5. 
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constitutive of behavior in general for Merleau-Ponty.174  In the case described by 
Merleau-Ponty, however, the tension across the norm is analogous not just to the 
relationship we might have in judging an artistic object, but to the productive tension in 
generating this artistic object. 
 Merleau-Ponty again turns toward the domain of art for a model of the dynamic 
totality he intends as occurring between an organism and its environment. He compares 
the totality of behavior that Gesell’s developmental studies reveal to the totality of a final 
painting in contrast to the production of the painting.  A painter, like the organism, works 
within a certain field of freedom and according to a certain style.  Her body tends toward 
certain gestures but no one gesture determines the form of the painting.  To illustrate this 
clearly, Merleau-Ponty describes a film of Picasso drawing.  In this clip – now displayed 
at the Picasso museum in Paris and on-line – Picasso draws the famous bull/minotaur 
figure in his later work.  But he draws it without a canvas or a brush in his hand; instead, 
only a light moving in the air is captured.  So practiced is Picasso’s gesture, that he can 
generate the gestures that portray “bull” without any visual record.  His body knows the 
pattern; his eyes would only supply redundant information.  But to the viewer, the 
appearance of the bull is almost miraculous: Picasso squats and jumps and reaches, 
seemingly at random, and yet the record of that gesture is the image of a bull.  Likewise,  
Matisse threw his brush in as many diverse places as possible, and after a 
certain time, logic appeared.  It’s the same thing for the body of behavior 
in Gesell.  Threads are tied up, which come from everywhere, and which 
constitute independent forms, and at the same time, he finds that these 
threads realize something which has a unity. (NC 154) 
 
The painting analogy reveals some subtleties that the musical analogy used previously 
does not: we see that the relation between the generation and the formal result may be 
                                                 
174 See Kelly “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty” and Thompson 147. 
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oblique.  The final form that appears emerges gradually, in a spiral between the artist and 
the environment.  When we see a painting, we attend to this final form.  If we were to 
study painting, like we study an organism, we would need to attend both to the final, 
meaningful form and to the strange interweaving of gestural threads that lead to it.  But 
we could not just watch the painter’s arm movement because such study would be 
meaningless without reference back to the generated painting.  The working biologist, 
whether or not she admits it, attends to the unity that emerges as well as to the individual 
threads of behavior or threads of molecular interaction.  She implicitly admits the being 
of these totalities as well as the being of the individual organism or the individual parts of 
the organism.  Without attention to the totality that these forms generate, these individual 
threads would have as little meaning as longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates of 
Picasso’s hand, without reference to the final picture.  The biologist, aware of the 
temporal unfolding of behavior in time, secretly performs the same sort of judgment as a 
person regarding a painting. 
 Talking about “adaptation” in the classical Darwinian sense gives the impression 
that at distinct moment in time, an organism altered itself in relation to the world, rather 
than temporally unfolding in a reciprocal relationship with its environment.  Neither a 
God of finalist teleology nor an omnipotent genome predetermines particular adaptive 
behaviors. An organism’s adaptive behaviors emerge through the confluence of style and 
environment.  This range of contingencies constitutes the animal’s freedom to initiate in 
its world. 
 Understanding adaptation according to simple utility would be to posit either “a 
somewhat vague proof of finality, or rather as a mysterious relation between the animal 
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and the milieu… a unity of the ‘world of will’ that would hide behind ‘the world of 
representations,’ as Schopenhauer would say” (NC 185). We cannot simply exclude the 
un-useful from understanding of natural life: Nature encompasses the productive activity 
itself, not merely an action for certain ends.   
 All in all, these issues are “the occasion to question Darwinian ideology” (NC 
186).  If we suggest that animals organize their environment and consciously adapt 
according to usefulness, then we implicitly return to a finalistic model of cause in Nature: 
Nature in-itself contains a causality that we can never known.  Alternatively, if we 
assume that the crab merely reacts mechanistically to external stimuli, then there is only 
mechanistic Nature in-itself that appears, falsely, to be organized for-us.  Instead, 
acknowledging the participation of organisms in organizing an environment helps us to 
avoid the “old dilemma” of a split between Nature in-itself and Nature for-us.  For 
example, the biologist Uexküll, according to Merleau-Ponty, was troubled by the 
ontological implications of his claims about behavior.  He thus makes some postulations 
about a secret “Naturfaktor” that prompts the motivated actions of living things.  Uexküll 
is, at first, in Merleau-Ponty’s words “agnostic” about this motivation for the unfolding in 
Nature, but then he himself makes the connection between judgment of totality in the 
domain of art and science (NC 173).  To describe the motivated, temporal development 
of the organism in its environment, Uexküll says that we can think of “the unfurling of an 
Umwelt as a melody that is singing itself” (NC 173).  I will quote at length Merleau-
Ponty’s reflections on this analogy.  He writes: 
This is a comparison full of meaning.  When we invent melody, the 
melody sings in us much more than we sing it; it goes down the throat of 
the singer, as Proust says.  Just as the painter is struck by a painting which 
is not there, the body is suspended in what it sings: the melody is 
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incarnated and finds in the body a type of servant.  The melody gives us a 
particular consciousness of time.  We think naturally that the past secretes 
the future ahead of it.  But this notion of time is refuted by the melody.  At 
the moment when the melody begins, the last note is there, in its own 
manner.  In a melody, a reciprocal influence between the first and the last 
note takes place, and we have to say that the first note is possible only 
because of the last, and vice versa.  It is the way things happen in the 
construction of a living being. (NC 174) 
 
Several claims are made in this passage with regard to productivity, temporality, and 
ontological status.  Let us consider each in turn.  First, notice that Merleau-Ponty 
imagines a setting in which we invent the melody; this is not the melody of Beethoven’s 
“Ode to Joy” as hummed by someone today in the shower, but the melody for the original 
piece as it overtook Beethoven himself.  When Beethoven sang this tune to himself, the 
tune overtook him: the song “went down his throat.”  Beethoven did not actively swallow 
the tune; it invaded him and gestated within him.   The tune took over his body and this 
body was “suspended” in the song, the very song that he gave birth to.  Thus, the living 
thing gives birth to a comportment that overtakes its life and carries the living thing to a 
future that it both began and to which it submits.  This futurity leads us to think that the 
past already contained this future in it; in a living thing, this would mean that an 
organism came into the world with a tiny germ of its future that would merely inevitably 
unfold.  The organism would be like medieval images of the fetus: a tiny person 
compressed into a seed pod.  This would be the assumption of finalism.   
 In more contemporary terms, we might assume that an organism’s genetic code 
contains a script for all its future possibilities.  The organism merely plays out this pre-
given script.  But the melody analogy corrects this model.  In composition, an unforeseen 
totality guides the emerging piece.  Some historical and personal contingencies give rise 
to a style, but this style does not lead directly to any particular piece.  In my example, 
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Beethoven scored a tune for the poem, An die Freude by Friedrich Schiller, the Romantic 
poet. This tune appears in Beethoven’s Nine Symphony.  When Beethoven wrote “Ode to 
Joy,” Schiller’s words haunted him, but they did not dictate a melody.  He lived with the 
composition until it prompted him toward a melody.  This melody carried itself forward 
into the tune and then into the symphony.175  
 Neither a tune nor a symphony can be understood by considering its form at any 
given moment in time.  Likewise, “Behavior cannot be understood if we understand it 
moment by moment” (NC 175).  The reciprocity between organism and environment 
cannot be seen just as a circle – visible at a glance in space – but like a spiral, rotating 
and unfurling.  Phenomenology adds temporality to morphologically-oriented biology 
and Schelling’s circular philosophy of Nature.  Nature appears in time, not only in space.  
We cannot simply tack one moment of time onto another, as if a series of distinct 
moments were discernable.  As Husserl shows in his lectures on internal time 
consciousness, time appears with a protention into the future and a retention of the past; 
no “pure” present is available to the subject.  Moreover, this is not an illusory model time 
distorted by its appearance for the subject; as we saw through Whitehead in the last 
chapter, contemporary physics shows us that we cannot appeal to some “pure” and 
therefore linear time.  Instead, the time of appearance of a dying star for us and the time 
of death of that star for itself, interleave and overlap in time and space. 
 The same might be said of the dynamic principle at play between animal 
comportment and the environment.  Nature unfurls in time for the organism itself and for 
ourselves.  We cannot unravel a linear chain of events to show either that some first cause 
                                                 
175 This is my “just-so” story of Beethoven’s compositional process. It is true that he took the libretto from 
Schiller, but I make no specific historical or musicological claims about the origin of the piece.  I only 
clarify Merleau-Ponty’s account of how such composition might have happened. 
258 
 
entailed all the following events or that there is a “priority of effect over cause.  Just as 
we cannot say that the last note the end of the melody and that the first is the effect of it, 
neither can we distinguish the meaning apart from the meaning where it is expressed” 
(NC 174).  Nature corresponds not to a state of affairs but to the meaning unfolding 
between life and environment.   
 Let us return to the question raised by Gesell’s experiments on development— 
how do we think about totality?  –  by considering how Merleau-Ponty conveys what the 
biologist witnesses. In order to capture the sense of totality in behavior that he intends, 
Merleau-Ponty again employs the metaphor of a melody: 
We can place the embryonic development which first becomes 
symmetrical, then asymmetrical, parallel with the natal phases… Behavior 
develops ‘in a spiral.’  If this is the case, then every motor theme of 
embryonic life can be considered as a theme that will be elaborated at a 
higher level in postnatal life. (NC 148) 
 
Again, the metaphor from the sphere of art is no mere arbitrary coincidence.  Witnessing 
the totality of behavior requires a sort of judgment akin to that of a person listening to a 
piece of music.  The working biologist attends to the prefigurations of the eventual 
behavioral melody in the embryo; she has a sense of where the melody will go in 
adulthood and looks for hints of it in these nascent stages.  As in the Structure of 
Behavior, Merleau-Ponty depends on this metaphor to escape reposing the problem of 
behavior in the standard terminology: The biologist does not witness a stimulus and a 
response, nor a linear chain of cause and effect.  She attunes herself to an emergent 
pattern, an improvisation on a theme rather than the filling in of pre-given categories.  As 
we saw in the Structure of Behavior, this type of judgment shares much with Kantian 
aesthetic judgment.  To return to the issues posed at the beginning of this chapter, we see 
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the first piece in poetic phenomenology.  Where Schelling’s poetic consciousness caught 
itself in a circle, Merleau-Ponty gently refines that movement into a spiral.  Though a 
spiral might indefinitely coil in on itself, a site on an inner coil differs from a site on an 
outer coil.  The temporal unfolding of the movement reveals itself in the form.  A poetic 
phenomenology attends to such temporal unfolding of totalities like behavior.   
 We do not need to postulate a new type of force or causality at play in life to 
reorient phenomenology toward totality.  This might be the worry of adaptionist-
evolutionists who critique Steven J. Gould176: are we unnecessarily inserting a macro 
“life force” with macro-phenomena?  But moving past Uexküll’s agnosticism does not 
require adopting a faith-like stance on a mysterious life force; it does, however, require 
shifting a paradigm that claims Nature can be defined a-temporally or microscopically.  
When a living thing participates in organizing its environment,  
[There is a] surging-forth of a privileged milieu… not the manifestation of 
a new force.  The living being works only with physicochemical elements, 
but these subordinated forces join the unseen relations between them.  We 
can at this moment speak of an animal.  This moment is not entirely under 
the dependence of physicochemical conditions.  The animal is like a quiet 
force.  (NC 177)   
 
The appearance of animal life does not indicate the spontaneous appearance of a super-
physical force.  Like the weak ties between hydrogen and oxygen, the animal is a “quiet 
force,” but also an effective and natural one.  The animal engenders this weak force with 
its birth, a birth that in turn depends on similar weak forces at play between environment 
and ancestral life forms.  Unlike the strong messianic promise of a finalist teleology, this 
weak force – like Benjamin’s “weak messianism” – draws an animal towards a future, 
                                                 
176 See below, on Gould and Simpson. 
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but an open future fraught with contingency and the detritus of the real world and the real 
environment.177 
 
Exceptions to Critique: Simpson, Gould, and Macroevolution 
 Of the neo-Darwinian theorists, Merleau-Ponty highlights as exceptional to this 
general failure of evolutionary theory the work of George Simpson, a paleontologist (NC 
247).  One problem that evolutionary theorists were facing at the time of the neo-
Darwinian revolution was understanding the differences in rates of evolution between 
parts of an organism and of organism as a whole.  Certain theorists postulated in advance 
that there was some general “uniform rate of evolution” for both parts and whole 
organisms (NC 248).  But no such consistent rate can be confirmed.  Instead of making 
this assumption, Simpson started from paleontological evidence of rapid changes in 
morphology at a macroscopic scale; on a macroscopic scale “discontinuity is the rule” 
(NC 248).  Simpson’s work “brings the paleo-ontological fact back to a ‘causal 
background’” (NC 248).  Much of neo-Darwinism assumed a linear, horizontal 
“progress” in evolution.  But for Merleau-Ponty, this assumption obstinately clings to a 
Cartesian model of causality; we can “compare [it to] Descartes: there is not more in 
creation than in conservation = philosophy of the horizontal” (NC 250). 
 Simpson’s work prefigures the now controversial yet popular work by Steven Jay 
Gould.   In a recent festschrift on Simpson’s work, Gould reaffirms Simpson’s work in 
more contemporary terms.   For Simpson, evolution as viewed through paleontology 
could study not only an established “phylogeny” but the “processes and mechanisms” 
                                                 
177 I return to “weak-messianism” as Arendt describes it in Chapter 8, Conclusion.  See Benjamin 
Illuminations  57. 
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that generated these life forms (Gould 130).  Paleontologists examine morphology and 
long-term change.  That is, they study life at a different scale and over a longer time 
period; both in space and time, paleontology points toward a larger totality.  This view 
accommodates “a plurality of factors in evolution, [and a] plurality of evolutions (micro-
macro-mega evolution)” (NC 247).  To return to Bergson’s analogy of life as the painting 
of a canvas, Simpson’s and Gould’s work each suggests that paleontology can show the 
history of the process that generated the picture, not just the state of the current picture 
itself.  Simpson identified the “tempo” and “mode” of evolution as the objects of 
paleontological study.  These terms describe the method and rate of change at a 
macroscopic level.  In Gould’s view “micro and macro evolution are not opposed, but 
neither does one follow by extrapolation from (and therefore become intellectually 
subservient to) the other” (Gould 135).  Evolution must be studied not only through the 
examination of living organisms – as done by molecular biologists working in genetics – 
but through paleontology precisely in order to reveal the transformations at a 
macroscopic level. In Gould’s view “if important new causes arise at higher 
phenomenological levels of long time or great magnitude,” then the paradigm for 
understanding evolution must change (136).178 In particular, Gould advocates a tough-
                                                 
178 In the controversial Punctuated Equilibrium, Gould expands on this theory, originally propounded in a 
1977 paper.  Many current adaptionist evolutionary theorists – such as Daniel Dennett- have excoriated 
Gould for positing unnecessary macro phenomena to what can be explained solely through other means. 
Interestingly, Gould attributes what he calls a “phenomenological” position to the molecular biology view 
(127).  According to Gould, a phenomenological account of evolution offers “a descriptive accounting 
dedicated to documenting that life followed this particular pathway, rather than another route equally 
plausible in theory” (127).  So defined, phenomenology would be interested only in actual Nature, not 
possible Natures, in description of a neutral state of affairs with an irrelevant history rather than a still-
emerging state of affairs whose history has implications for its future.  By contrast, I would suggest that a 
phenomenological account – properly described via Merleau-Ponty – would be quite close to Gould’s own.  
Gould assumes that phenomenology equates to static phenomenology.  We have seen that generative 
phenomenology, far from studying only static forms, attends to the generation of forms over time in a 
macroscopic totality that includes both organisms and the environment.  (Ironically, Gould does wryly 
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minded pluralism that would attend to the complexity of this situation and allow for 
possible “punctuated equilibrium” rather than steady, slow change over time. 
 Gould does self-critically point to the problem with such macro-oriented, tough-
minded pluralism: there is a problem with identifying criteria for evolutionary selection at 
all these various levels (139).  That is, how can we transfer the rigorous criterion of 
molecular biology to macroscopic study, whether paleontological or phenomenological?   
 This is a deep criticism, and I do not think Merleau-Ponty addresses it. (I return to 
this issue in my Conclusion.)  As we will see again, his own methodology for 
macroscopic attention to totality comes from the arts, not from the sciences.  Merleau-
Ponty’s work – like perhaps other phenomenological reflections on the practice of 
science – remains to a degree a negative critique rather than a clear positive prescription 
for new practice in biology.  The suggestions Merleau-Ponty implicitly makes are that 
science can learn much by attending to the practice of art.  These suggestions happen in 
the guise of metaphors and comparisons between these two domains, as we have seen in 
the Nature Courses and also in “Eye and Mind.”  
 
Conclusions – Ontology and Appearance  
 In “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty returns to Coghill’s experiment and the issue 
of totality.  In this article, he more explicitly connects the experiment to his critique of 
reductive science.  He remarks that in his “present time…our embryology and biology are 
full of ‘gradients,’” suggesting that gradients are descriptive trends that will fade – as 
they have – in favor of more precise terminology.  But his critique cuts much deeper than 
                                                                                                                                                 
admit that if the solution is to be found anywhere, it might be in postmodern thought, whatever “silliness in 
architecture and incomprehensibility in literature” it may also have engendered (135).)  
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the suggestion that biology has not reached its final conclusions on development.  I quote 
at length a passage that requires much explication:  
Just how these differ from what classical tradition called ‘order’ or 
‘totality’ is not at all clear.  This question, however, is not raised; it is not 
even allowed.  The gradient is a net we throw out to sea, without knowing 
what we will haul back in it.  It is the slender twig upon which 
unforeseeable crystallizations will form.  No doubt this freedom of 
operation will serve well to overcome many a pointless dilemma – 
provided only that from time to time we take stock, and ask ourselves why 
the apparatus works in one place and fails in others.  For all its flexibility, 
science must understand itself; it must see itself as a construction based on 
a brute, existent world and not claim for its blind operations the 
constitutive value that ‘concepts of nature’ were granted in a certain 
idealist philosophy. (NC 122) 
 
In an oft-cited passage in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty makes a similar allusion to trawling in the sea.  In that case, he speaks of the 
practice of phenomenology: “Husserl’s essences are destined to bring back all the living 
relationships of experience, as a the fisherman’s net draws up from the depths of the 
ocean quivering fish and seaweed” (PP xvii).  The key difference between this sort of 
phenomenological “trawling” for living beings and the reductive objectivism of certain 
practices in science appears in the second part of Merleau-Ponty’s example above.  The 
working concept of the gradient is like a twig on which scientific ideas crystallize.  
Merleau-Ponty alludes to a famous passage from Stendhal’s Love: 
At the mines of Salzburg, they throw a leafless wintry bough into one of 
the abandoned workings.  Two or three months later they pull it out 
covered with a shining deposit of crystals…. What I have called 
crystallization is a mental process which draws from everything that 
happens new proofs of the perfection of the loved one. (Stendhal 19) 
 
For Stendhal, this mental process of crystallization means that after falling in love,  “a 
man in love sees every perfection in the object of his love” (Stendhal 45).  In love, we are 
not blind, but we are misguided; like some sort of cognitively disabled Oliver Sacks 
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patient, we have the strange habit of mis-attributing all virtue to one person.  The scientist 
makes a similar mistake in attributing too much ontological value to concepts on which 
knowledge crystallizes. 
 The biologist must ask herself, what appearance suggested the concept of 
gradients in the first place?  It is to that “thing itself” that biology must return: the 
vinculum at which the vertical and horizontal orders intersect, where Nature and our 
concept “Nature” meet.  To make progress as science, biology cannot attribute more 
reality to its constructs than to the thing itself.  Recall from the previous discussion of 
Whitehead that a philosophy of science ought to explain (or at least attend to) the 
continuity between the macroscopic, microscopic, and personal levels of appearance.  
Phenomenology should reveal our ontological commitment to “middle-sized” everyday 
objects which are our “conceptual firsts” as Quine puts it (Word and Object 5).  The 
ontological value of these personal-sized objects should not be subsumed or forgotten in 
relation to macroscopic and microscopic objects of scientific study.  None of these 
viewpoints offers more valid insight into Nature itself because Nature itself crosses all 
these domains, the vinculum of the flesh of the world.  Merleau-Ponty requires the 
metaphor of the vinculum to make precise this jointure; to my mind, no term in either 
philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, or existential philosophy quite captures this 
aspect of Nature.   
 To explain the “thing itself,” the appearance “cell-developing,” the biologist casts 
out a net of theory: in this case, the theory of gradients.  But instead of releasing the 
living thing, the biologist allows ideas about life to crystallize.  She claims for these 
crystallizations a reality not attributed to the life itself.  In this, she implicitly expresses 
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an ontological position; as de Waehlens pointed out in the forward, unveiling this implicit 
ontology has been Merleau-Ponty’s concern since the Structure of Behavior.  
  At the time Merleau-Ponty gave his Nature Courses, the notion of gradients had 
great popularity and claimed a strong objective value.  It seemed that biology had 
discovered something “more objective,” with more reality than was available in previous 
theories of cell development.  Indeed, biologists had hit upon an important aspect of cell 
development.  But the question is, are gradients real? How real?  More real than the 
apparent behavioral structures of the developing organism?  But less real than the 
molecular and even sub-molecular structures beneath them?  What of the ontological 
status of the melody of behavior? And, by analogy, what of the ontological status of the 
comportment of the organism?  How real is this appearance?  These are the ontological 
questions of a natal ontology in contrast to a phenomenology of life.  In posing such 
questions, ontology does not become nominalism or conventionalism.  Merleau-Ponty’s 
natal ontology does not deny the reality of the ideal constructs of biology, but it suggests 
that these constructs imply an ontological position.    
 Biology now has a standard working account, however incomplete, of some of the 
molecular structures that cause cell differentiation.  Yet perhaps even current models of 
gradients are merely temporary theoretical constructs that biology will toss out, with the 
theory of phlogiston, when it uncovers a better molecular or sub-molecular explanation.  
This is the great “flexibility” of science that Merleau-Ponty notices.  But he replies that 
despite that flexibility, science ought to recognize the prereflective perceptual life (to use 
his early career terminology) or, in other words, the flesh of the brute world (to use his 
later career terms) in which the living scientist performs her operations.   
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 A natal ontology can not only retain a non-objectifying stance toward Nature, it 
ought to retain a non-objectifying stance.  To objectify Nature would reduce to an object 
independent of a situation and into the sort of totality that Levinas rightly critiques.  In 
suggesting that a ontology ought to avoid objectifying, Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology 
again incorporates an ethical stance into its ontological position.  It becomes an ethical 
error to objectify Nature and to deploy into an ethically and politically fraught human 
world, an objectified view of human nature.    
 If life science can resist the impulse to reduce Nature to an object, then it can truly 
investigate the vinculum.  Properly understood, Nature is a “leaf” of Being (NC 305).  s 
Merleau-Ponty’s translators point out, the French feuillet connotes both the fold of an 
uncut page and a leaf itself (NC 305, note 7).  In the former sense, human life as un 
feuillet forms not a hole in being but a fold: we are this leaf of Being and we are folded in 
it, a chiasmatic doubling. Thus, the “Nature outside of us must be unveiled to us by the 
Nature that we are” (NC 206).  This reciprocity has meaning not just for the “I” but for 
us: for the others among which we find ourselves and for ourselves, insofar as we find 
our self inseparable from the others also pleating Being.  From this ontological 
perspective, the “deepening of Nature must clarify to us the other Beings and their 
engagement in Being” (NC 206). 
 In these remarks, Merleau-Ponty reinforces the ontological emphasis of his work 
in these courses.  Merleau-Ponty suggests that life science – including phenomenology – 
must next move beyond the dialectical model of natural life toward a vision of world as 
flesh: an appearing, visible world.179  Again, Merleau-Ponty’s ontological shift 
                                                 
179 Thompson identifies this development: “the reciprocal determination of whole and part… is 
recognizable only to ‘dialectical thinking,’ but not mechanical thinking” (68).  Yet in distinction from 
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incorporates an ethical shift: in this case, a taking into account the others who appear with 
us in this life.  A natal ontology emphasizes that Being appears, and in particular, appears 
in a plurality.  
  For Merleau-Ponty this points toward another flawed assumption underlying 
simplistic Darwinism. A simplistic evolutionary theory might assume that this activity of 
adaptation and sense-making occurs according to a principle of utility and one relative to 
an individual.  This caricatured, simplistic view of adaptation180 imagines that animals 
only acquire traits according to a minimal criterion of usefulness.  For example, if a 
butterfly imitates other butterflies or displays markings resembling eyes, it has not 
acquired these behaviors in order to fool predators.  Instead, the butterfly also appears for 
other butterflies.  Again, the criterion of usefulness would posit that the butterfly appears 
in order to secure sexual reproduction.  But its appearance is in excess of what is 
“useful.”  Its need to appear, rather than a criterion of usefulness, motivates the butterfly.  
To ignore this and to focus only on utility, would be to make an implicit ontological 
claim: that a certain behavior must be “useful” to be “real.”  But in the view of Merleau-
Ponty (and Thompson), this inverts, or at the least distorts, the actual process of 
evolution.  This assumption implicitly retains a finalist model of evolution and misses the 
unpredictable play that leads to novelty at the genetic and behavioral level: the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Thompson, the dialectical model for Merleau-Ponty is not the final state of life science nor of a 
phenomenology of Nature.  As mentioned above, Merleau-Ponty does claim that by the time he gave his 
courses on Nature, “biology has become dialectical” (NC 139).  But this statement only marks the 
beginning of his investigation into a new description of what life science can and ought to be because the 
innovation of dialectical theories in biology only raises new ontological questions for a phenomenology of 
Nature. Positing a static definition of life according to vitalism or materialism would miss the on-going, 
generative activity of science itself.  Here we see the influence of Husserl’s Crisis, noted in the last chapter, 
on Merleau-Ponty’s view of the practice of biology in particular.    
180 Again, we must keep in mind that Merleau-Ponty critiques the versions of Darwinism and neo-
Darwinism popular in his day.  Subtler contemporary theories of evolution that take into account such 
factors as sexual display and epigenesis do not make such mistakes.  In either case, the potential problem 
for Merleau-Ponty would be the covering over of ontological claims.  
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unpredictability inherent to natality.  Adaptation “is not the canon of life, but a particular 
realization of the tide of natural production,” and utility is “not a criterion for life” (NC 
184).   
 It is to this next implicit ontological claim that, follow Merleau-Ponty – and, as I 
will show, also Arendt – that I turn my attention.  The claim is that natal being is 
conditioned by appearance.  Like all living beings, human beings display for one another.  
Birth marks the moment of our appearance into a plurality; natality describes the on-
going condition of appearing in a plurality. 
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Ch 7 Plurality and Visibility 
 
Does God ever judge us by appearances? 
I suspect that he does. 
- W.H. Auden 
 
Appearance and Display: Arendt, Portmann, and Merleau-Ponty 
 In The Life of the Mind, Arendt surprisingly – given her earlier anti-naturalism 
stance – devotes pages to assessing and affirming the work of the biologist Adolf 
Portmann.  In the midst of a tour-de-force through the history of Western metaphysics, 
Arendt reflects on the work of Portmann as well as of Merleau-Ponty and the significance 
of animal display for indicating the human condition of visibility and plurality.181  For 
Arendt, both Merleau-Ponty and Portmann demonstrate the necessary turn of philosophy 
from metaphysics and interiority toward ontology, phenomenology, and exteriority.   
In her early natal philosophy – in The Human Condition – Arendt reminds us that we 
must appear in public in order to participate in the political sphere.  In the Life of the 
Mind, Arendt returns to appearance to reflect on it in an ontological and metaphysical 
sense. In his own later work – the Visible and the Invisible – though he makes no 
reference to Life of the Mind, Merleau-Ponty independently confirms and develops 
Arendt’s insight into the turn toward appearances and visibility; Merleau-Ponty shows 
that as natals we are ontologically defined by the play of visibility and invisibility, 
display and interiority, that orients us toward others.  Merleau-Ponty grounds Arendt’s 
claims about appearance in the human sphere to the ontic details of display in animality.    
                                                 
181 Dewitte points out this reference by Arendt in his essay on Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Portmann 
(93). 
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 Phenomenology has shown that “we live in an appearing world,” Arendt argues, 
and thus it is “plausible that the relevant and the meaningful in this world of ours should 
be located precisely on the surface” (LM 27).  For Arendt, this phenomenological turn 
toward appearances is confirmed by Portmann’s work.   
 Until Portmann’s studies, functionalism was the dominant working hypothesis of 
biology: it was generally assumed that it was reasonable “to interpret all [animal] 
appearances as function of the [internal] life process” (LM 27).  By contrast, Arendt 
believes, “Portmann has shown that the facts themselves speak a very different language 
from the simplistic functional hypothesis” (LM 27).  Instead of emphasizing the utility of 
animals’ forms, Portmann emphasizes “the urge to self-display” by animals.  The 
plumage of birds, for example, cannot be entirely justified by a functionalist appeal to 
warmth or camouflage from enemies.  Rather, birds display for one another.  This is an 
instinct that seems to both Portmann and Arendt to be “entirely gratuitous in terms of 
life-preservation; it far transcends what may be deemed necessary for sexual attraction” 
(LM 29).  Humans do not merely echo animals tendency toward self-display, but in fact, 
Arendt believes the phenomena of self-display “reaches its climax in the human species” 
(LM 30).  Self-display, unlike conscious self-presentation, is prereflective and depends 
on “the consistency and duration of the image thereby presented to the world” (LM 36). 
She concludes: 
These findings suggest that the predominance of outside appearance 
implies, in addition to the sheer receptivity of our senses, a spontaneous 
activity: whatever can see wants to be seen, whatever can hear calls out to 
be heard, whatever can touch presents itself to be touched.  It is indeed as 
though everything that is alive … has an urge to appear. (LM 29, 
emphases in the original) 
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For Arendt, the significance of Portmann’s work is that it presents evidence that confirms 
the reversal of certain biological theories but also certain ontological presuppositions.  
Like Merleau-Ponty, Arendt finds that since Descartes, philosophy has prioritized 
interiority, the working of the mind for itself, forgetting its appearance in this world for 
others.182  Arendt finds frustrating this historical hierarchy of inner over outer person, 
with its suggestion that “our ‘inner life,’ is more relevant to what we ‘are’ than what 
appears on the outside” (LM 30).  For Arendt, we must appear on the outside, in the 
public sphere, or we do not appear at all.  We are visible because we are plural and plural 
because we are visible.  Arendt declares: “Not Man but men inhabit this planet.  Plurality 
is the law of the earth” (LM 19).  All true human action takes place in a plurality, 
between people, not in the privacy of an overly hallowed mental life.  Arendt certainly 
advocates thinking: without thought, we risk slipping into banality of evil.  But in order 
to avoid evil, thought must appear.   
 In the Life of the Mind, Arendt returns to this theme that she raised in the Human 
Condition, but here cites support from Merleau-Ponty to describe this forgetfulness of our 
orientation183 toward plurality.  This orientation, this sens, appears in and with our very 
corporeality.  For Arendt, there has been an important “reversal of the metaphysical 
hierarchy: [toward] the value of the surface” (LM 26).  She quotes Merleau-Ponty’s 
Visible and the Invisible – which in turn invokes Husserl with a series of German terms – 
                                                 
182 See the HC Chapter 6. 
183 Here as elsewhere, I use the term “orientation” to describe the relation to plurality to preserve the 
connotation of Merleau-Ponty’s sens as a corporeal and perceptual sense of situation.  Husserl or Heidegger 
might have describe plurality as a “horizon” of being, but for Merleau-Ponty, our relation to others arises 
corporeally.  Plurality intertwines with our very corporeal structure; it is not a horizon toward which we 
reaching but our sens of reaching-toward.  
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and summarizes the similarity between her critique and his.  In the following passage, I 
reproduce both Arendt’s citation of Merleau-Ponty and her commentary: 
‘For when an illusion dissipates, when an appearance suddenly breaks up, 
it is always for the profit of a new appearance which takes up again for its 
own account the ontological function of the first … The dis-illusion is the 
loss of one evidence only because it is the acquisition of another evidence 
… there is no Schein without an Erscheinung, every Schein is the 
counterpart of an Erscheinung.’  That modern science, in its relentless 
search for the truth behind mere appearances, will ever be able to resolve 
this predicament is, to say the least, highly doubtful, if only because the 
scientist himself belongs to the world of appearances although his 
perspective on this world may differ from the common-sense perspective. 
(26) 
 
For Arendt and Merleau-Ponty, when we truly reverse the Platonic metaphysical 
hierarchy, we find a new emphasis not only on existence rather than essence, but on 
appearance and visibility.  As visible beings, we find ourselves oriented toward a world 
of appearances and also toward other, visible beings.  For Arendt, recognizing orientation 
toward a plurality always entails both the possibility and responsibility for political 
action.  Thus, insofar as the natal – for example, the life scientist – realizes that she is “of 
the world and not merely in it” (LM 22), she can no longer consider herself a passive 
observer but an ethically and politically implicated participant in conditioning the 
existence of others.   
 Phenomenology – the study of appearance – had finally emerged to reorient 
philosophy to visibility.  With this turn comes a turn toward natality.  In a 
phenomenological context, as Michel Henry puts it, “coming into be” can only be 
understood as “coming into appearance” which in turn must be understood as “coming 
into the world” (“Phénoménologie de la naissance” 127, my translations).  
Phenomenological appearance occurs in a world of beings who witness appearance; such 
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beings, unlike rocks and air, do not only appear themselves but share a world of 
appearances.  Phenomenology can perform a “transcription of ontological themes,” 
illuminating the type of appearance attributed to beings who are born (Henry 
“Phénoménologie de la naissance” 125).  
   For Arendt, this new ontology appeared in the wake of the end of metaphysics 
with the nineteenth century “death of God.”  The end of metaphysics meant not the literal 
death of God – “about which we can know as little as about God’s existence” – but rather 
“the traditional thought of God” (LM).  For Arendt, the death of the traditional thought of 
God accompanied the end of the entire domain of the suprasensory, the transcendent, or 
“whatever is not given to the senses” (LM 10).  With the end of metaphysics, Arendt 
remarks “what has come to an end is the basic distinction between the sensory and the 
suprasensory” (LM 10).  But the end of this distinction does mean a descent into 
materialism per se.  When Nietzsche set in motion this end of metaphysical thought and 
the hierarchy associated with God, he did not thereby advocate a materialism in which 
the sensory is merely sensory.  Rather, quoting Heidegger, Arendt remarks that 
Nietzsche’s insight was that “the elimination of the suprasensory also eliminates the 
merely sensory and thereby the difference between them’ (Heidegger)” (LM 11).  The 
end of metaphysics does not mean the inevitable rise of materialism; rather “The whole 
framework of reference in which our thinking was accustomed to orient itself breaks 
down” (LM 11).   
 She believes that perhaps Merleau-Ponty alone fully saw this breakdown: 
“Merleau-Ponty, to my knowledge [was] the only philosopher who not only tried to give 
an account of the organic structure of human existence but also tried in all earnest to 
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embark upon a ‘philosophy of the flesh’” (LM 33).  Nonetheless, Arendt argues that even 
Merleau-Ponty still failed to fully shift his paradigm accordingly.  He  
was still misled by the old identification of mind and soul when he defined 
‘the mind as the other side of the body’ since ‘there is a body of the mind, 
a mind of the body and a chiasm between them.’  Precisely the lack of 
such chiasmata or crossings over is the crux of mental phenomena, and 
Merleau-Ponty himself, in a different context, recognized the lack with 
great clarity. (LM 33) 
   
Arendt here cites from Merleau-Ponty’s Visible and the Invisible and Signs.  She does 
indeed point to a weakness in Merleau-Ponty’s work as he transitions from classical 
dualistic terminology – “mind” and “body” – toward his terminology of “flesh,” which 
encompasses mind in life with others, irreducible to terms of dualism.  Certainly, he may 
have retained some problematically weighted terms.  But in his ontology of the flesh, 
especially as we see in the Nature Courses, it seems he does indeed make the shift that 
Arendt requires.  He, however, would dispute Arendt’s suggestions that in the flesh there 
are not “crossings over.”  What crosses-over is not the “mind” and the “body,” but 
existence and existence: my existence and that of the other.   
This is the very structure of the chiasm that marks his ontology: the visible is the 
invisible and invisible is the visible.  These two statements are irreducible to one another 
and in that irreducibility of the multivalent copula, ontology appears and hides.184  Where 
for example, a metaphor marks an ontological tension with its double claim of “it is” and 
“it is not” for Ricoeur,185 for Merleau-Ponty, the chiasm makes the double claim of “it is” 
                                                 
184 Note that “chiasm” refers specifically to this rhetorical structure, a crisscrossing or “chi” – an x – shape 
that appears between these two invert pairs of terms. Another example would be “The Rational is Real and 
the Real is Rational.”  This double distinction never folds in on itself.  See Barbaras 84 and my footnote 19 
for more on this non-dualistic distinction.  
185 See The Rule of Metaphor, Chapter 8, on this “ontological” tension. 
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and “it is” in which identity requires the subtle, twice-deployed copula for expression.186  
Each term of the chiasm lays claim and is claimed by the other term, active and passive: 
“the idea of chiasm, that is: every relation with being is simultaneously a taking and being 
taken, the hold is held” (VI 266, cited in Carbone xiv).  This simultaneous active-
passivity unfolds in time, for the incarnate someone who is time, as Carbone points out 
(7).  As Hegel might say, “even the transition to a mere proposition, contains a becoming-
other” (Phenomenology of Spirit 11); the rhetorical structure of the chiasm allows some 
of this becoming-other to appear in the in-between of discourse itself. 
 I find my own body visible and invisible, haunted by the visibility and invisibility 
of others.  Not only that but I can notice this crisscrossing.  That discernment itself merits 
phenomenological attention.  I can not only self-display, but notice this orientation for 
others and reflect on the meaning of participating in the world.  Discerning the chiasmatic 
crossing allows me to take up responsibility in the public sphere where I appear.  Were I 
to imagine – like Descartes – that I were first and foremost identifiable with my mental 
life, my corporeal presentation for others would have little or no relation to the life for 
which I am responsible.  Likewise, the corporeal presentation of others would tell me 
nothing of others.  In fact, corporeality is expressive: it is expressive not only of a 
personal, private interior, but of the situation in which that corporeal life comports itself.  
It is for that total comportment that I – that any one – is responsible.       
 Arendt thinks that Portmann’s only error – like Merleau-Ponty’s – is in not taking 
his own insights far enough:  
                                                 
186 Husserl makes such a distinction in the Sixth of the Logical Investigations.  Gilbert Ryle points to a 
similar ontological tension in the rhetorical deployment of the copula in his famous description of the 
category mistake in Concept of Mind (18).  One might say it would be a sort of category mistake to assume 
that two statements joined by copula in a chiasm are reducible to one another.  
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When Portmann defines life as ‘the appearance of an inside in an outside,’ 
he seems to fall victim to the very views he criticizes for the point of his 
own findings is that what appears outside is so hopelessly different from 
the inside that one can hardly say that the inside ever appears at all. (LM 
29)  
 
It is not certain, however, that this is a fair critique of Portmann’s final position. As 
Dewitte shows in a detailed resume of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Portmann, in a sense 
both Merleau-Ponty and Portmann describe an interanimality that goes beyond 
intervisibility per se. In his second edition revision of the Die Tiergestalt, Portmann 
describes a phenomena of visual presentation in animals that seems to be “for nothing”; 
visual qualities not actually seen by other animals but which implicate animals in a sort 
of general visibility (Dewitte108).  Dewitte believes there was un rendez-vous manqué 
between Merleau-Ponty and Portman (109).187  From our reading of Arendt, it seems she 
might also have enjoyed this meeting: in this appearance for the sake of appearing, 
Portmann and Merleau-Ponty would finally have gone beyond any hint of metaphysical 
finalism. Finally, we would truly be thinking in an ontology of the flesh.  
 
Merleau-Ponty on Sexual Display and Orientation toward Others 
 Although Arendt makes no mention of having read Merleau-Ponty’s work on 
Portmann, Merleau-Ponty himself devotes extensive commentary to Portmann’s work in 
                                                 
187 In a footnote referring to Dewitte’s essay, the English translators of the Nature Courses suggest that 
Dewitte argues that Merleau-Ponty and/or his auditors misread Portmann.  However, while Dewitte does 
point out some discrepancies between Merleau-Ponty’s citations and Portmann’s text, Dewitte’s thesis is 
essentially that there are complementary themes between the two authors.  He makes it clear that 
Portmann’s work, like Merleau-Ponty’s and even Arendt’s (though he only mentions hers in passing), was 
aimed at showing the importance of corporeality, interanimality, and appearance: “tout le travail de 
Portmann tendant à montrer que c’est au contraire l’apparence extérieure qui pourrait bien etre le plus 
reel  et le plus intéressant…. Merleau-Ponty et Arendt, ces deux philosophes d’inspiration 
phénomenologique, ont compris d’emblée de la meme façon la portée ontolologique de la pensée 
portmanniene” (93). 
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the Nature Courses and to related then-contemporary theories of animal evolution.188  In 
these courses on animality and the human body, armed with new research into 
evolutionary biology, Merleau-Ponty returns to the basic theses of the Structure of 
Behavior.   His lectures here depend on the recognition that natural – natal –living beings, 
whether animal or human, comport themselves with their world and with others.189  In 
these lectures, Merleau-Ponty is particularly concerned with demonstrating that an 
individual animal does not comport itself only for itself; comportment does not develop 
in a closed circuit between single animal and world.  Instead, comportment emerges 
between an animal, the environment, and other animals.  Animals display certain traits 
for each other: colorful feathers, certain gestures or even faces.  We cannot see the 
organism as simply a result of activity only in relation to itself or even between itself and 
the non-living world.  In order to understand these particular behaviors, we must see the 
organism as oriented toward other similar organisms.   
 Where in the Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty attempted to dispel myths of 
Pavlovian behaviorism, in these courses, he attempts to dispel the myths of utilitarianism 
and simplistic Darwinism (in contrast to the robust theories of evolution developed by 
later theorists in the modern synthesis190).  Even in animals, sexual display does not 
emerge according to a simple principle utility.  Merleau-Ponty points out that “sexuality, 
if it aims only at utility, could manifest itself by more economic plan” (NC 188). He 
postulates that there is “a specular relation between animals: each is the mirror of the 
                                                 
188 See Chapter 6 on his discussion of evolution. 
189 See Chapter 1 for my explication of Merleau-Ponty’s justification of this assumption in the Structure of 
Behavior.   
190 Darwin and his contemporary and rival Alfred Russel Wallace disputed just this point of sexual display 
and utility.  Wallace argued that bird plumage could not be explained according to the principle of utility 
alone but must take into account sexual display. C.f. Slotten 290.  
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other” (NC 189).  Many animals depend on their visibility: this allows the “specular 
relation” to occur.  Without this natural, mimetic relation to one another, sexual display 
would not have meaning. The meaning of display and copulation are not separable for the 
animal, any more than for a human.  Sexual display is a “monstration, a ceremony in 
which the animals give themselves to each other” (NC 196).   
Interanimality and the Ontological Value of Species 
 Because animals’ very bodies and comportment co-emerge with their world and 
with others, we cannot understand animality in terms of individual animals.  As Merleau-
Ponty puts it, “what exists are not separated animals, but an inter-animality” (NC 189).  
This inter-animality arises not between “subjects” or between “minds,” but between 
visible, displaying bodies, prereflectively oriented toward one another.  Interanimality is 
not an illusion but a perceptual relation.  Identifying “this perceptual relation gives an 
ontological value back to the notions of species” (NC 189).  Merleau-Ponty’s vision of 
“species” here is not equivalent to the fixed species described by pre-nineteenth century 
scientists nor the genetically and reproductively defined “species” of modern and 
contemporary biology.   
 Merleau-Ponty refutes the theory of “species nominalism” which argues that the 
very category “species” is an arbitrary and artifactual notion with no real bearing on 
animal life (Dewitte102).  By contrast, he argues that we must acknowledge speciation, 
not by way of reductive genetic or morphological classifications, but as description of a 
group in which an individual organism orients itself.  Merleau-Ponty refers to an 
experiential fact of animal life: animal existence is conditioned by not only an 
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environment but by the need to display for other animals. Jacques Dewitte puts it this 
way:  
To mutually recognize each other as congeners; it is this recognition (that 
includes at once a ‘showing oneself as’ and a ‘being recognizes as’) that 
gives ontological status to the species” [“se reconnaissent mutellement 
comme congénères; c’est cette reconnaissance (qui comporte à la fois un 
<<se montrer comme>> et un << se reconnaître comme>>) qui donne 
un statut ontologique à la espèce.] (Dewitte103) 
 
I reproduce de Witte’s comments in French because his word choices of 
“reconnaissance” and “reconnaître” re-enforce the tight relationship between natality, 
plurality, and visibility.  Animals mutually recognize each other as part of a plurality in 
which they are rooted by natality and into which they may give birth. 
 For Merleau-Ponty, this is as true of animals in general as it is true of humans. As 
with comportment in general, it is clear to him that “human desire emerges from animal 
desire.  Already in the animal, in the ceremony of love, desire is not a mechanical 
functioning, but an opening to an Umwelt of fellow creatures” (NC 225).  While animals 
do not have a Welt, a world of others per se, their environment, their Umwelt, includes 
others whose existence co-emerges with their own.  Sexuality fundamentally conditions 
human existence which orients itself toward other bodies, themselves drawn toward 
display.191  This by no means reduces existence to sexual drive; that would be to miss the 
excess of display that Portmann points to. In the Second Sex, de Beauvoir points out just 
this possible worry regarding existential views of sexuality, citing Merleau-Ponty’s in 
particular.  She writes: “‘Sexuality’ is coextensive with existence’ can be understood in 
two very different ways; it can mean that every experience of the existent has a sexual 
                                                 
191 Reversing his earlier negative views on Freud in Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty praises Freud 
for having seen the essential structuring of life by desire, especially sexual desire for others; Freud “truly 
saw” the “problem of the flesh” (NC 226).   
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significance, or that every sexual phenomenon has an existential import” (39).  For de 
Beauvoir, it would be a mistake to conclude, as she thought Freud did, that “biology is 
destiny” (46) and that “all human behavior” is “the outcome of desire” (42). 192  
Likewise, to reduce display to sexual display, visibility to the visual sense would be akin 
to reducing comportment to reductive behaviorism, a mistake against which Merleau-
Ponty has cautioned since the Structure of Behavior.  In all cases, human life includes a 
general involvement in the excessive totality of a world.   
Nor does Merleau-Ponty’s claim reduce human desire to animal desire any more 
than animal bodies can be reduced to a collection of organic molecules identical to those 
in rocks and trees.  Drawing a line in the sand between animal and human activity does 
not necessarily help us understand our sort of being.  Merleau-Ponty even goes so far as 
to say that since “there is not an objective criterion for consciousness,” he finds it to be 
reasonable to ask, “Is there animal consciousness, and if so, to what extent?” (NC 199).  
He does not pursue this question, but he finds it reasonable, not hesitating to connect 
human and animal sexual display.  Rather, he attempts to “bring these facts of the 
phenomena [of animal sexual display] close to human language” and to various other 
symbolic activities (NC 198).   
                                                 
192 Existential philosophy must recognize that, especially for the woman, the body is her, but her body is 
also “something other than herself” (29).  She worries that Merleau-Ponty may have overemphasized the 
generality of the body, and yet for the most part she agrees with his view which situates life within both 
factical bodies and history; she concludes: “As Merleau-Ponty very justly puts it, man is not a natural 
species.  He is a historical idea.  Woman is not a completed reality, but rather a becoming” (34).  The 
relationship between Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir on the issue of sexuality bears further investigation, 
but for an excellent study that shows the comparison rather than contrast between these two thinkers’ 
views, see Sonia Kruks’ “Simone de Beauvoir: Teaching Sartre about Freedom.” For my purposes here, it 
is most important to recognize that for Merleau-Ponty, sexuality does not exhaust biological motivation or 
visible animal display.  Humans and animals alike have, as de Beauvoir put it, “ways of being concerned 
with the world which cannot be reduced to any others” (46).  
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 As described in the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the flesh shows 
that there is no need to posit some radical distinction between human and animal life: 
“There are no substantial differences between physical Nature, life and mind” (NC 212).  
Rather than radically or substantially different from the “stuff” of the natural world, we 
are “the arrangement of a hollow” that “surges forth at birth” (NC 210).  Animal life 
appears inseparably with desire as “a sort of seething, an ‘always future hollow’” (NC 
210).   We do not reduce human existence to animal or natural existence in general: we 
merely attend to how it arises from the same ground.  Merleau-Ponty admits that “it is 
true that it remains for us to understand how this vision… becomes mind” (NC 210), but 
he does not shy from this problem.  Whatever mind is provoked in human life, it arises 
from this fold in the flesh that appears with all life.  This flesh is the body as an open 
“circuit” (NC 22) between visible and invisible, or, as he puts in the other essay, between 
eye and mind.  As the title of Arendt’s last book puts it, Arendt, like many others in the 
phenomenological tradition of the twentieth century, reflects primarily on “the life of the 
mind”; Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, as Thompson puts it in his title, suggests that we may 
encounter an even more complex problem if we admit there is “mind in life.”  In 
Merleau-Ponty’s view, although the problem of language happens “at the human level.  
The difficulty is to be situated at the level of axolotl” (NC 157).  Or, as Thompson puts it, 
rather than situating the problem of mind only at the level of conscious reflection, we 
might find an even more complicated problem if we associate the appearance of mind 
with the appearance of life (128).  Language emerges with life through the very same 
types of structural totalities that condition the existence of the axolotl.  Ideality itself 
arises naturally.  We cannot find the “reality” of language by searching at a sub-
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molecular level: this would miss the phenomenon of language that appears for humans.  
At the same time, we cannot postulate a radical difference between the structures at a 
molecular level and a linguistic level.  This would miss the excess of totality in which 
these orders of life are situated.  
  
Umbilical Bond and the Orientation toward Others  
 The urge to self-display – in humans as well as animals – depends on a 
prereflective orientation toward others.  Yet, as Merleau-Ponty recognizes, the case of the 
human animal does include very complex – irreducibly complex –expressions of the urge 
to display.  This orientation of existence toward display makes possible all of culture, 
including language, for Merleau-Ponty.  As Arendt does, Merleau-Ponty imagines that 
visibility conditions all appearing being.  In Merleau-Ponty’s words,  the self-display 
forms a “tacit language” of gesture and perhaps even “a moral physiognomy [in] 
(signature, gait, face)” (NC 211).  We might argue that sexual display is part of some 
“ready-made or natural symbolism of the body” and that as humans, we have a 
conventionalized language of symbols plus this bodily symbolism (NC 211).  But the 
excavation of such a gestural language is not what interests Merleau-Ponty as develops 
his ontological position.  What is of relevance ontologically is that philosophy “would 
have to take as its theme the umbilical bond that binds it always to Being” (VI 107).  In 
this metaphor, the phenomenology of animality and visibility meets ontology.  The 
metaphor of pregnancy presents not only our relation to others but our very relation to 
being.  In the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty refers more than once to our inter-
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animality and inter-corporeality as “notre lien natal avec le monde” (VI  32 / 54) and to 
“le cordon ombilical de notre savoir” (VI  157  / 209).   
   Even the tacit language of gesture and body presupposes this umbilical bond, this 
natal link to others.  Prior to developing any particular gestural language, we presuppose 
that we are seen and can be seen, hear and are heard.  However far we trace back 
language we find that “There is always a language before language, which is perception” 
(NC 219).  If we assume that conventional language can merely be derived from bodily 
language or alternatively, that it superseded it, we erase the very problem we need to 
study: we cannot step outside of incarnation for a view onto it (NC 226).  We would be 
returning to a fruitless dualism: not a dualism of body and soul, but of body and 
language.193  To avoid dualism, we cannot cut language off from Nature.  A 
phenomenology of Nature is an account, a logos, of Nature, yet that logos arises from 
Nature.  When logos does arise from Nature – logos broadly construed to encompass art, 
history, language, science – it gives rise to an “ideal intersubjectivity held together by 
noncorporeity” (NC 228).  But this intersubjectivity still arose from incarnate Nature.  
This orientation is toward not one particular other, but to the “atmosphere” of animality, 
or as Merleau-Ponty put it in Phenomenology of Perception, the “atmosphere of 
humanity.”194 In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
revealed the appearance of the atmosphere of humanity in perception; he now makes an 
ontological claim about the ground of this appearance.  What is of interest for a natal 
ontology is not a genetic account of the origin of language as such, but the meaning of 
being prereflectively oriented toward others with such structures as language.   
                                                 
193 Or, as Thompson has put it, a dualism of “information” and matter (185).   
194 See Chapter 3. 
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 What interests Merleau-Ponty is how conventional language presupposes 
communicability in general, presupposes this inter-animality, this prereflective relation to 
the other.  As we saw in the Phenomenology of Perception and the lectures, 
“Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language,” Merleau-Ponty does attend to the 
acquisition of language by developing individuals.  But in the Nature Courses, he situates 
this acquisition in a general prereflective orientation toward others.  
 For Merleau-Ponty, not surprisingly, our umbilical bond can be seen not only in 
sexual display but in infant development.  Interestingly, despite her emphasis on natality 
and even appearance in her later work, Arendt pays little attention to the actual event of 
physical birth in her discussion of visibility and appearance. Merleau-Ponty, however, in 
the Nature Courses, returns again and again to the event of birth as exemplary of the 
human condition.  
 One concrete manifestation of our umbilical bond – though not the only one – is 
in the gaze between caretaker and infant.  With birth, a child literally becomes “visible,” 
emerging from the womb into the public world and beginning to see with its own eyes.  
At the moment a child emerges from the womb, “the eye, with its nervous apparatus, 
takes to seeing” (NC 210).  This literal visibility serves as a metaphor to demonstrate the 
fleshy physicality of human life itself.  Merleau-Ponty has been rigorously critiqued, 
most famously by Luce Irigaray, for this bias toward vision. 195  Yet this critique and 
related critiques seem to rest on a dual misunderstanding: first, that he prioritizes the 
                                                 
195In Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray even remarks that Merleau-Ponty’s description of the 
prereflective relations aim at a certain “shared knowledge [connaissance]” (128).  For Irigaray, however, 
such connaissance is problematic insofar as it presumes total access to the invisible and interior of the 
other.  For Merleau-Ponty and certainly for the ontology I advocate here, connaissance does not presume 
such Cartesian clarity.  Elizabeth Grosz offers an excellent summary and reflection on these projects in 
Volatile Bodies.  
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visual apparatus per se, and a reduction of visibility to visual display alone, and second, 
that visibility comes with unimpeded access to the visible.  But such reduction would in 
fact be a Cartesian position: for the Cartesian, the eye, unimpeded by the thickness of the 
flesh, without the blind spot inherent to actual incarnation, can totally access visibility.  
The Cartesian eye – like the I – encompasses the visible, rather than is encompassed by it, 
enveloped by it.  Merleau-Ponty stresses not the visual apparatus itself, but the fact of 
being oriented toward other perceiving and perceived bodies.  More importantly perhaps, 
in no case does perception – visual or otherwise – allow for pure access to the object of 
perception, certainly not to the interior of the feminine or to the “invisible” of the 
feminine, as Irigaray imagines (128).  These critiques come primarily from a feminist 
perspective, and I do not dismiss the necessity of such feminist improvement upon 
Merleau-Ponty’s decidedly historically situated – and therefore limited - account of the 
body.   Merleau-Ponty would be the first to admit such historical limitation.  In a 
contemporary context, it would be problematic if it were true that, as Lawlor puts it, 
“[f]or Merleau-Ponty the Verflechtung exists between man, world, and writing” (NO x).  
I find Lawlor’s repetition of “man” as a term of the chiasm to be a troubling choice.  His 
choice points toward a possible problematic interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s account 
where gender determines the “natural” body which intertwines with the world and 
discourse.  Instead, I think we should see gender as appearing within the intertwining 
between the human, world, and writing rather than as defining one of the terms of the 
chiasm.  That said, certain feminist critiques of visibility – Irigaray’s forming the model – 
risk foreclosing phenomenology and existential philosophy in general by too hastily 
setting aside comparisons across difference for emphasis on difference itself.  It is 
286 
 
essential to my position here that our connaissance of the other – as other - be affirmed, 
or we risk the pitfalls of Cartesian skepticism.  Even as I admit the difference of the other 
from myself, I must first of all affirm my knowledge of the other’s existence and the 
mark of the other in knowing in general.  Visibility – or voyance – in a world of others 
does not, however, thereby equate to total possession or knowledge (as savoir) of the 
other.196  Visibility entails invisibility, just as activity entails passivity.  As Carbone puts, 
voyance is a “complying with the showing of the sensible universe itself,” akin to 
Heideggerian disclosure (33).197   
This fragile visibility complies with and engages a world of others.  The vision 
and visibility of the child appear together and in relation to a plurality.  With birth, “I see 
that other humans see” (NC 210).  Likewise, “just as I perceive my hand touching, I 
perceive others as perceiving.  The articulation of their body on the world is lived by me 
in the articulation of my body on the world where I see them” (NC 218).  This living-with 
the other does not possess the other or demand total access to the other but implicitly 
affirms the other. 
 The role of the gaze and the vision in this coming to be of the child is not that of 
the possessive, objectifying gaze described by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, nor that 
of the formative gaze that accompanies subjectivity described by Lacan in his lectures.198  
                                                 
196 In that sense, we have connaissance of the other a bit like Descartes has knowledge of God.  He knows 
indubitably that God exists, but he does not thereby have total comprehension of God.  
197 Carbone shows that Merleau-Ponty finds this voyance not only in painting (a literally “visual” art) but 
equally in literature and in music.  He cites Merleau-Ponty’s allusions to Proust and to the ‘little phrase’ as 
example of voyance  where “in light just as in the musical idea, we have an idea which is not what we see, 
but is behind it” (Carbone 35, citing the Course “Cartesian Ontology and the Ontology of Today”). 
198 Merleau-Ponty would no doubt have been familiar with these accounts, each of which would embroil us 
here in an interesting but divergent trajectory in the history of European philosophy.  Briefly, on Sartre’s 
view, see Being and Nothingness (340-343).  On Lacan’s view, c.f. The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psycho-analysis (84) or Le Séminaire, livre XI, 245).  Lacan comments on Merleau-Ponty’s Visible and the 
Invisible, identifying a kinship between their two projects, yet Lacan describes a general gaze that 
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Merleau-Ponty here emphasizes not the gazing of the child on itself, nor the gaze of the 
other on the child, nor even of a subject on another subject, but the mutual gazing of the 
child and the adult that prefigures the mutual gazing that continues into adult life. This is 
the prereflective, activity of, as Beata Stawarska has put it, “a process of social 
attunement” (20).199  Prior to “reading the minds of others” as some views on child 
development put it,200 the child attunes herself to their being.  In a sense, a child’s 
acquisition of a world quite literally depends on this co-visibility apparent in the gaze 
between infant and mother that constituting subjectivity and intersubjectivity.  
Evolutionary biologists now argue over the origins of the skill for attunement in humans 
and other primates.201  
 It would be a mistake to assume that in human beings or in Merleau-Ponty’s view 
of human beings that such mutual attunement depends on the visual apparatus per se.  In 
the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty argues that this coarticulation of the world begins 
even before birth, during pregnancy.202   A mother gives birth to a body already in 
motion, a motion provoked by her own motions: “there is no pregnancy of souls.  It is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitutes us as subjects, located at the order of the imaginary and symbolic, not the actual mutual gazing 
of infant and mother.  He argues that one must separate “the eye and the gaze” (74).  Dewitte points out the 
connection between Merleau-Ponty, Portmann, and Lacan on this issue regarding turn from a “god’s-eye” 
view of life toward the view of life as constituted by human events of gazing (110). 
199 Stawarska summarizes some of this research thus: “For the infant, joint visual attention with the adult 
initially takes the form of direct eye contact or mutual gaze before giving rise to a more complex formation 
which alternates between attending to each other’s eyes and jointly intending an object present in their 
visual field (a toy, food). Sustained focus on the caretaker’s eyes has been found in infants as young as 1 
month of age (Wolff 1963), and it has been documented as a basic trait of a normally developing mother-
infant relation. The focus on the eyes is made possible by the relative functional maturity of the infant’s 
visual-motor system, attained already by the third month, while other motor behaviors are less mature” 
(“Mutual Gaze and Social Cognition” 19). 
200 For a view that does seem to make such an assumption, see Baron-Cohen Mindblindness.  
201 For a recent overview of such research see Sarah Hardy Mothers and Others.  
202 Francine Wynn has critiqued Merleau-Ponty for overemphasizing the moment of birth as initiation into 
the world; she claims he has forgotten the significance of pre-natal in-utero development.  Wynn focuses 
primarily on Merleau-Ponty’s earlier published work, whereas I show below and in the preceding chapter 
that  Merleau-Ponty in fact devotes extended discussions to embryogenesis.   
288 
 
body that produces pregnancy and that moves to perceive… There is no descent of a soul 
into a body, but rather the emergence of a life in its cradle, a provoked vision” (NC 
218).203  Some “provocation” stirs up the life that is the child: the child has begun 
elsewhere, yet consists of flesh open to provocation.  Sexuality, also codependent with 
visibility and plurality, provoked life and so on and so forth.  The individual pleats this 
flesh that precedes and exceeds it: as flesh, the body participates in “an open totality” 
(NC 218).  Again, visibility indicates not the primacy of the visual organism per se, but 
the flesh in general: the co-perceptual (perceived and perceiving) emergence of an 
organism oriented toward a totality.  
 These connections between child development, evolutionary biology, and social 
cognition mark a domain for no-doubt fruitful further investigation.  In pursuit of an 
ontological project, I do not take on those investigations here, but I mark them as the site 
of further conversation between Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology and these burgeoning 
fields of research in life science.  A natal ontology does not resolve these issues, but 
points toward the ontological assumptions made in, for example, the Cartesian theory of 
mind models that overlook prepersonal and premental orientation toward others.  Prior to 
interpreting the minds of others, prior to objectifying others, the child is oriented toward 
others who visibly appear.  
 A natal ontology directs phenomenology toward both sexual display and 
development; these in turn each indicate the condition of plurality in human existence.  
                                                 
203 Admittedly, in neither the Nature Courses nor in the Visible and the Invisible, does Merleau-Ponty offer 
an actual, in-depth phenomenology of pregnancy per se. Pregnancy remains a loosely used metaphor.  (See 
the following chapter on my conclusions).  He borrows pregnancy as a metaphor for being, as if he 
borrowed sonar as a metaphor for perceiving being.  Merleau-Ponty could never check the terms of his 
metaphor against the experience of bats; nor can he ever check the metaphor of pregnancy by experiencing 
it himself.  Nonetheless, my hope is that even if Merleau-Ponty’s work does not fully reciprocate accounts 
of female embodiment in pregnancy– such as those of Iris Marion Young –  it can serve to enrich that 
metaphor of pregnancy and his ontology in general.   
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Even Arendt, with her non-natural view of natality, saw the inseparability of natality and 
plurality.  Merleau-Ponty emphasizes our natural natality and plurality.  Arendt calls 
“natality” and “plurality” aspects of the human condition; for Merleau-Ponty these are 
aspects of the “fabric of brute meaning” (NC 123).  To be born into Nature includes 
being a visible, actual physical structure, oriented toward others.  Where Arendt separates 
“first natality” and actual birth from what she calls “second natality” in speech and 
action, for Merleau-Ponty we can make no such absolute distinction.204  One might 
phenomenologically distinguish these moments in existence, as one might distinguish the 
feeling of being a subject and the feeling of being an object, but phenomenologists should 
not make the ontological claim that these orders of physical birth and second natality 
depend on radically different orders of being.  We cannot institute this distinction because 
it entails a return to a dualism of speech and action, action and perception, and indeed 
ethics and ontology: prior to these dualistic divisions, we appear in the world, oriented 
toward a visible exterior, oriented toward expression as much as perception.  Such is 
being that belongs to a plurality.  
 While phenomenology avoids speaking reductively of a human “species” as either 
fixed morphologies or as the passive result of genetics, phenomenology does affirm an 
orientation of life toward like-structured life.  Merleau-Ponty puts it this way:  
“associated bodies must be revived along with my object – ‘others,’ not merely as my 
congeners, as the zoologist says, but others who haunt me and whom I haunt” (EM 122).  
In this passage, Merleau-Ponty reinforces the continuity between human and animal life 
and yet also the difference that phenomenological reflection can make, or perhaps, as 
                                                 
204 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this distinction in relation to generative and poetic phenomenology and 
Birmingham 31-33 for a discussion of first and second natality in Arendt. 
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Derrida might put it, the différénce that phenomenology can mark.205  The zoologist, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s words – perhaps a better word choice would be “biologist” – studies a 
species as an objective group: a group that shares certain traits, can reproduce together or 
not.  The phenomenologist, by contrast, studies the meaning of belonging to such a group 
– notably the human group, with its complex comportment – from the inside.  While a 
great deal of phenomenological attention has been deservedly directed at describing 
others as different, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that phenomenology must also describe 
our very basic orientation toward others as like us; this orientation means that others are 
as identifiable as others who merit empathy and response.   
 A natal ontology depends on admitting the ontological status of “species,” as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, or the condition of “plurality,” as Arendt puts it.  In natality as in 
sexuality, human existence involves this prepredicative orientation and reciprocity.  In 
fact, in general we can see “The body as organ of the for-other” (NC 218). Sexual display 
and child development show that “there is a natural rooting of the for-other” (NC 210).  
Our corporeality not only gives us access to an Umwelt but to others with similar 
schemas, “ a relation to other corporal schemas” so that we find “among the things, there 
are living ‘similars’” (NC 224).  
 This “other” refers to other beings like ourselves, with whom we share the 
condition of both perceiving and being perceived. Yet this other is no less unlike our self: 
as Arendt points out, were a plurality to contain only identical beings, “endlessly 
reproducible repetitions of the same model,” there would be no need for speech at all (HC 
                                                 
205 On such confluences of thought between the later Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, see Leonard Lawlor’s 
“Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl.”  
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8).  The very fact that we are oriented to display for others affirms the otherness of 
others.   
 Phenomenology has had good reason to resist giving ontological value to the 
notion of species; the term suggests that human existence can be studied as an object 
from the outside.  Phenomenology may have assumed that delineating between the 
human order and the natural order would save it from the possible problem of viewing 
the history of humanity as the mere progress of a natural species.  But instead, Merleau-
Ponty shows that this natural history of a species is a problem if phenomenology 
postulates a radical difference between the order of life and the order of the human.  Such 
postulation resumes dualism: the human for-itself differs absolutely from nature-itself.  
Instead, we ought to see the human as a permutation of complexity; language is one – 
albeit significant – function of transformation that occurs.  The human order then gains 
an irreducible sort of complexity as Nature, not in opposition to Nature.  
 
Conclusions: Of Being Alone  
 Let us return to the quotation from George Oppen: “Shipwrecked by the singular / 
We have chosen / the meaning / of being numerous.”  We have seen in the preceding 
pages, that Merleau-Ponty, like Arendt, redirects phenomenology’s attention from the 
meaning of a singular life toward the meaning of a life in a plurality.   Like other 
twentieth century post-Cartesian thinkers, Merleau-Ponty restores our proximity to 
others.  He manages this redirection by pointing us toward our natality, toward our life as 
natural natals, toward the omphalous in our flesh that connects us with others.  He 
uniquely accomplishes this by restoring an ontological value to the very term “species.”  
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His natal ontology shows that we belong to a plurality, that existence is conditioned by 
the fact that we are numerous, natal, and natural.  Merleau-Ponty has shown that we are 
enveloped by the flesh of the world through our “umbilical bond that always binds us to 
Being.  
 In the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty returns to this theme of seeing 
according to others – to the inhabiting and co-habiting of vision – in some particularly 
forceful examples.  When I am talking with someone else, “should the voice alter, should 
the unwonted appear in the score of the dialogue, or, on the contrary, should a response 
respond too well to what I thought without having really said it” – in short, should the 
person with whom I am speaking do anything that shows her to be a person and not a 
robot – then, “suddenly there breaks forth the evidence that yonder also, minute by 
minute, life is being lived” (VI 11).  When this happens, I cease to be confined by the 
apparent limits of my physical skin; when I face this speaking other, “another private 
world shows through… and for a moment I live in it” (VI 11). 
 If I were not born, if I were not a natal being, inhering in a plurality, I could not 
accomplish this.  I could worry skeptically like Descartes that the other does not exist.  
But this is not a problem for the natal: I feel the umbilical tug of the other on my vision, 
and in fact, for Merleau-Ponty, I can even sense through the other as if she were a distant 
organ.  There is, in fact, a “propagation of my ownmost secret …” (VI 11). 
 And in this last phrase lies possible trouble.  The propagation of my inner life in 
another might be a beautiful thing; the propagation of an other’s inner life in mine might 
be a miraculous cohabitation.  But it might be a terrifying, traumatizing appropriation of 
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my interiority.  If perception can propagate, if it can instill itself sexually in another 
being, then it can rape, invade.  
 The question is, then, whether the emphasis on exteriority related to natality by 
Arendt and amplified by Merleau-Ponty has gone too far.  Has a phenomenology of 
natality become a phenomenology of existence that overprescribes exteriority, that 
connects us to others so entirely that we cannot acquire an interiority?  Have we restored 
an ontological value to “species” only to take ontological possibility from the individual?  
Has Merleau-Ponty given us a perceptual world, a world of interanimality so fertile that 
that we risk unwanted perceptual pregnancy?   
 At risk of taking this metaphor too far – and yet Merleau-Ponty himself has 
already done it: the number of references to fertility, pregnancy, and invagination in the 
Visible and the Invisible is startling206 – what prophylactic can one use in this atmosphere 
of fertility?  Merleau-Ponty himself does not hesitate to connect the theme of pregnancy 
to invasion and promiscuous behavior; he writes that things themselves generate their 
temporal and spatial existence  “by encroachment, by promiscuity – a perpetual 
pregnancy, perpetual parturition, generativity, and generality, brute essence and brute 
existence…” (VI 115).  
 What can Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology tell us of being singular?  We have 
found that we enjoy a sensus communis of the flesh, through our natal nature, our 
embodiment.  But does our nature not also give us a sensus individus? A sense of being 
singular?  A sense that, even as I understand the meaning of others, I might fail to 
understand it or to be understood.  In the sense that, at the moment the umbilical cord is 
                                                 
206 See VI  for “birth” 33, 126, 142, 144, 145, 155, 221 and “born” 246, 47 and “pregnancy” on 115,  148-
9, 206, 207, 208, 209, 212, 213, 259, “pregnant” 123, 124, 136, 216. In all these instances, the French 
original contains the same allusion. 
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severed, bitten off or torn, I find myself alone in the world.  Has Merleau-Ponty forgotten 
that the natal, once free from the womb, is so often alone?  
What can natals say of being alone? Of interiority as well as exteriority? What of 
the moment of being “shipwrecked by the singular”? What of the moment when I find 
that I can sail away from this plurality, this community that has given birth to me?   This 
turning away from the plurality might be a moment of despair, akin to Heideggerian 
Angst, or it might be a simple withdrawal into private meditation.  This might happen 
while we are physical with others as easily as when we are physically isolated.  
 At first glances, it seems possible that Merleau-Ponty has either failed to describe 
this experience or even – more philosophically troubling – excluded it ontologically.  It 
seems that in a natal ontology, our umbilical tie to others, always apparent as we exercise 
our connaissance, does not allow us to ever withdraw.  Perhaps the proximity of the 
flesh, the always being with others that it permits, so totally enfolds us that we cannot 
extract ourselves from it.  Perhaps we must simply awaken to this fact, as the Buddhist 
awakes to the fact that there is no difference between her being and others’ being.  And 
yet this metaphysical suggestion ignores the phenomenological fact, so well described by 
Heidegger, that we experience ourselves and others as distinct.   
 If properly formulated, a natal ontology must leave room for sense of 
individuation: of the capacity not only to be-with others but to be other to the plurality.  
But has Merleau-Ponty has ever described, in phenomenological detail, this withdrawing 
from the other?  Or, in more Levinasian terms, the other’s withdrawal from me?  
Merleau-Ponty painstakingly reassures us that we can affirm a prereflective relation to 
the other, but we may wonder if the same philosophy can also affirm our distance.  It is 
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true that Merleau-Ponty does not expressly devote chapters or essays to this experience of 
division per se.  We can easily imagine that he perhaps felt this unnecessary when faced 
with a Cartesian tradition that so emphasized the individual mind and a more recent 
Heideggerian, and even Sartrean, emphasis on the taking up of one’s own authentic 
projects.  Like Arendt, Merleau-Ponty stresses natality over mortality for good historical 
reasons, but he nonetheless may have done better to readdress these phenomena after 
reorienting phenomenology.   
That said, it is not the case that there is no room in his natal ontology to describe 
this phenomena.  This event does not contradict any of the conditions Merleau-Ponty has 
laid forth.  Though it is true that he has failed to devote as much time to explicitly 
describing the experience of individuation and privacy, he certainly identifies it.  
However, rather than a lack of division between self and other, we find a lack of 
hierarchy between self and other.  He puts it this way in the Phenomenology of 
Perception: “the self which perceives is in no particularly privileged position” (PP 353).  
Also in the Phenomenology, he explains that “[t]he generality of the body will never 
make it clear how the indeclinable I can estrange itself” (PP 358).  The body indicates 
generality but also the withdrawal of individuality.  In the Visible and the Invisible, we 
find hints – both metaphorically and prosaically offered – of such moments of division 
and their effects.  The metaphors of vision and pregnancy both illuminate and obscure the 
écart in being between my self and the other that Merleau-Ponty describes.  
 For Merleau-Ponty, between being singular and being numerous is a gap, un 
écart.  This difference is as vast and as narrow as that between 5:09 and “5:10 is for the 
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one who dies / At 5:09,” in the words of poet Alan Shapiro.207  Or, it is the divide 
between two tectonic plates pressed up against each other; between them, we can see a 
definitive, fundamental cleavage in the earth, yet for all intents and purposes, they form a 
mass: I cannot put my hand between the two.   
 Merleau-Ponty describes the écart in the flesh through the metaphor of vision.  He 
first explains how we might notice the écart within our binocular vision.  Between my 
two monocular eyes, there is a “certain divergence [écart] from the imminent true vision” 
(VI 7).  Likewise, Merleau-Ponty continues, one could also “describe the private worlds 
[of perceiving subjects] as divergence with respect to the world itself” (VI 10, note).  In 
this analogy, the left eye does not merge with the right eye: it is their very difference that 
permits binocular vision.  Likewise, my being does not merge with the being of another: 
it is our difference that permits a world to arise.  We must coordinate in order to see; one 
eye can close or the other open. A natal ontology requires the chiasmatic écart for a 
world to appear between human beings.   
 Merleau-Ponty uses the metaphor of vision in the Nature Courses in a slightly 
different way to clarify that the natal being, though appearing exteriorly, nonetheless 
preserves interiority.   As a metaphor, Merleau-Ponty explains that he prefers vision to 
other senses, such as touch, because of vision’s disproportionate nature: “the eye is much 
more seeing than seen, a more subtle flesh, more nervous” (NC 223).  When we study the 
appearance of the eye, we could never forget the interiority of the organism who lives 
through the eye.  The eye preserves the interiority of the organism while the organism at 
once takes on its environment.  The eye reminds us that though life appears for other life, 
it does so through its invisible interiority.  Life is a fold in being: what is a fold without 
                                                 
207 From “Country Western Singer” in Old War.  
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an interior? Yet unless we unfold a fold, all we can see is its exterior.  The same with life: 
until we dissect a body, we cannot see its interiority and yet this very action destroys the 
lively interiority of life itself.   
 Thus, though a natal ontology does turn toward appearance, it does not take away 
singularity, interiority, or the invisible that animates the visible.  The invisible is always 
already with the visible: “visible being is not the whole of Being, because it [Being] 
already has its other invisible side” (NC 271).  This is the very mystery of animal 
comportment: the exteriority, the appearance of life, indicates the interiority, the 
motivation and momentum of life.  Phenomenology cannot study “purely” physical or 
pure appearance, any more than Pavlov could.  The phenomenological turn toward 
appearance and visibility emphasized by both Arendt and Merleau-Ponty in their work on 
Portmann is equally a turn toward invisibility.  In animal life, this invisibility is indicated 
by the peculiar prospective momentum of comportment; in human life, invisibility is 
indicated by the even more peculiar movement of reflective activity and collective 
activity.  Even as Merleau-Ponty emphasizes appearance, he puts equal emphasis on what 
does not appear per se.   
 The condition of plurality does not mean that we find ourselves at one with all 
human beings.  As Babaras points out, in the Visible and Invisible Merleau-Ponty does 
not seek to prove our pure coincidence with Being (84).  Rather, Merleau-Ponty attempts 
to show that experience has given rise to our sense of duality and our dualistic split in 
philosophy between idealism and realism, to our sense of both the vertical and horizontal 
orders.  Merleau-Ponty does not seek to efface our experience of a mind and a body nor 
the historical, philosophical fact that two opposed schools of thought have emerged.  
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Instead, he wishes to describe the ground of experience from which dualism springs.  
Barbaras puts it this way:  
… [T]he soil where the to-and-from [of dualism] is grounded must be the 
soil for this duality; that is it must be able to give an account of the fact 
that the philosophies developed in our history are confronted, despite 
everything, with the choice between fact and essence. (Barbaras 84) 
 
A robust natal ontology must show how our natality leads us to experience ourselves as 
both singular and numerous.  We can at once attend to our connection to others and yet 
never achieve coincidence with others.  Phenomenology might affirm the sense of a 
distinction between first natality – original birth and coming to be with others – and 
second natality – giving birth to speech and actions – but it does postulate a radical 
difference between this first ontic fact and the ontology that might appear in reflection.  
Instead phenomenology attends to this differing. 
 The metaphor of pregnancy again helps to clarify the situation.  The appeal to 
metaphor marks not a turn from philosophy or from phenomenological rigor, but a radical 
attempt at such rigor.  Metaphor marks an investment of language with that which 
precedes and calls forth language. 208  The umbilical bond encapsulates this drawing 
together across a definitive divide.  The umbilical cord connects the mother to her child; 
through this organ, essential molecules are transferred.  Yet even as actual fleshy material 
unites them, never does the body of the mother merge with the body of the child.  At 
birth, the literally fleshy bond is cut, but the metaphorical bond – and the mark of the 
                                                 
208 Merleau-Ponty makes the point regarding vision that a metaphor is “too much and too little for what he 
intends” (VI 221, cited in Barbaras 194).  Merleau-Ponty does not fall into “ontological vehemence,” 
taking metaphor too seriously, but rather requires metaphorical language to “attention within language, that 
which exceeds and precedes its objectifying power” (Barbaras 196-197, note 9).  Again we see Merleau-
Ponty’s debt to Heidegger.  Barbaras refers to Merleau-Ponty’s use of the metaphor of vision,  and I 
suggest the same could be said of pregnancy in the later work.  So dominant is the reference to 
impregnation that we cannot let it rest at the level of “mere” allusion, mere metaphor.   
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literal bond – remains.  We can identify the concrete, factical site of our natal union with 
another, but even this site marks an equiprimordial distinction between my body and the 
body of my mother. 
In the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty makes the connection to 
pregnancy through both the metaphorical pregnancy of language – as in Gestalt 
psychology – and references to literal pregnancy. Merleau-Ponty frequently uses the term 
“prégnance” ; this is a technical term taken from Gestalt psychology and not the word for 
saying a woman “is pregnant” in French, which would be “enceinte.”  But he also uses 
enceinte several times, suggesting that he encouraged the double reading of prégnance 
(c.f. Le Visible et L’invisible 181, 316, 346).  Moreover, Merleau-Ponty takes quite 
seriously the allusions called up by the metaphor of pregnancy. When he says that 
perception is born, he notes also that it a labor accompanies it (c.f. VI 147, 156).  The 
pregnancy of human being shows itself corporeally, linguistically, and intersubjectively – 
all through our presentations for the other.  
 That said, to identify our natal connection to others, our exteriority and our 
appearance for others does not deny our interiority.  In fact, if properly understood, this 
affirmation of visibility is equally an affirmation of invisibility.  Both singularity and 
numerousness co-emerge; in more Arendtian terms, the public sphere of plurality and 
action depends on the private life of the mind.  In this public space, we do risk ourselves; 
we risk the propagation of our “own most secret life” by another, but such fertility is the 
condition of action.  Far from impregnable Cartesian minds, natals enter the world in 
vulnerable yet fertile bodies, whose interior lives are always already oriented to appear to 
others.  
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Conclusions  - Practical Implications of a Natal Ontology 
 
“ Of time … 
… is it not 
In fear the roots grip 
 
Downward 
And beget 
 
The baffling hierarchies 
Of father and child 
 
As of leaves on their high  
Thin twigs to shield us 
 
From time, from open 
Time” 
 - George Oppen, “Of Being Numerous” 
 
Practical Shifts in a Natal Ontology  
 Western thought still suffers from strabismus.  This strabismus is a pathologically 
disturbed vision – theoria— that does not coordinate theories of perception with theories 
of ethics in action.  It is not the Cartesian strabismus between body and soul, nor the 
Sartrean strabismus between being and nothingness.  It is rather a strabismus between 
body and brain, between cognitive science and politics, between nature and nurture, the 
first person and the third person perspectives.  If philosophy becomes philosophy of mind 
– as Arendt worries in the conclusion of the Human Condition – there is no discipline to 
attend to the coordination of these two lenses, two visions.   In the early twentieth century 
when Merleau-Ponty began the Structure of Behavior, he was concerned with 
overcoming dualism: an inherited Cartesian dualism and the dualism of neo-Kantians like  
Brunschvicg. Today phenomenology faces a situation with these other dualistic divisions; 
a natal ontology offers an alternative to these détentes.  
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  Let us review some of the characteristics revealed by phenomenological attention 
to natality and their ontological implications.  In the Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty uncovers the phenomenological fact that the action of natals occurs in a 
plurality.  He asks us to consider what this atmosphere of humanity is like.  What is it to 
live not alone, not even with one other, but among many others?  He asks, “[H]ow can 
the word ‘I’ be put into the plural … be grasped in the mode Thou, and through this, in 
the world of the ‘One’? (PP 348) In the Phenomenology and in the Structure of Behavior, 
he focuses on the genetic origin of this phenomenological fact.  That is, he asks how – in 
animal development, or in human childhood and infancy, for example– do we come to 
acquire our orientation to the plurality? And what is a life lived according to such 
acquisition?  For Merleau-Ponty, we do not construct the plural from the singular; we do 
not integrate from the “I” to the “one” or the “we.”  Instead, we co-emerge with our 
world and with others, born into a prereflective connaissance of others.  
 In the Nature Courses and the Visible and the Invisible, he makes the ontological 
claim that this atmosphere of humanity is rooted in the umbilical bond we share with 
being.  He asks us to consider what gives rise to the atmosphere of humanity identified in 
the Phenomenology and to address the meaning of belonging to such being.  What is the 
meaning of being a natal in a plurality?  What is the meaning of being natural?  How 
historically – through the legacy of Descartes, Schelling, and others – did we acquire our 
working definition of “natural” and “nature”?  He prompts us to reflect on the emergence 
of our understanding of “nature” and natality through the practices of life science, across 
generations, in time.   
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 Recall that throughout all these investigations we have been looking for the 
meaning of being numerous, for the meaning of belonging to a plurality and a life in 
Nature.  We have been seeking not an account of life as such, but the meaning of 
belonging to the sort of life we have.  For example, the ontological questions Merleau-
Ponty asks in the final Nature Course are not the question of the biologist – “Are there 
species?” – but the questions of the phenomenologist – “What would it mean to belong to 
a species?”  and “How shall I – or better, how shall we – comport ourselves as a result?”  
Jonas, Thompson, Varella, and others have embarked on the project of a phenomenology 
of life and gone much farther than Merleau-Ponty could have, given the biology of his 
day.  But in offering a natal ontology, Merleau-Ponty may have gone farther because his 
work locates a phenomenology of life in relation to the long tradition of philosophy of 
Nature and provides a reflection on the existential significance of natality.  Merleau-
Ponty summarizes this distinction through this example: 
There are two ways to consider the animals, as there are two ways to 
consider an inscription on an old stone: we can wonder how this 
inscription was traced, but we can also seek to know what it means.  
Likewise, we can either analyze the processes of the animal under a 
microscope, or see a totality in the animal. (NC 187) 
 
We can merely remark on the trace of plurality in our lives, or we can ask about the 
meaning of that trace.  Life sciences – phenomenology and biology – share a concern 
with life, but the nature of the concern differs profoundly.  Whereas the biologist attends 
to the definition of natural life – to the quality of its appearance— the phenomenologist 
attends to the meaning of being natal.  The phenomenologist considers how natality 
practically re-orients the meaning of our life. 
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 The phenomenological discovery of natality that Merleau-Ponty guides us toward 
is like the discovering of the anemone as a useful camouflage by the crab.  Upon 
discovering this new meaning in the anemone, the world is changed for the crab.  The 
crab’s environment has a new sens.  With the crab’s new perception of this meaning – 
despite no change in the anemone itself – new actions are possible for the crab.  The 
discovery has immediate significance.  It entails a practical shift in relation to the world.  
The phenomenologist, upon discovering the meaning of natality in her world, similarly 
has new possibilities open to her.  Of course, “natality” is not an external object like the 
anemone.  The phenomenologist’s natality intimately interweaves with her life.  
Nonetheless, as the discovery of the anemone’s possible meaning creates new conditions 
for the life of the crab, so the discovery of natality alters the condition of the life of the 
phenomenologist. Specifically, highlighting natality reveals life as a tendency toward not 
some particular final end – or death – but a range of new, unforeseen possibilities, both 
restricted and made possible by contingencies.   
 I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology entails a practical shift that results 
from the ontological shift away from dualism: for example, from the dualism of nature 
and nurture.  In a natal ontology, “nature” is not opposed to “nurture.”  Rather, to be 
natural is by definition to be nurtured.  One is nurtured by an environment and a world of 
others both synchronously and diachronously. This “nurturing” conditions and solicits 
our nature at the perceptual, reflective, and historical levels.  The practical shifts can be 
seen in three domains of philosophical and phenomenological study: philosophy of 
science, phenomenology, and ethics.  In each of these shifts, Merleau-Ponty draws on 
phenomenological descriptions of natal existence but also makes ontological claims – or 
304 
 
points out ontological claims implicitly made – about this existence. In the first two 
domains, Merleau-Ponty offers explicit critiques which I have clarified in his texts and 
readdress here; his critiques, following in the Kantian tradition, are not merely negative 
but positive, if incomplete, and prescriptive.  In the third domain, ethics, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests but does not explicitly state his position or offer a prescription.  In drawing out 
the ethical implications of the practical shifts he suggests, I amplify the meaning of his 
texts in the service of developing full-fledged natal ontology with an ethical orientation – 
an ethical sens, appearing with our very corporeality.  In the first domain, Merleau-
Ponty’s natal ontology critiques life science for dualism and reductionism and advocates 
instead an attention to totality that, for example, would admit the “ontological value” of 
belonging to a species. In the second domain, Merleau-Ponty critiques life science – both 
phenomenological and biological – for forgetting to situate itself in history, in a plurality 
stretched across generations.   Finally, a natal ontology – grounded in nature by Merleau-
Ponty’s work and situated politically by Arendt’s – entails a practical ethical shift toward 
affirming connaissance in the domain of human action in general.  In addressing this 
final domain, I again offer a clarification of this natal ontology by way of a contrast with 
the Heideggerian ontology.   
 As mentioned in my introduction, while Merleau-Ponty offers a phenomenology, 
a critique of science, a political philosophy, and even an ontology, he does not explicitly 
present a text on ethics.  Nonetheless, as we have see throughout the preceding pages, 
Merleau-Ponty never waivers in his concern for others; the turn toward natality is 
inseparable from a turn toward plurality.  In these conclusions, I will try to draw out some 
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of the practical and ethical implications of this turn, indicating a proto-ethics that I see as 
latent in his thought.  
Practical Shift: Affirming Connaissance  
First, let us reflect on the practical shift that Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology 
suggests regarding our connaissance – our natal knowing – rooted in others.  I have 
already gestured in the direction of this shift in the preceding chapters; I will now 
reiterate those claims, amplified by the new information in this chapter.  
 As we saw (primarily in Chapters 1, 3 and 6) from the Structure of Behavior to 
the Nature Courses, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the co-emergence of organism and 
environment, person and world: comportment and connaissance condition all natural/ 
natus being. To be born is to be born with a world and with others.  Again and again, 
Merleau-Ponty has shown that human existence, far from occurring in isolation like the 
Cartesian mind, appears in a world, motivated by others and caught in the momentum of 
a plurality that precedes and exceeds it.  As he puts it concisely in a working note from 
1959: 
Everything comes down to this: form a theory of perception and of 
comprehension that shows that to comprehend is not to constitute in 
intellectual immanence, that to comprehend is to apprehend by 
coexistence, laterally, by the style [… saisir par coexistence, latéralement, 
en style]” (VI 188 / 242). 
 
Comprehension – thinking itself – occurs through coexistence.  Comprehension itself 
implicates us with others; knowing implicates us with an ethical world.  In light of such a 
claim, the theory of perception and reflection and ethical practice could never truly part 
ways.  
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 Since his first gesture toward ethics, or “moral theory” as he then put it in the 
Structure of Behavior,209 Merleau-Ponty has suggested that there are ethical implications 
to his phenomenological studies, and later to his natal ontology.  His texts are rife with 
examples drawn from the political world; his work in Les Temps Moderne and the essays 
in Signs, Humanism and Terror and Adventures of the Dialectic remind us of his political 
commitment.  But between this politics and the phenomenological and ontological work 
described above, there is a gap.  Never does Merleau-Ponty explicitly express an ethics.  
But we cannot forget his claims in his 1945 talk: that if we adopt his ontology, “there is a 
type of doubt concerning man, and a type of spite, which become impossible” (PP 27).  I 
would like to return to few points in his work that I have identified as implicitly 
expressive of an ethical outlook and try to draw these together to articulate this ethical 
stance.  
 The Phenomenology of Perception offers a phenomenology of action that 
describes action and perception as co-emergent, natally conditioned by a plurality.   The 
text suggests that we put aside problems of skepticism and take up the problems of 
plurality.  If, Merleau-Ponty asks, I truly let go of the illusion of my self as most 
authentically interior and private, what new identity do I – or better, we – take on?  It 
would seem that we would have to take responsibility for our very appearance.  We 
would be as responsible for what we suggest with our visible bodies and with our words.  
Let me offer of a few perhaps trivial examples of what this shift might be like and then 
hint at the concomitant complications.  Imagine that a child – too young for language – 
faces me and expresses a need for a cup of juice; I have a connaissance of her 
comportment.  In the very moment of perceiving the child, I understand the action that 
                                                 
209 See Chapter 1 and SB 223. 
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she desires.  I may not respond to this desire – perhaps the child has had too much sugar – 
but I would be remiss not to admit that I recognize the desire.  By virtue of the umbilical 
bond that ties us both to being, I feel the pull of her existence on the world around me.  
Or, in a dispute with my husband, I cannot say “Well, you didn’t say not to do such and 
such” when his body language suggests that he would be hurt by my action.  Perhaps (I 
will reconsider this below), according to a natal ontology I am responsible for 
prereflective understanding of his attitude. Being a natal, I first of all understand his 
comportment; in reflection, I deny my connaissance for my convenience or private, 
conflicting wants.   
 This sort of practical shift is suggested by Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, and in many 
cases, this seems to be an excellent antidote to Cartesian ontology.  When I perceive my 
natal connection to others, new actions are possible, and I can better take up an attitude 
toward others when conscientious of the condition of my perception by plurality.   
Knowing arises from connaissance, from our motivated entrance in the world, caught in 
the momentum of plural existence.  At the heart of subjectivity we find Nature, and it is a 
Nature – quite unlike Cartesian Nature – that bears with it the mark of others.  In the very 
structure of being-for-us, we find the other.  As Barbaras puts it, “the passage to 
intersubjectivity truly constitutes at the heart of the sensible, a first step toward the 
invisible” (240).  The twining of the visible with the invisible describes my intertwining 
with the mode of the anonymous one, the atmosphere of humanity.  My appearance – my 
existence – is always equiprimordially existence with-others.  Barbaras describe it thus: 
“The other is constituted at the very level of mute experience, as an extension of the 
carnal relationship, that is, just as much as a dimension of sensible Being itself” (240).  
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As a result, “The relation to the other cannot, strictly speaking be situated on one side or 
the other,” (240) with the visible or the invisible, the material or the mental, with mind or 
life: Being-with and being-for-the-other describes being itself. 
 But, though profound, this new attitude toward natal connection is far from a 
cure-all for phenomenology or ontology.  Connaissance of the other’s appearance does 
not give me pure access to the other; as we saw in the Phenomenology of Perception, we 
can never mistake the body as a short-cut to knowledge.  To do so would be to make 
another Cartesian mistake: the mistaking of overlooking the thickness of the body.  The 
Cartesian envisions the body as a nearly transparent, unimportant medium rather than a 
thick and opaque mode of being-in-the-world.210  Connaissance does not see through the 
comportment of others toward intentions.  The example that I offer above suggests such 
transparent access to intention along with affirmation of connaissance.  What of an 
autistic person in my place who does not enjoy such easy access to this prereflective 
mode of being?  What of standard confusion and misinterpretation of gestural language?  
A natal ontology does not solve these problems, though it does identify them as a site of 
further research.211   All the natal ontology that I have here established can say is that I 
would be denying a more fundamental bond to others when I claim not to notice the other 
as an other, bearing meaning and interiority with her or himself. Perhaps the trouble with 
a natal ontology is the same one that Merleau-Ponty foresaw in naturalism:  “Naturalism 
                                                 
210 This is the mistake Merleau-Ponty claims Husserl made in regard to temporality: “Husserl’s error is to 
have described the [temporal] interlocking starting from a Prasenfeld considered without thickness, as 
immanent consciousness” (VI 173).  Husserl forgot the “thickness” of the temporal being.  
211 I can envision many further studies of the relation between first person and third person experiences of 
such situations of prereflective response to – if not understanding of –  the comportment of others.  
Consider, for example, the phenomenology of dance: dancers prereflectively coordinate movement with 
others, moving in a situation.  The experience of dancing offers phenomenological evidence of what 
participating in collective action is like.   Maxine Sheets-Johnstone has embarked on such research in dance 
from a phenomenological perspective; I can imagine fascinating encounters between her work and 
cognitive scientific studies, akin to the joint work accomplished by Stawarska, Kelly, and others.  
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is a philosophy vague enough to support the most varied moral superstructures” (AD 75).  
In that case, Merleau-Ponty’s naturalism only correlates with an ethics, but has no causal 
or structural relationship. 
 In this regard, it may seem Merleau-Ponty has gained minimal ground to establish 
ethics.  Of course, ethics per se was never his expressed project: all that he promised was 
to show a lack of doubt and spite concerning the other.  Indeed this lack of doubt may be 
all that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology offers in the way of an ethics, but it is no less 
significant.  A natal ontology assures us of the use of the first-person plural.  It does not, 
however, prescribe its empirical contents.  In that sense, it remains a proto-ethics: 
prescribing a stance that acknowledges the other but without indicating any particular 
conduct toward the other.  While we may not know what to do in relation to others, we 
will find that we are not isolated from them, and thus we find that we are not at risk of the 
ethical pitfalls of solipsism or of skepticism.  Our connaissance implicitly indicates our 
natality with others.  Knowledge as connaissance bears the mark of the other in its very 
appearance.  As a natal, I can be assured that we both witness a landscape.  I cannot know 
your experience of it – perhaps, you are blind, perhaps you have never see this 
countryside, perhaps you are afraid of a threat that does not threaten me – but I cannot 
mistake that between us, we act in and perceive the same situation.  I know this naturally; 
genetically before I knew any empirical fact, before I knew my self, I knew in the mode 
of the we.  This points to the other strength of a natal ontology: it offers this proto-ethics 
in coordination with an account of nature.  In another sense, in a natal ontology we must 
recognize that whatever epistemological or ontological claims we deploy inherently take 
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an ethical stance.  This is especially apparent, as I discus below, in the special case of the 
life scientist.  
 The affirmation of the first-person plural in a natal ontology disclose us as beings 
who are oriented in a world in which ethical action is possible.  Perhaps one might say 
Merleau-Ponty offers a minimalist ethics as Levinas has been said to include a minimalist 
religion. Without this orientation, without our connaissance of others, we could not know 
them as others, let alone choose to act responsibly toward them.  To return to the themes 
of the previous section, we find that we have an orientation to the plurality stretched 
across generations in which we find ourselves.  But we also find that, though alienation 
and skepticism are possible, comprehension and collective action are also possible.  
Twentieth century hermeneutics and then deconstructionists pointed toward a historical 
situation of human existence, but these movements have been often been seen as 
fracturing the collective, emphasizing difference over communication, the untranslatable 
over translation.212  Merleau-Ponty suggests another approach to our historical situation 
in a plurality, one that affirms our natal possibility to act with others.  
 I opened this project by contrasting Merleau-Ponty and Arendt’s natal ontology 
with Heidegger’s ontology of mortality.  Let me return to that contrast as I conclude and 
focus on the difference between the natal ontology and the mortal ontology on this issue 
of nature.  As I described earlier, for Heidegger, physis referred to an original ordering, 
growing, coming to be, whereas ethos/mores denoted an agreed upon, conventional 
ordering (Introduction to Metaphysics 13). 213  Ethos is determined by reflective, human 
                                                 
212 Dillon describes this tendency to view language as a sort of glass ceiling “which we cannot break 
through” as “post-hermeneutic pessimism” (89).   
213 Again, I focus on Introduction to Metaphysics as representative of mid-career Heidegger and because 
this text was among the earliest translated into French and likely influenced Merleau-Ponty.   
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putting-into order. Heidegger thus situates the problem of life at the difference between 
human life and all other being.  By contrast, Merleau-Ponty has stressed throughout the 
Nature Courses that we must see the “lateral union of animality and humanity” (NC 271).  
Where Heidegger imagines that emphasizing the Latin natus could only entail the 
opposition of life and non-life, Merleau-Ponty shows it entails rather a positive alliance 
of human life with life in general.  He also differs from this early Heideggerian stance on 
the need to follow the Greek model opposing ethos and physis: it is our nature in the 
sense of natus that initiates us into a world of others, tying us to Being through the same 
umbilical bond.  Whatever ethos human beings form draws upon rather than opposes this 
natural connection.  An ethos appears in our prereflective connaissance of our plurality 
and is brought into being by that plurality.  This connaissance appears 
phenomenologically as the “atmosphere of humanity” that conditions human action, as he 
puts it in the Phenomenology (PP 347).214 For Merleau-Ponty, just as action and 
perception co-emerge, so must a philosophy of Nature and ethical action.    
 To oppose physis and ethos is to divide human being from living being, and 
indeed all being, a move which would disrupt Merleau-Ponty’s entire natal ontology. In 
this, we again see Merleau-Ponty’s similarity to Arendt for whom natality and action are 
connected in the political sphere.  Though as we have seen, she does not emphasize 
natural facticity per se, her natal philosophy, like Merleau-Ponty’s, views the human 
condition as first and foremost conditioned by a natal plurality.  Human being 
distinguishes itself not by questioning being but by initiating action with others.  
 Thus, though a natal ontology may seem to have established a minimal ground for 
ethics – offered “weak” ethical force akin to Benjamin’s “weak” messianism – it is not 
                                                 
214 See Chapter 3 on the atmosphere of humanity and being-with-others in this text.  
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therefore negligible.  Weak messianism proposes that, while history does not prescribe 
our path in “strong” sense as perhaps for Hegel, it nonetheless draws us into a 
momentum.  Where a totalizing view of history might focus on great individuals and 
great wars, weak messianism looks to the little bits of history, the detritus floating with us 
into the future. Like the weak bonds between the hydrogen and oxygen molecules, 
natality weakly yet fundamentally bonds human being.  Its molecular totality exceeds the 
property of any individual part.  To separate out a single reflective human being would be 
as disruptive as molecular fission; nothing representative of the original situation would 
remain.  In Illuminations, introduced by Arendt, Benjamin writes:  
There is a secret agreement [Verabredung: also appointment, conspiracy] 
between the generations of the past and the present one. Our coming was 
expected on earth.  Like every generation that preceded us, we have been 
endowed with a weak messianic power, a power to which the past has a 
claim. (254, my additions to translations) 
 
In Benjamin’s view, the angel of history looks back on this past, witnessing the storm 
“blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel 
can no longer close them.  This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned” (Benjamin 257).  In the Human Condition, Arendt expresses this turning 
of history as a turn toward archē, beginnings which rule and guide future action (Young-
ah Gottlieb 135).  As Arendt pointed out, natality calls attention to these archai, to 
beginnings: such beginnings lie behind us and before us. 215  These natal ruling archai are 
“weak” guides like Benjamin’s “weak” messianism, but this hardly makes their effect 
unimportant.  Natality, like Benjamin’s weak force, entails a fragility and openness, not 
                                                 
215Archē restores a doubleness to beginnings comparable to that in endings.  We still have a double sense of 
endings in teleology in telos but “[i]n most modern European languages … the doubleness of beginning… 
has been effectively eliminated; but … the duplicity of the term for beginning (archein) has profound and 
disturbing consequences” (Young-Ah Gottlieb 148).    
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an absolute agency.  The natal is caught up in this momentum of history just as she is 
motivated to act within history.  
 Reflection on the meaning of belonging to a plural life in history need not involve 
arbitrarily drawing a line between human life and life in general.  In fact, witnessing the 
similarity of our natal lives to all natal lives can point us toward the atmosphere of 
humanity, the momentum of generations and the motivation of the affective life that 
conditions us as natals.  Perhaps due to the current American and European cultural 
dominance of the third person scientific perspective, phenomenology has hastened to 
preserve the first person perspective, thus implicitly and unnecessarily pitting the first 
person phenomenological perspective against the third person scientific perspective.  Yet 
between the two – or perhaps with both – we find the first person plural.  The first person 
plural reminds us of the natural atmosphere of humanity in which we are born.216 
 Phenomenology would miss out on an important opportunity if it failed to admit 
this phenomenological fact: that we are part of a plurality of others.  I do not suggest that 
phenomenology has not addressed plurality at all: we have many examples in Husserl and 
Heidegger and the tradition which follows of being-with others.  But outside of Merleau-
Ponty’s work, rarely are these others discussed as bodies that comport themselves, evolve 
even their so-called “physical” structures to display for each other (as we have seen, 
display and comportment are never purely physical) and certainly not in terms of 
evolving bodies participating in a species.  It seems that with the exception of Merleau-
Ponty, phenomenologists have been content to say at most “Yes, evolutionary theory 
                                                 
216 Stawarska and others, perhaps following in the tradition of Levinas though he is not mentioned, have 
argued the second person might provide an alternative to this first person/third person debate 
(“Introduction” to Special Edition of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science).  I add the first person plural 
as another alternative. 
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exists,” but not to admit any sense of such natural continuity with others into the 
phenomenological conversation.   
 The risk seems too great: this would be to reduce human history to natural history.  
But in the preceding pages we have seen the benefits of admitting developmental and 
evolutionary studies into the phenomenology of human existence. For example, admitting 
the details of epigenetic conditioning into a discussion of nature and nurture changes the 
terms of the conversation: we are saved useless repetitions of the nature vs. nurture or 
nature vs. culture debates.  Cultural and personal history cannot be disentangled from 
nature even at the molecular level.  This intertwining of Nature with culture appears at 
the microscopic and macroscopic levels and can be witnessed from the third person and 
the first person plural.   
 Given the entanglement of nature and culture, I argue that a natal ontology rather 
than a Cartesian ontology should be adopted.  Should this revelation not profoundly alter 
all future phenomenological reflections on Nature, especially human Nature?  
Phenomenology can then bring to the table relevant reflections on this intertwining, from 
Schelling to Merleau-Ponty, and phenomenology can show which ontology is implied by 
these revelations.  Once we admit that natal life must be understood in the context of a 
plurality of generations, we can admit into phenomenological reflection the “weak force” 
in the momentum of our plurality, that atmosphere of humanity in which we are born.  
The meaning and valuation of this life must be understood in relation to other, like-lives, 
not just in relation to a single, own-most finitude and project.   
 Phenomenology can then pursue a study of human life across generations not 
merely within a single consciousness or synchronous group of others; this is the turn 
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toward poetic phenomenology described here in Chapters 5-6.  The turn toward the 
historical is unsurprisingly marked by the turn of generative and then poetic 
phenomenology.  Generational structures are the basis of some of the first histories,217 
such as the chains of “The son of, the son of…” recounted in Genesis and Numbers.  It is, 
in the words of Oppen, to “[t]he baffling hierarchies / Of father and child” that 
phenomenology may turn its attention.  As poetic phenomenology, phenomenology can 
reflect on life as begun elsewhere, not as a project initiated or comprised by an individual 
life or static consciousness.  We feel the tug of a living, natural Mit-sein from the past 
and the future.  Phenomenology could ask: what is it like to belong to such historical 
movement?  What is experience like when it feels the tug of the past and the present on 
the future?  These are the same questions that Husserl and Heidegger asked; Merleau-
Ponty only adds that they need not exclude considerations of human naturalness.  To 
belong to a plurality stretched across generations does not mean to merely belong to a 
lineage, or chain of “filiation,” as Merleau-Ponty puts it (NC 213).  Rather, it means to 
live an existence conditioned by the momentum of life and a group of like – yet always 
distinct – lives.  
Example of the Practical Shift in Life Sciences, Both Biology and Phenomenology 
 
I have argued in this conclusion as well as in the body of this text that natals 
should take responsibility for action and productivity.  One such natal is the life scientist, 
both phenomenological and biological.  I would like to here consider the results of 
applying the practical shift of natality to each of these life sciences: I will first recall and 
then assess Merleau-Ponty’s critique of these life sciences.   
                                                 
217 On such first histories based on accounts of generation, see Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 
109-111. 
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 Connaissance and comportement – knowing with and being-born-with – indicate 
a totality too often overlooked by life science.  Both phenomenology and biology must be 
cautious not to forget the excess of totality or risk becoming an ontology of identity, 
positivity, and Bergsonian plenum.  The elusiveness and excess of totality appears, for 
example, in the hidden motivation for the movement of comportment.  As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, “To grasp life in the things is to grasp a lack in the things as such” (NC 158).  
Identifying life means identifying a general tendency toward some as yet indeterminate, 
unfixed end.  In his discussion of evolution, he reminds the life scientist that the key to 
avoiding reductive errors is to notice that “there is not a spirit of the species, but a 
dialogue” (NC 198).  Evolution may be the phenomenon that currently calls life science 
to attend most to totality.  When totality is taken into account, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, 
speciation is a dialogical concept, put into play by interrogative beings; in other words, 
“[i]t is not a positive being but an interrogative being which defines life” (NC 156).  If we 
can consider “species” as a notion that emerges dialogically and dialectically rather than 
as an object completely available to the scientific gaze, then we can restore an ontological 
value to “species.”   
The phenomenologist enjoys no more privileged view than the biologist on this 
total situation of life; she only enjoys a different view.  The difference, the convergence 
of these views, is the site of interest.  In biology, Darwinism “gives a fecundity of life 
starting from what there is” (NC 251).  But idealism “is right to say that the actual is not 
like a unique plane and without thickness” (NC 251).  In phenomenology, idealism points 
out the thickness of the world: human existence encompasses not only actuality but 
possibility, the visible and the invisible.  But the idealist strange of phenomenology must 
317 
 
be cautious not to turn fully into idealism (as perhaps the early Husserl did), privileging 
the ecstatic and transcendental over the actual and material.  Idealism and Darwinian 
materialism intersect at the vinculum, at the “suturing of organism-milieu, organism-
organism” and “in this suture, something happens which is not an actual fact – a jointure 
which is the articulation of the vertical order on the horizontal order” (NC 251).  A natal 
ontology attends to this suture.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it succinctly in the Visible and the 
Invisible, “The macrophenomena of evolution are not less real, the microphenenomena 
are not more real.  There is no hierarchy between them” (VI 226).  The working biologist 
cannot always make an ecstatic leap to reflect on her practice, but as Merleau-Ponty has 
shown, life science does make progress – a là Gesell, Coghill, Simpson, Gould, and 
others – when conscientious of totality.   
 Merleau-Ponty suggests that life science can learn this interrogative method from 
art and poetry.  Like the painter at work in “Eye and Mind,” the life scientist must 
interrogate Nature as if Nature itself were a person with an interior life.  If life science 
can maintain a similar attitude in relation to Nature as it appears humanly, then life 
science will keep open rather than foreclose its study of Nature.  As we saw from the 
Structure of Behavior through the Phenomenology of Perception, the Nature Courses, and 
“Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty draws many analogies between formal appearance in 
life science and in art – for example, the similarity between the forms of a melody and 
animal comportment.  He also suggests explicitly in the Nature Courses and “Eye and 
Mind” that the life scientist can learn to interrogate these forms like the artist or poet.  In 
the Visible and the Invisible, he summarizes the integration of creativity, productivity, 
and ontology thus: “Being is what requires creation of us for us to experience it” (VI 
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197).  What being is for us, we have participated in creating, even if – indeed, especially 
if – that being is Nature itself.  We must note and take responsibility for our ontologically 
productive creativity.  
 This may be Merleau-Ponty’s greatest positive contribution to the philosophy of 
life science: the reuniting of perception with action, theoretical (theoria) vision with a 
practical, ethical stance.  Life science expresses – implicitly or explicitly, actively and 
passively – a philosophy of Nature and should take up responsibility for that expression.  
Recall that for Merleau-Ponty, a Nature-philosophy, far from a mere theory, is “as always 
sustaining a taking of responsibility, an action” (NC 134).  The practice of visual artists 
exemplifies the codependence of action and perception in general in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work.  It is this inseparability of responsibility, action, and vision that natural science can 
learn from painting and poetry.  The artist, while she may require a certain privacy for 
artistic creation, rarely fails to take responsibility for her creativity, her productivity, and 
her creations.  If only for the sake of pride, the artist says, “I made this.”  While the 
productivity and creativity involved in life science differs from that at work in art, they 
are no less the responsibility of the scientist. In the case of evolutionary theory, the 
biologist must take responsibility for the attribution of ontological value to the category 
“species” with regard to the human being.  When this term is deployed into an ethically 
and politically charged world – and all human worlds are so charged – the life scientist 
must consider the effect of that deployment.  She cannot leave the responsibility for 
ethical assessment to the critical philosopher.  Insofar as new innovations – such as those 
in epigenesis – demonstrate the permeability and flexibility of this category, biology 
revises it.  This malleability reminds life science that it cannot appeal to its own ideal 
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objects as having a world-independent reality and thus a freedom from the 
responsibilities of this world.  To claim that the genome constitutes some purely natural, 
a-cultural, a-political construct is to fail in this responsibility.   
By contrast, to succeed in taking up this responsibility – to succeed in addressing 
Nature dialogically – can allow science to advance by affirming its already so-useful 
malleability. As epigenetic studies have shown, the so-called “natural” component of 
human existence co-emerges with a world that is, like any human world, culturally and 
historically conditioned.  The life scientist, no less than any other natal, must admit her 
natal connection to this ethical and political world.  To think of the life scientist as a 
natal, puts the life scientist back into history.  Rather than attempting an a-historical 
perspective on life, the life scientist views life from inside life. To do natural science is 
still to work in a political and ethical world, however thick the walls of the laboratory.  
To reiterate a claim made in the first chapter, we cannot leave ethics for the philosopher 
and the study of life or perception to the biologists.   
This positive yet cautious interrogation of life science distinguishes Merleau-
Ponty’s natal ontology from that of other phenomenologists and even from Arendt’s own 
natal political philosophy.  Again, a contrast with Heidegger brings to light Merleau-
Ponty’s unique position.  While Heidegger indubitably and incalculably influenced 
Merleau-Ponty, his ontology nonetheless differs profoundly from that of the latter, not 
only on the emphasis of mortality, but regarding the very definition of nature, ethics, and 
perhaps being.   It seems that whether we choose the “fallenness” of the everyday world 
of Da-sein in Being and Time, the hierarchical positioning of poetry over science in the 
Introduction to Metaphysics, or the denigration of technology from combines to gas 
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chambers in “The Question Concerning Technology,” we find an anti-scientism in 
Heidegger not present in Merleau-Ponty.  Heidegger, even before his more explicit turn 
to the poetic, praises philosophy and poetry over and above science, stating baldly that 
“the spirit of poetry … is essentially superior to the spirit that prevails in all mere 
science” (Introduction to Metaphysics 21).  For Merleau-Ponty such hierarchical 
prioritization of poetry over science is unnecessary and even misguided.  His natal 
ontology focuses on the jointure of the vertical and the horizontal orders.  Ontology 
happens at the intersection of the vertical, ecstatic, poetic or phenomenological attitude 
with the horizontal, natural attitude.  For Heidegger, the horizontal order of the everyday, 
while inevitable, is “fallen,” a fallenness that conditions the unfortunate, objectifying 
habit of working science.  Merleau-Ponty compresses many claims in a short but 
ramifying passage that critiques science as well as phenomenology, particularly the 
Heideggerian model: 
[S]cience still lives in part on a Cartesian myth: a myth, and not a 
philosophy, because if the consequences remain, the principles are 
abandoned … But modern science often criticizes itself and its own 
ontology.  Also, the radical opposition, traced by Heidegger, between 
ontic science and ontological philosophy is valid only in the case of 
Cartesian science, which posits nature as an object spread out in front of 
us, and not in the case of a modern science, which places its own object 
and its relation to this object in question. (NC 85) 
 
Like Levinas, Merleau-Ponty rejects the Heideggerian prioritization of ontological over 
ontic.  Phenomenology cannot claim a privileged place for itself outside of the ontic 
world nor outside of Nature.  Instead, phenomenology must attend to the jointure 
between the ontic and ontological.  As Arendt persistently points out in her history of 
modernity, science, philosophy, theology, and economics all participate in the 
conditioning of human existence; the innovations of each discipline co-emerge.  
321 
 
Ontology, like any philosophical notion emerges, from the historical confluence of 
theories, actions and bodies.  Ontology is not “decided” by convention, but is secreted 
through this ongoing complex of activities.  
 But who could ever then make ontological assessments?  Who will ever be in a 
position to arbitrate between natural science and a phenomenology of Nature?  It seems 
the only person qualified for this project would be someone dually trained in science yet 
freed from the constraints of actually practicing that discipline and able to purely reflect 
on its systems.  But here Merleau-Ponty’s positive ontological contribution to the 
philosophy of science reminds us of the trouble with such an ideal – rather than practical 
– vision of life science.  He suggests that life science should heed Schelling’s warning: 
pure reflection would not necessarily be a healthy practice or a possible one.  It might 
rather unhealthily perpetuate the strabismus, dividing theories and thus making them un-
useful in actual practice.  Neither biology nor phenomenology should withdraw into 
“pure” research as if disassociated from the ethical political world.  Attributing a special 
reflective role to phenomenology has its own risks.  Philosophy irresponsibly continues 
to instantiate a dualism when it definitively delineates science in-itself from philosophy 
for-itself, or in Heideggerian terms, ontology from the ontic life.  This dualism of 
reflection and action perpetuates the Cartesian dualism of mind and body because it 
implicitly assumes that in some real, substantial way, reflection can be performed while 
withdrawn from the world of action.    
 Merleau-Ponty finds that Heidegger turns so forcefully from this world and its 
technology toward the un-worldliness of ontology that he forgets the ontological mystery: 
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the prereflective life that Nature joins between ontic science and ontological study. 218 
Poetic phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty practices it, does not mean a retreat into 
language or art, but a recognition of the very ontic origin of even the activities of 
language, art, or life science.     
 This anti-technological and anti-scientific tendency of Heidegger’s has shown 
itself more than once in the history of twentieth century philosophy and remains a risk for 
the phenomenologist trying carve out a role for her study in relation to the elephantine 
presence of science in contemporary life.  As we have seen, Arendt, like Heidegger, 
noted with dismay a conflation of making with knowing in the rise of the homo faber 
after the seventeenth century.  She implies that we might find a way back around this 
historical shift toward something like the Greek attitude of speechless wonder at Nature.  
Where Arendt would eliminate making from knowing in favor of speechless wonder and 
Heidegger would follow the Greeks to a more authentic view of language, Merleau-Ponty 
turns to contemporary life science, suggesting that phenomenology attend to the birth of 
this human activity.  In the birth of life science, we can see the birth of Nature.  Nature 
was born with artifice, with techne, not before it.  For Merleau-Ponty, “we cannot think 
Nature without taking account to ourselves that our idea of Nature is impregnated with 
artifice” (NC 86).  Artifice couples with Nature: Nature is impregnated with artifice.  
This generative event ends forever the possibility of disentangling them.   
                                                 
218 While Merleau-Ponty frequently exhibits and expresses debt to Heidegger, he also definitively critiques 
him for the special status he gives to the philosopher and to language.  He levels this critique not only at the 
early Heidegger but the later Heidegger.  Heidegger reifies language so that his brand of humanism 
threatens to merge with theism: “there is not only the human outside of beings, but also the relation to 
Being which cannot be part of the human equipment” (NC 137).  Language possesses the human.  When 
Heidegger suggests this, he of course does not explicitly give language the power of the other-worldly 
dualistic Cartesian God; nonetheless, he does turn from the ontic details of language as actually expressed 
by human bodies in Merleau-Ponty’s view.  
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 For Merleau-Ponty, science is not fallen because it is not poetry or philosophy; no 
more do poetry and philosophy fail by not doing science.  Each domain must be cautious, 
cautious not to objectify a totality that exceeds all of these domains.  To withdraw from 
the ontic, horizontal order would be to claim the right to withdraw from the ethical and 
political world in which human action appears.  Such withdrawal is neither possible nor 
desirable.  In this, phenomenology should follow modern science which in fact “often 
criticizes itself” (NC 85).  Although phenomenology can teach life science of the 
situation in history to which it belongs, life science may likewise teach phenomenology 
to question its taking up of that history.   
 In his engagement with science, Merleau-Ponty rarely slips into romanticization 
or idealization of the scientific practice; he cautions the life scientist to be always 
conscientious of the ethical political world in which she works.  When, for example, the 
scientist works in her lab or writes up a report of her studies, her effect on the ethical and 
political community is muted, muffled by the thickness of the institution in which she 
practices.  She does not need to reflect on the ontological or ethical implications of her 
work as she moves the microscope.  When she speaks on the radio, online or in a public 
journal, however, she does need to exercise the caution that Merleau-Ponty demands.  To 
describe an aspect of the human genome is to do biology; to claim that this physical 
structure equates to human being in itself is to make an ontological claim about a totality 
that exceeds science itself.  It is in the making of such claims that Merleau-Ponty cautions 
life science, both phenomenologically and biologically. 
Some Limitations of Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Life Science 
 
324 
 
This is the critique of life science that Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology offers.  We 
must now consider whether it suffices as a prescription for improving the practice of life 
science.  The trouble with this dialogical, poetic model of life science is its imprecision.  
The natal understands that she co-emerges with her world and that life must be 
understood in the context of a totality not in a vacuum.  But what are the precise criteria 
that the biologist should use to account for totality?  What is the model for coordinated 
actions that involve shifts from public to private, discipline to discipline?  Western 
thought seems to require the philosophical equivalent of physical therapy to repair this 
disorder of vision that has caused a crisis in the sciences.  
In evolutionary theory, for example, we saw in Gould’s self-critique and critique 
of Simpson (see Chapter 6) the problem of identifying criteria for evolutionary selection 
at all these various levels, macroscopic to microscopic (Gould 139).  More generally, life 
science – both phenomenological and biological – must ask itself how to translate the 
rigorous criteria of molecular biology to macroscopic study, whether paleontological or 
phenomenological.  As Ricoeur might point out, such translation will not occur without a 
remainder, but this does not mean one should not attempt it.  The phenomenologist or the 
biologist may need to perform the work of mourning the loss in this translation, but she 
should not give up the work.219  
Merleau-Ponty offers no Rosetta stone for this translation, this practical shift that 
he asks life science to take.  In this sense, his natal ontology remains just that: an 
ontological project, not a practical manual for the practice of life science, either 
biological or phenomenological.  Here, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and ontology 
deserve criticism; perhaps were his project completed, he might have offered a more 
                                                 
219 On Translation 4-5. 
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precise prescription for life science.  We return to the possible criticism that de Waelhens 
pointed to regarding the Structure of Behavior: is Merleau-Ponty’s work only negative, 
only critique, with no positive techniques offered to the practicing biologist, let alone the 
practicing phenomenologist?  (See Chapter 1 and SB xxv) What can phenomenology say 
today when faced with the complexity of contemporary evolutionary biology or indeed 
any field of science today?  This field, like many others, has exploded in the sixty 
succeeding years since Merleau-Ponty studied it.    
I think Merleau-Ponty offers more than a negative critique but it is nonetheless an 
incomplete (or, biographical details aside, simply insufficient) expression of a positive 
project.  Phenomenology needs to study more closely the criteria of judgment exercised 
in describing perceptual wholes at a personal scale – “middle-sized” everyday objects 
which are our “conceptual firsts” and mark our basic ontological commitments, as Quine 
puts it (5) – to the macroscopic and microscopic fields of scientific study.220  Much work 
remains for the phenomenological translator within the life sciences. Given the 
insufficiency of his project, we can either flesh out his account or abandon it.   I believe I 
have shown in these pages that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology has much to offer, even with 
the aforementioned failing.  He has pointed to some serious limitations imposed by life 
science when it takes an unnecessarily objective and reductive standpoint (a negative 
critique).   But his work also points toward a vast and unfulfilled project of rigorously 
moving between these two life sciences.  
                                                 
220 I can envision fascinating further study comparing and contrasting W.V. Quine’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
critiques of science.  Though these two figures might at first glance appear to belong to radically divergent 
traditions, in fact there are many felicitous overlaps between their critiques, each of which was developed 
in the same historical time period.  
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 The possibility of ethical action in the life sciences, or indeed in life in general, 
points us back toward an as yet unresolved issue in our natal ontology drawn from 
Merleau-Ponty that may require supplementation by Arendt: responsibility for action.  
 
Unresolved Problems: Ambiguity, Nature, Culture, Responsibility 
 
 In this practical shift to affirming connaissance, a natal ontology assumes that 
nature and culture intertwine.  Nature and culture are the warp and woof of the fabric of 
the world; at the macroscopic to the microscopic level, they tightly and inseparably 
constitute human existence.  In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
showed that in the moments of the affective life in which we make choices, we cannot 
discern a level of culture and a level of nature; we cannot separate our active 
consciousness from the passive-active body through which we receive the world.  In the 
Nature Courses, through studies of development and epigenesis, Merleau-Ponty showed 
that nature and culture intertwine in the very formulation of our genome.  So closely tied 
are freedom and Nature, action and passivity, that “we no longer see where behavior 
begins and where mind ends” (NC 178).  This ambiguity might seem like a loss of clarity.  
Instead, we might see it as a rich opening onto a view of mind in life and life in mind, in 
Thompson’s words, or “flesh,” in Merleau-Ponty’s words. 
 Yet this intertwining of nature and culture returns us to a question that has already 
raised itself:  what then can we say of responsibility for a life so lived, where mind and 
life, freedom and nature intertwine?  For what of this complex of nature and culture, 
freedom and nature can I, or any natal, possibly be held responsible?  I have argued that 
life science ought to take responsibility for its productivity, but how can any natal be 
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responsible?  Thompson, Alva Nöe, Kelly, and others have amplified phenomenology’s 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying perception and even of action in a certain 
restricted sense, but what of action in its richest Arendtian sense?  Are natural natal 
humans capable of the very unpredictable initiation that Arendt saw as constitutive of 
natality?  
 Merleau-Ponty’s answer to this question is ambiguous.  Merleau-Ponty has been 
called the philosopher of ambiguity for good reason; from the Structure of Behavior to 
the Visible and the Invisible, his work describes an ambiguous, chiasmatic intertwining as 
fundamentally constitutive of human existence.221  In Sartre’s view of freedom and 
subjectivity, one is unambiguously responsible for one’s actions: Nature offers no excuse 
from responsibility.  Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, shows us that action ambiguously 
depends on a passivity for which we cannot be held consciously responsible.  As natals, 
we are precisely more than “consciousnesses”: we are bodies among generations of 
others’ bodies.  We ambiguously comprise a temporally unfolding dynamic of nature and 
culture, freedom and nature.  But I nonetheless find myself in a political world that 
unambiguously holds me responsible for personal acts.  Even if I were caught in the 
momentum and motivation of natal existence – if, for example, my passive receptivity to 
a sexual atmosphere led me not only to an erotic enchantment with another person, but to 
a rape or violation of that person – I am unambiguously responsible for that behavior.  If I 
fall asleep at the wheel of a car after days of driving, I am responsible for the lives in the 
vehicle I hit.  These are just the moments in which the slope of the affective life grows 
steep: the momentum of nature overwhelms the natal speeding through time.  The only 
                                                 
221 For an early articulation of this characterization, see de Waelhens, “Philosophy of Ambiguity” in 
Structure of Behavior.  
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clear statement about such situations that Merleau-Ponty has offered on the relation 
between a person’s identity and her acts is a quotation from Saint-Éxupery: “Your act is 
you.”  
 My act is me, but am I responsible for this act? For my “self”? What am I, are we 
to do? In what follows, I clarify what Merleau-Ponty has only hinted at in his texts; I 
push the claims of his text beyond what they explicitly offer.   
 First, let us readdress whether in these and other situations we are free, and then 
consider what responsibility could be entailed by such freedom were it to exist.  As 
natals, we are free, but in a natal ontology, freedom is acquired.  We are not “naturally” 
free; the equation of freedom with nature reduces all actions of nature to acts of freedom.  
In practice, we can and we should distinguish some actions as less free than others (See 
Chapter 2, SB 203, PP 437).  This is the case because we are free in relation to a 
contingent situation.  Like El Greco, we are free as bodies in this world.  Freedom, 
moreover, cannot be understood if it is equal in all moments in time, across a life.  When 
we exercise our freedom, we commit ourselves to acts that may lessen or increase our 
freedom.  Not only does freedom require commitment, it requires ongoing commitment. 
Instances of coming to awareness and free acts “are real only if they are sustained by a 
new commitment” (PP 455).   
 Freedom and Nature co-emerge for Merleau-Ponty as for Arendt222 in the natal 
beginning “of somebody,” to use Arendt’s words.  But what is “Nature” as I use it here?  
Let us recall some of the claims about Nature that have been made.  As we saw through 
the Nature Courses, Nature appears as a temporally and spatially unfurling principle; it is 
                                                 
222 Arendt argues that the principle of beginning “is only another way of saying that the principle of 
freedom was created when man was created and not before” (HC 177).   
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not just a principle “for us,” a veil hiding a materialist universe behind it.  Nor can Nature 
be understood outside of this contingent, spatio-temporal world.  Freedom, too, appears 
in this same spatio-temporal pattern.  As a result, for Merleau-Ponty, human freedom is 
not “freedom in the Kantian sense, that is, event-based freedom which is attested to in a 
decision; it is, rather, a structural freedom.  In brief, it is the theme of the melody much 
more than the idea of a nature-subject” (NC 178).  Like the movement of the animals 
itself, the movement of human freedom traces a melodic line for Merleau-Ponty.  This 
melody has no sense – sens – if we look at only one moment of it.  As we saw in the 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty identifies freedom over the course of a 
time, not in relation to any single event or choice.  To see freedom we must look at a 
whole life – animal or human – as it unfolds in time, in an environment.  We attest to 
freedom, as to Nature, “as a theme that haunts consciousness” (NC 178).   
 To answer the question, “am I free”?  I cannot look at just one moment of choice.  
I can only bear witness to the pattern of choosing that appears across my life.  A style 
will appear in that pattern, just as a style will appear in the pattern of an axolotl’s walking 
or a crab’s scuttling.  The pattern will be mine.  It will only have sense in relation to the 
world and the others in which it appears.   
 Responsibility for that freedom is something that I will have to make for myself.  
Responsibility is a meaning that I bring to a situation.  In this regard, we must depend on 
Arendt’s politically oriented philosophy to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s ambiguous 
philosophy.  Given contingency – indeed all that is “mysteriously given,” to use Arendt’s 
words (OT 301) – I can nonetheless make sense of this contingency.  I can witness in my 
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life and others’ lives stories and indeed histories.  For that meaning-making, and the 
responsibility it points toward, I can be responsible.   
 Again, we turn to the metaphor of the melody.  If I were a violinist, preparing an 
improvisation – for which I would literally and metaphorically be responsible— I would 
have to begin by hearing the melody, or the symphony, that preceded my cadenza. The 
action for which I would assume responsibility would depend on initial responsivity.  My 
action would depend on perception, an ongoing attunement to the others playing with me.   
If I wanted to play well – or metaphorically, act well – I could not play just any musical 
phrase: I would have to attend to the meaningful pattern – the musical “story” – that came 
before.  The “story” includes both immediate actions and historical actions.  That 
attunement, that attention, would reveal to me the principle that coemerged with the 
beginning of the melody.   
 On this issue of meaning-making, it is useful to return to Arendt’s account of the 
human condition.223  Natality refers not to the beginning of an event, but rather to the 
beginning “of somebody, who is a beginner himself” (HC 177).  This somebody who 
begins sets things in motion and also into order, rather than merely passively following 
the processes of nature.  Recall that for Arendt when natals begin in this rich Greek sense, 
they “set something in motion” (Arendt, HC 177), but this motion is unpredictable.  For 
Arendt we should see human action as miraculous precisely because it is unpredictable; 
unlike mere “natural processes,” humans can release themselves from cycles.224  It is thus 
                                                 
223 One might also turn to Paul Ricoeur for an in-depth discussion of the relation of story-telling, 
emplotment, and action in either Oneself as Another or Time and Narrative, especially Volumes 1 and 3.  
Ricoeur may offer a more rigorous phenomenology of this relationship than either Merleau-Ponty or 
Arendt, who both point toward poetry and history as meaning-making events but do not offer the detailed 
research that Ricoeur does.  
224 Rather than attempting to maintain rule over the unpredictable sphere of political action, political 
thought must readmit the unpredictability inherent to beginning (See Young-ah Gottlieb 150).  Arendt 
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that, in Peg Birmingham’s words, “humanity’s guarantee lies not in the end of humanity 
but in its beginning” (8).  Human beginnings, though unpredictable, are not therefore 
arbitrary.  As Arendt puts it, “What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness 
is that it carries its own principle within itself” (OT 212).   Humans can take up 
contingencies and “produce stories and become historical, which together form the very 
source from which meaningfulness springs into and illuminates human existence” (HC 
324).   For Arendt, the condition of natality can be understood in the Gospel message “a 
child has been born unto us,” which synedochally shows “the miracle that saves the 
world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, ‘natural’ ruins is ultimately the fact of 
natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted” (HC 247).225  That is, 
natal beings can make meaningful stories from their lives.  Natals can take an event – the 
event of life – and make it meaningful.  
 Merleau-Ponty, we might say, takes the message – a child has been born unto us –
quite literally as representative of natality.  Merleau-Ponty would agree with Arendt that 
natality refers to the beginning “of somebody” and that “[b]eginning and principle …. are 
not only related to each other, but are coeval” (Arendt OT 212).  But for Merleau-Ponty, 
this principle is coeval with natural life, not only with a story viewed in reflection on a 
life.  For Merleau-Ponty as for Arendt, history – with its meaningful stories – is rooted in 
                                                                                                                                                 
critiques Plato as one of the first political thinkers to make the mistake of forgetting the unpredictability of 
natality.  Plato, Arendt believed, thought that beginning in politics could guide and rule all that followed.  
This mistake of Plato’s conditioned much of Western political thinking: “In the tradition of Platonic 
thought, this original linguistically predetermined identity of ruling and beginning had the consequence that 
all beginning was understood as the legitimation for rulership, until finally, the element of beginning 
disappeared altogether from the concept of rulership” (HC 224). Arendt turns political thought from this 
utopian tendency in Western history. Rather than slipping into either Platonic absolute control or  into the 
passivity of behaviorism, and ending up with the “most sterile passivity history has ever known,” human 
beings should take up their capacity for unpredictable action (HC 322).   
225 Ironically, of course, Arendt pays little attention to actual birth (and is often troubled by the influence of 
certain elements of the Christian tradition) and sees human action as a way out of the problem of human 
nature.  Yet, as we have seen in considering her work in the Life of the Mind, this anti-naturalist prejudice is 
just that: it is a prejudice, not inherent to a philosophy of natality.    
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natality but it is rooted even more deeply in the very dynamic principle of life.  Meaning 
arises with life: it is not applied to it after the fact.  In the Structure of Behavior, we saw 
for Merleau-Ponty history itself is not of a movement of world spirit but “intelligibility in 
the nascent state” (SB 207).  History arises from the birth of intelligibility in living 
organisms, the coming-to-life of mind – the enlivening action of mind – over and over.   
As Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on totality remind us, identifying the principle of history 
as rooted in the movement of life does not mean that we can then see the total action of 
history.  Turning toward beginnings, we advance toward historical understanding by 
backing into a future we cannot see.  Or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it in Prose of the World, 
“The awareness of truth advances like a crab, turned toward its point of departure, toward 
that structure whose signification it expresses” (128).  Our natality points backwards 
toward our natal origins – to the fact that we began elsewhere – but also blindly forward 
toward our expressive life and projects.   
 Like weak-messianism, this nascent momentum of mind in life is something that 
we can only witness retrospectively: it is not a predictive tool.  As living things, we are 
drawn backwards toward a future we cannot see.  For Merleau-Ponty, history is not 
behind us – something the philosopher can see in total, as for Hegel – but hidden before 
us (SB 206).  We cannot, like Hegel, watch this principle from the outside.  We are 
caught up in its movement; its excessive momentum carries us on, even through our 
reflection on it. As he puts it in the Phenomenology,“[i]t is true Marx says, that history 
does not walk on its head, but it is also true that it does not think with its feet.  Or one 
should say rather that it is neither its ‘head’ nor its ‘feet’ that we have to worry about, but 
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its body” (PP xix).226  Through his natal ontology, Merleau-Ponty has put bodies into 
natural history by showing the fragile bodily initiation of the actions that set history into 
motion and follow from the momentum of history. 
 Like other natural life, humans do not merely passively respond to the 
contingencies of their situations, but organize these contingent situations into meaningful 
stories.  Here Arendt and even Ricoeur’s work usefully supplement Merleau-Ponty’s 
own; where Merleau-Ponty points out a continuity between the movement of life and the 
movement of history, Ricoeur and Arendt fill in a phenomenological gap between 
prereflective experience and phenomenological work on history, describing the activity 
of story-making and narrative structure.227  Human beings are thus historical beings.  And 
here perhaps we reach the point at which – even for Merleau-Ponty – human life 
distinguishes itself from other life: not at the level of meaning-making but historically 
transmitted meaning. Human action, in distinction from the activity of life in general, 
involves not just sustaining of life itself – self-making, auto-poeisis – but generative 
action, poeisis, that can be transmitted through history. Humans do not just reproduce 
themselves as lives, but make meaning of their lives, individually and collectively.  It is 
                                                 
226 This strange comment appears in the context of explaining that we cannot simply invert (or stand on its 
head) Marxism which has in turn inverted Hegelianism.  This analogy of the body as history recurs in both 
the Phenomenology and in the Adventures of the Dialectic.  For example, he explains that the movement of 
Communism is like that of an organism, “endowed with differentiated means of perception and action.”  
This movement of history analogously has a body and brain: “In an organism there is no action without a 
nervous system, but the nervous system endows an organism with a life which it is not adequate to explain” 
(AD 119).  But the life of an organism, the structure of its behavior, does not predetermine its action; 
instead there is a “mobilization of all these resources in the face of a perceived situation to which one must 
respond” (AD 119).  
227 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, and also Richard Kearney’s On Stories. Ricoeur uses the term 
“emplots” and “emplotment” to connote roughly the fundamental act of putting into meaningful narrative 
order, into a dramatic structure; this is the activity of “mimesis” in its richest Greek sense (mimesis1 in 
Ricoeur’s terms).  Rather than a mere copying of the world, mimesis in this sense is an original putting-
into-order, a putting-into-meaning.  This putting-into-meaning occurs at the levels of sentence syntax, 
story, and text.  See Time and Narrative, Volume 1, Part 1, Section 3 and Volume 3, Part 1, Section 1. 
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in the domain of history and poeisis that we find the meaning of being numerous and 
natural, not merely the fact of being numerous and natural.   
 
By Way of Conclusion  
 Again and again Merleau-Ponty has drawn connections between the poetic and 
aesthetic sphere and the sphere of action, between the appearance of life and the 
appearance of art.   Let us elaborate on this connection: The theory of art offers no art to 
be judged.  Likewise, a theory of action, offers no actions to judge.  To determine the 
ethical effect of the practical shifts suggested by Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, we would 
have to witness it at work precisely in practice.  Perhaps all we can say is what Merleau-
Ponty says at the end of the Phenomenology of Perception:  
There is no theoretical reply to these questions.  But there are these things 
which stand, irrefutable, there is before you this person whom you love, 
there are these men whose existence around you is that of slaves, and your 
freedom cannot be willed without leaving behind its singular relevance, 
and without willing freedom for all. (PP 456)  
 
We cannot resolve this discussion in theory; we must adopt a natal ontology and witness 
its effect in action.  Concretely, that would mean we would have to see if the life 
scientist, for example, who attends to the plurality in which she deploys her views on 
Nature – formulated in the laboratory but expressed in a politically charged environment 
– has a better ethical and political effect.  Can life science, for example, study race or 
gender through an evolutionary biological method and yet safely deploy these 
conclusions into an ethically and politically fraught sphere?  This question points toward 
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future research specifically applying a natal ontology to current détentes over human 
nature in, for example, feminism and gender studies.228  
 This question cannot be resolved theoretically within the investigations here, but 
perhaps not in any theoretical studies.  Merleau-Ponty’s natal ontology has guided life 
science toward a non-dualistic outlook on human naturalness; from these new outlooks, a 
new range of actions are possible.    
 Rather than avoiding the problem of natural life – as phenomenology may do for 
reason that Arendt expresses – Merleau-Ponty challenges phenomenology to take up that 
problem. Life science can now take action, understanding itself as a discipline of action, 
not only description.   Life science must take such coordinated action – between 
phenomenology and other life science – even when the issue of human natural life raises 
problems like “natural history” and the human “species.”   In the Phenomenology, 
Merleau-Ponty began to ask about the ontological status of the difference between nature 
and culture in experience.  He argues that we cannot leave our natality – our original, 
ambiguous, lived experience – and finally emerge as adult Kantian subjects.  We will 
never emerge into a world in which we can finally judge the a priori and a posteriori.  
That distinction is not more real than the prereflective unity in action.   We cannot know 
this in the moment; as with nature and culture, we find that freedom and nature 
dialectically condition us.  Nature is not over there but in me. This is not an illusion from 
which I can escape.  
 Merleau-Ponty describes his work in the Nature Courses as a “meditation of our 
‘strange kinship’ with the animals (and thus the theory of evolution)” (NC 271).  The 
lesson of this meditation is to reveal the “ontological part of the new science of life” so 
                                                 
228 For just one such recent study see Mann, “What Should Feminists Do About Nature?” 
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that phenomenology can correct itself, drawing on scientists’ “own intuitions”  and 
instead of regarding human being as having ascended from animal, envisioning the 
“lateral union of animality and humanity” (NC 271). Merleau-Ponty concludes that he 
has “given such a large place to theory of evolution” in his course because he needed to 
restore the depth of the “lateral relation, or Ineinander” to “give this depth to the human 
body, this archaeology, this natal past” (NC 273).  The project which we conclude here 
follows Merleau-Ponty in this restoration of our natal past.  Through an archaeological 
method, we turn toward our beginnings and find our natal and horizontal connection to 
animal life in general.  Because of this relation and this natal past, we find that we can 
give ontological value to the term “species”; we find that being is disclosed through our 
natal connection to a plurality. Just as Merleau-Ponty describes language as not behind us 
in a universal grammar but before us, in expression,229 so the life of the species or 
plurality to which we belong is something before us, not behind us.  
 Descartes had hoped for an impermeable Nature, pure exteriority with no 
interiority capable of such impregnation.  But once we realize our participation in the 
generation of Nature, we find not only that Nature is pregnable, but that we, as natural, 
are permeable as well.  Nature cannot be sought without artifice, nor vice versa; Nature 
corresponds not to a state of affairs but the meaning unfolding between life and 
environment.  Nature conditions culture which conditions Nature in a spiraling, 
temporally unfolding event in which, by our birthright, we are actors, not spectators. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
229 Prose of the World 41, cited in Dewitte 105. 
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List of Abbreviations  
 
Note: Where French and English translations appear together in my text, I have marked 
the page numbers with a slash.  For example “umbilical cord [le cordon 
umbilical]”(VI 107 / ).  
 
Works by Merleau-Ponty  
 
CA  Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language. 
 
CZ “Cezanne’s Doubt.” Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader.   
 
EM “Eye and Mind.”  Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader.   
 
NC Nature: Course Notes. 
 
NO  “Course Notes: Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology” in Husserl at the Limits 
of Phenomenology.    
 
PA “La Philosophie Aujourd’hui.” 
 
PP  Phenomenology of Perception.  
 
PrimP Primacy of Perception. 
 
SB  Structure of Behavior 
 
SI Signs.  
 
VI Visible and the Invisible. 
 
 
Works by Hannah Arendt 
 
OT Origins of Totalitarianism.  
 
HC  Human Condition . 
 
LI  Life of the Mind.  Two Volumes, designed 1, 2.  
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